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Foreword
 Indi, come orologio che ne chiami
ne l’ora che la sposa di Dio surge
a mattinar lo sposo perché l’ami,
 che l’una parte e l’altra tira e urge,
tin tin sonando con sì dolce nota,
che ’l ben disposto spirto d’amor turge;
 così vid’ ïo la gloriosa rota
muoversi e render voce a voce in tempra
e in dolcezza ch’esser non pò nota
 se non colà dove gioir s’insempra.
(Par. X.139-48)1
My first encounter with Kenelm Foster was in the depths of the Cambridge 
winter. The snow lay round about, and I had come to Blackfriars as a 
doctoral student just starting out and seeking advice on the usefulness 
or otherwise of comparing Dante and the second-generation Thomist 
1 Then, like a clock which calls us at the hour when the bride of God rises to sing 
her matins to her bridegroom, that he may love her, in which one part draws or drives 
the other, sounding ting! ting! with notes so sweet that the well-disposed spirit swells 
with love, so did I see the glorious wheel move and render voice to voice with harmony 
and sweetness that cannot be known except there where joy is everlasting. Principal 
editions: for the Commedia, ed. G. Petrocchi, La Commedia secondo l’antica vulgata, 4 vols 
(Milan and Verona: Mondadori, 1966-67); for the Vita Nuova, ed. D. De Robertis in Opere 
minori, 2 vols (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 1984), vol. 1, part 1, pp. 1-247; for the Rime, 
ed. G. Contini, 2nd edn (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), and in Opere minori, 2 vols (Milan and 
Naples: Ricciardi, 1984), vol. 1, part 1, pp. 249-552 ; for the De vulgari eloquentia, ed. P. V. 
Mengaldo in Opere minori (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 3-237; for the 
Convivio, ed. C. Vasoli and D. De Robertis in  Opere minori (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 
1988), vol 1, part 2; for the Monarchia, ed. P. G. Ricci (Milan: Mondadori, 1965) and P. 
Shaw (ed. and trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); for the Epistole, 
A. Frugoni and G. Brugnoli in Opere minori (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 1979), vol. 2, 
pp. 505-643. Translations (slightly amended): for the Commedia, The Divine Comedy, C. S. 
Singleton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973-1980); for the Convivio, C. Ryan, 
Dante. The Banquet (Saratoga (Calif.): Anma Libri, 1989); for the Monarchia, P. Shaw cit. 
I am grateful to Princeton University Press for permission to quote from the Singleton 
translation.
Conversations with Kenelmii
John of Paris in the area of political thought. I knocked, the door opened, 
and there he was, spectacularly dishevelled but at once notable for his 
sparkling Thomist eyes, eyes accustomed to seeing into the nature of 
things and determining their specificity. Not quite sure what to say or 
how to get started, he ushered me into his study, found me somewhere 
to sit among the piles of books competing for space on his floor, enquired 
of me whether I was up to speed with the Mittelalterliches Geistesleben of 
Grabmann, and straightaway fell into a gentle state of abstraction. But 
the best was yet to come, for having looked over my plan and commented 
in a preliminary way on its viability, he led me through to the kitchen, 
sat me down at a large oval table with those brothers recently returned 
from the town, from the garden and from the chapel, took his place at 
the table – but at a chair’s remove from me – and once again retreated 
into the stillness of his own inner world. The silence, I remember, seemed 
interminable. I coughed, rearranged myself on my seat, and eyed one by 
one the kindly faces of the brethren, the modest fair on the table, the bereft 
state of the room in which we were sitting, Kenelm himself in his egg-
stained abstraction, and the world-weary chair between us confirming in 
its inbetweenness his, for the moment at least, total unreachability. But 
then all of a sudden, and as if summoned from deep within himself by an 
ancient comforter and companion, he lent over the empty chair, cocked 
his ear in an attitude of attentiveness, and whispered gently, ‘I wonder 
what Brother Thomas would have to say about that’; for there in the chair 
between us was Brother Thomas, less than discernible, certainly, to the 
naked eye, but very definitely there, and perfectly prepared, as Brother 
Thomas always had been for Kenelm, to resolve the passing doubt and to 
assuage the passing anxiety. I was – and still am – impressed, for in my 
part of the Church there is nothing quite like it. For while in my part of 
the Church we revere our heroes – Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, Kierkegaard, 
Barth, Tillich and the cloud of Protestant witnesses generally, rarely do 
we lean over the chair to engage them in quite the same way and with 
quite the same degree of affection. We admire them, listen to them and 
learn from them, but we are not, somehow, quite so deeply in love with 
them. But there, ready and waiting for Kenelm, was Thomas, friend, 
fellow traveller, counsellor, and party to an intimate colloquium of the 
spirit. All would now be well.
The essays gathered together in this volume are not so much in 
commemoration of Kenelm Foster as in conversation with him, in the kind 
of conversation going on between those standing within the theological 
circle but inclined to deconstruct and reconstruct the argument according 
to the properties of formation and temperament. The first of them, entitled 
Foreword iii
‘Between Philology and Friendship: Dante and Aquinas Revisited’ and 
taking up afresh a question addressed in their time by Bruno Nardi, 
Etienne Gilson and Kenelm Foster himself, seeks to develop that question 
in terms, not only, nor even primarily, of the what of Dante’s reading of 
the Thomist text, but of the how of that reading, of his capacity for finding 
there – as often as not over against its declared or otherwise evident 
intention – grounds for encouragement in respect of his own leading 
emphases. The relationship, then, is a complex one, otherness at the level 
of ideas being taken up in a kind of spiritual collegiality, in a species of 
inmeing and inyouing (the ‘intuare’ and ‘inmiare’ of Par. IX.81) tending, not 
only to transcend it, but to authorize it as the means to a more complete 
humanity.
The second essay, entitled ‘The Twin Peaks of Dante’s Theology in 
the Paradiso’, turns on those instances of the text bearing witness to his 
readiness, not merely to restate, but to reshape the theological issue in the 
interests of something more persuasive, more accountable to its innermost 
– which for Dante means its innermost affective – reasons. On the one 
hand, then, there is his theology of atonement in Canto VII of the Paradiso, 
where propitiation at once gives way to potentiation as a means of seeing 
and understanding the life, death and resurrection of the Christ, to a sense 
of these things as a matter of God’s confirming man afresh in respect 
of his power to significant self-affirmation. On the other hand, there is 
his theology of salvation in Cantos XIX and XX of the same canticle, 
where, starting with the predicament of those unfortunate enough to be 
born either before or beyond the Christian dispensation and with the 
apparent injustice, therefore, of their reprobation, Dante settles at last 
on a sense, not of God’s impassivity as regards antique righteousness, 
but of his willingness to be persuaded by it. True, this is righteousness 
as engendered, sustained and perfected by grace; but, for all that, it is 
righteousness, Dante’s logical and lexical preferences – his developing the 
issue in terms of the love whereby love itself is vanquished – constituting, 
if only for an instant, a shaking of the theological foundations.
The third essay, entitled ‘Dante and the Modalities of Grace’, takes 
its cue from the discussion generated by Antonio Mastrobuono’s book 
Dante’s Journey of Sanctification on the relationship of nature and grace in 
Dante and Thomas. Where, then, Singleton had been inclined to see in 
the Virgilian phase of the Commedia (i.e. in just about the whole of the first 
two canticles of the poem) a preparation for the influx or incomingness 
of grace as mediated by Beatrice, Mastrobuono insisted on the status of 
this too as a product of grace, there being no movement of the spirit into 
God other than by way of his facilitating that movement in the first place. 
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The thesis is unexceptionable, both operative and co-operative grace (the 
latter more prominent as an object of contemplation in Dante) entering as 
of the essence into the moral and theological structure both of the Inferno 
and of the Purgatorio, my own contribution to the discussion, therefore, 
proceeding by way, less of the priority, than of the practicality of grace – 
of grace as present to the individual under the aspect (a) of encouragement, 
(b) of emancipation, and (c) of ecstatic affirmation. It is, in other words, by 
grace that the anxious subject is strengthened in respect of the task in 
hand (grace as encouragement), that he is freed from the tyranny of 
his own leading but self-consciously inauthentic preferences (grace as 
emancipation), and that he emerges at last into the immediate presence 
of God in the ineffability of that presence (grace as ecstatic affirmation), 
this, therefore, constituting an essay, less in the what or the why, than in the 
how of grace in the moment of its verification.
The fourth essay, taking its cue as far as the title is concerned – ‘Events 
and Their Inner Life: an Essay in Actual Eschatology’ – from another 
pivotal moment of Dante scholarship in the English-speaking world 
(from Alan Charity’s book on events and their afterlife in Dante),2 sets 
out to explore on the basis of three episodes in particular of the Inferno 
the whereabouts of the ἔσχατος as the ‘last thing’ in human experience, the 
‘last thing’, however, amounting for Dante, not only to the aftermost truth 
of human experience on the plane of the horizontal, but to the innermost 
truth of that experience on the plane of the vertical, herein, in its capacity 
for rising up from the depths to confront self in its destitution, lying its 
power to terrify.
The fifth essay, entitled ‘Two Dantes or One? An Essay in Transparency 
and Theatricality’, addresses Kenelm’s sense of the Commedia as but further 
evidence of the tension in Dante between the pagan and the Christian 
components of his spirituality and of his failure to dispel this tension. The 
argument, eloquently set out in the twilight pages of his volume The Two 
Dantes of 1977, is, as always in Kenelm, as searching as it is seasoned, but 
it is not unanswerable; for over against everything in the poem making 
for tension and instability there are forces at work making for consistency 
and resolution, namely the kind of transparency whereby every surface 
inflexion of the spirit is brought home at last to its theological substance, 
and the kind of theatricality whereby, distributed as it is among the players, 
the restive voice is at once neutralized as a principle of disruption.
The sixth essay, entitled ‘Complementarity and Coalescence: Dante 
and the Sociology of Authentic Being’, touches on one of the most 
2 A. C. Charity, Events and Their Afterlife. The Dialectics of Christian Typology in the Bible and 
Dante (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).
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radiant emphases of Dante’s mature spirituality, his sense, not only of the 
contiguity or alongsidedness, but of the co-immanence or indwellingness of self 
and of the other-than-self in circumstances of consummate being. If, then, 
as the first-person articulation of the Commedia suggests, there is a sense 
in which the individual stands alone in respect of what matters alone, 
in respect of his destiny as a creature of eschatological accountability, 
then that, within the economy of the whole, is nonetheless qualified by a 
sense of the presence to self of the next man as a parameter of ontological 
awareness, as that whereby he both is and knows himself in the fullness 
of his own humanity.
The last two essays, entitled ‘Dante and the Protestant Principle’ and 
‘The Courage of the Commedia’, take their cue from positions in the great 
German-American theologian Paul Tillich, who understood with perfect 
precision what is going on in Dante as the leading representative in the 
European Middle Ages of (as Tillich himself used to say) the existential 
point of view in theology, of theology as deriving its significance in human 
experience from its being unfolded across the problematics of existence 
as verified by the subject of that existence.3 The first of them, entitled 
‘Dante and the Protestant Principle’, has as I shall stress again nearer 
the time nothing whatever to do with fashioning from him a protestant 
spirit in any prototypical or otherwise historically anachronistic sense of 
the term, since for all his misgiving at the level of practicality, his is a 
spirit of reform contained by an untroubled sense of what the Church is 
in its apostolicity, its catholicity and its sacramentality. It has, however, 
everything to do with seeing in him, and especially in the mature 
spirituality of the Commedia, a desire to rethink accredited positions in the 
areas of soteriology and of election theology in the name and for the sake 
of their agapeic substance. On the one hand, then, there is his sense of the 
salvific significance, not only of the ecclesiastical encounter in particular, 
but of the historical and cultural encounter in general, while on the other 
there is his no less developed sense of episcopacy as a matter ultimately 
of self-episcopacy, of the soul’s at last knowing itself in the autonomy of 
self, in the power of self to self-governance. And it is the courageousness 
of this, the element of heroism attendant upon the notion of self in its 
power to self-governance, that comes into focus in the final essay entitled 
3 Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (London: Collins, 1962; originally 1952), pp. 128-29: 
‘The greatest poetic expression of the Existentialist point of view in the Middle Ages is 
Dante’s Divina Commedia. It remains, like the religious depth psychology of the monastics, 
within the framework of the scholastic ontology. But within these limits it enters the 
deepest places of human self-destruction and despair as well as the highest places of 
courage and salvation, and gives in poetic symbols an all-embracing existential doctrine 
of man.’ 
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‘The Courage of the Commedia’; for if as Tillich maintains the courage 
of the Middle Ages was by and large the courage to be as part (which as 
far as Dante is concerned would mean the courage to affirm self by way 
of the Church, of the Empire, and of the city as instruments of divine 
purposefulness in the world), then we need also to acknowledge how it 
is that Dante’s is a taking up of the courage to be as part in the courage to 
be as oneself, in the affirmation of self from out of its proper capacity for 
self-confrontation, for self-reconfiguration and for self-transcendence as 
constituting between them the infernal, the purgatorial and the paradisal 
moments of the soul’s journey into God. For all his commitment, in other 
words, to the indispensability of the great institutions of medieval life as 
features of the soteriological scheme generally, there can be no question in 
Dante of resolving self in the other-than-self as the way of properly human 
being and becoming, in anything other than the power of the individual to 
moral and ontological self-determination.
In a celebratory moment of the Paradiso, Dante has Thomas go round 
the circle of sage spirits identifying each in turn in point of proper calling 
and confirming how it is that self is everywhere present to the other-
than-self as a co-efficient of being in the endless and endlessly varied 
instantiation of that being. The image, at once perfectly Dantean and 
perfectly resplendent, underlies and informs these conversations of mine 
with Kenelm; for if in reading and rereading the cherished text, I have 
from time to time felt the need to enter a qualification, it is a matter here, 
as in the high consistory of paradise, of otherness as both contained and 
as authorized by sameness, as conditioned and set free by it for a life of its 
own. Never, in other words, is it a question in what follows of the stark 
alternativism of the sed contra, but instead a matter of formed friendship, 
of the kind of friendship which, conceived in love, makes for a sweet 
choreography of the spirit.
John Took, 
Easter 2012
Between Philology and Friendship: 
Dante and Aquinas Revisited
 “Dio vede tutto, e tuo veder s’inluia”,
diss’ io, “beato spirto, sì che nulla
voglia di sé a te puot’ esser fuia.
 Dunque la voce tua, che ’l ciel trastulla
sempre col canto di quei fuochi pii
che di sei ali facen la coculla,
 perché non satisface a’ miei disii?
Già non attendere’ io tua dimanda,
s’io m’intuassi, come tu t’inmii”.
(Par. IX.73-81)1
1. Preliminary considerations: Dante, Aquinas and intimations of otherness.  2. Patterns of 
deconstruction and reconstruction: Nardi, Gilson and Foster.  3. An alternative proposal: 
modes of reading and reception.  4. Dante and the theological project: theology and the 
crisis of existence.  5. Conclusion: philology, friendship and the common proclamation.
Perhaps the single most important accomplishment of twentieth-century 
Dante scholarship – certainly in the area of philosophy and theology – 
was the separating out of Dantean and Thomist spirituality, a process 
which, though coloured by the properties of personality, culminated by 
virtue of the energy and erudition of those party to it in a fresh sense both 
of what Dante owed to Thomas as more than ordinarily accomplished 
in the ways of Christian-theological intelligence and of what made of 
him his own man, a Christian thinker quite other in kind than Aquinas. 
Approaches to the issue were as many and varied as those who cared to 
address it, but for the moment we may settle for just three, the first two to 
an extent mutually dependent, the third presupposing them both, but each 
1 “God sees all, and into him your vision sinks, blessed spirit”, I said, “so that no wish 
may steal itself from you. Why then does your voice, which ever gladdens heaven – 
together with the singing of those devout fires that make themselves a cowl with the six 
wings – not satisfy my longings? Surely I should not wait for your request were I in you 
even as you are in me.”
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committed to the business of disentanglement, of marking the difference 
between one species of Christian spirituality and another. First, then, 
there was Bruno Nardi with his at times abrasive sense, not only of the 
otherness of Dantean and Thomist positions in the areas of cosmology and 
metaphysics, but of the often more Albertan than Thomist complexion of 
Dante’s thinking in these and related areas of concern. Then there was 
Etienne Gilson, who, while himself an occasionally militant spirit, was 
notable above all for his patient account of what he saw as, vis-à-vis that 
of Thomas, the more differentiated character of Dantean teleology, its 
tendency towards a more phased or periodic account of human experience 
in its positive unfolding. And finally there was Kenelm Foster, who, as one 
authorized by profession to pronounce in this matter, made it his business, 
not only to confirm Dante’s admiration and indeed love for Thomas in 
the twofold piety and precision of his mind, but to stress as a matter both 
of temperamental and of methodological difference the depth of their 
divergence in the areas particularly of anthropology, epistemology and 
creation theology. Well before the end of the century, then, the myth of 
Dante’s Thomism, at least in its more indiscriminate reaches, had as a 
result of these and of similar interventions been put to rest and the way 
opened up for a more responsible account of Dante’s relationship with one 
of the most cherished of his auctores.2
2 P. H. Wicksteed, Dante and Aquinas (London: Dent and New York: Dutton, 1913, with 
a facsimile reprint Honolulu (Hawaii): University Press of the Pacific, 2002); G. Busnelli, 
Cosmogonia e antropogenesi secondo Dante Alighieri e le sue fonti (Rome: Civiltà cattolica, 1922, 
with a review by Nardi in the Giornale storico della letteratura italiana 81 (1923), 307-34 
and reproduced in his Saggi di filosofia dantesca (note 3 below), pp. 341-80); V. Vettori, 
‘S. Tommaso e Dante oggi’, in Tommaso d’Aquino nella storia del pensiero (Naples: Edizioni 
Domenicane Italiane, 1976), vol. 2 (Dal medioevo ad oggi), pp. 149-51; M. Corti, Dante 
a un nuovo crocevia (Florence: Sansoni, 1982); eadem, La felicità mentale: nuove prospettive 
per Cavalcanti e Dante (Turin: Einaudi, 1983); E. Stump, ‘Dante’s Hell, Aquinas’ Moral 
Theory, and the Love of God’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1986), 2, 181-98; B. 
Panvini, ‘La concezione tomistica della grazia nella Divina Commedia’, in Letture classensi 
17 (Ravenna: Longo, 1988), pp. 69-85; L. M. La Favia, ‘Thomas Aquinas and Siger 
of Brabant in Dante’s Paradiso’, in Lectura Dantis Newberryana II (Chicago, Illinois, 1985-
1987), ed. P. Cherchi and A. C. Mastrobuono (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University 
Press, 1990), pp. 147-72; A. C. Mastrobuono, Dante’s Journey of Sanctification (Washington 
DC: Gateway, 1990); R. D. Crouse, ‘Dante as Philosopher. Christian Aristotelianism’, 
Dionysius 16 (1998), 141-56; M. Cogan, The Design in the Wax. The Structure of the Divine 
Comedy and its Meaning (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1999); A. A. Iannucci, ‘Dante’s Theological Canon in the Commedia’, Italian Quarterly 
37 (2000), 51-56; idem, ‘Tommaso e il canone teologico in Dante’, in La Ciociaria 
tra letteratura e cinema. Atti del Convegno di Studi, Ripi 17-20 gennaio 2002, ed. F. Zangrilli 
(Pesaro: Metauro, 2002), pp. 317-26; A. Gagliardi, ‘Dante fra Sigieri e Tommaso’, in 
Tommaso d’Aquino e Averroè. La visione di Dio (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2002), pp. 
273-94; W. Metz, ‘Das Weltgericht bei Dante in Differenz zu Thomas von Aquin’, in 
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2. Bruno Nardi’s critique of the Thomist gloss on Dante rests upon an 
incomparable familiarity with medieval philosophy in its central emphases 
and endless by-ways.3 Committed as he was to an interpretation of the text 
in terms of the variety of its sources and allegiances in the areas both of 
Ende und Vollendung. Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter, ed. J. A. Aertsen and M. 
Pickavé (Berlin and New York: Gruyter, 2002), pp. 626-37; G. Mazzotta, ‘The Heaven 
of the Sun: Dante between Aquinas and Bonaventure’, in Dante for the New Millennium, ed. 
T. Barolini and H. W. Storey (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), pp. 152-68; 
F. Adorno, ‘Dante (1265-1321), tra San Tommaso (1225/26-1274) e San Bonaventura 
(1221-1274)’, in Filosofi d’oggi per Dante, ed. N. Ancarani, Letture classensi 32-34 (Ravenna: 
Longo, 2005), pp. 13-22.
3 On Nardi as a dantista, T. Gregory, ‘Bruno Nardi’, Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 
22 (1968), 469-501 (also, with G. Petrocchi, ‘Ricordo di Bruno Nardi’, in L’Alighieri. 
Rassegna bibliografica dantesca 20 (1979), 1, 3-16, and, with P. Mazzantini (eds), Gli scritti 
di Bruno Nardi’, in ‘Lecturae’ ed altri studi danteschi (Florence: Le Lettere, 1990), pp. 285-
312); E. Garin, ‘Ricordo di Bruno Nardi (1884-1968)’, Studi danteschi 45 (1969), 5-28; C. 
Vasoli, ‘Bruno Nardi dantista’, in Letteratura italiana: I critici, vol. 3 (Milan: Marzorati, 
1970), pp. 2023-51; idem, ‘Bruno Nardi e il “restauro” della filosofia di Dante’, Letteratura 
e filologia tra Svizzera e Italia. Studi in onore di Guglielmo Gorni, 3 vols, ed. M. A. Terzoli et 
al. (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2010), vol. 1 (Dante: la Commedia e altro), 
pp. 57-73; A. Schiaffini, ‘Bruno Nardi filologo e scrittore’, in Italiano antico e moderno, ed. 
T. De Mauro and P. Mazzantini (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 1975), pp. 331-39; A. 
Vallone, Storia della critica dantesca dal XIV al XX secolo, 2 vols (Milan: Vallardi, 1981), vol. 
2, pp. 890-93; idem, ‘Bruno Nardi “lettore” di Dante con Appendice di lettere inedite’, 
in Profili e problemi del dantismo (Naples: Liguori, 1985), pp. 355-420; F. Mazzoni, ‘Bruno 
Nardi dantista’, in L’Alighieri. Rassegna bibliografica dantesca 23 (1982), 2, 8-28; T. Nardi, 
‘Dal carteggio di Bruno Nardi’, in La Società Dantesca Italiana 1888-1988 (Atti del Convegno 
Internazionale, Firenze 24-26 novembre 1988, ed. R. Abardo (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 
1995), pp. 89-97; G. M. Cao, ‘Appunti storiografici in margine al carteggio Gilson-Nardi’, 
in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, 6th series,  21 (2001), 137-70; O. Capitani, ‘Bruno 
Nardi e il percorso dantesco dal Convivio alla Commedia’, in Medievistica e medievisti nel 
secondo Novecento (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 2003), pp. 239-
62 (originally the introduction to the second edn of Dal Convivio alla Commedia (Rome: 
Istituto Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1992), pp. 5-29). Nardi himself on Dante and Thomas, 
‘Intorno al tomismo di Dante e alla quistione di Sigieri’, Giornale Dantesco 22 (1914), 182-
97; ‘Il tomismo di Dante e il P. Busnelli S.J.’, Giornale storico della letteratura italiana 81 
(1923), 307-34 (a review of G. Busnelli, Cosmogonia e antropogenesi secondo Dante Alighieri 
e le sue fonti (note 2 above), also in Saggi di filosofia dantesca, 2nd edn (Florence: La Nuova 
Italia, 1967), pp. 341-80); Dante e la cultura medievale (Bari: Laterza, 1942, in a new edn 
by P. Mazzantini with an introduction by T. Gregory (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1983)); 
review of F. Orestano, ‘Dante e “il buon frate Tommaso”’ (Sophia 9 (1941), 1-19), Studi 
danteschi 26 (1942), 148-60; Nel mondo di Dante (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
1944); Dal ‘Convivio’ alla ‘Commedia’: sei saggi danteschi (Rome: Nella sede dell’Istituto, 
1960; in a new edn with a preface by O. Capitani (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il 
Medio Evo, 1992)); Saggi e note di critica dantesca (Milan: Ricciardi, 1966); ‘Lecturae’ e altri 
studi danteschi, ed. R. Abardo (Florence: Le Lettere, 1990). For a general bibliography, 
Saggi sulla cultura veneta del Quattro e Cinquecento, ed. P. Mazzantini (Padua: Antenore, 
1971), pp. ix-xlix.
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philosophy and of theology, he was never less than impatient (a) with too 
ready a referral of Dante to Aquinas as in any sense paramount among 
his authorities, (b) with instances of intertextuality reducible to the mere 
τόποι of scholastic discourse, and (c) with the least hint of carelessness in 
respect of the precise form of the source text, be it Thomist or otherwise, 
and thus as regards its precise meaning. Exemplary in respect of the 
first of these is the following passage on Busnelli’s alignment of Thomas 
and Dante in the field of general cosmology, this, Nardi thinks, being 
but another instance of his at-all-costs attempt, if not to reconcile the 
unreconcilable exactly, then to extract from the text a meaning other 
than that evidently intended by the author: ‘il passo della stessa opera 
[Contra gentiles], II.30, tende a dimostrare che le cose create possono 
dirsi assolutamente necessarie per rapporto ai principii prossimi di cui 
risultano. Così, per il fatto che gli esseri del mondo inferiore son costituiti 
di materia e di forma, e siccome la loro materia è in potenza a ricevere 
forme contrarie, essi sono necessariamente corruttibili. Al contrario, 
poiché la forma è atto e non potenza, quando essa sussiste senza materia, 
come nelle intelligenze separate, oppure esaurisce tutta la potenza della 
materia, com’è il caso dei corpi celesti, è necessariamente incorruttibile. 
Io chiedo al Busnelli che cosa ha che fare questo discorso col passo in cui 
Dante afferma, con alcuni vecchi Dottori scolastici, che “Dio in principio 
creò tre cose”: la pura forma (le intelligenze), la materia informe (soggetto 
dei quattro elementi) e il composto indissolubile di materia e di forma 
(i cieli)!’ 4 In fact, the issue may be more delicate than Nardi supposed, for 
4 The passage drawn from the same work (ScG II.xxx) sets out to show how things 
which are created might be said to be absolutely necessary as regards the proximate 
principles from which they flow. So, by virtue of the fact that beings here below are made 
up of form and matter, and that their matter is in potential to receiving other forms, they 
are necessarily corruptible. Since form, by contrast, is act rather than potency, whenever 
it subsists immaterially (as in the separate substances), or when it exhausts the whole 
potentiality of matter (as with the heavenly bodies), it is necessarily incorruptible. I 
therefore ask of Busnelli what all this has to do with the passage in which, with some of 
the old scholastic doctors, Dante affirms that “God in the beginning created three things”, 
pure form (the Intelligences), uninformed matter (the subject of the four elements), and 
the indissoluble amalgamation of matter and form (the heavens)! (Saggi di filosofia dantesca 
(note 3 above), p. 343). For the triple procession of pure form, pure matter and their 
amalgamation in the superlunary world from the Godhead, Par. XXIX.10-36. Thomas, in 
the passage indicated (ScG II.xxx.9-11), has ‘Ex his autem principiis, secundum quod sunt 
essendi principia, tripliciter sumitur necessitas absoluta in rebus. Uno quidem modo, per 
ordinem ad esse eius cuius sunt. Et quia materia, secundum id quod est, ens in potentia 
est; quod autem potest esse, potest etiam et non esse: ex ordine materiae necessario res 
aliquae corruptibiles existunt; sicut animal quia ex contrariis compositum est, et ignis 
quia eius materia est contrariorum susceptiva. Forma autem, secundum id quod est, actus 
est: et per eam res actu existunt. Unde ex ipsa provenit necessitas ad esse in quibusdam. 
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as often as not when it comes to Dante and his auctores it is a question, not 
so much of the what, as of the how of his reading, of what, over and beyond 
(or even over and against) the author’s original intention, he chooses to 
find there – at which point reading shades off into reception as the nub 
of the issue. For Nardi, however, this is not the point, for at the level of 
authorial intention they are simply not talking about the same thing. And 
that is not all, for even when they are talking about the same thing, it often 
comes down, Nardi thinks, to the mere commonplaces of the scholastic 
mind, these, therefore, as a means of identifying patterns of allegiance 
and of antagonism, making for something less than good scholarship; 
so, for example, on Dante’s supposed recourse to the Contra gentiles in 
the areas of creation theology and of astral determinism, these remarks, 
peremptory as ever, on the unexceptionality of it all: ‘il passo della stessa 
somma Contra gent., II.19, e gli altri affini, in cui è detto che la creazione 
è passaggio istantaneo dal non essere all’essere, simile al diffondersi 
della luce, secondo la fisica antica, racchiude un concetto comune fra gli 
Scolastici ... la citazione di San Tommaso, ov’è detto che i cieli influiscono 
colla luce e col moto, è superflua. Si tratta di un luogo comune.’5 Here, 
Quod contingit vel quia res illae sunt formae non in materia: et sic non inest ei potentia 
ad non esse, sed per suam formam semper sunt in virtute essendi; sicut est in substantiis 
separatis. Vel quia formae earum sua perfectione adaequant totam potentiam materiae, 
ut sic non remaneat potentia ad aliam formam, nec per consequens ad non esse: sicut est 
in corporibus caelestibus. In quibus vero forma non complet totam potentiam materiae, 
remanet adhuc in materia potentia ad aliam formam. Et ideo non est in eis necessitas 
essendi, sed virtus essendi consequitur in eis victoriam formae super materia: ut patet 
in elementis et elementatis. Forma enim elementi non attingit materiam secundum totum 
eius posse: non enim fit susceptiva formae elementi unius nisi per hoc quod subiicitur 
alteri parti contrarietatis. Forma vero mixti attingit materiam secundum quod disponitur 
per determinatum modum mixtionis. Idem autem subiectum oportet esse contrariorum et 
mediorum omnium, quae sunt ex commixtione extremorum. Unde manifestum est quod 
omnia quae vel contrarium habent vel ex contrariis sunt, corruptibilia sunt. Quae autem 
huiusmodi non sunt, sempiterna sunt: nisi per accidens corrumpantur, sicut formae quae 
non subsistunt sed esse earum est per hoc quod insunt materiae.’
5 the passage from the selfsame Summa contra gentiles (II.19), and others like it, where 
– somewhat after the manner of the diffusion of light in ancient physics – it is said that 
creation is a matter of the immediate passage from non-being to being, embodies a notion 
common among the scholastics ... the quotation from Saint Thomas, where it is said that 
the heavens exercise their influence by their light and their movement, is superfluous, for 
this is a mere commonplace (Saggi di filosofia dantesca (note 3 above), pp. 343 and 353). 
Spirited in this respect, p. 354: ‘Il ravvicinare, quindi, questa dottrina antica alle dottrine 
dei moderni astronomi, sull’azione che certi corpi celesti esercitano sulla terra, è una 
specie di concordismo molto simile a quello biblico dell’abate Moigno; meglio ancora, 
una tardiva e inaspettata difesa dei dilemmi di Don Ferrante.’ Thomas, at II.xix.6, has 
‘Relinquitur igitur quod creatio sit in instanti. Unde simul aliquid, dum creatur, creatum 
est: sicut simul illuminatur et illuminatum est.’
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then, it is a question of discernment, of the kind of sixth sense whereby 
those genuinely expert in these things pick up on the significant instance. 
And finally, there is Nardi’s impatience at the philological level, where 
anything less than scrupulous attention to editorial exactness spells 
disaster for exact understanding. Exemplary in this sense is the following 
passage on the difference between seminal reason as a property of matter 
and the virtual presence of the idea to the Creator as its author and origin, 
where Busnelli, addressing a passage in the Dantean Quaestio but misled 
as to punctuation, is said by Nardi to confuse the issue:
per dimostrarmi che Dante nega nella materia le rationes seminales, il 
Busnelli mi cita questo passo della Quaestio, XVIII, 46:
Cum omnes forme, que sunt in potentia materie idealiter, sint in actu 
in Motore celi ...
A p. 16, n. 1, il Busnelli aveva dichiarato di riferirsi, per le citazioni di 
Dante, al testo critico della Società Dantesca. Ora invece, zitto zitto, 
senza darne avviso al lettore, mi trasporta, come fanno altre edizioni, 
la virgola che nel testo critico è, con ragione, dopo la parola materie, 
e non dopo idealiter, e così mi cambia tutto il senso del passo citato. 
È vero che il Busnelli potrebbe farsi forte di altre edizioni. Ma egli 
avrebbe torto. Prima di tutto, perché il passo della Quaestio va messo 
in relazione coi versi 127-138 del canto II e coi versi 67-69 del canto 
XIII del Paradiso. Poi per un’altra ragione: il passo d’Averroè, citato 
da Dante, non si trova nel De substantia orbis, ma nel commento alla 
Metafisica, e suona così:
Omnes proportiones et formae sunt in potentia in prima materia et 
in actu in primo Motore.
L’idealiter non c’è; ma Dante, che cita a senso, senza avere il testo 
sotto gli occhi, l’ha aggiunto per render meglio il significato. Anche 
Tommaso cita questo passo, nel II delle Sentenze, per provare 
l’esistenza delle idee in Dio.6
6 for the purposes of convincing me how it is that Dante denies the presence in matter 
of seminal reasons, Busnelli cites the passage from the Quaestio at XVIII, 46: “Since 
all forms, which are ideally present in matter potentially, are in act in the mover of the 
heavens ...”. On p. 16 at note 1, Busnelli had made it plain that, when it comes to quoting 
Dante, he had used the critical text of the Società Dantesca. Now, however, without so 
much as a word, he follows other editions in relocating the comma which, in the critical 
text, and with good reason, is put, not after ‘idealiter’, but after ‘materie’, thus changing 
the entire sense of the quotation. True, Busnelli could well draw comfort in this from 
the other editions, but he would be wrong in doing so, above all because the passage 
from the Quaestio needs to be set alongside lines 127-38 of Canto II of the Paradiso and 
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Unmistakable here is the note of philosophical and philological 
triumphalism never far beneath the surface in Nardi as one exceptionally 
competent in the field; but never even so is there any attempt in his work 
to minimize, still less to spirit away, Thomas’s presence to Dante as to 
the fore among his auctores, as tending to shape the notional or expressive 
instance. On the contrary, he has by his own admission no axe to grind, no 
‘mulino antitomistico’ where Dante is concerned,7 for, Thomas, certainly, 
is there, if as but one of those from whom Dante derived comfort in respect 
of this or that inflexion of the spirit: ‘Né tomista, né antitomista, Dante 
prende il materiale della sua informazione filosofica con largo spirito 
eclettico, nel ricco arsenale della Scolastica, senza esclusione di scuole; e 
quel materiale poi rifonde nel crogiuolo della sua mente, collo sforzo della 
riflessione personale, in quell’ardente crogiuolo da cui escono, temprati di 
pensiero filosofico, i fantasmi della più alta poesia’.8 The ‘fantasmi della 
più alta poesia’ element in this way of putting it, touching as it does upon 
the power of poetry properly or at least persuasively to signify in the area 
of theology, raises as many issues as it resolves, but in respect of what 
matters here – namely the nature of Dante’s dealings with his auctores in 
general and with Thomas in particular – the formula is unexceptionable.
Etienne Gilson, whose work as a historian of medieval thought 
consistently, though not uncritically, complements that of Nardi, is similarly 
preoccupied by the problem of over-interpretation, by the need come what 
may to accredit Dante by way of Aquinas, an issue he pursues, however, 
by way pre-eminently of otherness and eccentricity, of what from a strictly 
Thomist point of view amounts to too ready an inclination in Dante to 
interrupt the continuity of human activity in time and eternity in favour of 
moral and intellectual finalities open to accomplishment here and now.9 The 
lines 67-69 of Canto XIII. And that’s not all, for the Averroes passage cited by Dante is 
not, in fact, in the De substantia orbis, but in the commentary on the Metaphysics, and runs 
thus: “All proportions and forms are in potential in prime matter and in act in the first 
mover.” There is no ‘idealiter’ here, Dante, citing according to his sense of the passage 
and without the text to hand, adding it all the better to bring out its meaning. Thomas 
too cites this passage in Book II of the Sentences for the purpose of proving the existence 
of ideas in God (Saggi di filosofia (note 3 above), p. 347).
7 Ibid., p. 379: ‘Il Parodi, in un benevolo cenno di coserelle mie, mi accusa garbatamente 
di tirare l’acqua, trattando della filosofia di Dante, al mio “mulino antitomistico”.’
8 Neither for Thomas nor against Thomas, Dante proceeds on an ample eclectic basis to 
gather up all he needs by way of philosophical substance and inspiration from the rich arsenal 
of scholasticism, excluding as he does so no tradition; and all this he refashions by way of 
his own personal reflection in the crucible of his mind, the crucible from which proceed, 
philosophically tempered, the most exalted flights of poetic imagination (ibid., pp. 379-80).
9 On Gilson as a dantista, Etienne Gilson’s letters to Bruno Nardi, ed. P. Dronke (Tavarnuzze 
(Florence): Galluzzo, 1998); S. Toussaint, ‘Dante tra neoscolastica e teologia poetica: 
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pattern is indeed a recognizable one, Dante’s, in respect both of cognition 
and of appetition, being a tendency to interrupt the flow of human experience 
under the aspect both of time alone and of time and eternity taken together 
in favour of its successive instants, of points of arrival along the way; so, for 
example, as regards cognition, these lines from Book IV of the Convivio (xiii.1-
2) with their sense of human intellection as but a movement from one peak of 
understanding to the next:
A la questione rispondendo, dico che propriamente crescere lo desiderio 
de la scienza dire non si può, avvegna che, come detto è, per alcuno 
modo si dilati. Ché quello che propriamente cresce, sempre è uno: lo 
desiderio de la scienza non è sempre uno, ma è molti, e finito l’uno, viene 
l’altro; sì che, propriamente parlando, non è crescere lo suo dilatare, 
ma successione di picciola cosa in grande cosa. Che se io desidero di 
sapere li principii de le cose naturali, incontanente che io so questi, è 
compiuto e terminato questo desiderio. E se poi io desidero di sapere 
che cosa e com’è ciascuno di questi principii, questo è un altro desiderio 
nuovo, né per l’avvenimento di questo non mi si toglie la perfezione 
a la quale mi condusse l’altro; e questo cotale dilatare non è cagione 
d’imperfezione, ma di perfezione maggiore. Quello veramente de la 
ricchezza è propriamente crescere, ché è sempre pur uno, sì che nulla 
successione quivi si vede, e per nullo termine e per nulla perfezione.10
Curtius, Maritain, Maurras, Gilson’, in Dante e la cultura del suo tempo. Dante e le culture 
dei confini. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi Danteschi, Gorizia, ottobre 1997 (Gorizia: 
Società Dante Alighieri (Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Gorizia), 1999), pp. 81-90; 
C. Marabelli, ‘Etienne Gilson e Dante’, in Medievali e medievisti. Saggi su aspetti del Medioevo 
teologico e della sua interpretazione (Milan: Jaca Book, 2000), pp. 243-48. On Gilson 
generally, L. K. Shook, Etienne Gilson (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
1984). In Gilson himself, Dante and Philosophy, trans. D. Moore (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1963; originally Dante et la philosophie, Paris: Vrin, 1939; in Italian, Dante e la filosofia, 
ed. C. Marabelli, (Milan: Jaca Book, 1987)); ‘Dante’s Notion of a Shade: Purgatorio XXV’, 
Medieval Sudies 29 (1967), 14-42 (also in Dante. The Critical Complex, 8 vols, ed. R. Lansing 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2003), vol. 3, pp. 340-58); ‘Dante’s Mirabile Visione’, 
Cornell Library Journal 5 (1968), 1-17; Dante et Béatrice: études dantesques (Paris: Vrin, 1974), 
with an Italian translation ed. B. Garavelli (Milan: Medusa, 2004); ‘Dante, la filosofia e 
la politica’, Cultura e libri 57 (1990), 56-60; ‘Dante’s Place in History’, in Critical Essays on 
Dante, ed. G. Mazzotta (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1991), pp. 119-39. On Thomas, and apart from 
Le Thomisme: introduction à la philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin (5th and 6th edn Paris: Vrin, 
1947 and 1965 respectively; originally 1919) and its many reprints both of the original 
and in translation, The Elements of Christian Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1960). For 
a general bibliography, Etienne Gilson: a bibliography / une bibliographie (The Etienne Gilson 
Series, 3), ed. M. McGrath (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982).
10 My response to the difficulty is as follows. The desire for knowledge cannot be 
said to grow in the strict sense, although, as I have shown, it broadens out in a certain 
way. Whatever grows in the strict sense always remains a single entity. The desire for 
knowledge does not remain a single entity. It is multiple, and when one desire is satisfied 
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while as regards appetition, these from Book III (xv.7-10) designed to 
secure in the wake of a now soaring spirituality a species of philosophical 
wisdom, and thus of philosophical happiness, proportionate to those 
‘many men and women in this language of ours burdened by domestic 
and civic care’ but anxious in respect of their proper humanity, of what it 
might mean to be as a creature of adult accountability:
Veramente può qui alcuno forte dubitare come ciò sia, che la sapienza 
possa fare l’uomo beato, non potendo a lui perfettamente certe cose 
mostrare; con ciò sia cosa che ’l naturale desiderio sia a l’uomo di 
sapere, e sanza compiere lo desiderio beato essere non possa. A ciò si 
può chiaramente rispondere che lo desiderio naturale in ciascuna cosa 
è misurato secondo la possibilitade de la cosa desiderante: altrimenti 
andrebbe in contrario di sé medesimo, che impossibile è; e la Natura 
l’avrebbe fatto indarno, che è anche impossibile. In contrario andrebbe: 
ché, desiderando la sua perfezione, desiderrebbe la sua imperfezione; 
imperò che desiderrebbe sé sempre desiderare e non compiere mai suo 
desiderio (e in questo errore cade l’avaro maladetto, e non s’accorge che 
desidera sé sempre desiderare, andando dietro al numero impossibile a 
giungere). Avrebbelo anco la Natura fatto indarno, però che non sarebbe 
ad alcuno fine ordinato. E però l’umano desiderio è misurato in questa 
vita a quella scienza che qui avere si può, e quello punto non passa se non 
per errore, lo quale è di fuori di naturale intenzione. E così è misurato 
ne la natura angelica, e terminato, in quanto, in quella sapienza che la 
natura di ciascuno può apprendere. E questa è la ragione per che li Santi 
non hanno tra loro invidia, però che ciascuno aggiugne lo fine del suo 
desiderio, lo quale desiderio è con la bontà de la natura misurato. Onde, 
con ciò sia cosa che conoscere di Dio e di certe altre cose quello esse sono 
non sia possibile a la nostra natura, quello da noi naturalmente non è 
desiderato di sapere. E per questo è la dubitazione soluta.11
another comes into being, so that, in the broadening out of the desire for knowledge, 
growth, strictly speaking, does not occur; rather, what happens is that something small is 
successively replaced by something large. For instance, if I desire to know the constitutive 
principles of physical objects, this desire is fulfilled and brought to completion as soon as 
I know what these principles are. If I then desire to know with respect to each of these 
principles how it is composed, and what are its sources, this is another and distinct desire. 
Further, the occurrence of this new desire does not deprive me of the perfection gained 
through fulfilling the first desire. Such broadening out does not cause imperfection. In 
the case of the desire for riches, by contrast, what occurs is growth in the strict sense, 
since the desire always remains one and the same thing: one entity is replaced by another, 
since nothing comes to completion and no perfection is attained.
11 However, at this point a person may seriously wonder how it can be that wisdom 
can make man happy, if it cannot perfectly show certain things to him, since the natural 
desire of man is to know, and he cannot be happy unless that desire is satisfied. To this, the 
clear answer can be given that the natural desire in everything is in accordance with the 
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Throughout, then, the pattern is the same, Dante, with respect both 
to knowing and to willing, being inclined to construe these things 
successionally or in terms of an ideal progression from one qualitatively 
distinct moment to the next. Gilson, however, pursues the idea on the basis, 
not of these, but of two other passages pointing in the same direction, 
namely Conv. II.xiv.14-18 as touching on ethics rather than metaphysics as 
(theology apart) the human science par excellence, and Mon. III.xvi.7-8 as 
touching on the complementarity of philosophy and theology as the means 
respectively to mortal and immortal happiness, each of these passages, 
he thinks, testifying to this same preoccupation, less with understanding 
in the round, than with the completeness of the cognitive instance. First, 
then, on ethics as the ground of human happiness this side of death, the 
Convivio passage, secure in its sense of moral science as the architectonic 
or organizational science in human experience and of the authorization of 
this position both in Thomas and in the Philosopher:
Lo Cielo cristallino, che per Primo Mobile dinanzi è contato, ha 
comparazione assai manifesta a la Morale Filosofia; ché Morale 
Filosofia, secondo che dice Tommaso sopra lo secondo de l’Etica, 
ordina noi a l’altre scienze. Che, sì come dice lo Filosofo nel quinto de 
l’Etica, ‘la giustizia legale ordina la scienze ad apprendere, e comanda, 
perché non siano abbandonate, quelle essere apprese e ammaestrate’; 
e così lo detto cielo ordina col suo movimento la cotidiana revoluzione 
capacity of the thing which desires; otherwise the thing would strive in a fashion contrary 
to its own being, which is impossible; and Nature would have made it in vain, which is 
also impossible. It would strive in a self-contrary fashion, for in desiring its own perfection 
it would desire its own imperfection, because it would desire always to be desiring and 
never to satisfy its own desire (which is the error into which the accursed miser falls: 
he does not recognize that he desires always to be desiring, in striving after a number 
impossible to reach). Also, Nature would have made it in vain, because it would not be 
directed to any end. Human desire, consequently, is measured in this life in accordance 
with that knowledge which can be gained here, and never passes that point except in 
error, which is something foreign to the intention of nature. In the angelic nature desire 
is likewise measured, and is limited precisely to that wisdom which the nature of each is 
capable of apprehending. It is for this reason, too, that the saints do not envy each other, 
for each attains the end of his own desire, and this desire is commensurate with the quality 
of his goodness. Since, then, it is impossible for our nature to know of God what He is 
(the same holds true of certain other things), this is not something which we naturally 
desire to know. In this way the difficulty is resolved.  For the ‘many men and women in 
this language of ours’ element of the argument, Conv. I.ix.5 and i.4: ‘e questi nobili sono 
principi, baroni, cavalieri, e molt’altra nobile gente, non solamente maschi ma femmine, 
che sono molti e molte in questa lingua, volgari, e non litterati ... Di fuori da l’uomo 
possono essere similemente due cagioni intese, l’una de le quali è induttrice di necessitade, 
l’altra di pigrizia. La prima è la cura familiare e civile, la quale convenevolmente a sé tiene 
de li uomini lo maggior numero, sì che in ozio di speculazione esser non possono.’
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di tutti li altri, per la quale ogni die tutti quelli ricevono [e mandano] 
qua giù la vertude di tutte le loro parti. Che se la revoluzione di questo 
non ordinasse ciò, poco di loro vertude qua giù verrebbe o di loro vista. 
Onde ponemo che possibile fosse questo nono cielo non muovere, la 
terza parte del cielo sarebbe ancora non veduta in ciascun luogo de la 
terra; e Saturno sarebbe quattordici anni e mezzo a ciascuno luogo de 
la terra celato, e Giove sei anni quasi si celerebbe, e Marte uno anno 
quasi, e lo Sole centottantadue dì e quattordici ore (dico dì, cioè tanto 
tempo quanto misurano cotanti dì), e Venere e Mercurio quasi come lo 
Sole si celerebbe e mosterrebbe, e la Luna per tempo di quattordici dì 
e mezzo, starebbe ascosa ad ogni gente. E da vero non sarebbe qua giù 
generazione né vita d’animale o di piante: notte non sarebbe né die, né 
settimana né mese né anno, ma tutto l’universo sarebbe disordinato, 
e lo movimento de li altri sarebbe indarno. E non altrimenti, cessando 
la Morale Filosofia, l’altre scienze sarebbero celate alcuno tempo, e 
non sarebbe generazione né vita di felicitade, e indarno sarebbero 
scritte e per antico trovate. Per che assai è manifesto, questo cielo [in] 
sé avere a la Morale Filosofia comparazione.12
12 The crystalline heaven, described as the first moving body in the account given above, 
is quite clearly similar to moral philosophy, because, as Thomas says in his commentary 
on the second book of the Ethics, moral philosophy directs us towards the other sciences. 
For, as the Philosopher states in the fifth book of the Ethics, “civic justice directs that the 
sciences be learned in due order, and, to ensure that they never be abandoned, commands 
that they be both learned and taught”; similarly the heaven just mentioned directs with its 
movement the daily revolution of all the others, by which means all those heavens every 
day receive and communicate to our world below the power invested in their every part, 
for if the revolution of this heaven did not direct this, little of their power would come 
down to our world below, and we would have little sight of them. Consequently, in the 
hypothetical case that this ninth heaven did not move, a third of the heaven of the stars 
would not yet have been seen from any place on earth; Saturn would be hidden from 
every place on earth for fourteen and a half years; Jupiter would be hidden for almost 
six years, Mars for almost a year, the Sun for one hundred and eighty two days days and 
fourteen hours. Venus and Mercury would be hidden and be visible for much the same 
time as the Sun, and the Moon would remain concealed from all mankind for fourteen 
and a half days. And indeed in this world below, plant and animal life would neither 
be generated nor continue; there would be neither night nor day, no weeks, months or 
years, and in fact the whole universe would be thrown into disorder, and the movement 
of other heavens would be in vain. In the same way, should moral philosophy disappear, 
the other sciences would be hidden for some time, the life of happiness would neither be 
generated nor continue, and it would have been in vain that the sciences were discovered 
in ancient times and committed to writing. It is quite clear, then, that this heaven has a 
similarity to moral philosophy.  Thomas (In eth. II, lect. 1, note 1), tracing the structure 
of the second book of the Ethics, has ‘Prima autem pars dividitur in partes duas: in prima 
determinat de virtutibus moralibus. In secunda de intellectualibus, in sexto libro, ibi; 
quia autem existimus prius dicentes et cetera. Et ratio ordinis est, quia virtutes morales 
sunt magis notae, et per eas disponimur ad intellectuales.’ For Thomas on iustitia legalis 
and the common good, V, lect. 3, but the form of Dante’s argument suggests I, lect. 2, n. 9: 
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Gilson, alarmed by Dante’s commitment to ethics pure and simple – to 
ethics as untouched by theology – as the ground of human well-being here 
and now, lets it pass for the moment, contenting himself instead with some 
remarks relative to his, Thomistically speaking, no less strange promotion 
of ethics over metaphysics in the order of scientific excellence: ‘at the risk’, 
he says, ‘of slightly stretching Dante’s thought, but with the object of 
bringing out what seems to me the idea which a great number of passages 
suggest, I am going to say, in definitely stating that the formula is not his, 
that metaphysics as conceived by Dante remains in itself the loftiest and 
most perfect of the sciences, but that it is not so as far as we are concerned’.13 
But by the time we reach the Monarchia he is more resolute, more intent on 
pointing up the damage done to the fabric of Christian wisdom, and thus of 
Christendom itself, by what amounts to Dante’s effrontery at this point, to 
his indifference to the seamlessness of it all. The offending text reads thus:
Duos igitur fines providentia illa inenarrabilis homini proposuit 
intendendos: beatitudinem scilicet huius vite, que in operatione 
proprie virtutis consistit et per terrestrem paradisum figuratur; et 
beatitudinem vite ecterne, que consistit in fruitione divini aspectus 
ad quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi lumine divino 
adiuta, que per paradisum celestem intelligi datur. Ad has quidem 
beatitudines, velut ad diversas conclusiones, per diversa media venire 
oportet. Nam ad primam per phylosophica documenta venimus, 
dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales 
operando; ad secundam vero per documenta spiritualia que humanam 
rationem transcendunt, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes 
theologicas operando, fidem spem scilicet et karitatem.14
‘Sed scientiae speculativae praecipit civilis solum quantum ad usum, non autem quantum 
ad determinationem operis; ordinat enim politica, quod aliqui doceant vel addiscant 
geometriam. Huiusmodi enim actus inquantum sunt voluntarii pertinent ad materiam 
moralem et sunt ordinabiles ad finem humanae vitae. Non autem praecipit politicus 
geometrae quid de triangulo concludat, hoc enim non subiacet humanae voluntati, nec est 
ordinabile humanae vitae, sed dependet ex ipsa rerum ratione. Et ideo dicit, quod politica 
praeordinat quas disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, scilicet tam practicarum 
quam speculativarum, et quis quam debeat addiscere, et usque ad quod tempus.’ Also 
note 11: ‘Et dicit quod, cum politica, quae practica est, utatur reliquis practicis disciplinis, 
sicut secundo dictum est, et cum ipsa legem ponat quid oporteat operari et a quibus 
abstinere, ut primo dictum est, consequens est quod finis huius tamquam architectonicae 
complectitur, idest subse continet fines aliarum scientiarum practicarum.’
13 Dante and Philosophy cit. (note 9 above), p. 122 (italics original).
14 Ineffable providence has thus set before us two goals to aim at; i.e. happiness in 
this life, which consists in the exercise of our own powers and is figured in the earthly 
paradise; and happiness in the eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of the vision 
of God (to which our own powers cannot raise us except with the help of God’s light) 
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– at which point Gilson, a shade rhetorically (for neither ‘shattering’ nor 
‘striking’ forms part either of Dante’s logic or of his lexis in this final 
chapter of the Monarchia), notes that, just as by way of his separating out 
Church and Empire Dante splits the Christian world into two camps, so 
also, by way of separating out philosophy and theology, he ‘completely 
shatters the unity of Christian wisdom, the unifying principle and the 
bond of Christendom. In each of these vital matters this alleged Thomist 
struck a mortal blow at the doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas’.15 Rhetoric 
aside, however, the formula is again unexceptionable; for though, as Gilson 
insists, there is hardly sufficient here to align him with the more radical 
philosophical spirits of his time, with those committed to the notion of a 
double order of truth in the world, there is more than enough to mark him 
out from Thomas and from the rhythm of specifically Thomist spirituality, 
from a way of seeing and understanding the human situation attuned to 
ulteriority rather than to periodicity as the means of its interpretation.
Temperamentally as well as by profession Kenelm Foster lived in the 
company of one whom he believed to be incomparably gifted in point both 
of holiness and of erudition, of one who offered a perfect example of how 
to be a Christian in – as Kenelm himself used to say – the Dominican way 
of being a Christian.16 And this, he thought, this special combination of 
and which is signified by the heavenly paradise. Now these two kinds of happiness must 
be reached by different means, as representing different ends. For we attain the first 
through the teachings of philosophy, provided that we follow them putting into practice 
the moral and intellectual virtues; whereas we attain the second through spiritual 
teachings which transcend human reason, provided that we follow them putting into 
practice the theological virtues, namely faith, hope and charity.
15 Dante and Philosophy cit. (note 9 above), p. 212.
16 K. Foster, O.P., The Mind in Love, Aquinas Society of London, Aquinas paper no. 
25 (London: Blackfriars, 1956); God’s Tree: Essays on Dante and Other Matters (London: 
Blackfriars, 1957), with, at pp. 141-49, an essay entitled ‘The Tact of St Thomas’; ‘Religion 
and Philosophy in Dante’, in The Mind of Dante (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1965), pp. 47-78 (subsequently in Dante. The Critical Complex, 8 vols, ed. R. Lansing (New 
York and London: Routledge, 2003), vol. 6, pp. 113-44); ‘Tommaso d’Aquino’, in the 
Enciclopedia dantesca, 6 vols (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970-76), vol. 5, 
pp. 626-49; Dante e San Tommaso (Rome: Casa di Dante, 1975; lecture of 17 November, 
1974 at the Casa di Dante in Rome); The Two Dantes and Other Studies (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1977), with, at pp. 56-65, ‘St Thomas and Dante’; ‘Purgatorio 
XXII’, in Cambridge Readings in Dante’s Comedy, ed. K. Foster and P. Boyde (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 138-54; ‘Dante’s Idea of Purgatory, with Special 
Reference to Purgatorio XXI.58-66’, in Dies Illa. Death in the Middle Ages (Proceedings of 
the 1983 Manchester Colloquium), ed. J. H. M. Taylor (Liverpool: Cairns, 1984), pp. 97-
106; ‘Dante and Two Friars: Paradiso XI-XII’, New Blackfriars 66 (1985), 480-96 (and, 
in a revised form, as ‘Gli elogi danteschi di san Francesco e di san Domenico’, in Dante 
e il francescanesimo (Lectura Dantis Metelliana) (Cava di Tirreni: Avagliano, 1987), pp. 
229-49). Also (ed. and trans.), The Life of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Biographical Documents 
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piety and precision, was what Dante too saw in him. What Dante saw in 
Thomas, Kenelm thought, was the power to structured consciousness, to 
an orderly expression of the idea in all the complexity of the idea; so, for 
example, on intellectual discretion and, implicitly, Thomas as exemplary 
in this area, this passage from the Convivio at IV.viii.1: ‘Lo più bello ramo 
che de la radice razionale consurga si è la discrezione. Ché, sì come dice 
Tommaso sopra lo prologo de l’Etica, “conoscere l’ordine d’una cosa ad 
altra è proprio atto di ragione”, e è questa discrezione’,17 a passage which, 
taken together with the ‘infiammata cortesia / di fra Tommaso e ’l discreto 
latino’ moment of Par. XII.143-44,18 determines the shape and substance 
of the ‘Con questa distinzion prendi ’l mio detto’ sequence of Paradiso XIII 
as a hymn to the properties of the Thomist mind in act:
 Non ho parlato sì, che tu non posse
ben veder ch’el fu re, che chiese senno
acciò che re sufficïente fosse;
 non per sapere il numero in che enno
li motor di qua sù, o se necesse
con contingente mai necesse fenno;
 non si est dare primum motum esse,
o se del mezzo cerchio far si puote
trïangol sì ch’un retto non avesse.
 Onde, se ciò ch’io dissi e questo note,
regal prudenza è quel vedere impari
in che lo stral di mia intenzion percuote;
 e se al “surse” drizzi li occhi chiari,
vedrai aver solamente respetto
ai regi, che son molti, e ’ buon son rari.
 Con questa distinzion prendi ’l mio detto;
(London: Longmans, 1959), and, with P. Boyde, Dante’s Lyric Poetry, 2 vols (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1967). C. Ryan, ‘Kenelm Foster on Dante’, New Blackfriars 59 (1978), 
187-92; M. Roddewig, ‘In memorian Pater Kenelm Foster, O.P. (26.12.1910-6.2.1986)’, 
in Mitteilungsblatt der deutschen Dante Gesellschaft (1986), 20; P. Boitani, ‘Kenelm Foster: la 
mente innamorata’, in Dante e la Bibbia. Atti del convegno internazionale promosso da ‘Biblia’, 
Firenze, 26-28 settembre 1986, ed. G. Barblan (Florence: Olschki, 1988), pp. 63-66; W. 
Wilson, ‘Kenelm Foster’, Lectura Dantis 8 (1991), 20-22.
17 The fairest branch that springs from the root of reason is discretion, for, as Thomas says, 
commenting on the prologue to the Ethics, “To know how one thing is related to another 
is the distinctive act of reason”, this being precisely what discretion is.  Aquinas, In Eth. I. 
i, note 1: ‘Sicut philosophus dicit in principio metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius 
ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere 
ordinem. Nam etsi vires sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius 
rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis’; ScG I.i.2, etc.
18 the glowing courtesy and the well-judged discourse of Brother Thomas ...
Between Philology and Friendship 15
e così puote star con quel che credi
del primo padre e del nostro Diletto.
 E questo ti sia sempre piombo a’ piedi,
per farti mover lento com’ uom lasso
e al sì e al no che tu non vedi:
 ché quelli è tra li stolti bene a basso,
che sanza distinzione afferma e nega
ne l’un così come ne l’altro passo;
 perch’ elli ’ncontra che più volte piega
l’oppinïon corrente in falsa parte,
e poi l’affetto l’intelletto lega.
 Vie più che ’ndarno da riva si parte,
perché non torna tal qual e’ si move,
chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l’arte.
(Par. XIII.94-123)19
Thomas, then, for Dante, was a guide to the refined utterance, a mentor 
in the ways and means of truth under the aspect of articulation: ‘Di qui, per 
concludere, la pressante raccomandazione suaccennata a chiunque si metta 
a “pescare per il vero”, d’imparare con cura “l’arte” di pensare, per conoscere 
dove affermare e dove dubitare, prima di pronunciarsi su materie difficili. 
L’Aquinate dantesco è un educatore.’ 20 At the same time, however, there is 
discernible here a pattern of divergence, an independence of spirit and of 
leading emphasis in just about every area of concern. Cosmologically, then, 
there is little in Aquinas to encourage Dante in his – from a Thomist point 
19 I have not so spoken that you cannot plainly see that he was a king, who asked for 
wisdom, in order that he might be a worthy king; not to know the number of the mover 
spirits here above, nor if necesse with a contingent ever made necesse; nor si est dare primum 
motum esse; nor if in a semicircle a triangle can be so constructed that it shall have no 
right angle. Wherefore, if you note this along with what I said, kingly prudence is that 
peerless vision on which the arrow of my intention strikes. And if to ‘rose’ you turn your 
discerning eyes, you will see it has respect only to kings – who are many and the good are 
rare. Take my words with this distinction, and they can stand thus with what you believe 
of the first father and of our beloved. And let this ever be as lead to your feet, to make 
you slow, like a weary man, in moving either to the yes or the no which you see not; for he 
is right low down among the fools, alike in the one and in the other case, who affirms or 
denies without distinguishing; because it happens that oftentimes hasty opinion inclines 
to the wrong side, and then fondness for it binds the intellect. Far worse than in vain does 
he leave the shore (since he returns not as he puts forth) who fishes for the truth and has 
not the art.
20 Hence, to conclude, the above advice to anyone about to ‘go fishing for the truth’ to 
the effect that he should master carefully the ‘art’ of thinking, of knowing when to affirm 
and when to hold back, before pronouncing on difficult matters. Dante’s Aquinas, in 
short, is an educator (Dante e San Tommaso, note 16 above, p. 19).
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of view – extravagant commitment to secondary causality as the means of 
divine purposefulness in the world,21 while metaphysically Dante reflects 
but faintly Thomas’s preoccupation with the Pentateuchal I AM as a basis 
for something approaching a revolution in respect of every kind of ancient 
essentialism, every antique preference for whatness as distinct from thereness 
as an object of concern.22 And what applies in the area of cosmology and 
metaphysics applies also in that of anthropology and psychology; for if 
Dante’s is a sense of the rational soul as the entelechy or formal principle 
21 Conv. III.vi.5: ‘e però che Dio è universalissima cagione di tutte le cose, conoscendo lui, 
tutte le cose conosce in sé, secondo lo modo de la Intelligenza. Per che tutte le Intelligenze 
conoscono la forma umana, in quanto ella è per intenzione regolata ne la divina mente; 
e massimamente conoscono quella le Intelligenze motrici, però che sono spezialissime 
cagioni di quella e d’ogni forma generale, e conoscono quella perfettissima, tanto quanto 
essere puote, sì come loro regola ed essemplo’; Par. II.121-23: ‘Questi organi del mondo 
così vanno, / come tu vedi omai, di grado in grado, / che di sù prendono e di sotto fanno’; 
VII.130-38: ‘Li angeli, frate, e ’l paese sincero / nel qual tu se’, dir si posson creati, / sì 
come sono, in loro essere intero; / ma li alimenti che tu hai nomati / e quelle cose che di 
lor si fanno / da creata virtù sono informati. / Creata fu la materia ch’elli hanno; / creata 
fu la virtù informante / in queste stelle che ’ntorno a lor vanno.’ Thomas, ScG III.lxvi.6: 
‘Secundum ordinem causarum est ordo effectuum. Primum autem in omnibus effectibus 
est esse: nam omnia alia sunt quaedam determinationes ipsius. Igitur esse est proprius 
effectus primi agentis, et omnia alia agunt ipsum inquantum agunt in virtute primi 
agentis. Secunda autem agentia, quae sunt quasi particulantes et determinantes actionem 
primi agentis, agunt sicut proprios effectus alias perfectiones, quae determinant esse’; ST 
Ia.65.4 resp.: ‘Et ideo, cum simile fiat a suo simili, non est quaerenda causa formarum 
corporalium aliqua forma immaterialis; sed aliquod compositum, secundum quod hic 
ignis generatur ab hoc igne. Sic igitur formae corporales causantur, non quasi influxae 
ab aliqua immateriali forma, sed quasi materia reducta de potentia in actum ab aliquo 
agente composito’, etc. A. Mellone, O.F.M., La dottrina di Dante Alighieri sulla prima creazione 
(Salerno: Convento S. Maria degli Angeli, 1950, and in Saggi e letture dantesche. Lectura 
Dantis Metelliana (Angri (Salerno): Editrice Gaia, 2005), pp. 21-87); idem, ‘Emanatismo 
neoplatonico di Dante per le citazioni del Liber de Causis’, Divus Thomas 54 (1951), 205-12; 
idem, ‘Il concorso delle creature nella produzione delle cose secondo Dante’, Divus Thomas 
56 (1953), 273-86, and in Saggi e letture dantesche cit., pp. 89-110; idem, ‘Il canto XXIX del 
Paradiso’, in Nuove letture dantesche (Casa di Dante, Roma), 7 (Florence: Le Monnier, 1974), 
193-213 (subsequently in Saggi e letture dantesche cit., pp. 157-74, with the title ‘Il canto 
XXIX del Paradiso. (Una lezione di angelologia)’); B. Nardi, ‘Il canto XXIX del Paradiso’, 
Convivium 24 (1956), 294-302; S. Bemrose, Dante’s Angelic Intelligences. Their Importance in 
the Cosmos and in Pre-Christian Religion (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1983).
22 K. Foster, O.P., Dante e San Tommaso cit. (note 16 above), p. 11, with reference both to 
Thomas (ST Ia 3.4; ScG I.xxii and xxviii, etc.) and E. Gilson (Le Thomisme (note 9 above), 
pp. 44-58, 515-18): ‘A simile conclusione ci porterebbe, io credo, un accurato confronto 
... fra lo scarso uso che fa Dante del termine “esse”, o “essere”, in senso filosofico, e l’uso 
diffusissimo e personalissimo che ne fa Tommaso – al segno che questo dell’“esse”, ossia 
dell’“actus essendi”, può chiamarsi il vero e proprio concetto chiave della sua metafisica, 
quello per cui (secondo Tommaso) meglio si coglie e si misura e la realtà intrinseca di 
ogni cosa ed i suoi rapporti con Dio, il quale appunto è l’“ipsum esse subsistens”, e perciò 
l’unica sorgente dello “esse” di qualsiasi cosa.’
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of the psychosomatic whole in man, then the Convivio testifies on more than 
one occasion to something closer to the pneumatic, to a sense of the soul as 
a spiritual entity captive pro tempore to the flesh;23 and if Dante’s is a sense 
of the empirical and abstractive mechanism of properly human intellection, 
he, unlike Thomas, is inclined to opt for the possible rather than for the 
active intellect as the principle of specifically human being.24 Clearly, the 
argument requires – and in Kenelm always enjoys – careful statement, 
Dante’s, again, being a virtually unqualified admiration for Thomas as 
the embodiment of Christian-theological wisdom and sanctity (‘nel santo 
dottore il genio di Dante percepiva e ammirava qualcosa di ben altrimenti 
personale e profondo; voglio dire, una certa combinazione d’intelligenza 
e di santità, tal che le stesse sue qualità di forza e di finezza intellettuale 
fossero insieme riflesso e espressione di probità morale’);25 but for all that, 
23 Conv. III.ii.14: ‘però che l’anima è tanto in quella sovrana potenza nobilitata e 
dinudata da materia, che la divina luce, come in angelo, raggia in quella’; vii.5 ‘Così la 
bontà di Dio è ricevuta altrimenti da le sustanze separate, cioè da li Angeli, che sono 
sanza grossezza di materia, quasi diafani per la purità de la loro forma, e altrimenti 
da l’anima umana, che, avvegna che da una parte sia da materia libera, da un’altra è 
impedita, sì come l’uomo ch’è tutto ne l’acqua fuor del capo, del quale non si può dire che 
tutto sia ne l’acqua né tutto fuor da quella; e altrimenti da li animali, la cui anima tutta 
in materia è compresa, ma alquanto è nobilitata; e altrimenti da le piante, e altrimenti 
da le minere; e altrimenti da la terra che da li altri [elementi], però che è materialissima, 
e però remotissima e improporzionalissima a la prima simplicissima e nobilissima 
vertude, che sola è intellettuale, cioè Dio’, etc. Aquinas, by contrast, ScG II.lxviii (a 
chapter variously interesting from the point of view of the Convivio): ‘Si enim substantia 
intellectualis non unitur corpori solum ut motor, ut Plato posuit, neque continuatur ei 
solum per phantasmata, ut dixit Averroes, sed ut forma; neque tamen intellectus quo 
homo intelligit, est praeparatio in humana natura, ut dixit Alexander; neque complexio, 
ut Galenus; neque harmonia, ut Empedocles; neque corpus, vel sensus, vel imaginatio, 
ut antiqui dixerunt: relinquitur quod anima humana sit intellectualis substantia corpori 
unita ut forma’ (2); ST Ia.76.1 resp. etc.
24 Mon. I.iii.6-7: ‘sed esse apprehensivum per intellectum possibilem ... Patet igitur quod 
ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive virtus intellectiva’, à propos of 
which K. Foster, O.P., Dante e San Tommaso (note 16 above), pp. 10-11: ‘E mi sembra 
molto significativo che quando Dante vuol dare, nella Monarchia, una definizione precisa 
dell’agire umano in quanto tale, tira in campo solo lo “intellectus possibilis”, asserendo che 
il “constitutivum spetiei” dell’uomo è “esse apprehensivum per intellectum possibilem” – 
formula inconcepibile in bocca a sanTommaso, ma a cui avrebbe potuto sottoscrivere 
benissimo un filosofo così lontano dal tomismo come fu, ad esempio, il francescano 
inglese Roger Bacon. Insomma, l’assenza totale d”“intellectus agens” dal lessico di Dante 
è argomento piuttosto forte contro il suo tomismo.’ Aquinas, ScG II.lxxvi.20: ‘Operatio 
autem propria hominis est intelligere: cuius primum principium est intellectus agens, qui 
facit species intelligibiles, a quibus patitur quodammodo intellectus possibilis, qui factus 
in actu, movet voluntatem’; ST Ia.79.3, etc.
25 in the saintly doctor Dante in his wisdom saw and admired something far more 
personal and profound, by which I mean a certain combination of intelligence and 
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there is no disguising the otherness of Dante’s thinking with respect to 
the ipse dixit of the master, his willingness for the sake of an alternative 
spirituality to embrace the alternative solution.
3. By the time, then, of Kenelm Foster’s initiative the myth of Dante’s 
Thomism – certainly if by this we mean anything approaching a sense 
of his systematic espousal of Thomist positions in key areas of moral-
philosophical, natural-philosophical and theological concern – had been 
laid. Fashioned by a desire to claim the text for Thomas and for Thomism 
as normative in the area of Christian-theological understanding, it had 
gradually been dismantled in favour of something closer to contrast than 
to continuity as the hallmark of a relationship nonetheless decisive for 
Dante’s emergence as a philosophical and theological spirit. But for all the 
power and persuasiveness of the argument so far, there is still a way to 
go; for to live with the question of Dante and Aquinas is to be impressed 
by two things: (a) by the way in which it stands to be proposed in terms, 
not so much of the what, as of the how of Dante’s reading of Thomas, not 
so much of the substance as of the psychology of that reading, and (b) by the 
notion that, mediated as it is by the problematics of existence as verified 
by the subject of that existence, Dante’s, vis-à-vis that of Aquinas, is a 
revised sense of the theological project in its essential shape and structure. 
As far, then, as the first of these things is concerned we may begin by 
saying that, in a manner apt to defy the mathematics of the case – just five 
references in all, four in the Convivio and one in the Monarchia26 – Thomas 
holiness, such that these selfsame qualities of strength and intellectual finesse were in 
one and the same moment a reflection and an expression of moral integrity (Dante e San 
Tommaso, note 16 above, p. 17).
26 Conv. IV.xv.12: ‘Ché, secondo la malizia de l’anima, tre orribili infermitadi ne la 
mente de li uomini ho vedute. L’una è di naturale jattanza causata: ché sono molti tanto 
presuntuosi, che si credono tutto sapere, e per questo le non certe cose affermano per 
certe; lo qual vizio Tullio massimamente abomina nel primo de li Offici e Tommaso 
nel suo Contra-li-Gentili, dicendo: “Sono molti tanto di suo ingegno presuntuosi, che 
credono col suo intelletto poter misurare tutte le cose, estimando tutto vero quello che a 
loro pare, falso quello che a loro non pare”’ (ScG I.v.4: ‘Sunt enim quidam tantum de suo 
ingenio praesumentes ut totam rerum naturam se reputent suo intellectu posse metiri, 
aestimantes scilicet totum esse verum quod eis videtur et falsum quod eis non videtur’); 
Conv. IV.xxx.3: ‘Dico adunque: Contra-li-erranti mia. Questo Contra-li-erranti è tutto una 
parte, e è nome d’esta canzone, tolto per essemplo del buono frate Tommaso d’Aquino, 
che a un suo libro, che fece a confusione di tutti quelli che disviano da nostra Fede, 
puose nome Contra li Gentili’; Mon. II.iv.1: ‘sicut dicit Thomas in tertio suo contra Gentiles, 
miraculum est quod preter ordinem in rebus comuniter institutum divinitus fit’ (ScG III.
xcix.2: ‘Potest autem Deus praeter hunc ordinem facere: ut scilicet ipse effectum aliquem 
in inferioribus operetur, nihil ad hoc agente superiori agente’). For the commentary on 
the Ethics, Conv. II.xiv.14: ‘Lo Cielo cristallino, che per Primo Mobile dinanzi è contato, 
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is everywhere discernible as that whereby Dante feels able to settle on 
the exact notional and expressive solution. Instances abound, but to take 
first the least complicated of them there is, for example, the ‘oportet igitur 
ultimum finem universi esse bonum intellectus’ of ScG I.i.427 for the ‘ben 
de l’intelletto’ of Inf. III.18 at the heart of his anthropology and ethic;28 
or the ‘ut ex hoc ad divinum amorem inflammarentur’ of ScG IV.lv.1329 
for the ‘Questo decreto, frate, sta sepulto / a li occhi di ciascuno il cui 
ingegno / ne la fiamma d’amor non è adulto’ of Par. VII.58-60 at the heart 
of his soteriology;30 or the ‘si aliquis non videret solem et lunam et alia 
astra’ of ScG II.xcii.931 for the ‘amor che move il sole e l’altre stelle’ of 
Par. XXXIII.145 at the heart of his affective theology.32 Everywhere 
the pattern is the same, for everywhere it is a question of Thomas’s 
functioning, not merely as a master or mentor, but as a friend or fellow 
traveller, as one co-involved at the point of precise understanding and 
exact expression. And what applies at the level of the merely phrasal, 
clausular or otherwise minimal syntactic unit applies also at the level of 
ha comparazione assai manifesta a la Morale Filosofia; ché Morale Filosofia, secondo che 
dice Tommaso sopra lo secondo de l’Etica, ordina noi a l’altre scienze’ (In eth. I, lect. 2, note 
7: ‘Optimus finis pertinet ad principalissimam scientiam, et maxime architectonicam. 
Et hoc patet ex his, quae supra praemissa sunt. Dictum est enim quod sub scientia 
vel arte quae est de fine continentur illae quae sunt circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Et 
sic oportet quod ultimus finis pertineat ad scientiam principalissimam, tamquam de 
principalissimo fine existentem, et maxime architectonicae, tamquam praecipienti aliis 
quid oporteat facere. Sed civilis scientia videtur esse talis, scilicet principalissima, et 
maxime architectonica. Ergo ad eam pertinet considerare optimum finem’); Conv. 
IV.viii.1: ‘Lo più bello ramo che de la radice razionale consurga si è la discrezione. Ché, sì 
come dice Tommaso sopra lo prologo de l’Etica, “conoscere l’ordine d’una cosa ad altra è 
proprio atto di ragione”, e è questa discrezione’ (In eth. I, lect. 1, note 1: ‘Sicut philosophus 
dicit in principio metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est, quia sapientia est 
potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem ...’).
27 the ultimate end of the universe must therefore be the good of the intellect ...; cf. 
the ‘bonum igitur intellectus etiam in cognitione mali consistit’ of I.lxxi.4 and the ‘nam 
verum est bonum intellectus et finis ipsius’ of II.lxxxiv.4.
28 [We have come to the place where you will see the wretched people who have lost] 
the good of the intellect.
29 [First, indeed, because it was necessary for men to know the beneficence of the 
Incarnation] so as to be thereby inflamed in the divine love.
30 This decree, brother, is buried from the eyes of everyone whose understanding is not 
matured within love’s flame.
31 [In the same way, a person who had not seen] the sun or the moon or the other stars 
[and had heard that they were incorruptible bodies, might call them by the names of these 
corruptible bodies ...].
32 [Here power failed the lofty phantasy; but already my desire and my will were 
revolved, like a wheel that is evenly moved, by the] love which moves the sun and the 
other stars.
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the period as a whole, where again the original utterance is on hand, not 
so much to determine the Dantean initiative in its precise notional and 
linguistic complexion, as to free the reader for an independent movement 
of the mind; so, for example, in respect of these lines (1-12) from Purgatorio 
IV on the psychology of layered consciousness, on the binding and loosing 
of the soul in circumstances of intense concentration:
 Quando per dilettanze o ver per doglie,
che alcuna virtù nostra comprenda,
l’anima bene ad essa si raccoglie,
 par ch’a nulla potenza più intenda;
e questo è contra quello error che crede
ch’un’anima sovr’ altra in noi s’accenda.
 E però, quando s’ode cosa o vede
che tegna forte a sé l’anima volta,
vassene ’l tempo e l’uom non se n’avvede;
 ch’altra potenza è quella che l’ascolta,
e altra è quella c’ha l’anima intera:
questa è quasi legata e quella è sciolta.33
this passage from the Contra gentiles at II.lviii.10 on the referability of 
every movement of the mind to one and the same intellectual principle, to 
the rational soul as one and undivided in essence and operation:
Videmus autem quod diversae actiones animae impediunt se: cum 
enim una est intensa, altera remittitur. Oportet igitur quod istae 
actiones, et vires quae sunt earum proxima principia, reducantur in 
unum principium ... quae est anima. Relinquitur igitur quod omnes 
actiones animae quae sunt in nobis, ab anima una procedunt. Et sic 
non sunt in nobis plures animae.34
Here, certainly, it is a question of reading, reception and the subtle 
psychology thereof, for if on the one hand there is enough in Dante by way 
33 When through impression of pleasure or of pain, which some one of our faculties 
receives, the soul is entirely centred thereon, it seems that it gives heed to no other of 
its powers; and this is contrary to that error which holds that one soul above the other 
is kindled within us; and therefore when aught is heard or seen which holds the soul 
strongly bent to it, the time passes away and we perceive it not, for one faculty is that 
which notes it, and another that which possesses the entire soul, the latter as it were 
bound, the former free.
34 Now we observe that the diverse actions of the soul hinder one another, for when one is 
intense another is remiss. Therefore, these actions and powers that are proximate principles 
must be referred to one principle ... which is the soul. It follows, then, that all the actions of 
the soul which are in us proceed from the one soul. Thus, there are not several souls in us.
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of sameness to suggest an element of positive borrowing (the ‘questo è contra 
quello error che crede / ch’un’anima sovr’ altra in noi s’accenda’ of lines 5 
and 6 for Thomas’s ‘Et sic non sunt in nobis plures animae’, or the ‘altra 
potenza è quella che l’ascolta, / e altra è quella c’ha l’anima intera’ of lines 
10 and 11 for Thomas’s ‘cum enim una est intensa, altera remittitur’), there 
is at the same time sufficient by way of otherness – Dante’s proposal of the 
question in terms of distraction and temporality, of the waylaying of self 
by its own passing preoccupations – to confirm something more refined 
than this, namely, the function of the original utterance as a means of 
emancipation, as that whereby, far from being constrained by the text, the 
spirit is empowered in respect of a discourse uniquely and unmistakably its 
own. And what applies to this passage from the early part of the Purgatorio 
applies also to the love-meditation in the central part of the canticle, where 
again it is a question, less of authorization, than of formed friendship, of 
companionship as the means of laying hold of the idea and thus of self itself 
in its now – for the moment at least – settled disposition. The question here is 
one of astral determinism, of the role of the stars in making us what we are. 
If, then, as Dante is willing to allow, the stars do indeed have some part to 
play in the shaping of self, this can only ever be preliminary, their role being 
at best dispositive, a matter of readying the soul for the task of free moral 
choice; for man as man, he believes, is moved, not so much by those forces 
ranged over against him, be they ever so exalted, as by free will as that 
whereby he most commends himself to God (the ‘e quel ch’e’ più apprezza’ 
of Par. V.21),35 his, therefore, being a nobler species of subjection, the kind of 
subjection amounting to perfect freedom. The key lines (XVI.58-84) run 
as follows:
 “Lo mondo è ben così tutto diserto
d’ogne virtute, come tu mi sone,
e di malizia gravido e coverto;
 ma priego che m’addite la cagione,
sì ch’i’ la veggia e ch’i’ la mostri altrui;
ché nel cielo uno, e un qua giù la pone”.
 Alto sospir, che duolo strinse in “uhi!”,
mise fuor prima; e poi cominciò: “Frate,
lo mondo è cieco, e tu vien ben da lui.
 Voi che vivete ogne cagion recate
pur suso al cielo, pur come se tutto
movesse seco di necessitate.
 Se così fosse, in voi fora distrutto
libero arbitrio, e non fora giustizia
35 and that which he most prizes ...
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per ben letizia, e per male aver lutto.
 Lo cielo i vostri movimenti inizia;
non dico tutti, ma, posto ch’i’ ’l dica,
lume v’è dato a bene e a malizia,
 e libero voler; che, se fatica
ne le prime battaglie col ciel dura,
poi vince tutto, se ben si notrica.
 A maggior forza e a miglior natura
liberi soggiacete; e quella cria
la mente in voi, che ’l ciel non ha in sua cura.
 Però, se ’l mondo presente disvia,
in voi è la cagione, in voi sì cheggia;
e io te ne sarò or vera spia.”36
relative to which we may note the following extracts from the Contra 
gentiles at III.lxxxv.11 and 19-20:
Frustra etiam darentur leges et praecepta vivendi, si homo suarum 
electionum dominus non esset. Frustra etiam adhiberentur poenae et 
praemia bonis aut malis, ex quo non est in nobis haec vel illa eligere. 
His autem desinentibus, statim socialis vita corrumpitur. Non igitur 
homo est sic secundum ordinem providentiae institutus ut electiones 
eius ex motibus caelestium corporum proveniant ... Sciendum tamen 
est quod, licet corpora caelestia non sint directe causa electionum 
nostrarum quasi directe in voluntates nostras imprimentia, indirecte 
tamen ex eis aliqua occasio nostris electionibus praestatur, secundum 
quod habent impressionem super corpora ... Manifestum autem est, 
et experimento cognitum, quod tales occasiones, sive sint exteriores 
sive sint interiores, non sunt causa necessaria electionis: cum homo 
per rationem possit eis resistere vel obedire ... quia scilicet impressio 
36 “The world is indeed as utterly deserted by every virtue as you declare to me, and 
pregnant and overspread with iniquity, but I beg you to point out to me the cause, so 
that I may see it and show it to men, for one places it in the heavens and another here 
below.” He first heaved a deep sigh which grief wrung into an “Ah me!”, and then began, 
“Brother, the world is blind, and truly you come from it! You who are living refer every 
cause upward to the heavens alone, as if they of necessity moved all things with them. 
If this were so, free will would be destroyed in you, and there would be no justice in 
happiness for good or grief for evil. The heavens initiate your movements – I do not say 
all of them, but given for the moment that that is what I am saying, a light is given you 
to know good and evil, and free will, which if it endure fatigue in its first battles with 
the heavens, afterwards, if it is well nurtured, it conquers completely. You lie subject, in 
your freedom, to a greater power and to a better nature, and that creates the mind in you 
which the heavens have not in their charge. Therefore if the present world goes astray, 
in you is the cause and in you let it be sought; and I shall now bear you true testimony 
in this.”
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stellarum in pluribus sortitur effectum, qui non resistunt inclinationi 
quae est ex corpore; non autem semper in hoc vel in illo, qui forte per 
rationem naturali inclinationi resistit.37
Again, there is plenty here to sustain the critic in the more routine 
aspects of his calling, in the pinning down of Dante to his sources: 
Thomas’s ‘frustra etiam adhiberentur poenae et praemia bonis aut malis, 
ex quo non est in nobis haec vel illa eligere’ for Dante’s ‘non fora giustizia 
/ per ben letizia, e per male aver lutto’, or Thomas’s ‘licet corpora caelestia 
non sint directe causa electionum nostrarum quasi directe in voluntates 
nostras imprimentia’ for Dante’s ‘Lo cielo i vostri movimenti inizia; / non 
dico tutti ...’, or Thomas’s ‘cum homo per rationem possit eis resistere 
vel obedire’ for Dante’s ‘lume v’è dato a bene e a malizia, / libero voler’. 
But here too there is sufficient by way of difference – by way of Dante’s 
reconfiguration and indeed re-substantiation of the text in point both 
of emphasis (the ‘A maggior forza e a miglior natura / liberi soggiacete’ 
moment of lines 79-81) and of expressivity (the ‘duolo strinse in “uhi!”’ 
moment of lines 64-66) – to encourage him in a sense of something at 
once more subtle and sublime than this, namely in a sense of the text as a 
principle of deliverance, as that whereby the receptive spirit is made equal 
at last to the matter in hand.
As a third example of textuality under the aspect of friendship we 
may take Dante’s account in the Paradiso of the role of providence both 
in fashioning personality and in ensuring its proper functionality as an 
instrument of God’s purposes in the world. If, then, nature, in the sense of 
natura naturans, does a good job in perpetuating the species, it is down to 
providence as operative through the stars that the individual is confirmed 
(a) in the fullness of his individuality, and (b) in his status as a means 
of divine intentionality:
37 Besides, it would be useless for laws and rules of living to be promulgated if man were 
not master of his own choices. Useless, too, would be the employment of punishments and 
rewards for good or evil deeds, in regard to which it is not in our power to choose one 
or the other. In fact, if these things disappear, social life is at once corrupted. Therefore, 
man is not so established by the order of providence that his choices originate from the 
motions of the celestial bodies ... Yet we should note that, though celestial bodies are not 
directly the cause of our choices, in the sense of directly making impressions on our wills, 
some occasion for our choices may be indirectly offered by them, because they do make 
an impression on bodies ... Moreover, it is plain and well known by experience that such 
occasions, whether they are external or internal, are not the necessary cause of choice, 
since man is able, on the basis of reason, either to resist or obey them. But there are many 
who follow natural impulses, while but few, the wise only, do not take these occasions of 
acting badly and of following those natural impulses.
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 Ond’ elli ancora: “Or dì: sarebbe il peggio
per l’omo in terra, se non fosse cive?”
“Sì”, rispuos’ io; “e qui ragion non cheggio”.
 E puot’ elli esser, se giù non si vive
diversamente per diversi offici?
Non, se ’l maestro vostro ben vi scrive”.
 Sì venne deducendo infino a quici;
poscia conchiuse: “Dunque esser diverse
convien di vostri effetti le radici:
 per ch’un nasce Solone e altro Serse,
altro Melchisedèch e altro quello
che, volando per l’aere, il figlio perse.
 La circular natura, ch’è suggello
a la cera mortal, fa ben sua arte,
ma non distingue l’un da l’altro ostello.
 Quinci addivien ch’Esaù si diparte
per seme da Iacòb; e vien Quirino
da sì vil padre, che si rende a Marte.
 Natura generata il suo cammino
simil farebbe sempre a’ generanti,
se non vincesse il proveder divino”.
(Par. VIII.115-35)38
Here as before, the line is perfectly Dantean, perfectly secure in point 
both of substance and of expression. Wanting for nothing, it proceeds 
with superlative assurance to address a complex issue – the interplay of 
providence and of personality within the economy of the whole – by way of 
a series of propositions (socio-political, world-historical and theological) 
as robust in conception as they are in articulation. But for all that, the 
Thomist text is once again everywhere to hand as that whereby the 
hitherto anxious spirit comes home to itself on the plane of understanding:
Sicut supra ostensum est, divina providentia ad omnia singularia 
se extendit, etiam minima. Quibuscumque igitur sunt aliquae 
38 Whereupon he again, “Now say, would it be worse for man on earth if he were not 
a citizen?” “Yes”, I replied, “and here I ask for no proof.” “And can that be, unless men 
below live in diverse ways for diverse duties? Not if your master writes well of this for 
you.” Thus he came deducing as far as here, then he concluded, “Therefore the roots of 
your works must needs be diverse, so that one is born Solon and another Xerxes, one 
Melchizedek and another he who flew through the air and lost his son. Circling nature, 
which is a seal on the mortal wax, performs its art well, but does not distinguish one 
house from another. Whence it happens that Esau differs in the seed from Jacob, and 
Quirinus comes from so base a father that he is ascribed to Mars. The begotten nature 
would always make its course like its begetters, did not divine provision overrule.”
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actiones praeter inclinationem speciei, oportet quod per divinam 
providentiam regulentur in suis actibus praeter directionem quae 
pertinet ad speciem. Sed in rationali creatura apparent multae 
actiones ad quas non sufficit inclinatio speciei: cuius signum est quod 
non similes sunt in omnibus, sed variae in diversis. Oportet igitur 
quod rationalis creatura dirigatur a Deo ad suos actus non solum 
secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum.Item. Deus 
unicuique naturae providet secundum ipsius capacitatem: tales enim 
singulas creaturas condidit quales aptas esse cognovit ut per suam 
gubernationem pervenirent ad finem. Sola autem creatura rationalis 
est capax directionis qua dirigitur ad suos actus non solum secundum 
speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum: habet enim intellectum 
et rationem, unde percipere possit quomodo diversimode sit aliquid 
bonum vel malum secundum quod congruit diversis individuis, 
temporibus et locis. Sola igitur creatura rationalis dirigitur a Deo 
ad suos actus non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum 
individuum.
(ScG III.cxiii.3-4)39
Here again, everything is ready and waiting, the authoritative text 
reaching out to shape and substantiate the argument: the co-subsistence of 
specificity and singularity as properties of human being under the aspect 
of time and space; time and space themselves as the arena of properly 
human being and becoming; selfhood and the uniqueness thereof as the 
means of divine purposefulness in the world, of God’s carrying out the 
cosmic plan. Dante, then, could not but have been impressed. Everything 
is there, everything one could possibly wish for when it comes to human 
39 Besides, as we showed above, divine providence extends to all singular things, even 
to the least. In the case of those beings, then, whose actions take place apart from the 
inclination appropriate to their species, it is necessary for them to be regulated in their 
acts by divine providence, over and above the direction which pertains to the species. But 
many actions are evident, in the case of the rational creature, for which the inclination 
of the species is not enough. The mark of this is that such actions are not alike in all, 
but differ in various cases. Therefore, the rational creature must be directed by God in 
his acts, not only specifically, but also individually. Moreover, God takes care of each 
nature according to its capacity; indeed, he created singular creatures of such kinds that 
he knew were suited to achieving the end under his governance. Now, only the rational 
creature is capable of this direction, whereby his actions are guided, not only specifically, 
but also individually. For he possesses understanding and reason, and consequently he 
can grasp in what different ways a thing may be good or bad, depending on its suitability 
for various individuals, times and places. Therefore, only the rational creature is directed 
in his acts by God, individually as well as specifically.  III. cxxxiv.2: ‘Haec autem 
distributio diversorum officiorum in diversas personas fit divina providentia, secundum 
quod quidam inclinantur magis ad hoc officium quam ad alia’, etc.
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and divine intentionality and their coalescence in re. But for all the 
decisiveness of the archetypal text, it is a question here, less of authority, 
than of alongsidedness, of how it is that, from out of the garner both of 
his goodness and of his generosity, one man furnishes another with the 
means of orderly intellection and thus of orderly actualization. The text, 
in other words, functions as great texts always do, as that whereby those 
shaped by them at last stand securely in their own presence, thereafter to 
rejoice in their indebtedness to everyone and no-one.
But with this we are still in the foothills when it comes to Dante, 
Aquinas and the relationship between them; for companionship as a cause 
for celebration in circumstances of sameness, of a common mind among 
those party to it, comes most completely into its own in circumstances of 
otherness, of an alternative way of seeing, setting up and resolving the 
matter to hand. Yet here too, in circumstances of otherness amounting 
to out and out opposition, Thomas is once again on hand to assist in 
determining the key emphasis. Take, for example, the case of Conv. III.
xv.8-10, a passage designed to stave off a collapse of the whole project 
in consequence of its now well-nigh impossibly contradictory character. 
The problem is readily stated, for having in the first treatise of the book 
committed himself to the possibility of a species of philosophical happiness 
appropriate to men and women bowed down by civic and domestic care 
and thus without the leisure for speculation,40 and having in the third 
treatise secured the notion of philosophy as the love of wisdom first and 
foremost in the mind of God,41 Dante is suddenly struck by the implications 
of the position he has now reached for the viability of his undertaking 
generally in the Convivio; for if philosophy is first and foremost the love 
of wisdom in the mind of God, then what use philosophy to the man in 
the street, to those looking for something more pragmatic, more medium 
term? Happily, a solution is to hand, Dante’s, in this twilight phase of 
40 Conv. I.ix.5 and i.4: ‘Ché la bontà de l’animo, la quale questo servigio attende, è 
in coloro che per malvagia disusanza del mondo hanno lasciata la litteratura a coloro 
che l’hanno fatta di donna meretrice; e questi nobili sono principi, baroni, cavalieri, e 
molt’altra nobile gente, non solamente maschi ma femmine, che sono molti e molte in questa lingua, 
volgari, e non litterati ... Di fuori da l’uomo possono essere similemente due cagioni intese, 
l’una de le quali è induttrice di necessitade, l’altra di pigrizia. La prima è la cura familiare e 
civile, la quale convenevolmente a sé tiene de li uomini lo maggior numero, sì che in ozio di speculazione 
esser non possono’.
41 Conv. III.xii.12-13: ‘Ché se a memoria si reduce ciò che detto è di sopra, filosofia è 
uno amoroso uso di sapienza, lo quale massimamente è in Dio, però che in lui è somma 
sapienza e sommo amore e sommo atto; che non può essere altrove, se non in quanto da 
esso procede. È adunque la divina filosofia de la divina essenza, però che in esso non può 
essere cosa a la sua essenzia aggiunta; ed è nobilissima, però che nobilissima è la essenzia 
divina; ed è in lui per modo perfetto e vero, quasi per etterno matrimonio.’
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Convivio III, being a sense of our wanting to know here and now only what 
it is possible for us to know here and now, anything other than this, any 
overshooting of the mark, being both misconceived and unnatural:
A ciò si può chiaramente rispondere che lo desiderio naturale 
in ciascuna cosa è misurato secondo la possibilitade de la cosa 
desiderante: altrimenti andrebbe in contrario di sé medesimo, 
che impossibile è; e la Natura l’avrebbe fatto indarno, che è anche 
impossibile. In contrario andrebbe: ché, desiderando la sua perfezione, 
desiderrebbe la sua imperfezione; imperò che desiderrebbe sé sempre 
desiderare e non compiere mai suo desiderio ... Avrebbelo anco la 
Natura fatto indarno, però che non sarebbe ad alcuno fine ordinato. 
E però l’umano desiderio è misurato in questa vita a quella scienza 
che qui avere si può, e quello punto non passa se non per errore, lo 
quale è di fuori di naturale intenzione ... Onde, con ciò sia cosa che 
conoscere di Dio e di certe altre cose quello esse sono non sia possibile 
a la nostra natura, quello da noi naturalmente non è desiderato di 
sapere. E per questo è la dubitazione soluta.42
That he has now contradicted just about everything he has said 
and is about to say in the Convivio relative to man’s desire for God 
as the beginning and end of all desiring goes without saying,43 the 
42 To this the clear answer can be given that the natural desire in everything is in 
accordance with the capacity of the thing which desires; otherwise the thing would 
strive in a fashion contrary to its own being, which is impossible; and nature would have 
made it in vain, which is also impossible. It would strive in a self-contrary fashion, for in 
desiring its own perfection it would desire its own imperfection, because it would desire 
always to be desiring and never to satisfy its own desire ... Also, Nature would have made 
it in vain, because it would not be directed to any end. Human desire, consequently, is 
measured in this life in accordance with that knowledge which can be gained here, and 
never passes that point except in error, which is something foreign to the intention of 
nature ... Since, then, it is impossible for our nature to know of God what he is (the same 
holds true of certain other things), this is not something which we naturally desire to 
know. In this way the difficulty is resolved.
43 Conv. III.ii.7: ‘E però che naturalissimo è in Dio volere essere – però che, sì come ne 
lo allegato libro si legge, “prima cosa è l’essere, e anzi a quello nulla è” –, l’anima umana 
essere vuole naturalmente con tutto desiderio; e però che ’l suo essere dipende da Dio 
e per quello si conserva, naturalmente disia e vuole essere a Dio unita per lo suo essere 
fortificare’; IV.xii.14: ‘E la ragione è questa: che lo sommo desiderio di ciascuna cosa, e 
prima da la natura dato, è lo ritornare a lo suo principio. E però che Dio è principio de le 
nostre anime e fattore di quelle simili a sé (sì come è scritto: “Facciamo l’uomo ad imagine 
e similitudine nostra”), essa anima massimamente desidera di tornare a quello.’ In the 
Commedia, Purg. XVII.127-29: ‘Ciascun confusamente un bene apprende / nel qual si queti 
l’animo, e disira; / per che di giugner lui ciascun contende’; Par. II.19-21: ‘La concreata e 
perpetüa sete / del deïforme regno cen portava / veloci quasi come ’l ciel vedete’; VII. 142-
44: ‘ma vostra vita sanza mezzo spira / la somma beninanza, e la innamora / di sé sì che poi 
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peremptoriness of it all – the ‘A ciò si può chiaramente rispondere’ 
with which the passage begins and the ‘E per questo è la dubitazione 
soluta’ with which it ends – testifying to his discomfiture at this point.
And that he has also now contradicted everything Aquinas has to say 
on this matter also goes without saying, Thomas’s, albeit with some 
qualifications along the way, being a sense of man’s desire even now, 
this side of death, to know God as the final cause of his every yearning. 
But for all that, it is once again Aquinas who, from out of the apologetic 
abundance of the Contra gentiles, is on hand to furnish, if not the solution 
exactly, then its essential ingredients, the parts necessary for its hasty 
assembly:
Vanum enim est quod est ad finem quem non potest consequi. 
Cum igitur finis hominis sit felicitas, in quam tendit naturale 
ipsius desiderium, non potest poni felicitas hominis in eo ad 
quod homo pervenire non potest: alioquin sequeretur quod homo 
esset in vanum, et naturale eius desiderium esset inane, quod est 
impossibile.
(ScG III.xliv.2)44
Now Thomas, possessed as he is of a sense of the ultimately 
uninterrupted teleology of human desiring, has as we have said no 
interest in the kind of periodization Dante has in mind here, his point in 
this passage being simply that what we cannot know in this life we shall 
know in the next:
Adhuc. Impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane: natura enim 
nihil facit frustra. Esset autem inane desiderium naturae si nunquam 
posset impleri. Est igitur implebile desiderium naturale hominis. Non 
sempre la disira.’ Thomas, ScG III.l.7: ‘Nos autem, quantumcumque sciamus Deum esse 
... non quiescimus desiderio, sed adhuc desideramus eum per essentiam suam cognoscere’; 
ST Ia.44.4 ad 3: ‘omnia appetunt Deum ut finem, appetendo quodcumque bonum, sive 
appetitu intelligibili, sive sensibili, sive naturali, qui est sine cognitione, quia nihil habet 
rationem boni et appetibilis, nisi secundum quod participat Dei similitudinem’, etc.
44 Indeed, a thing is futile which exists for an end which it cannot attain. So, since the 
end of man is felicity, to which his natural desire tends, it is not possible for the felicity 
of man to be placed in something than man cannot achieve. Otherwise, it would follow 
that man is a futile being, and his natural desire would be incapable of fulfilment, which 
is impossible.  For Dante himself on the nature and function of the Contra gentiles as 
an apologetic undertaking, Conv. IV.xxx.3: ‘Dico adunque: Contra-li-erranti mia. Questo 
Contra-li-erranti è tutto una parte, e è nome d’esta canzone, tolto per essemplo del buono 
frate Tommaso d’Aquino, che a un suo libro, che fece a confusione di tutti quelli che 
disviano da nostra Fede, puose nome Contra-li-Gentili.’
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autem in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod impleatur 
post hanc vitam. Est igitur felicitas ultima hominis post hanc vitam.
(ibid. III.xlviii.12)45
But that, crystal clear as it is in the text, is not what Dante saw there, 
or at any rate what he chose to see there; for what Dante saw there was 
a means of confirming that there must after all be a satisfactory point of 
arrival on the plane of seeing and understanding here and now, anything 
short of this making a mockery of the whole thing. Viewed, in other words, 
through the eyes of one disposed from deep within himself to rejoice in 
the realizability of the human project under certain at least of its aspects 
in the historical order, the Contra gentiles, with its talk of the futility of it 
all short of a positive outcome (the ‘alioquin sequeretur quod homo esset 
in vanum’ of the III.xliv.2 passage), was just what he needed, a means of 
saving both himself and his current project.
As a further example of Thomas’s coming to Dante’s aid in the moment 
of his setting off in a fresh direction, we may take the question of secondary 
causality, the role of the separate substances within the general scheme of 
things. Dante’s position in this matter – not, in fact, a comfortable one – 
involves a combination of the creationist proper and of the processionist; 
for though pure form, pure matter and their amalgamation in the heavenly 
bodies (to which for the sake of completeness we should add the rational 
soul in man) are understood by him to be the immediate product of divine 
creativity,46 form, even in its first instantiation as the intelligible and 
operative principle of a thing, is referred to the separate substances by 
which those same bodies appear to be animated.47 Everything that is, in 
45 Again, it is impossible for natural desire to be unfulfilled, since  “nature does nothing 
in vain” [De caelo ii.11; 291b13]. Now, natural desire would be in vain if it could never be 
fulfilled. Therefore, man’s natural desire is capable of fulfilment, but not in this life, as 
we have shown. So it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity 
comes after this life.
46 Par. XXIX.13-36, with Purg. XXV.67-75 and Conv. IV.xxi.4-5 on God’s in-breathing 
of the rational soul into the vegetative and sensitive soul generated ex materia. S. Bemrose, 
‘“Come d’animal divegna fante”: the Animation of the Human Embryo in Dante’, in The 
Human Embryo. Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions, ed. G. R. Dunstan (Exeter: 
Exeter University Press, 1990), pp. 123-35.
47 Par. II.139-41: ‘Virtù diversa fa diversa lega / col prezïoso corpo ch’ella avviva, / nel 
qual, sì come vita in voi, si lega.’ D. O’Keeffe, ‘Dante’s Theory of Creation’, Revue néo-
scolastique, 26 (1924), 45-64; B. Nardi, Nel mondo di Dante (note 3 above), pp. 307-13; idem, 
‘Dante e Pietro d’Abano’, in Saggi di filosofia dantesca (note 3 above), pp. 40-62 (especially pp. 
42-45);  A. Mellone, O.F.M., La dottrina di Dante Alighieri sulla prima creazione, ‘Emanatismo 
neoplatonico di Dante per le citazioni del Liber de Causis?’, and ‘Il concorso delle creature 
nella produzione delle cose secondo Dante’ (note 21 above); idem, ad voc. ‘Creazione’, 
in the Enciclopedia dantesca, 6 vols (Rome: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970-78), 
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other words, in the sublunary world (the rational soul of man apart) receives 
its substantial form – that by virtue of which it is what it is and does what it 
does – from the Intelligences, Dante’s being in this sense a firm commitment 
in the areas both of creation theology and of general cosmology to the role 
of intermediate causality in the universe:
 Tu dici: “Io veggio l’acqua, io veggio il foco,
l’aere e la terra e tutte lor misture
venire a corruzione, e durar poco;
 e queste cose pur furon creature;
per che, se ciò ch’è detto è stato vero,
esser dovrien da corruzion sicure”.
 Li angeli, frate, e ’l paese sincero
nel qual tu se’, dir si posson creati,
sì come sono, in loro essere intero;
 ma li alimenti che tu hai nomati
e quelle cose che di lor si fanno
da creata virtù sono informati.
 Creata fu la materia ch’elli hanno;
creata fu la virtù informante
in queste stelle che ’ntorno a lor vanno.
 L’anima d’ogne bruto e de le piante
di complession potenzïata tira
lo raggio e ’l moto de le luci sante;
 ma vostra vita sanza mezzo spira
la somma beninanza, e la innamora
di sé sì che poi sempre la disira.
(Par. VII.124-44)48
vol. 2, pp. 251-53; J. A. Mazzeo, ‘The Analogy of Creation’, Speculum 32 (1957), 706-
21; E. Moore, ‘Dante’s Theory of Creation’, in Studies in Dante, Fourth Series, edited and 
with new introductory matter by C. Hardie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968; originally 
1917), pp. 134-65; S. Bemrose, Dante’s Angelic Intelligences: Their Importance in the Cosmos and 
in Pre-Christian Religion (note 21 above), pp. 90-113. On  the animation of the stars, Par. 
II.139-41: ‘Virtù diversa fa diversa lega / col prezïoso corpo ch’ella avviva, / nel qual, sì 
come vita in voi, si lega.’ Thomas (reporting Aristotle) has: ‘Est igitur caelum compositum, 
secundum opinionem Aristotelis, ex anima intellectuali et corpore. Et hoc significat in II 
de anima [ii.3; 414b19], ubi dicit quod “quibusdam inest intellectivum et intellectus: ut 
hominibus, et si aliquid huiusmodi est alterum, aut honorabilius”, scilicet caelum’ (ScG 
II.lxx.4, though cf. 8: ‘Hoc autem quod dictum est de animatione caeli, non diximus quasi 
asserendo secundum fidei doctrinam, ad quam nihil pertinet sive sic sive aliter dicatur. 
Unde Augustinus, in libro Enchiridion [I.lviii, ult.], dicit: “nec illud quidem certum habeo, 
utrum ad eandem societatem, scilicet Angelorum, pertineant sol et luna et cuncta sidera: 
quamvis nonnullis lucida esse corpora, non cum sensu vel intelligentia, videantur”’).
48 You say, “I see water, I see fire and air and earth, and all their mixtures come to 
corruption and endure but little, and yet these things were created things; so that, if 
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Now here, as Kenelm Foster was quick to affirm,49 Thomas is 
unambiguous, his, both in and beyond the Contra gentiles, being an equally 
firm sense of form in its preliminary manifestation as the immediate 
product of divine creativity, of the original and abiding let it be whereby 
something is brought forth from nothing, to suppose otherwise being to 
countenance the notion of pure subsistent matter:
Prima inductio formarum in materia non potest esse ab aliquo agente 
per motum tantum: omnis enim motus ad formam est ex forma 
determinata in formam determinatam; quia materia non potest esse 
absque omni forma, et sic praesupponitur aliqua forma in materia. 
Sed omne agens ad formam solam materialem oportet quod sit agens 
per motum: cum enim formae materiales non sint per se subsistentes, 
sed earum esse sit inesse materiae, non possunt produci in esse 
nisi vel per creationem totius compositi, vel per transmutationem 
materiae ad talem vel talem formam. Impossibile est igitur quod 
prima inductio formarum in materia sit ab aliquo creante formam 
tantum: sed ab eo qui est creator totius compositi.
(ScG II.xliii.5)50
what I have said to you be true, they ought to be secure against corruption”. The angels, 
brother, and the pure country in which you are, may be said to be created even as they 
are, in their entire being; but the elements which you have named, and all things that are 
compounded of them, are informed by created power. Created was the matter that is in 
them, created was the informing virtue in these stars that wheel about them. The soul of 
every beast and of the plants is drawn from a compound potentiated by the shining and 
motion of the holy lights; but your life the supreme beneficence breathes forth without 
intermediary, and so enamours it of itself that it desires it ever after.
49 Dante e San Tommaso (note 16 above), pp. 12-16.
50 The first induction of forms into matter cannot have originated from an agent 
acting by means of movement only. All motion directed to a form is from a determinate 
form toward a determinate form, for matter cannot exist in the absence of all form; 
the existence of some form in matter is presupposed. But every agent whose action is 
directed only toward material forms is necessarily an agent that acts by means of motion. 
For, since material forms are not self-subsistent, and since, in their case, to be is to be in 
matter, there are but two possible ways in which they can be brought into being: either 
by the creation of the whole composite, or by the transmutation of matter to this or that 
form. The first induction of forms into matter, therefore, cannot possibly be from an 
agent that creates the form alone; rather, this is the work of him who is the creator of the 
whole composite.  Similarly, ST Ia.65.4 resp.: ‘opinio fuit quorundam quod omnes formae 
corporales deriventur a substantiis spiritualibus quas Angelos dicimus. Et hoc quidem 
dupliciter aliqui posuerunt. Plato enim posuit formas quae sunt in materia corporali, 
derivari et formari a formis sine materia subsistentibus, per modum participationis 
cuiusdam. Ponebat enim hominem quendam immaterialiter subsistentem, et similiter 
equum, et sic de aliis, ex quibus constituuntur haec singularia sensibilia, secundum 
quod in materia corporali remanet quaedam impressio ab illis formis separatis, per 
modum assimilationis cuiusdam, quam participationem vocabat. Et secundum ordinem 
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The position, then, is clear: no secondary causality at the point of 
inception. Subsequently, yes, for secondary causality is everywhere 
present to being as part of its fundamental mechanism, but at the point of 
inception, no.51 But that is not what Dante found in the text; for, sensitive as 
formarum ponebant Platonici ordinem substantiarum separatarum, puta quod una 
substantia separata est quae est equus, quae est causa omnium equorum; supra quam est 
quaedam vita separata, quam dicebant per se vitam et causam omnis vitae; et ulterius 
quandam quam nominabant ipsum esse, et causam omnis esse. Avicenna vero et quidam 
alii non posuerunt formas rerum corporalium in materia per se subsistere, sed solum 
in intellectu. A formis ergo in intellectu creaturarum spiritualium existentibus (quas 
quidem ipsi intelligentias, nos autem Angelos dicimus), dicebant procedere omnes formas 
quae sunt in materia corporali, sicut a formis quae sunt in mente artificis, procedunt 
formae artificiatorum ... Omnes autem hae opiniones ex una radice processisse videntur. 
Quaerebant enim causam formarum, ac si ipsae formae fierent secundum seipsas. Sed 
sicut probat Aristoteles in VII Metaphys., id quod proprie fit, est compositum, formae 
autem corruptibilium rerum habent ut aliquando sint, aliquando non sint, absque hoc 
quod ipsae generentur aut corrumpantur, sed compositis generatis aut corruptis, quia 
etiam formae non habent esse, sed composita habent esse per eas, sic enim alicui competit 
fieri, sicut et esse. Et ideo, cum simile fiat a suo simili, non est quaerenda causa formarum 
corporalium aliqua forma immaterialis; sed aliquod compositum, secundum quod hic 
ignis generatur ab hoc igne. Sic igitur formae corporales causantur, non quasi influxae ab 
aliqua immateriali forma, sed quasi materia reducta de potentia in actum ab aliquo agente 
composito. Sed quia agens compositum, quod est corpus, movetur a substantia spirituali 
creata, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin.; sequitur ulterius quod etiam formae corporales 
a substantiis spiritualibus deriventur, non tanquam influentibus formas, sed tanquam 
moventibus ad formas. Ulterius autem reducuntur in Deum, sicut in primam causam, 
etiam species angelici intellectus, quae sunt quaedam seminales rationes corporalium 
formarum. In prima autem corporalis creaturae productione non consideratur aliqua 
transmutatio de potentia in actum. Et ideo formae corporales quas in prima productione 
corpora habuerunt, sunt immediate a Deo productae, cui soli ad nutum obedit materia, 
tanquam propriae causae.’
51 ScG III.ciii.3 (over against Avicenna’s sense of material agency as merely dispositive 
with respect to separate agency): ‘Haec autem positio satis consona est aliis suis 
positionibus. Ponit enim [i.e. Avicenna] quod omnes formae substantiales effluunt in 
haec inferiora a substantia separata; et quod corporalia agentia non sunt nisi disponentia 
materiam ad suscipiendam impressionem agentis separati. Quod quidem non est verum 
secundum Aristotelis doctrinam, qui probat in VII Metaphys., quod formae quae sunt in 
materia, non sunt a formis separatis, sed a formis quae sunt in materia; sic enim invenietur 
similitudo inter faciens et factum’; ST Ia 110.2 resp.: ‘Respondeo dicendum quod Platonici 
posuerunt formas quae sunt in materia, causari ex immaterialibus formis, quia formas 
materiales ponebant esse participationes quasdam immaterialium formarum. Et hos, 
quantum ad aliquid, secutus est Avicenna, qui posuit omnes formas quae sunt in materia, 
procedere a conceptione intelligentiae, et quod agentia corporalia sunt solum disponentia 
ad formas. Qui in hoc videntur fuisse decepti, quia existimaverunt formam quasi aliquid 
per se factum, ut sic ab aliquo formali principio procederet. Sed sicut philosophus probat 
in VII Metaphys., hoc quod proprie fit, est compositum, hoc enim proprie est quasi 
subsistens. Forma autem non dicitur ens quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est, et sic per 
consequens nec forma proprie fit; eius enim est fieri, cuius est esse, cum fieri nihil aliud sit 
quam via in esse. Manifestum est autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens 
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he must have been to Thomas’s general position, he nonetheless discovered 
as he read on into Book III of the Contra gentiles what seemed to him to be 
an exemplary account, if not of the generation, then of the transmission 
of form, even in its primary instantiation, by the separate substances. In 
this, he was mistaken, for Thomas, again, will have none of it. But read 
in a certain way and with a dash of enthusiasm, the text does indeed hold 
out possibilities, namely a sense (a) of form as pre-existent in the intellect 
of ‘some substance or substances’ (‘in intellectu alicuius substantiae, vel 
aliquarum’); (b) of form in matter as proceeding from form without matter 
(‘formae quae sunt in materia, venerunt a formis quae sunt sine materia); 
(c) of form generally as a product of movement in the heavens (‘et causantes 
formas inferiores per motum caeli’); (d) of the Intelligences as directive 
(‘sicut directa in finem a substantia intelligente’); and (e) of form as 
proceeding from natural – in the sense of ‘natured’ or created – bodies (‘ex 
moventibus naturalibus’). Thus everything once again is to hand, Thomas, 
never less than careful in the area of secondary causality, appearing to 
authorize the alternative emphasis:
Si autem corpus caeleste a substantia intellectuali movetur, 
ut ostensum est; motus autem corporis caelestis ordinatur ad 
generationem in inferioribus: necesse est quod generationes et motus 
istorum inferiorum procedant ex intentione substantiae intelligentis. 
In idem enim fertur intentio principalis agentis, et instrumenti. 
Caelum autem est causa inferiorum motuum secundum suum motum, 
quo movetur a substantia intellectuali. Sequitur ergo quod sit sicut 
instrumentum intellectualis substantiae. Sunt igitur formae et motus 
inferiorum corporum a substantia intellectuali causatae et intentae 
sicut a principali agente, a corpore vero caelesti sicut ab instrumento.
 Oportet autem quod species eorum quae causantur et intenduntur 
ab intellectuali agente, praeexistant in intellectu ipsius: sicut formae 
artificiatorum praeexistunt in intellectu artificis, et ex eis deriventur 
in effectus. Omnes igitur formae quae sunt in istis inferioribus, 
et omnes motus, derivantur a formis intellectualibus quae sunt in 
intellectu alicuius substantiae, vel aliquarum. Et propter hoc dicit 
Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod “formae quae sunt in materia, venerunt 
a formis quae sunt sine materia”. Et quantum ad hoc verificatur 
dictum Platonis, quod formae separatae sunt principia formarum 
quae sunt in materia: licet Plato posuerit eas per se subsistentes, et 
agit sibi simile. Et ideo id quod facit res naturales, habet similitudinem cum composito, 
vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem; vel quia totum compositum, et 
quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, est in virtute ipsius; quod est proprium 
Dei. Sic igitur omnis informatio materiae vel est a Deo immediate, vel ab aliquo agente 
corporali; non autem immediate ab Angelo’, etc.
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causantes immediate formas sensibilium; nos vero ponamus eas in 
intellectu existentes, et causantes formas inferiores per motum caeli.
 Quia vero omne quod movetur ab aliquo per se, non secundum 
accidens, dirigitur ab eo in finem sui motus; corpus autem caeleste 
movetur a substantia intellectuali; corpus autem caeleste causat 
per sui motum omnes motus in istis inferioribus: necessarium est 
quod corpus caeleste dirigatur in finem sui motus per substantiam 
intellectualem, et per consequens omnia inferiora corpora in proprios 
fines.
 Sic igitur non est difficile videre qualiter naturalia corpora 
cognitione carentia moveantur et agant propter finem. Tendunt enim 
in finem sicut directa in finem a substantia intelligente, per modum 
quo sagitta tendit ad signum directa a sagittante. Sicut enim sagitta 
consequitur inclinationem ad finem determinatum ex impulsione 
sagittantis, ita corpora naturalia consequuntur inclinationem in 
fines naturales ex moventibus naturalibus, ex quibus sortiuntur suas 
formas et virtutes et motus.
(ScG III.xxiv.1-4)52
52 Now, if a celestial body is moved by intellectual substance, as we have shown, and if 
the motion of a celestial body is ordered to generation in the realm of things here below, it 
must be that the processes of generation and the motions of these lower things start from 
the intention of an intelligent substance. For the intention of the principal agent and that 
of the instrument are directed toward the same thing. Now, the heaven is the cause of 
the movements of inferior bodies, by virtue of its own motion in which it is moved by an 
intellectual substance. It follows, then, that the heavenly body is like an instrument for 
intellectual substance. Therefore, the forms and movements of lower bodies are caused 
by intellectual substance which intends them as a principal agent, while the celestial body 
is like an instrument.
It must be, then, that the species of things caused and intended by the intellectual agent 
exist beforehand in his intellect, as the forms of artifacts pre-exist in the intellect of the 
artist and are projected from there into their products. So, all the forms that are in these 
lower substances, and all their motions, are derived from the intellectual forms which are 
in the intellect of some substance or substances. Consequently, Boethius says in his book, 
The Trinity, that “forms which are in matter have come from forms which are without 
matter”. And on this point, Plato’s statement is verified, that forms separated from matter 
are the principles of forms that are in it. Although Plato claimed that they subsist in 
themselves and immediately cause the forms of sensible things, we assert that they exist 
in an intellect and cause lower forms through the motion of the heavens.
Since everything that is moved directly and not merely accidentally by another being 
is directed by that being to the end of its motion, and since the celestial body is moved 
by an intellectual substance, and, moreover, the celestial body causes, through its own 
motion, all the motions in these lower things, the celestial body must be directed to the 
end of its motion by an intellectual substance, and so must all lower bodies be directed 
to their own ends.
So, then, it is not difficult to see how natural bodies, devoid of knowledge, are moved 
and perform actions for an end. They tend to the end as things directed to that end by 
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Here too, then, the text functions, not as a source, but as a stimulus, 
as apt from out of its particular kind of spaciousness to quicken the 
independent initiative.
As a final instance of this same process, of the tendency of the Thomist 
text to function in Dante as a principle of emancipation, we may take the 
case of his embryology, his account of the genesis of the rational soul as 
the formal principle of specifically human being and doing,53 for here too 
Dante is both with Thomas and against him. He is with him in so far as for 
Thomas too the rational soul in man is understood to come from beyond, 
to be infused into the psychosomatic totality ab extra. He is against him 
in so far as his – Dante’s – is a transformational or evolutionary account 
of the soul in its vegetative and sensitive aspects, an account envisaging 
a series of mutations at the level of form until at last the soul generated 
ex materia is ready for the in-breathing of its rational component by God. 
The key passage here, Purg. XXV.52-60, reads as follows:
 Anima fatta la virtute attiva
qual d’una pianta, in tanto differente,
che questa è in via e quella è già a riva,
 tanto ovra poi, che già si move e sente,
come spungo marino; e indi imprende
ad organar le posse ond’ è semente.
 Or si spiega, figliuolo, or si distende
la virtù ch’è dal cor del generante,
dove natura a tutte membra intende.54
an intellectual substance, in the way that an arrow tends toward the target when it has 
been aimed by the archer. Just as the arrow attains its inclination to a definite end from 
the archer’s act of shooting it, so do natural bodies attain their inclination to natural 
ends, from natural movers; from which movers they also receive their forms, powers, 
and motions.
53 B. Nardi, Sigieri di Brabante nella Divina Commedia e le fonti della filosofia di Dante 
(Spianate (Pescia): Presso l’Autore, 1912; four articles published originally in the Rivista 
di filosofia neo-scolastica in 1911 and 1912), pp. 43-52; idem, ‘Intorno al tomismo di Dante e 
alla quistione di Sigieri’ (note 3 above); idem, ‘Noterelle polemiche di filosofia dantesca’, 
Nuovo giornale dantesco I (1917), 123-29; idem, ‘Sull’origine dell’anima umana’, in Dante e 
la cultura medievale (Bari: Laterza, 1949), pp. 260-83; idem, ‘La formazione dell’anima 
umana secondo Dante’, in Studi di filosofia medievale (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e di 
Letteratura, 1960, with an anastatic reprint in 1979), pp. 9-68 (with  ‘L’anima umana 
secondo Sigieri’ at  pp. 151-161); idem, ‘ll tomismo di Dante e il p. Busnelli, S. J.’, in Saggi 
di filosofia dantesca (note 3 above), pp. 341-80 (especially pp. 359 ff.); S. Bemrose, ‘“Come 
d’animal divegna fante”: the Animation of the Human Embryo in Dante’ (note 46 above).
54 The active virtue having become a soul, like that of a plant (but different in so far 
as this is on the way, and that has already arrived), so works then that now it moves 
and feels, like a sea-fungus; then it proceeds to develop organs for the power of which it 
is the germ. Now, my son, expands, now distends, the virtue which proceeds from the 
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For Thomas, this is out of the question, for form, he believes, is impatient 
of gradual implementation or of affirmation by degrees, a position secure 
both in the Contra gentiles and in the Summa theologiae.55 Rather, the question 
stands for him to be set up substitutionally rather than transformationally, 
the sensitive and the rational each alike taking the place of its predecessor 
as distinct from constituting the term of its development. Here too, however, 
it is Thomas who, for all his rejection of anything resembling a gradualistic 
account of the psychogenetic issue in man, provides Dante with what he 
needs for his own solution, the passage from Canto XXV cited a moment 
ago not only reflecting but invoking Thomist ways of thinking and speaking:
heart of the begetter, where nature makes provision for all the members.  With a slight 
redistribution of emphases, Conv. IV.xxi.4-5: ‘E però dico che quando l’umano seme cade 
nel suo recettaculo, cioè ne la matrice, esso porta seco la vertù de l’anima generativa e la 
vertù del cielo e la vertù de li elementi legati, cioè la complessione; e matura e dispone la 
materia a la vertù formativa, la quale diede l’anima del generante; e la vertù formativa 
prepara li organi a la vertù celestiale, che produce de la potenza del seme l’anima in 
vita. La quale, incontanente produtta, riceve da la vertù del motore del cielo lo intelletto 
possibile; lo quale potenzialmente in sé adduce tutte le forme universali, secondo che sono 
nel suo produttore, e tanto meno quanto più dilungato da la prima Intelligenza è.’
55 ScG II.lxxxix.6: ‘Secundum enim hanc positionem, sequeretur quod aliqua virtus 
eadem numero nunc esset anima vegetabilis tantum, et postmodum anima sensitiva: et sic 
ipsa forma substantialis continue magis ac magis perficeretur. Et ulterius sequeretur quod 
non simul, sed successive educeretur forma substantialis de potentia in actum. Et ulterius 
quod generatio esset motus continuus, sicut et alteratio. Quae omnia sunt impossibilia 
in natura’; ST Ia.118.2 ad 2: ‘Dicunt ergo quidam quod supra animam vegetabilem quae 
primo inerat, supervenit alia anima, quae est sensitiva; et supra illam iterum alia, quae 
est intellectiva. Et sic sunt in homine tres animae, quarum una est in potentia ad aliam. 
Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo alii dicunt quod illa eadem anima quae primo fuit 
vegetativa tantum, postmodum, per actionem virtutis quae est in semine, perducitur ad 
hoc quod fiat etiam sensitiva; et tandem perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem fiat intellectiva, 
non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet 
Dei deforis illustrantis. Et propter hoc dicit philosophus quod intellectus venit ab 
extrinseco. Sed hoc stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis 
recipit magis et minus; sed superadditio maioris perfectionis facit aliam speciem, sicut 
additio unitatis facit aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem 
forma numero sit diversarum specierum. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod generatio 
animalis esset motus continuus, paulatim procedens de imperfecto ad perfectum; sicut 
accidit in alteratione. Tertio, quia sequeretur quod generatio hominis aut animalis non sit 
generatio simpliciter, quia subiectum eius esset ens actu. Si enim a principio in materia 
prolis est anima vegetabilis, et postmodum usque ad perfectum paulatim perducitur; 
erit semper additio perfectionis sequentis sine corruptione perfectionis praecedentis. 
Quod est contra rationem generationis simpliciter. Quarto, quia aut id quod causatur 
ex actione Dei, est aliquid subsistens, et ita oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma 
praeexistente, quae non erat subsistens; et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas in 
corpore. Aut non est aliquid subsistens, sed quaedam perfectio animae praeexistentis, et 
sic ex necessitate sequitur quod anima intellectiva corrumpatur, corrupto corpore; quod 
est impossibile’; II Sent. 18.2.1 resp., etc.
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etsi a principio decisionis in semine non sit anima actu, sed virtute, 
propter deficientiam organorum; tamen ipsammet virtutem 
seminis, quod est corpus organizabile, etsi non organizatum, esse 
proportionaliter semini animam in potentia, sed non actu; et quia 
vita plantae pauciora requirit organa quam vita animalis, primo 
semine sufficienter ad vitam plantae organizato, ipsam praedictam 
virtutem fieri animam vegetabilem; deinde, organis magis perfectis 
et multiplicatis, eandem perduci ut sit anima sensitiva; ulterius 
autem, forma organorum perfecta, eandem animam fieri rationalem, 
non quidem per actionem virtutis seminis, sed ex influxu exterioris 
agentis, propter quod suspicantur Aristotelem dixisse intellectum ab 
extrinseco esse, in libro de generatione animalium.
(ScG II.lxxxix.6)56
Here too, therefore, everything is ready and waiting: Thomas’s ‘vita 
plantae pauciora’ for Dante’s ‘qual d’una pianta’; Thomas’s ‘in semine 
non sit anima actu ... semini animam in potentia’ for Dante’s ‘le posse 
ond’ è semente’; Thomas’s ‘organa quam vita animalis ... ad vitam plantae 
organizato ... forma organorum perfecta’ for Dante’s ‘ad organar le posse’. 
True, there are other possibilities, Dante’s proposal of this matter in terms 
of a series of inchoative instants – of the vegetative as embryonic in respect 
of the sensitive and of the sensitive as embryonic in respect of the rational 
– looking very much like Albert’s in the De natura et origine animae (I.v):
56 From the moment of severance the soul is not present in the semen actually but virtually, 
because of the lack of organs; and yet this very power of the semen – itself a body potentially 
endowed with organs though actually without them – is, proportionately to the semen, 
a potential but not an actual soul. Moreover, since plant life requires fewer organs than 
animal life, from the moment that the organic development of the semen suffices for plant 
life, the aforesaid seminal power becomes a vegetative soul; and later, the organs having 
been perfected and multiplied still more, the same power is raised to the level of a sensitive 
soul; and finally, with the perfecting of the organs’ form, the same soul becomes rational, 
not, indeed, by the action of that seminal power, but through the influx of an external agent. 
And for this reason the proponents of the theory suppose Aristotle to have said in the De 
generatione animalium [ii.3; 736b28] that “the intellect is from without”. Cf. III.xxii.7: ‘In 
actibus autem formarum gradus quidam inveniuntur. Nam materia prima est in potentia 
primo ad formam elementi. Sub forma vero elementi existens est in potentia ad formam 
mixti: propter quod elementa sunt materia mixti. Sub forma autem mixti considerata, est 
in potentia ad animam vegetabilem: nam talis corporis anima actus est. Itemque anima 
vegetabilis est potentia ad sensitivam; sensitiva vero ad intellectivam. Quod processus 
generationis ostendit: primo enim in generatione est fetus vivens vita plantae, postmodum 
vero vita animalis, demum vero vita hominis. Post hanc autem formam non invenitur in 
generabilibus et corruptibilibus posterior forma et dignior. Ultimus igitur finis generationis 
totius est anima humana, et in hanc tendit materia sicut in ultimam formam. Sunt ergo 
elementa propter corpora mixta; haec vero propter viventia; in quibus plantae sunt propter 
animalia; animalia vero propter hominem. Homo igitur est finis totius generationis.’
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Oportet autem scire, quod, sicut in aliis, ita etiam in homine inchoatio 
vegetativi est in materia et in esse primo substantiae animandae, 
et inchoatio sensibilis est in vegetativo, et inchoatio rationalis in 
sensitivo est ... Ostensum est etiam per ante dicta, quod substantia 
illa quae est anima hominis partim est ab intrinseco et partim ab 
extrinseco ingrediens: quia licet vegetativum et sensitivum in 
homine de materia educantur mediante virtute formativa, quae est 
in gutta matris et patris, tamen haec formativa non educeret eas 
hoc modo prout sunt potentiae rationalis et intellectualis formae et 
substantiae, nisi secundum quod ipsa formativa movetur informata 
ab intellectu universaliter movente in opere generationis; et ideo 
complementum ultimum quod est intellectualis formae et substantiae 
non per instrumentum neque ex materia, sed per lucem suam influit 
intellectus primae causae purus et immixtus.57
But for all its status as exemplary in respect of the transformational 
as opposed to the substitutional, there can be no privileging of the De 
57 What we have to understand is that, in man as in other things, the beginning of the 
vegetative is in matter itself, in the original being of the substance to be quickened, and 
the beginning of the sensitive in the vegetative, and the beginning of the rational in the 
sensitive ... It has already been demonstrated in the aforesaid that the substance that 
is the human soul comes partly from within and partly from beyond; for although the 
vegetative and the sensitive are brought forth from matter by way of the formative virtue, 
which is in the fluids of the mother and the father, nonetheless this formative virtue would 
not bring them forth such that they were powers of the rational soul and of an intellectual 
form and substance were not that same formative virtue itself moved and informed by 
the universal intellect at work in the process of generation. Therefore, the point of arrival, 
which is an intellectual form and substance, is accomplished, not instrumentally or by 
way of matter, but through an influx of the pure and uncontaminated light of the divine 
mind as its first cause (text in B. Nardi, ‘Alcuni luoghi di Alberto Magno e di Dante’, 
in Saggi di filosofia dantesca (note 3 above), pp. 63-72 at p. 71). Thomas, preparatory to 
rejecting this position, summarises thus in the De pot. at 3.9 ad 9: ‘Unde alii dicunt, 
quod anima vegetabilis est in potentia ad animam sensibilem et sensibilis est actus eius; 
unde anima vegetabilis quae primo est in semine, per actionem naturae perducitur ad 
complementum animae sensibilis; et ulterius anima rationalis est actus et complementum 
animae sensibilis; unde anima sensibilis perducitur ad suum complementum, scilicet ad 
animam rationalem, non per actionem generantis sed per actum creantis; et sic dicunt 
quod ipsa rationalis anima in homine partim est ab intrinseco, scilicet quantum ad 
naturam intellectualem; et partim ab extrinseco, quantum ad naturam vegetabilem et 
sensibilem. Sed hoc nullo modo potest stare: quia vel hoc ita intelligitur quod natura 
intellectualis sit alia anima a vegetabili et sensibili, et sic redit in idem cum secunda 
opinione: vel intelligitur ita quod ex istis tribus naturis constituatur substantia animae in 
qua natura intellectualis erit ut formale, et natura sensibilis et vegetabilis erit ut materiale. 
Ex quo sequitur quod cum natura sensibilis et vegetabilis sint corruptibiles, utpote de 
materia eductae, substantia animae humanae non possit esse perpetua. Sequitur idem 
etiam inconveniens quod inductum est contra primam, scilicet quod forma substantialis 
successive educatur in actum.’
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natura et origine animae over the Contra gentiles as the key text here, the 
difficulty of the Albertan line in both its lexical and syntactical choices 
(‘inchoatio vegetativi ... substantiae animandae ... nisi secundum quod 
ipsa formativa movetur informata ab intellectu movente ... complementum 
ultimum’) tending to confirm over against the conceptual and expressive 
congeniality of the Thomist text the remoteness of the former as Dante’s 
‘control’, as his vademecum in the area of psychogenesis. On the contrary, 
his chosen companion, guide and counsellor remains the Contra gentiles, 
a text which, in its commitment to the sorting and sifting of competing 
emphases (for that is the business of apologetics), provides him with just 
what he needs in his determination to look the other way.
4. Dante’s celebration of Aquinas as spokesman for the sage spirits in 
paradise testifies to what he saw and most appreciated in him, namely, 
his poise as a philosophical spirit, his mastery of the Aristotelian 
text, and, as informing the entire undertaking, the piety of it all, the 
transparency of the Thomist utterance to something other and greater 
than itself. But for all his admiration and affection for Thomas as master 
of the syllogistic statement, as incomparable in his sense of what Aristotle 
was and of why Aristotle matters, and as secure in his understanding of 
what it is to live humbly in Christ, Dante’s was an alternative sense of 
the theological project, of what theology is and of how it stands to be 
done; for the theological project in Dante stands to be proposed by way, 
not so much of the propositional as of the predicamental, of the crisis of 
existence into which the contents of propositional awareness enter as 
a principle of resurrection, as that whereby the soul lays hold at last of 
its proper inheritance. Now this, as a way of describing the situation 
in Dante, needs careful statement, since for all his starting out from 
the crisis of existence as the across which of theological awareness and 
as the whereabouts of its verification, there can be no referral of the 
essential to the existential component of his spirituality as to its point of 
departure, for it is the essential component of that spirituality which, as 
the prius of everything coming next by way both of the substance and 
of the phenomenology of the moral and religious life (both of the what 
and of the how of that life), determines the shape and substance of the 
existential crisis in the first place. On the one hand, then, we have the 
dogmatic moment of the text, the moment which, turning as it does upon 
creation as a matter of the love-overflowing of the Godhead, upon the 
catastrophe of Eden as a matter of perverse willing, and upon the Christ 
event as a matter of moral and ontological re-potentiation, constitutes, 
not only the prius, but the encompassing of the crisis engendered by the 
forces of reckless selfhood, by the standing of self over against self in 
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the forum of conscience; so, for example, on the first of these things, on 
creation as but the love-extrinsication of the Godhead and on this as the 
ground in man of the immortality, of the freedom and of the Godlikeness 
properly his from the outset, these lines (13-18 and 64-75) from Cantos 
XXIX and VII of the Paradiso:
 Non per aver a sé di bene acquisto,
ch’esser non può, ma perché suo splendore
potesse, risplendendo, dir “Subsisto”,
 in sua etternità di tempo fore,
fuor d’ogne altro comprender, come i piacque,
s’aperse in nuovi amor l’etterno amore.
...
 La divina bontà, che da sé sperne
ogne livore, ardendo in sé, sfavilla
sì che dispiega le bellezze etterne.
 Ciò che da lei sanza mezzo distilla
non ha poi fine, perché non si move
la sua imprenta quand’ ella sigilla.
 Ciò che da essa sanza mezzo piove
libero è tutto, perché non soggiace
a la virtute de le cose nove.
 Più l’è conforme, e però più le piace;
ché l’ardor santo ch’ogne cosa raggia,
ne la più somigliante è più vivace.58
while on the second of them, on the impudence of Eden as man’s response 
to the love-overflowing of the Godhead thus understood, these (lines 
22-30 and 115-17) from Canto XXIX of the Purgatorio and Canto 
XXVI of the Paradiso:
 E una melodia dolce correva
per l’aere luminoso; onde buon zelo
mi fé riprender l’ardimento d’Eva,
 che là dove ubidia la terra e ’l cielo,
58 Not for gain of good unto himself, which cannot be, but that his splendour might, in 
resplendence, say “Subsisto” – in his eternity beyond time, beyond every other bound, as 
it pleased him, the eternal love opened in new loves ... The divine goodness, which spurns 
all envy from itself, burning within itself so sparkles that it displays the eternal beauties. 
That which derives immediately from it therefore has no end, because when it seals, its 
imprint may never be removed. That which rains down from it immediately is wholly 
free, because it is not subject to the power of the new things. It is the most conformed to it 
and therefore pleases it the most; for the holy ardour, which irradiates everything is most 
living in what is most like itself.
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femmina, sola e pur testé formata,
non sofferse di star sotto alcun velo;
 sotto ’l qual se divota fosse stata,
avrei quelle ineffabili delizie
sentite prima e più lunga fïata.
...
 Or, figluol mio, non il gustar del legno
fu per sé la cagion di tanto essilio,
ma solamente il trapassar del segno.59
and on the third of them, on the Father’s work in the Son as a matter 
of God’s renewing man in his power to moral and eschatological self-
determination, these (lines 106-20) from, again, Canto VII of the Paradiso:
 Ma perché l’ovra tanto è più gradita
da l’operante, quanto più appresenta
de la bontà del core ond’ ell’ è uscita,
 la divina bontà che ’l mondo imprenta,
59 And a sweet melody ran through the luminous air; wherefore good zeal made me 
reprove Eve’s daring, that, there where earth and heaven were obedient, a woman, alone 
and but then formed, did not bear to remain under any veil, under which, if she had been 
devout, I should have tasted those ineffable delights before, and for a longer time ... Now 
know, my son, that the tasting of the tree was not in itself the cause of so long an exile, 
but solely the overpassing of the bound.  Cf. Par. XXXII. 121-23: ‘colui che da sinistra 
le s’aggiusta / è il padre per lo cui ardito gusto / l’umana specie tanto amaro gusta.’ N. 
Borsellino, ‘Notizie sull’Eden (Paradiso XXVI)’, Lettere Italiane 41 (1989), 3, 321-33 
(and in Sipario dantesco. Sei scenari della Commedia (Rome: Salerno, 1991), pp. 88-101); L. 
Cardellino, ‘Struttura del poema e senso del viaggio. Eden: peccato originale e umiltà’, 
in Autocritica infernale (Milan: Jaca Book,1992), pp. 25-51; C. A. Mangieri, ‘L’Eden 
dantesco: allegorismo e significazione’, Italian Quarterly 41, 161-62 (2004), 5-53; W. W. 
Marshall, ‘Dante and the Doctrine of Original Sin. A Theological Gloss on Purgatorio 
XVI, 80-105 and Paradiso XXVII, 121-41’, Dante. Rivista internazionale di studi su Dante 
Alighieri 3 (2006), 21-40. Also, B. Nardi, ‘Il concetto dell’impero nello svolgimento del 
pensiero dantesco’, in Saggi di filosofia dantesca (note 3 above), pp. 215-75 (especially pp. 
215-28). More generally, H. Rondet, Original Sin: the Patristic and Theological Background, 
trans. C. Finegan (Shannon, Eire: Ecclesia Press, 1972; originally Le Péché originel dans 
la tradition patristique et théologique (Paris: Fayard, 1967)); H. M. Köster, Urstand, Fall und 
Erbsünde in der Scholastik (Freiburg: Herder, 1979); and, with reference to particular 
representatives of the tradition, J. B. Kors, O.P. La Justice primitive et le peché originel 
d’après S. Thomas, Bibliothèque Thomiste (Paris: Vrin, 1930); R. Martorelli Vico, ‘La 
dottrina della giustizia originale e del peccato originale nel trattato De peccato originali 
di Egidio Romano’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 1 (1990), 1, 227-46; 
P. J. Weithman, ‘Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function of Political 
Authority’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992), 3, 353-76. Otherwise, N. P. 
Williams, The Idea of the Fall and Original Sin (London: Longmans, 1927); E. Yarnold, The 
Theology of Original Sin (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1971); M. Flick, Il peccato 
originale (Brescia: Queriniana, 1972).
Conversations with Kenelm42
di proceder per tutte le sue vie,
a rilevarvi suso, fu contenta.
 Né tra l’ultima notte e ’l primo die
sì alto o sì magnifico processo,
o per l’una o per l’altra, fu o fie:
 ché più largo fu Dio a dar sé stesso
per far l’uom sufficiente a rilevarsi,
che s’elli avesse sol da sé dimesso;
 e tutti li altri modi erano scarsi
a la giustizia, se ’l Figliuol di Dio
non fosse umilïato ad incarnarsi.60
On the other hand we have the predicament of the one who, knowing 
himself as called to be in, through and for God as the beginning and end 
of all being, knows himself also by way of the alternative project and of the 
drastic phenomenology of this, of the disorientation, the directionlessness, 
the fear, the self-inexplicability, and, as the boundary and underlying 
condition of these and of every other symptom of being in its far-
wandering, the despair contingent on radical lostness and fashioning from 
it a scourge of the spirit. This, then, is where Dante begins. Setting aside 
every preoccupation with the propaedeutics of faith and the methodology 
of sacred science, he begins with the substance and psychology of being 
in its proximity to non-being, with self itself under the aspect of imminent 
dissolution:
 Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita
mi ritrovai per una selva oscura,
ché la diritta via era smarrita.
 Ahi quanto a dir qual era è cosa dura
esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte
che nel pensier rinova la paura!
 Tant’ è amara che poco è più morte;
ma per trattar del ben ch’i’ vi trovai,
dirò de l’altre cose ch’i’ v’ho scorte.
 Io non so ben ridir com’ i’ v’intrai,
tant’ era pien di sonno a quel punto
60 But because the deed is so much the more prized by the doer, the more it displays of 
the goodness of the heart whence it issued, the divine goodness which puts its imprint on 
the world, was pleased to proceed by all its ways to raise you up again; nor between the 
last night and the first day has there been or will there be so exalted and so magnificent 
a procedure, either by the one or by the other; for God was more bounteous in giving 
himself to make man sufficient to uplift himself again, than if he solely of himself had 
remitted; and all other modes were scanty in respect to justice, if the Son of God had not 
humbled himself to become incarnate.
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che la verace via abbandonai ...
 Questi parea che contra me venisse
con la test’alta e con rabbiosa fame,
sì che parea che l’aere ne tremesse.
 Ed una lupa, che di tutte brame
sembiava carca ne la sua magrezza,
e molte genti fé già viver grame,
 questa mi porse tanto di gravezza
con la paura ch’uscia di sua vista,
ch’io perdei la speranza de l’altezza.
(Inf. I.1-12 and 46-54)61
With this, then, the way is open for a discourse turning, certainly, 
upon an act of intellection, of theological right understanding but, 
more fundamentally still, on intellection as a means of actualization ex 
parte subiecti, as that whereby self emerges into the fullness of its now 
transfigured humanity. First, then, comes the moment of self-encounter, the 
moment in which, quickened by grace as a principle of encouragement, 
the soul more than ever anxious in respect of the integrity and of the 
intelligibility of its presence in the world looks into the face, not of love, 
but of lovelessness as the truth of its own being and of being generally 
in the world, a process issuing, in the recesses of the pit, in a sense of 
the nothingless of it all, of being under the aspect of non-being. But in 
so far as lovelessness presupposes love as the ground of its intelligibility, 
the way is open to renewal, the moment of self-encounter thus giving way 
to that of self-reconfiguration, to the moment in which, with the taking of 
the guilt of estrangement into itself as the condition of its liquidation, 
the soul sets about bringing home every otherwise random love-impulse 
of the spirit to the kind of love given with the act itself of existence – a 
process culminating, Dante thinks, in a state of perfect spiritual self-
possession, of governance as a matter of self-governance (the ‘per ch’io te 
sovra te corono e mitrio’ of Purg. XXVII.142).62 But that, resplendent as 
it is, is not all, for the kind of self-encounter and self-reconfiguration whereby 
61 Midway in the journey of our life I found myself in a dark wood, for the straight way 
was lost. Ah, how hard it is to tell what that wood was, wild, rugged, harsh; the very 
thought of it renews my fear! It is so bitter that death is hardly more so. But, to treat of the 
good that I found in it, I will tell of the other things I saw there. I cannot rightly say how 
I entered it, I was so full of sleep at the moment I left the true way ... [the lion] seemed to 
be coming at me, head high and raging with hunger, so that the air seemed to tremble at 
it; and a she-wolf, that in her leanness seemed laden with every craving and had already 
caused many to live in sorrow; she put such heaviness on me with the fear that came from 
the sight of her that I lost hope of the height.
62 wherefore I crown and mitre you over yourself.
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the soul knows itself in the possibility of new life is in turn taken up in 
the kind of self-transcendence whereby it knows itself in the now ecstatic 
substance of self, in the opening out of self upon the kind of deiformity 
to which it is called from beforehand as to its proper destiny.63 Having, 
in other words, known and struggled with self in its endless capacity for 
self-destruction, the soul at last rejoices in the kind of transhumanity 
(the ‘trasumanar’ of Par. I.70-72) proper to it as the most immanent 
of its immanent possibilities. Such at any rate is the Christian hope as 
Dante sees and understands it, at which point we return at last to Dante 
and Aquinas; for if on the one hand Thomas remains the undisputed 
master of Christian-theological discourse on the plane of the horizontal, 
of the forward thrust of the mind as it attends to the business of precise 
intellection, then Dante remains the undisputed master of Christian-
theological discourse on the plane of the vertical, of the downward 
thrust of the mind – which is also its upward thrust – as it attends to 
the business of disclosure, of laying open the deep substance of self as 
embarked on the way of death and resurrection.
5. Where, then, does this leave us with respect to the massive and at 
times militant intervention of Nardi, Gilson and Foster with which we 
began? It leaves us first with an enhanced appreciation of what between 
them they accomplished in this area of Dante scholarship, for it is thanks 
to their combination of courage and clearsightedness that, not so much 
Dante, as we ourselves are set free for a new order of enquiry, for an 
account of the precise nature (a) of Dante’s reading and reception of 
the Thomist text, and (b) of the theological issue as he himself sees and 
understands it. Of the second of these things, we have said sufficient, 
Dante’s being a proposal of the theological project by way, not so much 
of the content in and for itself of dogmatic consciousness, as of the 
situation into which that content enters as a co-efficient of new life, 
as that whereby, in and through an ever more refined sense of its own 
63 For the terminology (‘trasumanar’), S. Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition: Bernard 
of Clairvaux in the Commedia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Chapter 6 
(‘From deificari to transumanar? Dante’s Paradiso and Bernard’s De diligendo Deo’), pp. 
194-241; V. Capelli, ‘Lettura del canto I del Paradiso. L’esperienza del “trasumanar”’, 
in Letture dantesche tenute nella pieve di Polenta e nella basilica di S. Mercuriale in Forlì (1996-
2005) (Genoa and Milan: Marietti, 2006), pp. 215-29; G. Jori, ‘Per un commento di 
“trasumanar e organizzar” (appunti di lettura)’, in E ’n guisa d’eco i detti e le parole. Studi 
in onore di Giorgio Barberi Squarotti, 3 vols (Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 2006), vol. 
2, pp. 959-81; B. Guthmüller, ‘“Trasumanar significar per verba / non si poria”. Sul 
I canto del Paradiso’, L’Alighieri. Rassegna dantesca, n.s. 29 (2007), 48, 107-20 (from the 
German original in the Deutsches Dante-Jahrbuch 82 (2007), 67-85, and updated in Mito e 
metamorfosi. Da Dante al Rinascimento (Rome: Carocci, 2009), pp. 75-90).
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innermost reasons, the soul at last comes home to itself in the fullness 
of its proper humanity, its proper humanity being nothing other 
than its proper transhumanity. As far, however, as the first of them 
is concerned, namely the kind of relationship subsisting between the 
reader and the text he cherishes and by which he is in turn cherished, 
it is a question of the way in which otherness in respect of the idea pure 
and simple points on beyond itself to the kind of sameness whereby it is 
authorized from out of the depths. Something of the kind, at any rate, 
is the object of Dante’s meditation in the exquisite tenth canto of the 
Paradiso, where, given the power of the idea, not so much to unite, as to 
divide one man from another, each alike remains indispensable to the 
collective proclamation:
 Tu vuo’ saper di quai piante s’infiora
questa ghirlanda che ’ntorno vagheggia
la bella donna ch’al ciel t’avvalora.
 Io fui de li agni de la santa greggia
che Domenico mena per cammino
u’ ben s’impingua se non si vaneggia.
 Questi che m’è a destra più vicino,
frate e maestro fummi, ed esso Alberto
è di Cologna, e io Thomas d’Aquino.
 Se sì di tutti li altri esser vuo’ certo,
di retro al mio parlar ten vien col viso
girando su per lo beato serto.
 Quell’ altro fiammeggiare esce del riso
di Grazïan, che l’uno e l’altro foro
aiutò sì che piace in paradiso.
 L’altro ch’appresso addorna il nostro coro,
quel Pietro fu che con la poverella
offerse a Santa Chiesa suo tesoro.
 La quinta luce, ch’è tra noi più bella,
spira di tale amor, che tutto ’l mondo
là giù ne gola di saper novella:
 entro v’è l’alta mente u’ sì profondo
saver fu messo, che, se ’l vero è vero,
a veder tanto non surse il secondo.
 Appresso vedi il lume di quel cero
che giù in carne più a dentro vide
l’angelica natura e ’l ministero.
 Ne l’altra piccioletta luce ride
quello avvocato de’ tempi cristiani
del cui latino Augustin si provide.
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 Or se tu l’occhio de la mente trani
di luce in luce dietro a le mie lode,
già de l’ottava con sete rimani.
 Per vedere ogne ben dentro vi gode
l’anima santa che ’l mondo fallace
fa manifesto a chi di lei ben ode.
 Lo corpo ond’ ella fu cacciata giace
giuso in Cieldauro; ed essa da martiro
e da essilio venne a questa pace.
 Vedi oltre fiammeggiar l’ardente spiro
d’Isidoro, di Beda e di Riccardo,
che a considerar fu più che viro.
 Questi onde a me ritorna il tuo riguardo,
è ’l lume d’uno spirto che ’n pensieri
gravi a morir li parve venir tardo:
 essa è la luce etterna di Sigieri,
che, leggendo nel Vico de li Strami,
silogizzò invidïosi veri.
(Par. X.91-138)64
In a passage decisive for the now sublime sociology of it all, over-
againstness gives way to alongsidedness as a paradigm of consciousness, to 
a species of circuminsession or ‘inseatedness’ as a means of seeing and 
64 You wish to know what plants these are that enflower this garland, which amorously 
circles round the fair lady who strengthens you for heaven. I was of the lambs of the holy 
flock which Dominic leads on the path where there is good fattening if they do not stray. 
He that is next beside me on the right was my brother and my master, and he is Albert of 
Cologne, and I Thomas of Aquino. If thus of all the rest you would be informed, come, 
following my speech with your sight, going round the blessed wreath. The next flaming 
comes from the smile of Gratian who served the one and the other court so well that it 
pleases in paradise. The other who next adorns our choir was that Peter who, like the poor 
widow, offered his treasure to holy Church. The fifth light, which is the most beautiful 
among us, breathes with such love that all the world there below thirsts to know tidings 
of it. Within it is the lofty mind to which was given wisdom so deep that, if the truth be 
true, there never rose a second of such full vision. At its side behold the light of that candle 
which, below in the flesh, saw deepest into the angelic nature and its ministry. In the next 
little light shines that defender of the Christian times, of whose discourse Augustine made 
use. If now you are bringing your mind’s eye from light to light after my praises, you are 
already thirsting for the eighth. Therewithin, through seeing every good, the sainted soul 
rejoices who makes the fallacious world manifest to any who listen well to him. The body 
from which it was driven lies down below in Cieldauro, and he came from martyrdom and 
exile to this peace. See, flaming beyond, the glowing breath of Isidore, of Bede, and of 
Richard who in contemplation was more than man. This one from whom your look returns 
to me is the light of a spirit to whom, in his grave thoughts, it seemed that death came slow. 
It is the eternal light of Siger who, lecturingin Straw Street, demonstrated invidious truths.
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celebrating the relationship between one man and another in the moment 
of emergence, this in turn pointing on to the nature of Dante’s relationship 
with those of his auctores he most cherished – to a relationship lit up and 
sustained by its own perichoretic intensity.65
65 O light eternal, who alone abidest in thyself, [and, known to thyself and knowing, 
lovest and smilest on thyself!]. A. Deneffe, ‘Perichoresis, circumincessio, circuminsessio,’ 
in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 47 (1923), 497-532; D. F. Stramara Jr, ‘Gregory of 
Nyssa’s Terminology for Trinitarian Perichoresis’, Vigiliae Christianae 52 (1998), 3, 257-
63; R. Cross, ‘Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication in John of 
Damascus’, Medieval Studies 62 (2000) , 69-124, after  Gregory Nazianzen, Epistula ci.6; 
xxii.4; John of Damascus De fide ortho. i.14, etc.

The Twin Peaks of Dante’s 
Theology in the Paradiso
 Né tra l’ultima notte e ’l primo die
sì alto o sì magnifico processo,
o per l’una o per l’altra, fu o fie:
 ché più largo fu Dio a dar sé stesso
per far l’uom sufficiente a rilevarsi,
che s’elli avesse sol da sé dimesso;
 e tutti li altri modi erano scarsi
a la giustizia, se ’l Figliuol di Dio
non fosse umilïato ad incarnarsi.
 ...
 Regnum celorum vïolenza pate
da caldo amore e da viva speranza,
che vince la divina volontate:
 non a guisa che l’omo a l’om sobranza,
ma vince lei perché vuole esser vinta,
e, vinta, vince con sua beninanza.
(Par. VII.112-20 and XX.94-99)1
1. Introduction: preliminary emphases – being, affectivity and a reconfiguration of the 
theological issue.  2. Atonement theology I: Anselm and the Christ event as a matter 
of reparation.  3. Atonement theology II: Dante and the Christ event as a matter of 
re-potentiation.  4. Election theology I: Thomas, implicit faith and salvation in casu. 
5. Election theology II: Dante, explicit faith and the love-susceptibility of the Godhead.
Dante’s is a love-interpretation of existence under the conditions of time 
and eternity. Everything that is in the world as an object of perception 
1 Nor between the last night and the first day has there been or will there be so exalted and 
so magnificent a procedure, either by one or the other; for God was more bounteous in giving 
himself to make man sufficient to uplift himself again, than if he solely of himself had remitted; 
and all other modes were scanty in respect to justice, if the Son of God had not humbled 
himself to become incarnate ... Regnum celorum suffers violence from fervent love and from 
living hope which vanquishes the divine will; not as man overcomes man, but vanquishes it 
because it wills to be vanquished, and, vanquished, vanquishes with its own benignity.
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and delight stands to be understood in terms (a) of its proceeding from 
the Godhead as original and abiding love, and (b) of its tending from deep 
within itself – from out of the love given with the act itself of existence – 
towards its proper perfection in the world. Eloquent in respect of the first 
of these things, of the notion of God as original and abiding love and as 
forever opening out in fresh channels of creative and recreative concern, 
is the ‘Non per aver a sé di bene acquisto’ passage of Par. XXIX.13-18, an 
essay in the twofold love-immanence and love-extrinsication of the One 
who is as of the essence:
 Non per aver a sé di bene acquisto,
ch’esser non può, ma perché suo splendore
potesse, risplendendo, dir “Subsisto”,
 in sua etternità di tempo fore,
fuor d’ogne altro comprender, come i piacque,
s’aperse in nuovi amor l’etterno amore.2
while no less committed in respect of the second of them, of the notion 
of everything as tending from out of its connatural affectivity towards a 
consummate act of existence, is this passage from the Convivio (III.iii.2-5), 
an essay in being in general as but the sum total of its love-impulses:
Onde è da sapere che ciascuna cosa, come detto è di sopra, per la 
ragione di sopra mostrata ha ’l suo speziale amore. Come le corpora 
simplici hanno amore naturato in sé a lo luogo proprio, e però la terra 
sempre discende al centro; lo fuoco ha [amore a] la circunferenza 
di sopra, lungo lo cielo de la luna, e però sempre sale a quello. Le 
corpora composte prima, sì come sono le minere, hanno amore a 
lo luogo dove la loro generazione è ordinata, e in quello crescono e 
acquistano vigore e potenza; onde vedemo la calamita sempre da la 
parte de la sua generazione ricevere vertù. Le piante, che sono prima 
animate, hanno amore a certo luogo più manifestamente, secondo che 
la complessione richiede; e però vedemo certe piante lungo l’acque 
quasi c[ontent]arsi, e certe sopra li gioghi de le montagne, e certe ne 
le piagge e dappiè monti: le quali se si transmutano, o muoiono del 
tutto o vivono quasi triste, sì come cose disgiunte dal loro amico. Li 
animali bruti hanno più manifesto amore non solamente a li luoghi, 
ma l’uno l’altro vedemo amare. Li uomini hanno loro proprio amore 
a le perfette e oneste cose. E però che l’uomo, avvegna che una sola 
sustanza sia, tuttavia [la] forma, per la sua nobilitade, ha in sé e la 
2 Not for gain of good unto himself, which cannot be, but that his splendour might, in 
resplendence, say “Subsisto” – in his eternity beyond time, beyond every other bound, as 
it pleased him, the eternal love opened into new loves.
The Twin Peaks of Dante’s Theology in the Paradiso 51
natura [d’ognuna di] queste cose, tutti questi amori puote avere e 
tutti li ha.3
Thus everything that is in the world, be it animate or inanimate, is 
open to contemplation in terms of the affective economy of the whole, 
of being as, again, no more than the aggregate of its love-instances. 
And it is this sense of existence both severally and in the round as open 
to interpretation in terms of the love by which it is moved from deep 
within itself that determines the form and content of two of the great 
doctrinal emphases of the Commedia: in the area of atonement theology, 
its commitment to the notion of God’s initiative in Christ as a matter of 
moral and ontological empowerment, as that whereby man as man is once 
again made sufficient on the planes of being and doing (the ‘per far l’uom 
sufficiente a rilevarsi’ moment of Par. VII.116);4 and, in the area of election 
theology, its sense of the love-susceptibility of it all, of God’s willingness 
to be overcome, not only by the justified in Christ, but by all those living 
out the synderectic substance of their humanity (the ‘ma vince lei perché 
vuole esser vinta’ moment of Par. XX.98).5 Now neither of these things 
need scandalize the pious spirit, those sensitive (a) to the nature of grace 
as, always and everywhere, the condition of human being and becoming, 
and (b) to God’s immunity to anything but the substance of his own 
intentionality, for each of them survives intact within the soteriological 
economy of the whole. But in surviving intact they are relieved of any 
sense (a) of the continuing poverty of the human situation in respect of its 
3 It is important to know, therefore, that, as was said above and for the reason adduced 
there, everything has its own special kind of love. Just as simple bodies have an inborn 
love for the place proper to them – so that earth always descends to the centre, while fire 
has an inborn love for the circumference above us bordering the heaven of the Moon, 
and therefore always rises upwards towards that – so primary compound bodies, such as 
minerals, have a love for the place suited to their generation; in that place they grow, and 
from it they derive their vigour and power. That is why, as we observe, the magnet always 
receives power from the quarter in which it was generated. Plants, which are the primary 
form of animate life, even more clearly have a love for certain places, in accordance with 
what their constitution requires; and so we see that some plants rejoice, as it were, when 
alongside water, others when on the ridges of mountains, others when on slopes and on 
foothills; if they are transplanted, they either die completely or live a sad life, like beings 
so to speak separated from their friends. Brute animals not only more clearly still have a 
love for particular places, but, as we observe, they also love one another. Human beings 
have their specific love, for what is perfect and just. And since the human being, despite 
the fact that his whole form constitutes a single substance in virtue of its nobility, has a 
nature that embraces all these features, he can have all these loves, and indeed does have them.
4 [for God was more bounteous in giving himself] to make man sufficient to uplift 
himself again [than if he solely of himself had remitted].
5 but vanquishes it because it wills to be vanquished ...
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power to significant determination, and (b) of the inevitable reprobation 
of those through no fault of their own a stranger to Christ. On the 
contrary, they testify between them to something more magnanimous and 
more magnificent than this, to a sense on Dante’s part of the kind of love-
encompassing whereby the human project may be said both to subsist 
in its intrinsic viability, and to commend itself in the sight of God as its 
author and architect.
2. Quite apart from the solutions it advances in the area of salvation 
theology, the Cur Deus homo of Anselm commended itself in Dante’s time as 
the classic case of theology under the aspect of faith seeking understanding 
(fides quaerens intellectum), for what is going on here is a proposal of the 
faith component of the religious life in terms of its reasonableness, of 
its making good sense.6 Without prejudice to the mystery of it all, the 
theologian seeks to throw light on the contents of faith as belief, to gloss 
the how and why of God’s purposes under the aspect of their intelligibility. 
Anselm, availing himself of the obvious text here (I Peter 3:15), puts it thus:
Saepe et studiosissime a multis rogatus sum et verbis et litteris, 
quatenus cuiusdam de fide nostra quaestionis rationes, quas soleo 
respondere quaerentibus, memoriae scribendo commendem. Dicunt 
enim eas sibi placere et arbitrantur satisfacere. Quod petunt, non ut per 
rationem ad fidem accedant, sed ut eorum quae credunt intellectu et 
contemplatione delectentur, et ut sint, quantum possunt, ‘parati semper 
ad safisfactionem omni poscenti se rationem de ea quae in nobis est spe’.
(Cur Deus homo I.i prin.)7
6 K. Barth, Fides quaerens intellectum. Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of his 
Theological Scheme (Pittsburg, Pickwick Press, 1985; originally 1960). More generally on 
the soteriological issue in Christian theology, R. S. Franks, The Work of Christ. A Historical 
Study of Christian Doctrine (London and New York: Nelson, 1962); F. W. Dillistone, 
The Christian Understanding of Atonement (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968); A. 
McGrath, Iustitia Dei. A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification. The Beginnings to 
the Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); R. Cessario, The Godly 
Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas (Petersham, MA: St 
Bede’s Publications, 1990); J. McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1992). Older but still serviceable, H. Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian 
Theology (London: MacMillan, 1925; originally 1919); G. Aulén, Christus Victor. An 
Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, trans. A. G. Hebert (New 
York: Macmillan, 1951).
7 I have often been asked most earnestly, both by word of mouth and in writing, by 
many people, to set down a written record of the reasoned explanations with which I am 
in the habit of answering people who put enquiries to me about a certain position in our 
faith. For they say that these explanations please them, and they think them satisfactory. 
They make this request, not with a view to arriving at faith through reason, but in order 
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His, therefore, in the Cur Deus homo, is an epoche or parenthesizing of 
every given in respect of the Christ and of the Christ event in favour of its 
logicality, of its acceptibility even to the most sceptical of spirits:
Quod secundum materiam de qua editum est, Cur deus homo 
nominavi et in duos libellos distinxi. Quorum prior quidem 
infidelium Christianam fidem, quia rationi putant illam repugnare, 
respuentium continet obiectiones et fidelium responsiones. Ac 
tandem remoto Christo, quasi numquam aliquid fuerit de illo, probat 
rationibus necessariis esse impossibile ullum hominem salvari sine 
that they may take delight in the understanding and contemplation of the things which 
they believe, and may be, as far as they are able, “ready to give satisfaction to all who 
ask the reason for the hope that is in us [1 Peter 3:15]”. The Latin text is F. S. Schmitt 
(ed.), Anselmi Opera Omnia, 6 vols (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946-61), in facsimile in S. Anselmi 
Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia ad fidem codicum recensuit Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 
6 vols in 2 (Stuttgart: F. Frommann, 1968-84). It may also be consulted in Migne, PL 
CLVIII, 360C-432B. There are several translations, this one (from Schmitt, 1946) by 
J. Fairweather in Anselm of Canterbury. The Major Works, ed. B. Davies and G. R. Evans 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 260-356 (slightly amended). On the Cur 
Deus homo (but the list is selective), J. McIntyre, St Anselm and his Critics: A Re-Interpretation 
of the Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1954); G. H. Williams, 
Anselm: Communion and Atonement (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1960); C. B. Gray, ‘Freedom 
and Necessity in St Anselm’s Cur Deus homo’, Franciscan Studies 14 (1976-77), 177-91; G. 
R. Evans, ‘Cur deus homo: the Nature of St Anselm’s Appeal to Reason’, Studia Theologica 
31 (1977), 33-50; B. Leftow, ‘Anselm on the Beauty of the Incarnation’, The Modern 
Schoolman 72 (1995), 109-24; idem, ‘Anselm on the Necessity of the Incarnation’, Religious 
Studies 31 (1995), 167-85; R. Campbell, ‘The Conceptual Roots of Anselm’s Soteriology’, 
in D. E. Luscombe and G. R. Evans (eds), Anselm: Aosta, Bec and Canterbury. Papers in 
Commemoration of the Nine-hundreth Anniversary of Anselm’s Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 
September 1093 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), pp. 256-63. More generally 
on Anselm, R. W. Southern, St Anselm and His Biographer: a Study of Monastic Life and 
Thought, 1059-c.1130 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); idem, St Anselm: 
A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); J. R. Fortin 
(ed.), Saint Anselm: His Origins and Influence (Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 2001); G. 
R. Evans, Anselm (London: Continuum, 2002; originally 1989); B. Davies and B. Leftow 
(eds), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). On Dante and Anselm, in addition to C. Ryan, ‘Marking the Difference between 
Dante and Anselm’, in Dante and the Middle Ages, ed. J. Barnes and C. Ó Cuilleanáin 
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995), pp. 117-37 (a piece to which I am much indebted 
in the first part of this essay), and to commentaries and lecturae on Paradiso VII generally 
(see especially G. Fallani, ‘Il Canto VII del Paradiso’, in Paradiso: Letture degli anni 1979-
81, ed. S. Zennaro (Rome: Bonacci, 1989), pp. 233-39), A. Agresti, Dante e S. Anselmo 
(Naples: de Bonis, 1887); F. S. Schmitt, ad voc. ‘Anselmo’ in the Enciclopedia dantesca, 6 
vols (Rome: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970-78), vol. 1, pp. 293-94; G. Muresu, 
‘Le “vie” della redenzione (Paradiso VII)’, Rassegna della letteratura italiana, eighth series, 
98 (1994), 1-2, 5-19 (subsequently in Il richiamo dell’antica strega (Rome: Bulzoni, 1997), 
pp. 203-24); R. McMahon, Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent. Augustine, Anselm, 
Boethius, and Dante (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 2006).
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illo. In secundo autem libro similiter quasi nihil sciatur de Christo, 
monstratur non minus aperta ratione et veritate naturam humanam 
ad hoc institutam esse, ut aliquando immortalitate beata totus homo, 
id est in corpore et anima, fruereter; ac necesse esse ut hoc fiat de 
homine propter quod factus est, sed non nisi per hominem-deum; 
atque ex necessitate omnia quae de Christo credimus fieri oportere.
(Cur Deus homo, praefatio)8
Setting aside, then, all we have come to believe about the Christ as 
made known to us by revelation, we may begin by saying that man as man 
was created to live in a state of covenantal bliss, in the kind of happiness 
contingent upon his acknowledging himself as a child of the Most High. 
But in the moment of his disobedience, of his grasping at equality with 
God, reparation fell due, reparation not only equal to that disobedience 
but, in defiance of mere proportionality, exceeding it:
Hoc est debitum quod debet angelus et homo deo, quod solvendo 
nullus peccat, et quod omnis qui non solvit peccat. Haec est iustitia 
sive rectitudo voluntatis, quae iustos facit sive rectos corde id est 
voluntate. Hic est solus et totus honor, quem debemus deo et a nobis 
exigit deus. Sola namque talis voluntas opera facit placita deo, cum 
potest operari; et cum non potest, ipsa sola per se placet, quia nullum 
opus sine illa placet. Hunc honorem debitum qui deo non reddit, 
aufert deo quod suum est, et deum exhonorat; et hoc est peccare. 
Quamdiu autem non solvit quod rapuit, manet in culpa. Nec sufficit 
solummodo reddere quod ablatum est, sed pro contumelia illata 
plus debet reddere quam abstulit. Sicut enim qui laedit salutem 
alterius, non sufficit si salutem restituit, nisi pro illata doloris iniuria 
recompenset aliquid: ita qui honorem alicuius violat non sufficit 
honorem reddere, si non secundum exhonorationis factam molestiam 
aliquid, quod placeat illi quem exhonoravit, restituit. Hoc quoque 
8 I have named it, in consideration of its subject-matter, Why God became man, and have 
divided it into two books. The first book contains the objections of unbelievers who reject 
the Christian faith because they think it militates against reason, and the answers given 
by the faithful. And eventually it proves, by unavoidable logical steps, that, supposing 
Christ were left out of the case, as if there had never existed anything to do with him, 
it is impossible that, without him, any member of the human race could be saved. In the 
second book, similarly, the supposition is made that, even knowing nothing of Christ, 
it is open to demonstration with no less clear logic and truth: that human nature was 
instituted with the specific aim that at some stage the whole human should enjoy blessed 
immortality, ‘whole’ meaning ‘with both body and soul’; that it was inevitable that the 
outcome concerning mankind which was the reason behind man’s creation should become 
a reality, but that this could only happen through the agency of a Man-God; and that it 
is from necessity that all the things which we believe about Christ have come to pass.
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attendendum quia, cum aliquis quod iniuste abstulit solvit, hoc debet 
dare, quod ab illo non posset exigi, si alienum non rapuisset. Sic ergo 
debet omnis qui peccat, honorem deo quem rapuit solvere; et haec est 
́satisfactió, quam omnis peccator deo debet facere.
(ibid. i.xi)9
– at which point, given the depth of man’s destitution and his manifest 
inequality to the task in hand, the inevitability of God’s work in Christ, 
of his stepping in to do what man could not do for himself, moves clearly 
into view. Now here we need to be careful, for in speaking of the necessity 
– by which we mean the logical necessity – of Christ’s coming amongst 
us, we have to acknowledge its love-dimensionality, the referability of 
everything God set out to do in Christ to his mercy in man’s regard; so, 
for example, as transparent to the substance of Anselmian piety, these 
lines from ii.20 on the compassion which is God, on the generosity which 
is Christ, and on these between them as the ground of hope in the midst 
of hopelessness:
Misericordiam vero Dei quae tibi perire videbatur, cum iustitiam dei 
et peccatum hominis considerabamus, tam magnam tamque concordem 
iustitiae invenimus, ut nec maior nec iustior cogitari possit. Nempe quid 
misericordius intelligi valet, quam cum peccatori tormentis aeternis 
damnato et unde se redimat non habenti deus pater dicit: accipe 
unigenitum meum et da pro te; et ipse filius: tolle me et redime te? Quasi 
enim hoc dicunt, quando nos ad Christianam fidem vocant et trahunt.10
9 This is the debt which man and angel owe to God, and no one who pays this debt 
commits sin; but every one who does not pay it sins. This is justice, or uprightness of 
will, which makes a being just or upright in heart, that is, in will; and this is the sole and 
complete debt of honour which we owe to God, and which God requires of us. For it is such 
a will only, when it can be exercised, that does works pleasing to God; and when this will 
cannot be exercised, it is pleasing of itself alone, since without it no work is acceptable. He 
who does not render this honour which is due to God, robs God of his own and dishonours 
him; and this is sin. Moreover, so long as he does not restore what he has taken away, 
he remains in fault; and it will not suffice merely to restore what has been taken away, 
but, considering the contempt offered, he ought to restore more than he took away. For as 
one who imperils another’s safety does not enough by merely restoring his safety, without 
making some compensation for the anguish incurred, so he who violates another’s honour 
does not enough by merely rendering honour again, but must, according to the extent of 
the injury done, make restoration in some way satisfactory to the person whom he has 
dishonoured. We must also observe that when any one pays what he has unjustly taken 
away, he ought to give something which could not have been demanded of him, had he not 
stolen what belonged to another. So then, every one who sins ought to pay back the honour 
of which he has robbed God; and this is the satisfaction which every sinner owes to God.
10 Now, the mercy of God which, when we were considering the justice of God and the 
sin of mankind, seemed to you to be dead, we have found to be so great, and so consonant 
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Implicit, therefore, in the Cur Deus homo, and here explicit, is Anselm’s 
referral of the calculative aspect of the atonement to its compassionate 
aspect, to the movement of love by which it is inaugurated and maintained. 
But this, for the moment, is not what interests him, for what interests 
him is, again, the logic of the case, thoughts of compassion not only not 
entering into it, but tending to compromise the nature of the Godhead 
as original and abiding justice; so, for example, as a caveat to the ii.20 
passage noted above, the following lines from i.24, with their sense of 
God’s brooking no excuse when it comes to exacting his due:
Quod si vis dicere: misericors Deus dimittit supplicanti quod debet, 
idcirco quia reddere nequit: non potest dici dimittere, nisi aut hoc 
quod homo sponte reddere debet nec potest, id est quod recompensari 
possit peccato, quod fieri non deberet pro conservatione omnis rei 
quae Deus non est; aut hoc quod puniendo ablaturus erat invito, sicut 
supra dixi, id est beatitudinem. Sed si dimittit quod sponte reddere 
debet homo, ideo quia reddere non potest, quid est aliud quam: dimittit 
Deus quod habere non potest? Sed derisio est, ut talis misericordia 
Deo attribuatur. At si dimittit quod invito erat ablaturus, propter 
impotentiam reddendi quod sponte reddere debet: relaxat Deus 
poenam et facit beatum hominem propter peccatum, quia habet 
quod debet non habere. Nam ipsam impotentiam debet non habere, 
et idcirco, quamdiu illam habet sine satisfactione, peccatum est illi. 
Verum huiusmodi misericordia Dei nimis est contraria iustitiae illius, 
quae non nisi poenam permittit reddi propter peccatum. Quapropter 
quemadmodum Deum sibi esse contrarium, ita hoc modo illum esse 
misericordem impossibile est.11
with justice, that a greater and juster mercy cannot be imagined. What, indeed, can be 
conceived of more merciful than that God the Father should say to a sinner condemned to 
eternal torments and lacking any means of redeeming himself, “Take my only-begotten 
Son and give him on your behalf”, and that the Son himself should say, “Take me and 
redeem yourself”? For it is something of this sort that they say when they call us and 
draw us towards the Christian faith.
11 But if you want to say, “A merciful God remits the debt of anyone who begs 
forgiveness on the ground that he is incapable of making repayment”, God cannot be 
said to be remitting anything except either that which the person ought to repay and 
cannot, that is, recompense which he might hypothetically be able to give for his sin – sin 
which ought not to be committed even for the sake of preserving everything that exists 
which is not God – or, alternatively, that which, by way of punishment, he was about to 
take away from a person against that person’s will, that is, the state of blessed happiness. 
But if God remits what a person cannot give back of his own volition, for the reason 
that he is incapable of giving it back, how is this different from saying: “God remits 
what he is not able to have”? But it is mockery for mercy of this kind to be attributed to 
God. If, however, God remits what he was about to take away from a person against his 
will, because of that person’s incapacity to make payment, in that case he is making his 
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There can be no question then, Anselm insists, of God’s giving up or 
going back here, for giving up and going back when it comes to good order 
makes a mockery of the whole thing, and God will suffer no mockery. 
And this, as an aspect of his setting aside every kind of faith-awareness in 
the Cur Deus homo in favour of argumentation pure and simple, is a point 
he will not let go of; so, for example, in the same chapter, his statement 
to the effect that God is indeed a merciful God, but that, rather than the 
other way round, mercy follows upon justice as the dominant mode of 
God’s dealings with man – at which point the good Boso, impressed (or 
maybe just oppressed) by the non-negotiability of it all, gives way:
B. Si rationem sequitur Deus iustitiae, non est qua evadat miser 
homuncio, et misericordia Dei perire videtur.
A. Rationem postulasti, rationem accipe. Misericordem Deum 
esse non nego, qui “homines et iumenta” salvat, “quemadmodum 
multiplicavit misericordiam suam” – Nos autem loquimur de illa 
ultima misericordia, qua post hanc vitam beatum facit hominem. 
Hanc beatitudinem nulli dari debere nisi illi, cui penitus dimissa 
sunt peccata, nec hanc dimissionem fieri nisi debito reddito, quod 
debetur pro peccato secundum magnitudinem peccati, supra positis 
rationibus puto me sufficienter ostendisse. Quibus si quid tibi videtur 
posse rationibus obici, dicere debes.
B. Ego utique nullam tuarum rationum aliquatenus infirmari posse video.12
Now this again, as an account of what is going on in the Cur Deus homo, 
needs careful statement, since for Anselm as for every seasoned Christian 
spirit what God does he does in and through the love co-terminous 
punishment lax and making a person happy on account of his sin, in that the person has 
what he ought not to have. For his very incapacity is something he ought not to have, and 
therefore, so long as he has it without paying recompense, it is sin on his part. But mercy 
of this kind is absolutely contrary to God’s justice, which does not allow anything to be 
given in repayment for sin except punishment. Hence, given that it is impossible for God 
to be self-contradictory, it is impossible for him to be merciful in this way.
12 B. If the God of justice acts according to logic, there is no route whereby man in his 
meanness may escape, and it seems that the mercy of God is dead.
A. You asked for logic, and so here it is. I do not deny that God is merciful, he who saves 
‘‘men and beasts in accordance with how he has multiplied his mercy’’ [Ps. 36: 7-8; 35 
iuxta LXX]. Moreover, we are talking about that final mercy, whereby, after this life, 
he makes a human being blessedly happy. That this state of bliss ought not to be given 
to anyone whose sins have not been utterly forgiven, and that this forgiveness ought not 
to happen except on repayment of a debt which is owed because of his sin and which 
is proportioned to the magnitude of his sin, I think I have demonstrated by the logical 
reasonings set out earlier. If it seems to you that any objection can be made to these 
logical reasonings, you ought to say so.
B. I see no way of showing your logical reasonings to be in the slightest invalid.
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and thus consubstantial with his being. To look elsewhere in his work, 
therefore, particularly among his prayers and meditations, is to register 
his sense both of the incarnation and of the crucifixion as a matter of 
boundless self-giving, at which point legality is taken up in love as the 
currency of all God’s dealings with man in his far-offness. But – and this 
now is the point – love, by reason of Anselm’s chosen methodology in 
the Cur Deus homo, is contemplated across its judicial aspect, the judicial 
aspect, he thinks, being both excisable from the salvific scheme generally 
and furnishing an object of contemplation in its own right.13
3. It is by way, then, of Anselm’s sense of the cross as God’s way of seeing 
that justice was done and his honour preserved intact that we come 
to Dante’s sense of Christ’s work on Calvary as a matter of moral and 
ontological re-potentiation, as that whereby, in and through the Word 
made flesh, man was re-empowered in respect of what he already was, 
and now is once more, as a creature of reasonable self-determination. 
The key canto is Canto VII of the Paradiso, Dante’s being a step-by-step 
reconstruction of the argument until at last he settles on the notion of moral 
and ontological co-adequation as his point of arrival, of God’s once again 
making man equal to the business in hand. First, then, comes the offence 
itself, his sense of Eden as a matter of wilfulness, of the unwillingness of 
our first parents to suffer the yoke of their creatureliness.14 In fact, the 
13 For a gentler view of the Cur Deus homo, a sense of the text as belonging to the 
mainstream of Anselmian piety, D. Brown in his ‘Anselm on Atonement’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Anselm (note 7 above), pp. 279-302, at p. 290: ‘He was no cold rationalist 
imposing purely external criteria on God but a devout monk concerned to explore his 
faith in a God, the internal logic of whose nature, he believed, entailed His never failing 
to act beautifully and well.’ For a critique of the position in Anselm, ranging over both 
the strengths and the weaknesses of that position, A. Harnack, History of Dogma, seven 
volumes bound as four (unabridged republication of the English translation of the third 
German edn), trans. N. Buchanan (New York: Dover Publications, 1961), vol.6, p. 54 ff. 
More recently, J. McIntyre, Saint Anselm and His Critics: A Re-interpretation of the Cur Deus 
homo (note 7 above).
14 B. Nardi, ‘Il concetto dell’impero nello svolgimento del pensiero dantesco’, in Saggi 
di filosofia dantesca, 2nd edn (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1967), pp. 215-75 (especially pp. 
215-28); N. Borsellino, ‘Notizie sull’Eden (Paradiso XXVI)’, Lettere Italiane 41 (1989), 3, 
321-33 (and in Sipario dantesco. Sei scenari della Commedia (Rome: Salerno, 1991), pp. 88-
101); L. Cardellino, ‘Struttura del poema e senso del viaggio. Eden: peccato originale 
e umiltà’, in Autocritica infernale (Milan: Jaca Book, 1992), pp. 25-51; C. A. Mangieri, 
‘L’Eden dantesco: allegorismo e significazione’, in Italian Quarterly 41, 161-62 (2004), 
5-53; W. W. Marshall, ‘Dante and the Doctrine of Original sin. A Theological Gloss on 
Purgatorio XVI, 80-105 and Paradiso XXVII, 121-41’, Dante. Rivista internazionale di studi 
su Dante Alighieri 3 (2006), 21-40. More generally, J. B. Kors, O.P., La Justice primitive 
et le peché originel d’après S. Thomas: les sources, la doctrine, (Paris: Vrin, 1930; originally 
1922); H. Rondet, Original Sin: the Patristic and Theological Background, trans. C. Finegan 
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idea is already there in the twilight pages of the Purgatorio, where it is a 
question pre-eminently of melancholy and misgiving:
 E una melodia dolce correva
per l’aere luminoso; onde buon zelo
mi fé riprender l’ardimento d’Eva,
 che là dove ubidia la terra e ’l cielo,
femmina, sola e pur testé formata,
non sofferse di star sotto alcun velo;
 sotto ’l qual se divota fosse stata,
avrei quelle ineffabili delizie
sentite prima e più lunga fiata.
(Purg. XXIX.22-30)15
But in the Paradiso melancholy and misgiving give way to something 
more drastic, to a sense of the co-implication of all men in the self-undoing 
of Adam:
 Per non soffrire a la virtù che vole
freno a suo prode, quell’ uom che non nacque,
dannando sé, dannò tutta sua prole.
(Par. VII.25-27)16
It was in response to this situation, then, to Adam’s guilt as visited upon 
the generations and as borne by them in an attitude of patient expectation 
(the ‘molt’ anni lacrimata pace’ of Purg. X.35),17 that God looked to its 
resolution in Christ, to a descent into the flesh as the way of reconciliation:
 onde l’umana specie inferma giacque
giù per secoli molti in grande errore,
(Shannon, Eire: Ecclesia Press, 1972; originally Le Péché originel dans la tradition patristique 
et théologique (Paris: Fayard, 1967)); H. Köster, Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde in der Scholastik 
(Freiburg: Herder, 1979); R. Martorelli Vico,‘La dottrina della giustizia originale e del 
peccato originale nel trattato De peccato originali di Egidio Romano’, Documenti e Studi 
sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 1 (1990), 1, 227-46; P. J. Weithman, ‘Augustine and 
Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function of Political Authority’, Journal of the History and 
Philosophy 30 (1992), 3, 353-76.
15 And a sweet melody ran through the luminous air; wherefore good zeal made me 
reprove Eve’s daring, that, there where earth and heaven were obedient, a woman alone 
and but then formed, did not bear to remain under any veil, under which, if she had been 
devout, I should have tasted those ineffable delights before, and for a longer time.
16 By not enduring for his own good a curb upon the power that wills, that man who 
was never born, in damning himself damned all his progeny.
17 the peace wept for since many a year ...
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fin ch’al Verbo di Dio discender piacque
 u’ la natura, che dal suo fattore
s’era allungata, unì a sé in persona
con l’atto sol del suo etterno amore.
(Par. VII.28-33)18
But – and this now is the question – why? Why this complicated 
way of going about it? Would not a suitable reprimand, perhaps with a 
penalty proportionate to what man as man could afford to pay, have been 
enough? To this, Dante is ready with a reply, but not before establishing 
the ground of that reply, namely its rootedness in love as nothing other 
than the endless working out of the Pentateuchal let it be, as that whereby 
whatever is in the world as an object of perception and delight is confirmed 
from deep within itself in its equality to a consummate act of existence. 
The Christ event, in other words, necessary as it was and still is to man’s 
homecoming as man, was necessary by virtue, not of the law, but of love, 
of the kind of love, which, in any adult understanding of what love is, 
functions as a principle of emancipation and, by way of emancipation, of 
actualization – the substance of the exquisite ‘mature in the flame of love’ 
tercet beginning at line 58:
 Questo decreto, frate, sta sepulto
a li occhi di ciascuno il cui ingegno
ne la fiamma d’amor non è adulto.19
Only now, on the basis of a developed sense of love as a matter of letting 
a thing be in the totality of that being, is it possible to see into the mystery 
of it all and to fashion from that mystery a moment of intelligibility. Dante, 
therefore, secure in the strength of his leading intuition, proceeds to its 
definitive statement, each successive emphasis serving to draw out and 
to develop the content of its predecessor. First, then, comes his sense of 
the Fall as forfeiture, as a foregoing of God’s original gift to mankind: 
of the immortality whereby he himself would share in the sempiternity 
of the Godhead,20 of the freedom whereby he would be unconstrained by 
18 wherefore the human race lay sick down there for many centuries in great error, until 
it pleased the word of God to descend where he, by the sole act of his eternal love, united 
with himself in person the nature which had estranged itself from its maker.
19 This decree, brother, is buried from the eyes of everyone whose understanding is not 
mature in the flame of love.  L. M. La Favia, Soteriologia e poesia (Par. VII). Giustizia e amore 
(Ravenna: Centro Dantesco dei Frati Minori Conventuali, 2011).
20 Anselm, Cur Deus homo ii.2: ‘Quod autem talis factus sit, ut necessitate non moreretur, 
hinc facile probatur, quia, ut iam diximus, sapientiae et iustitiae Dei repugnat, ut cogeret 
hominem mortem pati sine culpa, quem iustum fecit ad aeternam beatitudinem. Sequitur 
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anything other than his own righteousness,21 and of these things between 
them as the substance and meaning of his God-likeness, of his subsisting 
in the image of his maker.22 To forfeit any one of them, Dante thinks, is to 
know self in the disenfranchisement and thus in the dysfunctionality of 
self, in the falling away of self from its own high calling:
 La divina bontà, che da sé sperne
ogne livore, ardendo in sé, sfavilla
sì che dispiega le bellezze etterne.
 Ciò che da lei sanza mezzo distilla
non ha poi fine, perché non si move
la sua imprenta quand’ ella sigilla.
 Ciò che da essa sanza mezzo piove
libero è tutto, perché non soggiace
a la virtute de le cose nove.
ergo, quia si nunquam peccasset nunquam moreretur’; ibid. ii.11: ‘Non puto mortalitatem 
ad puram sed ad corruptam hominis naturam pertinere’, etc. Thomas, ST Ia.97.1 resp.: 
‘Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo 
in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit in 
libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., “Deus hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret, 
immortalitate vigeret, ut ipse sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam aut ad mortem”. Non enim 
corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed 
inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab 
omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset’, etc. In Scripture, 
Ecclesiastes 3:14: ‘Didici quod omnia opera, quae fecit Deus, perseverent in perpetuum’, 
etc.
21 Purg. XVI.79-81, but also, by way of the Dante-character’s reply to Brunetto Latini’s 
particular brand of astral determinism (Inf. XV.46-47; 55-57; 70-72), Inf. XV.88-96. 
Exact, in this sense, the commentary of Benvenuto da Imola ad loc.: ‘Et addit aliam 
praerogativam, scilicet libertatis, dicens, repetendo eadem verba, ciò che piove da essa, 
idest, procedit ab eadem bonitate, senza mezzo, idest, organo coeli, è tutto libero, ab omni 
corruptione, ab omni coactione; et ecce rationem: perchè non soggiace alla virtude, scilicet 
informativae, delle cose nuove, scilicet planetarum et stellarum, quae de novo creatae 
sunt et non sunt ab aeterno. Et hic nota quod corpora coelestia influunt in terrestria 
et elementaria quantum ad distinctionem temporum et productionem generabilium et 
corruptibilium; non tamen influunt super liberum arbitrium per vim constellationum, 
quam quidam philosophi dixerunt factum, nec sunt certa signa futurorum contingentium, 
contra quae homo potest per liberum arbitrium ...’
22 Mon. I.viii.2 (on the in-breathing of Godlikeness), Par. V.19-24 (with Mon. I.xii.6, 
on free will as the principle in man of Godlikeness). Thomas on the threefold modality 
of man’s assimilation to God, ST Ia.93.4 resp.: ‘imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari 
in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad 
intelligendum et amandum Deum; et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae 
est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu 
Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte; et haec est imago per conformitatem 
gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte; et sic 
attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae.’
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 Più l’è conforme, e però più le piace;
ché l’ardor santo ch’ogne cosa raggia,
ne la più somigliante è più vivace.
 Di tutte queste dote s’avvantaggia
l’umana creatura, e s’una manca,
di sua nobilità convien che caggia.
(ibid., 64-78)23
The situation, then, is bleak, man as man, in the wake of Eden, 
knowing himself only in the powerlessness of sin (the ‘solo il peccato è 
quel che la disfranca’ of line 79),24 in the dissimilitude or God-unlikeness 
of the guilty spirit (the ‘falla dissimìle al sommo bene’ of line 80),25 in 
the darkling spirituality of the offender (the ‘per che del lume suo poco 
s’imbianca’ of line 81),26 in the indignity of being in its remotion (the ‘in 
sua dignità mai non rivene’ of line 82),27 and in the moral emptiness of it 
all (the ‘se non rïempie, dove colpa vòta’ of line 83)28 – bleakness shading 
off in these circumstances into impossibility, into a delivery of self to the 
near-nothingness of self. This at any rate is the meaning of the ‘Ficca mo 
l’occhio per entro l’abisso’ sequence beginning at line 94, where the notion 
of impasse ushers in that of a fresh initiative from on high, of an auxilium 
Dei designed to do for man what he cannot do for himself:
 Ficca mo l’occhio per entro l’abisso
de l’etterno consiglio, quanto puoi
al mio parlar distrettamente fisso.
 Non potea l’uomo ne’ termini suoi
mai sodisfar, per non potere ir giuso
con umiltate obedïendo poi,
 quanto disobediendo intese ir suso;
e questa è la cagion per che l’uom fue
23 The divine goodness, which spurns all envy from itself, burning within itself so 
sparkles that it displays the eternal beauties. That which immediately derives from it 
thereafter has no end, because when it seals, its imprint may never be removed. That 
which rains down from it immediately is wholly free, because it is not subject to the 
power of new things. It is the most conformed to it and therefore pleases it the most; for 
the holy ardour, which irradiates everything, is most living in what is most like itself. 
With all these gifts the human creature is advantaged, and if one fails, it needs must fall 
from its nobility.
24 Sin alone is that which disfranchises it ...
25 and makes it unlike the supreme good ...
26 so that it is little illumined by its light.
27 and to its dignity it never returns ...
28 unless, where fault has emptied, it is filled afresh [with just penalties against evil delight].
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da poter sodisfar per sé dischiuso.
 Dunque a Dio convenia con le vie sue
riparar l’omo a sua intera vita,
dico con l’una, o ver con amendue.29
God, then, alone equal to the task in hand, had just two options: either 
to wipe the slate clean and start all over again, or to leave man to sort it 
out for himself (the ‘o che Dio solo per sua cortesia / dimesso avesse, o 
che l’uom per sé isso / avesse sodisfatto a sua follia’ of lines 91-93)?30 In 
the event he chose neither. Or, rather, he chose both, both to forgive with 
a suitable penalty (the penalty paid by Christ in his suffering as man for 
29 Fix your eyes now within the abyss of the eternal counsel, as closely focused on my 
words as you are able. Man, within his own limits, could never make satisfaction, for not 
being able to descend in humility, by subsequent obedience, so far as in his disobedience 
he had intended to ascend; and this is the reason why man was shut off from power to 
make satisfaction by himself. Therefore it was needful for God, with his own ways, to 
restore man to his full life – I mean with one way, or else with both.
30 either that God alone, solely by his clemency, had pardoned; or that man should of 
himself have given satisfaction for his folly.  Thomas on the impossibility of God’s having 
forgiven man without satisfaction, ST IIIa.46.2 ad 3: ‘Alioquin, si voluisset absque omni 
satisfactione hominem a peccato liberare, contra iustitiam non fecisset. Ille enim iudex 
non potest, salva iustitia, culpam sive poenam dimittere, qui habet punire culpam in alium 
commissam, puta vel in alium hominem, vel in totam rempublicam, sive in superiorem 
principem. Sed Deus non habet aliquem superiorem, sed ipse est supremum et commune 
bonum totius universi. Et ideo, si dimittat peccatum, quod habet rationem culpae ex 
eo quod contra ipsum committitur, nulli facit iniuriam, sicut quicumque homo remittit 
offensam in se commissam absque satisfactione, misericorditer, et non iniuste agit.’ It was 
for various reasons more fitting that God should have proceeded in quite the way he did 
in Christ, for (a) Christ’s passion shows forth God’s love for man, (b) it provides a model 
of submission and humility, (c) it merits for man justifying grace and ultimate glory, (d) 
it binds him more strongly to obedience, and (e) it confirms him in his moral dignity 
(ibid. IIIa.46.3 resp.). On the depth, and thus the impossibility, of man’s depravity in 
consequence of Eden (for the ‘Non potea l’uomo ne’ termini suoi’ passage beginning at 
VII.97), Hugh of St Victor, De verbi incarn. viii: ‘Ad hanc plenitudinem oportuit, ut tanta 
esset humiliatio in expiatione, quanta fuerit praesumptio in praevaricatione. Rationalis 
autem substantiae Deus tenet summum, homo vero imum gradum. Quando ergo homo 
praesumpsit contra Deum, facta est elatio de imo ad summum. Oportuit ergo, ut ad 
expiationis remedium fieret humiliatio de summo ad imum’; Thomas, ST IIIa.1.2 ad 2: 
‘Hominis puri satisfactio sufficiens esse non potuit pro peccato, tum quia tota humana 
natura erat per peccatum corrupta; nec bonum alicujus personae, vel etiam plurium, 
poterat per aequiparantiam totius naturae detrimentum recompensare; tum etiam qui 
peccatum contra Deum commissum quamdam infinitatem habet ex infinitate divinae 
majestatis; tanto enim offensa est gravior, quanto major est ille in quem delinquitur. 
Unde oportuit ad condignam satisfactionem ut actus satisfacientis haberet efficaciam 
infinitam, utpote Dei et hominis existens’, etc. For the ‘per sé isso’ component of the 
formula, Thomas, ST Ia IIae.109.7 resp.: ‘homo nullo modo potest resurgere a peccato 
per seipsum sine auxilio gratiae’; IIa IIae.164.2 resp.: ‘Et quia ad illum statum primae 
innocentiae per seipsum redire non poterat’, etc.
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man) and, by identifying with him in the midst of his desolation, to make 
it possible for him to participate in his own renewal. This, then, is the 
substance of the ‘Ma perché l’ovra tanto è più gradita’ moment of Canto 
VII beginning at line 106, a passage tending in its sense of God’s work 
in Christ as a matter of love-empowerment to fashion from atonement 
theology an essay, not so much in sacrifice, as in sufficiency, in the newly 
won adequacy of man to his proper destiny:
 Ma perché l’ovra tanto è più gradita
da l’operante, quanto più appresenta
de la bontà del core ond’ ell’ è uscita,
 la divina bontà che ’l mondo imprenta,
di proceder per tutte le sue vie,
a rilevarvi suso, fu contenta.
 Né tra l’ultima notte e ’l primo die
sì alto o sì magnifico processo,
o per l’una o per l’altra, fu o fie:
 ché più largo fu Dio a dar sé stesso
per far l’uom sufficiente a rilevarsi,
che s’elli avesse sol da sé dimesso;
 e tutti li altri modi erano scarsi
a la giustizia, se ’l Figliuol di Dio
non fosse umilïato ad incarnarsi.31
Now here too we must be careful, for just as Anselm’s account in the 
Cur Deus homo of God’s work in Christ as a matter of his exacting his due 
is enfolded at last by a sense of the love-dimensionality of it all, so Dante 
takes seriously its judicial component, the notion of a debt to be redeemed 
and of an account to be settled. Twice, then, in the course of Paradiso VII 
he lights on the retributive or legalistic aspect of the argument, its quid pro 
quo aspect (the ‘nulla già mai sì giustamente morse’ moment of line 42 and 
the ‘tutti li altri modi erano scarsi / a la giustizia, se ’l Figliuol di Dio / non 
fosse umilïato ad incarnarsi’ moment of lines 118-20),32 Anselm, in this 
sense, never being far away. But for all that, the differences are greater 
31 But because the deed is so much the more prized by the doer, the more it displays of 
the goodness of the heart whence it issued, the divine goodness which puts its imprint on 
the world, was pleased to proceed by all its ways to raise you up again; nor between the 
last night and the first day has there been or will there be so exalted and so magnificent 
a procedure, either by the one or by the other; for God was more bounteous in giving 
himself to make man sufficient to uplift himself again, than if he solely of himself had 
remitted; and all other modes were scanty in respect to justice, if the Son of God had not 
humbled himself to become incarnate.
32 none ever so justly stung ... and all other modes were scanty in respect to justice, if 
the Son of God had not humbled himself to become incarnate.
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than the similarities; for this is a thinking through of the Christ event in 
terms, not of logic, but of love, not of the apologetic, but of the agapeic. 
It is a meditation turning upon the notion, not so much of debt and the 
paying off of debt, as upon the endless love-outpouring of the Godhead as 
that whereby man knows himself in the fullness of his humanity, at which 
point atonement theology, like every other species of theology in Dante, is 
drawn at last into the ambit of creation theology, of a theology both moved 
by and transparent to God’s original and abiding concern for the human 
project in the viability of that project.
4. But that is not all, for this sense of love as a matter of letting it be and of 
this as a key to understanding in the area of salvation theology, extends 
also into the area of election theology, where as our control text we may 
take, not Anselm, but Aquinas, the Aquinas of the De veritate and of the 
Summa theologiae. Aquinas’s, then, though not without qualification, is a 
proposal of this issue in terms of explicit faith, of a positive profession of 
the Christ as the condition in man of ultimate homecoming. In the Summa 
theologiae the matter arises in the course of the faith articles of the Secunda 
secundae, where in reply to the question as to whether a man is bound to 
believe anything explicitly (‘utrum homo teneatur ad credendum aliquid 
explicite’), Thomas affirms that whereas the contingencies of the scriptural 
narrative need not compel in conscience, the leading propositions of the 
faith are binding for the purposes of salvation:
Determinatio igitur virtuosi actus ad proprium et per se obiectum 
virtutis est sub necessitate praecepti, sicut et ipse virtutis actus. Sed 
determinatio actus virtuosi ad ea quae accidentaliter vel secundario 
se habent ad proprium et per se virtutis obiectum non cadit sub 
necessitate praecepti nisi pro loco et tempore. Dicendum est ergo 
quod fidei obiectum per se est id per quod homo beatus efficitur, ut 
supra dictum est. Per accidens autem vel secundario se habent ad 
obiectum fidei omnia quae in Scriptura divinitus tradita continentur, 
sicut quod Abraham habuit duos filios, quod David fuit filius Isai, et 
alia huiusmodi. Quantum ergo ad prima credibilia, quae sunt articuli 
fidei, tenetur homo explicite credere, sicut et tenetur habere fidem.
(ST IIa IIae.2.5 resp.)33
33 Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a precept, so 
is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in its proper and direct object: 
but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act 
should terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the 
proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain times. We 
must, therefore, say that the direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the 
blessed, as stated above [qu. 1, art. 8]; while the indirect and secondary object comprises 
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Attentive, therefore, to the distinction between what does and does 
not matter, or, more exactly, between what matters primarily and what 
matters secondarily, the text settles on a sense of explicit faith in the 
primary articles of religion as the ground of man’s ultimate well-being. 
And what applies in the Secunda secundae at 2.5 applies in Articles 7 and 
8 of the same question in relation to the mysteries of the incarnation and 
of the Trinity, where it is a question of faith as consent to the hypostatic 
union of the human and the divine in Christ and to the triune substance 
of the Godhead as the ground of salvation:
illud proprie et per se pertinet ad obiectum fidei per quod homo 
beatitudinem consequitur. Via autem hominibus veniendi ad 
beatitudinem est mysterium incarnationis et passionis Christi, dicitur 
enim Act. IV, ‘non est aliud nomen datum hominibus in quo oporteat 
nos salvos fieri’. Et ideo mysterium incarnationis Christi aliqualiter 
oportuit omni tempore esse creditum apud omnes ... mysterium 
Christi explicite credi non potest sine fide Trinitatis, quia in mysterio 
Christi hoc continetur quod filius Dei carnem assumpserit, quod 
per gratiam spiritus sancti mundum renovaverit, et iterum quod de 
spiritu sancto conceptus fuerit.
(ST IIa IIae.2.7 resp. and 8 resp.)34
Thomas’s, then, is a commitment to the notion of explicit faith as a 
principle of homecoming, formal profession of the Christian mysteries 
entering as of the essence into the salvific economy of the whole. But for 
all their consistency at this point, these articles of the Secunda secundae 
register a caveat, for in well-nigh the same breath Thomas acknowledges 
the notion of implicit faith as a means of salvation among two groups of 
people: (a) the Jewish inferiores or those living within the Old Law but 
all things delivered by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, 
that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth. Therefore, as regards the primary points or 
articles of faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith. Here, as 
elsewhere, in this essay, I am much indebted to the work of the late professor Christopher 
Ryan in his Dante and Aquinas. A Study of Nature and Grace in the Comedy, a text revised and 
edited by me on the basis of papers kindly made available by his widow and soon to be 
published.
34 the object of faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man 
obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ’s incarnation and passion is the way by 
which men obtain beatitude; for it is written in Acts 4 [v. 12] that ‘‘there is no name 
under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved’’. Therefore belief of some kind in 
the mystery of Christ’s incarnation was necessary at all times and for all persons ... it is 
impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since 
the mystery of Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh, that he renewed the world 
through the grace of the Holy Ghost, and again that he was conceived by the Holy Ghost.
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not learned in it, and (b) those who, knowing neither the Old nor the New 
Law, may nonetheless be said to have an inkling of the providentiality of 
it all and maybe even of their ultimate deliverance. Notable as far as the 
first of these groups is concerned, the Jewish inferiores, are the following 
lines from the Secunda secundae at 2.7 resp. and 2.8 resp. with their sense 
that, while in respect of the Christ now among us, an act of explicit faith 
is required both of the inferiores and of the superiores, in respect of the 
Christ as yet to come, implicit faith sufficed for the greater part of the 
people:
Post peccatum autem fuit explicite creditum mysterium Christi 
non solum quantum ad incarnationem, sed etiam quantum ad 
passionem et resurrectionem, quibus humanum genus a peccato et 
morte liberatur. Aliter enim non praefigurassent Christi passionem 
quibusdam sacrificiis et ante legem et sub lege. Quorum quidem 
sacrificiorum significatum explicite maiores cognoscebant, minores 
autem sub velamine illorum sacrificiorum, credentes ea divinitus 
esse disposita de Christo venturo, quodammodo habebant velatam 
cognitionem ... Et ideo eo modo quo mysterium Christi ante Christum 
fuit quidem explicite creditum a maioribus, implicite autem et quasi 
obumbrate a minoribus, ita etiam et mysterium Trinitatis. Et ideo 
etiam post tempus gratiae divulgatae tenentur omnes ad explicite 
credendum mysterium Trinitatis. Et omnes qui renascuntur in 
Christo hoc adipiscuntur per invocationem Trinitatis, secundum 
illud Matth. ult., ‘euntes, docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in 
nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti.35
35 But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the incarnation, but 
also as to the passion and resurrection, whereby the human race is delivered from sin and 
death; for they would not, else, have foreshadowed Christ’s passion by certain sacrifices 
both before and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the learned 
explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those sacrifices, believed them to be 
ordained by God in reference to Christ’s coming, and thus their knowledge was covered 
with a veil, so to speak ... wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of Christ was 
believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the 
simple, so too was it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace 
had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity; and 
all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation of the 
Trinity, according to Matthew 28:19: ‘‘Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing 
them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.’’ De ver. 14.11 resp.: 
‘Sed ante peccatum et post, omni tempore necessarium fuit a maioribus explicitam fidem 
de Trinitate habere; non autem a minoribus post peccatum usque ad tempus gratiae; 
ante peccatum enim forte talis distinctio non fuisset, ut quidam per alios erudirentur 
de fide. Et similiter etiam post peccatum usque ad tempus gratiae maiores tenebantur 
habere fidem de redemptore explicite; minores vero implicite, vel in fide patriarcharum 
et prophetarum, vel in divina providentia.’
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Significant as far as the second of them is concerned – those, that is 
to say, without the Law but sensitive to the providentiality of things – 
is this passage, again from the Secunda secundae at 2.7, where in reply to 
the objection that some of the gentiles appear on the testimony of the 
Areopagite to have been brought home irrespective of their ignorance of 
Christ and of the Christian mysteries,36 Thomas insists (a) that they were 
not, in fact, without oracular and other utterances testifying to the truth 
about to be revealed, and (b) that, though not party to Christian revelation 
precisely as such, they knew themselves in something approaching a sense 
of God’s will to salvation:
Si qui tamen salvati fuerunt quibus revelatio non fuit facta, non fuerunt 
salvati absque fide mediatoris. Quia etsi non habuerunt fidem explicitam, 
habuerunt tamen fidem implicitam in divina providentia, credentes 
Deum esse liberatorem hominum secundum modos sibi placitos et 
secundum quod aliquibus veritatem cognoscentibus ipse revelasset ...
(ST IIa IIae.2.7 ad 3)37
to which, for the sake of confirming his consistency hereabouts, we should 
add these lines from the De veritate on the comparability of the old Jews 
living as inferiores under the Law and of the gentiles living beyond the 
Law but possessed even so of an inkling of it:
gentiles non ponebantur ut instructores divinae fidei. Unde, 
quantumcumque essent sapientes sapientia saeculari, inter minores 
computandi sunt; et ideo sufficiebat eis habere fidem de redemptore 
implicite, vel in fide legis et prophetarum, vel etiam in ipsa divina 
providentia.
(De ver. 14.11 ad 5)38
36 ST IIa IIae.2.7 obj. 3: ‘multi gentilium salutem adepti sunt per ministerium 
Angelorum, ut Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier. Sed gentiles non habuerunt fidem 
de Christo nec explicitam nec implicitam, ut videtur, quia nulla eis revelatio facta est. 
Ergo videtur quod credere explicite Christi mysterium non fuerit omnibus necessarium 
ad salutem.’
37 If, however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not saved 
without faith in a mediator, for, though they did not believe in him explicitly, they did, 
nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in divine providence, since they 
believed that God would deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to him, and 
according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew the truth ...
38 the gentiles were never deemed to be teachers in faith and divinity, whence, although 
they were wise in the secular way of being wise, they are to be counted as minores. It 
was therefore enough for them to have implicit faith in the redeemer or in the law or the 
prophets, or even in that same divine providence.
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True, as Thomas himself suggests, it is all somewhat hypothetical (the 
‘Si qui tamen salvati fuerunt quibus revelatio non fuit facta’ of the Secunda 
secundae passage), but, given his commitment to belief in the Christ either 
as to come or else as already with us as the only sure way of salvation, the 
door is left ajar, Thomas’s, as far as the pagans are concerned, being to this 
extent a generous sense of the matter. Persuaded as he is of the centrality 
of the Christ to every definitive account of God’s dealings with man and 
thus of man’s with God under the conditions of time and eternity, and 
thus, all other things being equal, of the indispensability of explicit faith 
as a condition of man’s ultimate happiness, his, nonetheless, is a sense of 
the efficacy of implicit faith as a principle in casu of homecoming.
5. Now Dante, when it comes to those living outside the Christian 
dispensation but under the Old Law, is not too far removed, either in 
substance or in spirit, from Thomas, for though doing without the distinction 
between explicit and implicit faith decisive for the precise complexion of 
Thomas’s position, he too is eager to bring home the Jewish patriarchs on 
the basis of their living in anticipation of the Christ to come; so, for example, 
on the threshold of the poem, the harrowing of hell passage of Inferno IV, 
at once inclusive and exclusive in spirit, inclusive as regards those living 
within the Old Law and exclusive as regards those living beyond it:
 “Dimmi, maestro mio, dimmi, segnore”,
comincia’ io per voler esser certo
di quella fede che vince ogne errore:
 “uscicci mai alcuno, o per suo merto
o per altrui, che poi fosse beato?”.
E quei che ’ntese il mio parlar coverto,
 rispuose: “Io era nuovo in questo stato,
quando ci vidi venire un possente,
con segno di vittoria coronato.
 Trasseci l’ombra del primo parente,
d’Abèl suo figlio e quella di Noè,
di Moïsè legista e ubidente;
 Abraàm patrïarca e Davìd re,
Israèl con lo padre e co’ suoi nati
e con Rachele, per cui tanto fé,
 e altri molti, e feceli beati.
E vo’ che sappi che, dinanzi ad essi,
spiriti umani non eran salvati”.
(Inf. IV.46-63)39
39 “Tell me, master, tell me, sir”, I began, wishing to be assured of the faith that conquers 
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while further on in the poem, the Hebrew women passage of Paradiso 
XXXII, where, as Dante himself puts it (the ‘secondo lo sguardo che 
fée / la fede in Cristo’ of lines 19-20), it is a question of directionality, of 
those looking forward rather than backward upon the Christ event as the 
pivotal point of world-historical understanding:
 E dal settimo grado in giù, sì come
infino ad esso, succedono Ebree,
dirimendo del fior tutte le chiome;
 perché, secondo lo sguardo che fée
la fede in Cristo, queste sono il muro
a che si parton le sacre scalee.
 Da questa parte onde ’l fiore è maturo
di tutte le sue foglie, sono assisi
quei che credettero in Cristo venturo;
 da l’altra parte onde sono intercisi
di vòti i semicirculi, si stanno
quei ch’a Cristo venuto ebber li visi.
(Par. XXXII.16-27)40
But when it comes to those living before and beyond the Old and New 
Law he is not so sure, for these, though sensitive to the providentiality 
of it all, were nonetheless bereft of the word which, quickened as it is by 
the Spirit, alone brings a man to the fullness of faith and the blessedness 
thereof. And this, for Dante, makes all the difference, for while for Thomas 
faith and the blessedness thereof are the product of a movement of grace 
notionally and substantially independent of their external occasions,41 for 
every error, did ever anyone go forth from here, either by his own or by another’s merit, 
who afterwards was blessed?” And he, who understood my covert speech, replied, “I was 
new in this condition when I saw a mighty one come here, crowned with sign of victory. 
He took hence the shade of our first parent, Abel his son, and Noah, and Moses, obedient 
giver of laws, Abraham the patriarch and David the king, Israel with his father and his 
children and with Rachel, for whom he did so much, and many others; and he made them 
blessed. And I would have you know that before these no human souls were saved.”
40 And from the seventh row downwards, even as down to it, Hebrew women follow in 
succession, dividing all the trees of the flower; because, according to the look which their 
faith turned to Christ, these are the wall by which the sacred stairway is divided. On 
this side, wherein the flower is mature in all its petals, are seated those who believed in 
Christ yet to come. On the other side, where the half-circles are broken by vacant places, 
sit those who turned their faces towards Christ already come.
41 ST IIa IIae 6.1 resp.: ‘Quantum vero ... ad assensum hominis in ea quae sunt fidei, 
potest considerari duplex causa. Una quidem exterius inducens, sicut miraculum visum, vel 
persuasio hominis inducentis ad fidem. Quorum neutrum est sufficiens causa, videntium 
enim unum et idem miraculum, et audientium eandem praedicationem, quidam credunt 
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Dante the external occasions of faith, including above all Scripture as the 
living word of God, constitute in themselves a channel of grace, herein lying 
their indispensability to a coming home of the individual to his proper 
happiness; so, for example, on the power of Scripture in and through itself 
– irrespective, that is to say of any movement of the Spirit other than that 
by which it is itself irradiated – to persuasion, the ‘silogismo che la m’ha 
conchiusa’ sequence of Paradiso XXIV.91-96: 
           E io: “La larga ploia
de lo Spirito Santo, ch’è diffusa
in su le vecchie e ’n su le nuove cuoia,
 è silogismo che la m’ha conchiusa
acutamente sì, che ’nverso d’ella
ogne dimostrazion mi pare ottusa.” 42
  
the ‘e a tal creder non ho io pur prove / fisice e metafisice’ sequence of the 
same canto at lines 130-38:
 E io rispondo: Io credo in uno Dio
solo ed etterno, che tutto ’l ciel move,
non moto, con amore e con disio;
 e a tal creder non ho io pur prove
fisice e metafisice, ma dalmi
anche la verità che quinci piove
 per Moïsè, per profeti e per salmi,
per l’Evangelio e per voi che scriveste
poi che l’ardente Spirto vi fé almi.43
and the ‘Avete il novo e ʼl vecchio Testamento’ passage of Paradiso V.73-78:
et quidam non credunt. Et ideo oportet ponere aliam causam interiorem, quae movet 
hominem interius ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei. Hanc autem causam Pelagiani 
ponebant solum liberum arbitrium hominis, et propter hoc dicebant quod initium fidei 
est ex nobis, inquantum scilicet ex nobis est quod parati sumus ad assentiendum his 
quae sunt fidei; sed consummatio fidei est a Deo, per quem nobis proponuntur ea quae 
credere debemus. Sed hoc est falsum. Quia cum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, 
elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius 
movente, quod est Deus. Et ideo fides quantum ad assensum, qui est principalis actus 
fidei, est a Deo interius movente per gratiam.’
42 And I: “The plenteous rain of the Holy Spirit which is poured over the old and new 
parchments is a syllogism that has proved it to me so acutely that, in comparison with 
this, every demonstration seems obtuse to me.”
43 And I reply: I believe in one God, sole and eternal, who, unmoved, moves all the 
heavens with love and with desire; and for this belief I have not only proofs physical and 
metaphysical, but it is given to me also in the truth that rains down hence through Moses 
and the prophets and the psalms, through the gospel, and through you who wrote when 
the fiery Spirit made you holy.
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 Siate, Cristiani, a muovervi più gravi:  
non siate come penna ad ogne vento,  
e non crediate ch’ogne acqua vi lavi.  
 Avete il novo e ʼl vecchio Testamento,  
e ʼl pastor de la Chiesa che vi guida;  
questo vi basti a vostro salvamento.44
each alike secure in its sense of Scripture, along with the inspired teaching 
of the Church (the ‘e ʼl pastor de la Chiesa che vi guida’ of the Paradiso V 
passage), as salvifically sufficient. Throughout, then, the pattern is the same. 
Dispensing with the notion of grace as dispositive in respect of faith as a 
property of the spirit (a notion which, especially when taken in conjunction 
with that of implicit faith, leaves considerable room for manoeuver), Dante 
opts instead for the encounter pure and simple as a means of grace and 
principle of salvation, an option, however, at once making for the exclusion of 
whole tracts of humanity from the feast of the Lamb. And it is precisely this 
– the melancholy of a position not entirely innocent of effrontery in respect 
of the wideness of God’s mercy – that urged him to rethink the issue here 
with a view to resolving it at the highest conceivable level, in terms, that is to 
say, less of the revelatory instant in all its historical contingency, than of the 
love and thus of the love-susceptibility of One whose being is his loving. It 
is, in other words, the sadness of a soteriology making only for repudiation 
as its point of arrival, that, in a moment of exhilaration, encouraged him, 
indeed compelled him, to revise the whole question of ultimate being and 
becoming in turns of the willingness of God (a) to accommodate all those 
who in good faith plead the cause of the righteous spirits of antiquity 
(the case of Trajan), and (b) to grace those who, though unChristed and 
unchurched, nevertheless lived or live still according to their lights (the case 
of Rhipeus). First, then, in the order of exposition comes the predicament of 
the good man and true, who, though bereft of Christ through no fault of his 
own, lives even so a just and honourable life. Where, the pilgrim protagonist 
wonders, is the justice which condemns him?:
 Assai t’è mo aperta la latebra
che t’ascondeva la giustizia viva,
di che facei question cotanto crebra;
 ché tu dicevi: “Un uom nasce a la riva
de l’Indo, e quivi non è chi ragioni
di Cristo né chi legga né chi scriva;
 e tutti suoi voleri e atti buoni
44 Be graver, you Christians, in moving. Be not like a feather to every wind, and think 
not that every water may cleanse you. You have the New Testament and the Old, and the 
Shepherd of the Church to guide you. Let this suffice for your salvation.
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sono, quanto ragione umana vede,
sanza peccato in vita o in sermoni.
 Muore non battezzato e sanza fede:
ov’ è questa giustizia che ’l condanna?
ov’ è la colpa sua, se ei non crede?”.
(Par. XIX.67-78)45
The answer, delivered by the celestial eagle, comes in two parts, the 
first of which, taken alone, is no answer at all, merely a preliminary 
admonition: let no one, the eagle says, jump to conclusions, for all justice 
is grounded in the righteousness of God, which, forever consistent with 
the goodness of which it is but the outshining, informs steadily – if, as far 
as man is concerned, inscrutably – his every decree:
 Or tu chi se’, che vuo’ sedere a scranna,
per giudicar di lungi mille miglia
con la veduta corta d’una spanna? 
 Certo a colui che meco s’assottiglia,
se la Scrittura sovra voi non fosse,
da dubitar sarebbe a maraviglia.
 Oh terreni animali! oh menti grosse!
La prima volontà, ch’è da sé buona,
da sé, ch’è sommo ben, mai non si mosse.
 Cotanto è giusto quanto a lei consuona:
nullo creato bene a sé la tira, 
ma essa, radïando, lui cagiona.
(Par. XIX.79-90)46
45 Now is laid well open to you the hiding place which concealed from you the living 
justice concerning which you have made question so incessantly. For you said, “A man 
is born on the banks of the Indus, and none is there to speak, or read, or write of Christ, 
and all his wishes and acts are good, so far as human reason sees, without sin in life or 
in speech. He dies unbaptized, and without faith. Where is this justice which condemns 
him? Where is his sin if he does not believe?”
46 Now who are you who would sit upon the seat to judge at a thousand miles away with 
the short sight that carries but a span? Assuredly, for him who subtilizes with me, if the 
Scriptures were not set over you, there would be marvelous occasion for questioning. O 
earthly animals! O gross minds! The primal will, which of itself is good, has never moved 
from itself, which is the supreme good. All is just that accords with it; no created good draws 
it to itself, but it, raying forth, is the cause of it. Mon. II.ii.4-5: ‘Ex hiis iam liquet quod ius, 
cum sit bonum, per prius in mente Dei est; et, cum omne quod in mente Dei est sit Deus, 
iuxta illud “Quod factum est in ipso vita erat”, et Deus maxime se ipsum velit, sequitur quod 
ius a Deo, prout in eo est, sit volitum. Et cum voluntas et volitum in Deo sit idem, sequitur 
ulterius quod divina voluntas sit ipsum ius. Et iterum ex hoc sequitur quod ius in rebus nichil 
est aliud quam similitudo divine voluntatis; unde fit quod quicquid divine voluntati non 
consonat, ipsum ius esse non possit, et quicquid divine voluntati est consonum, ius ipsum sit.’
Conversations with Kenelm74
– an emphasis straightaway confirmed in the ‘Roteando cantava’ tercet 
beginning at line 97 of the same canto:
 Roteando cantava, e dicea: “Quali
son le mie note a te, che non le ’ntendi,
tal è il giudicio etterno a voi mortali”.47
But, then, from out of the stillness (the ‘Poi si quetaro quei lucenti 
incendi / de lo Spirito Santo ...’ of XIX.100-101)48 comes the reply proper 
to Dante’s question, a reply nicely attentive once again to its periodization, 
its step-by-step unfolding. First, then, comes the Johannine moment of 
the argument to the effect that no one comes to the Father other than by 
way of the Son as crucified (the ‘A questo regno / non salì mai chi non 
credette ’n Cristo, / né pria né poi ch’el si chiavasse al legno’ of lines 103-
105),49 and then the Matthean moment to the effect that many of those 
crying ‘Christ! Christ!’ will be turned away as strangers to him (the ‘Ma 
vedi: molti gridan “Cristo, Cristo!”, / che saranno in giudicio assai men 
prope / a lui, che tal che non conosce Cristo’ of lines 106-108),50 the latter, 
however, serving merely to reinforce the pathos everywhere generated  by 
the spectacle of those living out the synderectic substance of their being 
but even so far off. And with this – this recognizably Pauline sense of 
the claim set up by those not so much proclaiming the law as bearing it 
inscribed on their hearts51 – we come to the nub of the matter, to Dante’s 
47 Wheeling it sang and said, “As are my notes to you who understand them not, such is 
the eternal judgement to you mortals”.
48 After those glowing flames of the Holy Spirit became quiet ...
49 To this realm none ever rose who believed not in Christ, either before or after he was 
nailed to the tree. John 14:6: ‘Dicit ei Jesus: ego sum via et veritas et vita; nemo venit ad 
Patrem nisi per me.’
50 But behold, many cry Christ, Christ, who, at the judgement, shall be far less near to 
him than he who knows not Christ. Matt. 7:21-23: ‘Non omnis qui dicit mihi Domine, 
Domine intrabit in regnum cœlorum, sed qui facit voluntatem Patris mei, qui in cœlis 
est, ipse intrabit in regnum cœlorum. Multi dicent mihi in illa die: Domine, Domine, 
nonne in nomine tuo prophetavimus, et in nomine tuo dæmonia ejecimus, et in nomine 
tuo virtutes multas fecimus? Et tunc confitebor illis, quia nunquam novi vos, discedite a 
me, qui operamini iniquitatem.’
51 Romans 2:14-15: ‘Cum enim Gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae 
legis sunt, faciunt, ejusmodi legem non habentes, ipsi sibi sunt lex. Qui ostendunt opus 
legis scriptum in cordibus suis, testimonium reddente illis conscientia ipsorum et inter se 
invicem cogitationum accusantium, aut etiam defendentium, in die, cum judicabit Deus 
occulta hominum, secundum evangelium meum per Jesum Christum.’ P. S. Hawkins, 
‘Dante, St Paul, and the Letter to the Romans’, in Medieval Readings in Romans, ed. W. S. 
Campbell, P. S. Hawkins and B. D. Schildgen (Edinburgh and New York: Continuum and 
T. & T. Clark, 2007), pp. 115-31. More generally, J. A. Mazzeo, ‘Dante and the Pauline 
Modes of Vision’, in Structure and Thought in the ‘Paradiso’ (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
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account, not simply of the susceptibility, but of the vulnerability of God as 
seeing and delighting in the good works of the pagan spirit. Startled, then, 
by the presence in paradise of Trajan and Rhipeus as innocent of Christ 
and clergy, but invited by the eagle of righteousness to think through 
the deep reasons of it all, the pilgrim poet is at last initiated in an act of 
understanding, in a sense of God’s readiness, not only to love, but to be 
won over by love, herein lying the triumph of love over lovelessness:
 Regnum celorum vïolenza pate
da caldo amore e da viva speranza,
che vince la divina volontate:
 non a guisa che l’omo a l’om sobranza,
ma vince lei perché vuole esser vinta,
e, vinta, vince con sua beninanza.
(Par. XX.94-99)52
Press, 1958; reprint New York: Greenwood, 1968), pp. 84-110; G. Petrocchi, ‘San Paolo in 
Dante’, in G. Barblan (ed.), Dante e la Bibbia. Atti del Convegno internazionale promosso da Biblia, 
Florence, 26-28 settembre 1986 (Florence: Olschki, 1988), pp. 235-48 (subsequently in La selva 
del protonotario. Nuovi studi danteschi (Naples: Morano, 1988), pp. 65-82); R. Hollander, Dante 
and Paul’s ‘Five Words with Understanding’ (Binghampton, N.Y.: Center for Medieval and 
Early Renaissance Studies, 1992); G. Di Scipio, The Presence of Pauline Thought in the Works 
of Dante (Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter: Edwin Mellen, 1995).
52 Regnum celorum suffers violence from fervent love and from living hope which 
vanquishes the divine will; not as man overcomes man, but vanquishes it because it wills 
to be vanquished, and, vanquished, vanquishes with its own benignity.  G. Cannavò, 
Regnum celorum vïolenza pate. Dante e la salvezza dell’umanità. Letture Dantesche Giubilari, 
Vicenza, ottobre 1999 - giugno 2000 (Montella (Avellino): Accademia Vivarium Novum, 
2002), with, at pp. 193-203, A. M. Chiavacci Leonardi, ‘La salvezza degli infedeli: il canto 
XX del Paradiso’ (subsequently in Le bianche stole. Saggi sul Paradiso di Dante (Florence: 
Sismel, 2009), pp. 97-112). Also, F. Ruffini, ‘Dante e il problema della salvezza degli 
infedeli’, Studi danteschi 14 (1930), 79-92; B. Quilici, Il destino dell’ infidele virtuoso nel pensiero 
di Dante (Florence: Ariani, 1936); T. O’H. Hahn, ‘I “gentili” e “un uom nasce a la riva / 
de l’Indo” (Par. XIX, vv.70 sqq.)’, L’Alighieri. Rassegna bibliografica dantesca 18 (1977), 2, 
3-8; R. Morghen, ‘Dante tra l’“umano” e la storia della salvezza’, in L’Alighieri. Rassegna 
bibliografica dantesca 21 (1980), 1, 18-30; N. Iliescu, ‘Will Virgil be saved?’, Mediaevalia 
12 (1986), 93-114 and as ‘Sarà salvo Virgilio?’ in Dante. Summa medievalis. Proceedings 
of the Symposium of the Center for Italian Studies, SUNY Stony Brook, ed. C. Franco and L. 
Morgan (Stony Brook, N.Y.: Forum Italicum, 1995), pp. 112-33; M. Allan, ‘Does Dante 
hope for Vergil’s Salvation?’, Modern Language Notes 104 (1989), 193-205; M. Picone, ‘La 
“viva speranza” di Dante e il problema della salvezza dei pagani virtuosi. Una lettura 
di Paradiso 20’, Quaderni di Italianistica 10 (1989), 1-2, 251-68 ; idem, ‘Auctoritas classica e 
salvezza cristiana: una lettura tipologica di Purgatorio XXII’, in Studi in memoria di Giorgio 
Varanini (Pisa: Giardini, 1992), vol. I (Dal Duecento al Quattrocento), pp. 379-95; T. Barolini, 
‘Q: Does Dante hope for Vergil’s Salvation?’, Modern Language Notes 105 (1990), 1, 138-44 
and 147-49 (and in Dante and the Origins of Italian Literary Culture (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2006), pp. 151-57); B. D. Schildgen, ‘Dante and the Indus’, Dante 
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Taking as his core text the difficult saying of Christ in Matthew 11:12 
to the effect that ‘ever since the coming of John the Baptist the kingdom of 
heaven has been subject to violence and violent men are seizing it’,53 Dante 
fashions from it a notion reaching as far into the essential nature of the 
Godhead as it is possible for man to go, a notion which, transcending as it 
does the customary τοποι of God-discourse relative to his impassivity and 
unmoveability, settles on his love-responsiveness, on his willingness, where 
love is concerned, to reply in kind. Now here, clearly, we have to be careful, 
for tempting as it is to see in this a breaking of the mould in the area of election 
theology, we need to note that neither the ‘viva speranza’ nor the ‘caldo amore’ 
of which the eagle speaks originates with the beneficiary of that love, the 
former, the lively hope, proceeding from the prayers of the supplicant spirit, 
and the latter from the storehouse of God’s own graciousness:
 D’i corpi suoi non uscir, come credi,
Gentili, ma Cristiani, in ferma fede
Studies 111 (1993), 177-93; eadem, ‘Dante’s Utopian Political Vision, the Roman Empire, 
and the Salvation of Pagans’, Annali d’Italianistica 19 (2001), 51-69; G. Muresu, ‘Le “vie” 
della redenzione (Paradiso VII)’, Rassegna della letteratura italiana, ser. 8, 98 (1994), 1-2, 
5-19; N. Cacciaglia, ‘“Per fede e per opere” (una lettura del tema della salvezza nella 
Divina Commedia)’, in Critica Letteraria 30 (2002), 2-3, 265-74 (also in Annali dell’Università 
per Stranieri di Perugia 29 (2002), 123-131); B. Martinelli, ‘Canto XIX’, in Lectura Dantis 
Turicensis. Paradiso, ed. G. Güntert and M. Picone (Florence: Cesati, 2002), pp. 281-305 
(revised with the title ‘La fede in Cristo. Dante e il problema della salvezza (Paradiso 
XIX)’, Rivista di Letteratura Italiana 20 (2002), 2, 11-39, and in Dante. L’“altro viaggio” 
(Pisa: Giardini, 2007), pp. 289-319); G. Inglese, ‘Il destino dei non credenti. Lettura di 
Paradiso XIX’, La Cultura. Rivista trimestrale di filosofia letteratura e storia 42 (2004), 2, 315-
29; A. Lanza, ‘Giustizia divina e salvezza dei “senza fede”, in Dante eterodosso (Bergamo: 
Moretti Honegger, 2004), pp. 113-24; C. O’Connell Baur, Dante’s Hermeneutics of Salvation. 
Passages to Freedom in the Divine Comedy (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of 
Toronto Press, 2007). More generally, S. Harent, ‘Infidèles, Salut des’, Dictionnaire de 
Théologie Catholique, 15 vols, ed. P. Moraux et al. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1909-46), 
vol. 7, ii, cols 1276-1930; L. Capéran, Le Problème du salut des infidèles, 2 vols, revised edn 
(Toulouse: Grand Séminaire, 1934); T. P. Dunning, ‘Langland and the Salvation of the 
Heathen’, Medium Aevum 12 (1943), 45-54; M. Frezza, Il problema della salvezza dei pagani 
(da Abelardo al Seicento) (Naples: Fiorentino, 1962); R. V. Turner, ‘“Descendit ad Inferos”. 
Medieval Views on Christ’s descent into Hell and the Salvation of the Ancient Just’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas 27 (1966), 173-94; C. L. Vitto, The Virtuous Pagan in Middle 
English Literature. Transactions of The American Philosophical Society 79, part 5 (Philadelphia: 
The American Philosophical Society, 1989), pp. 36-49; N. Watson, ‘Visions of Inclusion. 
Universal Salvation and Vernacular Theology in Pre-Reformation England’, Journal of 
Medieval and Early Modern Studies 27 (1997), 145-88. On the cases of Trajan and Rhipeus, 
G. Whatley, ‘The Uses of Hagiography: the Legend of Pope Gregory and the Emperor 
Trajan in the Middle Ages’, Viator 15 (1984), 25-63.
53 ‘a diebus autem Joannis Baptistae usque nunc, regnum cælorum vim patitur, et 
violenti rapiunt illud’; Luke 16:16: ‘Lex et prophetae, usque ad Joannem; ex eo regnum 
Dei evangelizatur, et omnis in illud vim facit.’ Translation NEB.
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quel d’i passuri e quel d’i passi piedi.
 Ché l’una de lo ’nferno, u’ non si riede
già mai a buon voler, tornò a l’ossa;
e ciò di viva spene fu mercede:
 di viva spene, che mise la possa
ne’ prieghi fatti a Dio per suscitarla,
sì che potesse sua voglia esser mossa.
 L’anima glorïosa onde si parla,
tornata ne la carne, in che fu poco,
credette in lui che potëa aiutarla;
 e credendo s’accese in tanto foco
di vero amor, ch’a la morte seconda
fu degna di venire a questo gioco.
 L’altra, per grazia che da sì profonda
fontana stilla, che mai creatura
non pinse l’occhio infino a la prima onda,
 tutto suo amor là giù pose a drittura:
per che, di grazia in grazia, Dio li aperse
l’occhio a la nostra redenzion futura;
 ond’ ei credette in quella, e non sofferse
da indi il puzzo più del paganesmo;
e riprendiene le genti perverse.
(Par. XX.103-26)54
54 They came forth from their bodies not as you think, gentiles, but Christians, with 
firm faith, the one in the feet that were to suffer, the other in the feet that had suffered. 
For the one came back to his bones from hell, where none ever returns to right will; and 
this was the reward of living hope, of living hope that gave power to the prayers made to 
God to raise him up, that it might be possible for his will to be moved. The glorious soul I 
tell of, having returned to the flesh for a short time, believed in him that was able to help 
him; and, believing, was kindled to such a fire of true love that on his second death he 
was worthy to come to this rejoicing. The other, through grace that wells from a fountain 
so deep that never did creature thrust eye down to its first wave, set all his love below 
on righteousness; wherefore, from grace to grace, God opened his eye to our future 
redemption, so that he believed in it, and therefore endured not the stench of paganism, 
and reproved the perverse peoples for it. On Dante and the virtuous pagans (in addition 
to commentaries and lecturae on Inferno IV), G. Rizzo, ‘Dante and the Virtuous Pagans’, 
in Dante Symposium in Commemoration of the 700th Anniversary of the Poet’s Birth (1265-1965), 
ed. W. De Sua and G. Rizzo (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 
pp. 115-40; K. Foster, O.P., ‘The Two Dantes (III). The Pagans and Grace’, in The Two 
Dantes and Other Studies (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1977), pp. 220-53 (also, 
in the same volume, pp. 137-55, ‘The Son’s Eagle: Paradiso XIX’); D. Thompson, ‘Dante’s 
Virtuous Romans’, Dante Studies 96 (1978), 145-62; H.A. Mason, ‘A Journey through 
Hell: Dante’s Inferno Revisited. Virtuous pagans – “gente di molto valore”. Canto IV’, 
The Cambridge Quarterly 16 (1987), 3, 187-211; M. Picone, ‘La “viva speranza” di Dante 
e il problema della salvezza dei pagani virtuosi. Una lettura di Paradiso 20’ (note 52 
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There can, then, be no inferring from this passage a theology of election 
unconstrained by the customary contents of Christian consciousness, 
a theology of election, that is to say, countenancing the dispensability of 
grace, and above all of the grace made available to us in Christ, to any 
ultimate homecoming of the soul. At the same time something stirs in the 
depths, a sense of God’s concern, not simply for those seated at his table, 
but for the stranger at the gate, and for his status too as a guest. Something 
of the kind, at any rate, would seem to be the substance of Dante’s final 
reflection in this canto, of his sense of the wind as blowing where it listeth 
and of this as its sweetness:
 O predestinazion, quanto remota
è la radice tua da quelli aspetti
che la prima cagion non veggion tota!
 E voi, mortali, tenetevi stretti
a giudicar: ché noi, che Dio vedemo,
non conosciamo ancor tutti li eletti;
 ed ènne dolce così fatto scemo,
perché il ben nostro in questo ben s’affina,
che quel che vole Iddio, e noi volemo.
(ibid. XX.130-38)55
above); C. L. Vitto, ‘The Virtuous Pagan in Legend and in Dante’, in The Virtuous Pagan 
in Middle English Literature (note 52 above); M. L. Colish, ‘The Virtuous Pagan: Dante 
and the Christian Tradition’, in The Unbounded Community. Papers in Christian Ecumenism 
in Honor of Jaroslav Pelikan, ed. W. Caferro and D. G. Fisher (New York: Garland, 
1996), pp. 43-91; G. Inglese, ‘Il destino dei non credenti. Lettura di Paradiso XIX’, La 
Cultura. Rivista trimestrale di filosofia letteratura e storia (note 52 above). On Virgil (Dante’s 
Virgil) in particular, and in addition to the Enciclopedia dantesca ad voc. (Rome: Istituto 
dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970-78), vol. 5, pp. 1030-44; E. Auerbach, Dante Poet of the 
Secular World, trans. R. Manheim (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1961 
and reprints; originally 1929), with ‘Dante und Virgil’, Das Humanistiches Gymnasium 42 
(1931), 136-44; D.Consoli, Significato del Virgilio dantesco (Florence: Le Monnier, 1967); 
R. Hollander, Il Virgilio dantesco: tragedia nella ‘Commedia’ (Florence: Olschki, 1983); 
T. Barolini, Dante’s Poets. Textuality and Truth in the ‘Comedy’ (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). More generally, D. Comparetti, Vergil in the Middle Ages, trans. E. 
F. M. Benecke (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997; original Italian 1872). 
On the Dantean limbo, G. Busnelli, ‘La colpa del “non fare” degli infedeli negativi’, Studi 
danteschi 23 (1938), 79-97; G. Padoan, ‘Il limbo dantesco’, Lettere italiane 21 (1969), 369-88 
(and in Il pio Enea, l’empio Ulisse (Ravenna: Longo, 1977), pp. 103-24); K. Foster, O.P., 
‘The Two Dantes (I). Limbo and Implicit Faith’, in the Two Dantes (above), pp. 156-89; A. 
A. Iannucci, ‘Limbo: the Emptiness of Time’, Studi danteschi 52 (1979-80), 69-128.
55 O predestination, how remote is thy root from the vision of those who see not the 
first cause entire! And you mortals, keep yourselves restrained in judging; for we who 
see God, know not yet all the elect. And to us such defect is sweet, because our good in 
this good is refined, that what God wills we also will.
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To rest in God, in other words, is to rest in the sweet understanding 
that, however he chooses to resolve it all, his will be a resolution in love, 
understanding to this effect serving but to refine still further the joy of 
the elect. 
Love-magnanimity, therefore, and love-responsiveness, these are the 
twin emphases of Dante’s mature meditation in the areas of atonement 
and of election theology: the kind of love-magnanimity whereby, in the 
midst of his destitution, man is freshly empowered as man and the kind 
of love-responsiveness whereby, consubstantial and co-extensive with his 
own loving, God cannot but reply in kind to a movement of love wherever 
he sees it. Good theology? Most certainly. For this is theology which, 
jealous of its credentials and communicability, is forever on the point of 
being undone by its own agapeic substance, its fundamental inequality to 
the business in hand. 

Dante and the Modalities of Grace
 Né tra l’ultima notte e ’l primo die
sì alto o sì magnifico processo,
o per l’una o per l’altra, fu o fie:
 ché più largo fu Dio a dar sé stesso
per far l’uom sufficiente a rilevarsi,
che s’elli avesse sol da sé dimesso ...
                            (Par. VII.112-17)1
1. Preliminary considerations: Singleton, Singletonians and patterns of grace-theological 
consciousness.  2. Dante and the revised geometry of grace awareness.  3. Dante and the 
modalities of grace: grace as a principle of encouragement (being under the aspect of 
fortitude) – grace as a principle of emancipation (being under the aspect of freedom) – 
grace as a principle of ecstasy (being under the aspect of rejoicing).  4. Conclusion: grace 
as but love by another name.
In 1990 a book appeared which, by way of its knack both of uplifting 
and of upsetting the reader at the same time, called into question 
an interpretation of the Commedia in its theological aspect going 
back through Giuseppe Mazzotta and John Freccero to Charles 
Singleton in his seminal Journey to Beatrice. The book was Antonio 
Mastrobuono’s Dante’s Journey of Sanctification,2 which, in the course of 
1 Nor between the last night and the first day has there been or will there be so exalted and so 
magnificent a procedure, either by one or by the other; for God was more bounteous in giving 
himself to make man sufficient to raise himself again, than if he solely of himself had remitted ...
2 A. C. Mastrobuono, Dante’s Journey of Sanctification (Washington, D.C.: Gateway, 1990), 
especially Chapter 1 (‘Justification and Merit’). C. S. Singleton, Journey to Beatrice (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), cited by Mastrobuono in the 1967 edition from the same 
press. G. Mazzotta, Dante: Poet of the Desert. History and Allegory in the Divine Comedy (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); J. Freccero (relative to whom Mastrobuono’s 
lengthy appendix ‘A Book Twenty-Five Years in the Making’, pp. 212-79), Dante. The Poetics of 
Conversion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). Peter Armour on the merits 
of Mastrobuono’s book as a timely critique of ‘the most influential American Dante scholar 
of recent years’ but as ‘intemperate’ and apt to ‘alienate the reader, Modern Language Review 88 
(1993) 1, 219-20; similarly Christopher Ryan, Italian Studies 46 (1991), 110-14.
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its preface (page x), reproduces the following passage from Singleton 
to the effect that
what we are finally privileged to see is clear: Dante has continued 
to work with the metaphor ‘return to Eden’ even in this respect. At 
the summit and end of the climb up the mountain, when Eden is 
reached, we may see history somehow repeating itself; as it was with 
Adam in his formation, so now with this man, so now with ‘man’, in 
his reformation. Only now do we glimpse an aspect of the metaphor 
we might otherwise have missed. There had been a moment in 
Adam’s formation when Adam was not yet in Eden, when Adam 
was formed outside of Eden in a first condition ‘secundum naturam’. 
What corresponds to this, in a ‘return’ to Eden, is the moment when 
Virgil proclaims that Dante the Wayfarer is now reformed in justice, 
a justice discernible by the natural light. This then is the moment 
‘secundum naturam’ in the reformation.
The pattern of the original formation of man is thus seen to repeat 
itself in the reformation of a man named Dante, who attains first to 
a condition of justice with Virgil, within the proportion of his nature 
and under the natural light, and then, in a second moment attains to 
Eden proper, crossing the river to a kind of justice with Beatrice that 
is truly beyond all human measure.
In fact, Mastrobuono would have done better to quote in full at this point, 
for occupying the space between what here look like consecutive paragraphs 
there is, in the original, additional material summing up Singleton’s main 
thesis in the book – namely, his sense of how it is that, having been confirmed 
under the auspices of Virgil in a state of natural justice, Dante aspires in the 
earthly paradise, and in the presence of Beatrice, to one of supernatural 
justice, to a species of righteousness ushered in by grace:
Dante advances to a stream which cuts across his path and blocks 
his way. He may go no further for the moment, nor may Virgil ever 
go further than this. Beatrice is expected and when she comes Virgil 
has disappeared. The light of grace flashes through the forest, from 
beyond the stream. And when after contrition and confession, Dante 
may cross through the water to the far shore, to attain to Beatrice 
and the infused virtues, we know that he crosses to a condition of 
grace and justice beyond Virgil and beyond nature. And we come 
to understand better why that further bank of the stream where 
Beatrice comes is called a ‘blessed’ shore.
The stream of Lethe in Eden is as a boundary, marking the 
confines of the Paradise proper. Return to Eden is thus not complete 
until the wayfarer has crossed over. Only when he stands on the far 
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shore, where Beatrice and Matelda are, does he stand in that place 
where God has placed him after He had formed him outside the 
Garden, according to nature.
Fully restored, then, the passage offers a faithful account of what, 
theologically, Singleton thinks is going on in the Commedia. Everything 
leading up to the gracing of the pilgrim’s soul in the Earthly Paradise 
is, he believes, a preparation for that gracing, a praeparatio ad gratiam 
accomplished by way of an as yet ungraced movement of the spirit, of the 
kind of natural reasonableness proper to one such as Virgil. This situation 
is open to exploration, he thinks, on the basis of the analogy to be drawn 
between justification and generation, for just as God is said to breathe the 
rational soul into the sensitive soul generated ex materia,3 so also might he 
be said to grace the natural activity of man as a creature of reasonable 
moral determination with a view to its ulterior perfection, to its resolution 
on a higher plane of knowing and loving; so, for example, these lines from 
page 46 of the Journey to Beatrice, secure in their sense of grace and gracing 
as a matter of something like formal specification:
This clearly becomes a point of very particular interest to our 
consideration of the substance and basic structural progression of 
Dante’s poem, when we realize that the whole area of Virgil’s guidance in 
3 Purg. XXV.67-75: ‘Apri a la verità che viene il petto; / e sappi che, sì tosto come al feto 
/ l’articular del cerebro è perfetto, / lo motor primo a lui si volge lieto / sovra tant’arte 
di natura, e spira / spirito novo, di vertù repleto, / che ciò che trova attivo quivi, tira / 
in sua sustanzia, e fassi un’alma sola, / che vive e sente e sé in sé rigira’, with a parallel 
passage in the Convivio at IV.xxi.4: ‘E però dico che quando l’umano seme cade nel suo 
recettaculo, cioè ne la matrice, esso porta seco la vertù de l’anima generativa e la vertù 
del cielo e la vertù de li elementi legati, cioè la complessione; e matura e dispone la materia 
a la vertù formativa, la quale diede l’anima del generante; e la vertù formativa prepara 
li organi a la vertù celestiale, che produce de la potenza del seme l’anima in vita’. G. 
Di Giannatale, ‘Considerazioni sull’origine dell’anima in Dante’, Sapienza 30 (1977), 
4, 450-54; B. Nardi, ‘L’origine dell’anima umana secondo Dante’, in Studi di filosofia 
medievale (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1979; originally 1960), pp. 9-68; idem, 
‘Sull’origine dell’anima umana’, in Dante e la cultura medievale, ed. P. Mazzantini (Bari: 
Laterza, 1983; originally 1942), pp. 207-24, with ‘L’immortalità dell’anima’ at pp. 225-43; 
idem, ‘Il canto XXV del Purgatorio’, in Lecturae ed altri studi danteschi, ed. R. Abardo with 
an introduction by F. Mazzoni and A. Vallone (Florence: Le Lettere, 1990), pp. 139-50; 
S. Bemrose, ‘“Come d’animal divenga fante”. The Animation of the Human Embryo in 
Dante’, in The Human Embryo. Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions, ed. G. R. 
Dunstan (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), pp. 123-35; idem, ‘God so Loves 
the Soul. Intellections of Immortality in Dante’, in Medium Aevum 74 (2005), 1, 86-108; 
M. Gragnolati, Experiencing the Afterlife. Soul and Body in Dante and Medieval Culture (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), especially Chapter 2 (‘Embryology 
and Aerial Bodies in Dante’s Comedy’), pp. 53-87 – much of this discussion turning on the 
evolutionary character of Dantean psychogenesis over against Thomist substitutionalism.
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the Comedy is that of praeparatio ad gratiam, and that had the Aristotelian 
notion of generatio not prevailed so generally in the thought of the poet’s 
time, the event of the journey would not have been at all as it is.
 If, then, sanctifying grace is ‘form’ and if the process of conversion 
is construed on such a pattern of generatio, what exactly are we to 
understand the ‘matter’ to be which is made ready to receive that 
form? The matter is, in the broadest sense, some human creature ...
More exactly, Singleton thinks, it is a question here of grace as that 
whereby reason and will are ‘elevated above the limits of what is natural to 
man’, of what he is able to do from out of his ordinary power to moral self-
determination. It is by way of grace and its power to ‘transhumanization’ 
that he is raised above himself in point of understanding and confirmed 
in his status as an adopted son of God:
But the advent of Beatrice is not merely the advent of light. By such 
grace as she (in allegory) is, man’s whole nature is transformed, 
elevated above the limits of what is natural to man. A trasumanar 
takes place, not in the intellect alone but also in the will. A new 
orientation of the inner man prevails, itinerarium mentis ‘turns’ and 
moves in a new way. Through sanctifying grace the soul is uplifted 
and turned toward God as to its special object of beatitude. By such 
grace alone do we become the ‘adopted sons of God’. (ibid., p. 42)
But on both accounts, Mastrobuono maintains, Singleton is mistaken. 
He is mistaken as regards the analogy to be drawn between justification 
and generation in that, while the latter is accomplished in the order of time, 
the former is accomplished in the order of being. Grace as a principle of 
justification, in other words, functions on the plane, not of the horizontal 
or of the before and after of the moment, but on that of the vertical or of 
the height and depth of the instant, successionality thus giving way to 
simultaneity or all-at-onceness as a means of understanding here; so, for 
example, this from the Prima secundae at 113.7 resp.:
tota justificatio impii originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione. Per 
eam enim et liberum arbitrium movetur, et culpa remittitur. Gratiae 
autem infusio fit in instanti absque successione ... Cum igitur virtus 
divina sit infinita, potest quamcumque materiam creatam subito 
disponere ad formam, et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis, 
cujus motus potest esse instantaneus secundum naturam. Sic igitur 
justificatio impii fit a Deo in instanti.4
4 The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. 
For it is by grace that free will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace 
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But that is not all, for we do not speak of the powers of the soul, but 
rather of the soul itself, as graced. True, it is by faith as an infused virtue 
of the intellect and by charity as an infused virtue of the will that man is 
said to participate in the life of the Godhead, but preceding these things 
and subsisting as their indispensable condition is the recreative work of 
grace in the recesses of the soul itself. Thomas again:
... ista quaestio ex praecedenti dependet. Si enim gratia sit idem quod 
virtus, necesse est quod sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto; nam 
potentia animae est proprium subiectum virtutis, ut supra dictum est. 
Si autem gratia differt a virtute, non potest dici quod potentia animae 
sit gratiae subiectum; quia omnis perfectio potentiae animae habet 
rationem virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod gratia, 
sicut est prius virtute, ita habeat subiectum prius potentiis animae, 
ita scilicet quod sit in essentia animae. Sicut enim per potentiam 
intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei, 
et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum per virtutem 
caritatis; ita etiam per naturam animae participat secundum quamdam 
similitudinem naturam divinam per quamdam regenerationem, sive 
recreationem.
(ST Ia IIae.110.4 resp.)5
takes place in an instant and without succession ... Therefore, since the divine power 
is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and much more 
man’s free will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. Therefore the justification 
of the ungodly by God takes place in an instant.  De verit. 28.9 resp. ult.: ‘Dico igitur, 
quod extrema iustificationis sunt gratia et privatio gratiae, inter quae non cadit medium 
circa proprium susceptibile: unde oportet quod transitus de uno in alterum sit in instanti, 
quamvis causa huius privationis successive tollatur; vel secundum quod homo cogitando 
disponit se ad gratiam, vel saltem secundum quod tempus praeterit postquam Deus se 
gratiam daturum praeordinavit; et sic gratiae infusio fit in instanti. Et quia expulsio 
culpae est formalis effectus gratiae infusae, inde est quod tota iustificatio impii in instanti 
est. Nam forma et dispositio ad formam completam et abiectio alterius formae, totum est 
in instanti’, etc. Mastrobuono, p. 49.
5 this question depends on the preceding. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must 
necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the soul’s powers are the 
proper subject of the virtue, as stated above [qu. 56, art. 1]. But if grace differs from 
virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every 
perfection of the soul’s powers has the nature of virtue, as stated above [qu. 55, art. 1; 
qu. 56, art. 1]. Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to 
the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective 
power participates in the divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power 
of the will participates in the divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the 
nature of the soul does he participate in the divine nature, after the manner of a likeness, 
through a certain regeneration or re-creation.  Mastrobuono, pp. 17-18.
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Grace, then, is present to the individual, not operationally or as 
empowering reason and will as faculties of the rational soul, but entitatively 
or as a principle of transformation in respect of the soul in its totality 
(which is why we speak of it as a matter of accidental or superadditional 
formality).6 And it is this sense in Aquinas of the ontological as distinct 
from the merely operational character of grace in its positive working out 
that enables Mastrobuono to reconstruct over against the Singletonians 
the position in Dante. Grace, he believes, is understood in the Commedia 
to function both operatively and co-operatively.7 It functions co-
6 Thomas, ST Ia IIae.110.2 ad 1 and ad 2: ‘gratia, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur 
agere in animam non per modum causae efficientis, sed per modum causae formalis, sicut 
albedo facit album, et iustitia iustum ... Et quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non 
potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis; sed est forma accidentalis ipsius 
animae’; ScG III.cl.6: ‘Oportet quod homo ad ultimum finem per proprias operationes 
perveniat. Unumquodque autem operatur secundum propriam formam. Oportet 
igitur, ad hoc quod homo perducatur in ultimum finem per proprias operationes, quod 
superaddatur ei aliqua forma, ex qua eius operationes efficaciam aliquam accipiant 
promerendi ultimum finem’, etc.
7 Cf. Thomas, ST Ia IIae.111.2, resp.: ‘Est autem in nobis duplex actus: primus quidem 
interior voluntatis; et quantum ad istum actum voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem 
ut movens; et praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle, quae prius malum volebat; 
ei ideo, secundum quod Deus movet humanam mentem ad hunc actum, dicitur gratia 
operans. Alius autem actus est exterior, qui cum a voluntate imperetur, ut supra habitum 
est [qu. 17, art. 9], consequens est quod ad hunc actum operatio attribuatur voluntati. Et 
quia etiam ad hunc actum Deus nos adjuvat, et interius confirmando voluntatem, ut ad 
actum perveniat, et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo; respectu huiusmodi actus 
dicitur gratia cooperans. Unde post praemissa verba subdit Augustinus [De gratia et lib. arb. 
xvii, in the sed contra]: “Ut autem velimus, operatur; cum autem volumus, ut perficiamus, 
nobis cooperatur”’ (Augustine, in the De gratia et lib. arb. xvii.33, has the following: ‘Et 
quis istam etsi parvam dare coeperat caritatem, nisi ille qui praeparat voluntatem, et 
cooperando perficit, quod operando incipit? Quoniam ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, 
qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens. Propter quod ait Apostolus: “Certus sum quoniam 
qui operatur in vobis opus bonum, perficiet usque in diem Christi Iesu” [Philip. 1:6]. 
Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, 
nobiscum cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante cum 
volumus, ad bona pietatis opeera nihil valemus. De operante illo ut velimus, dictum est: 
“Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle” [Philip. 2:13]. De cooperante autem cum 
iam volumus et volendo facimus: “Scimus”, inquit, “quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia 
cooperatur in bonum” [Rom. 8:28]’); Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 5, c. 4: ‘Operans quidem 
gratia dicitur, qua iustificatur impius, id est de impio fuit pius, de malo bonus. Cooperans 
vero, qua iuvatur ad bene volendum efficaciter et Deum prae omnibus diligendum et 
ad operandum bonum et ad perseverandum in bono et huiusmodi’, etc. R. Garrigou-
Lagrange, O.P., La Prédestination des saints et la grâce: doctrine de Saint Thomas comparée aux 
autres systèmes théologiques (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1936); idem, Grace: Commentary on 
the Summa Theologica of St Thomas, Ia IIae, 109-14, trans. from the Commentarius of 1947 
(Rome: Pontificium Institutum Internationale ‘Angelicum’) by the Dominican Nuns of 
the Corpus Christi Monastery, Menlo Park, California (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1952); B. 
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operatively in that it is everywhere on hand, in circumstances at any rate 
of justification, to assist and strengthen the individual in his commitment 
to right being and right doing, to living out the substance of his nature 
as a creature of moral and ontological accountability. But first comes 
the moment of justification, the moment in which, quickened by grace 
under the aspect of operation, the soul is (a) turned away from self 
towards God, (b) deflected from its old habits, and (c) absolved from its 
sin, these between them constituting the basis of everything coming next 
by way either of infused or of acquired virtue.8 This, then, Mastrobuono 
maintains, is where Dante begins. Having reconstructed in the person 
of his protagonist the substance and psychology of estrangement from 
self and from the innermost reasons of self, he begins with the grace 
proclaimed by Virgil in the second canto of the Inferno whereby the soul is 
duly disposed towards God (the ‘Tu m’hai con desiderio il cor disposto’ of 
II.136) and quickened afresh in point of willing (the ‘Or va, ch’un sol volere 
J. F. Lonergan, S.J., ‘St Thomas’s Thought on Gratia Operans’, Theological Studies 2 (1941), 
3, 289-324; 3 (1942), 1, 69-88; 3, 375-402 and 4. 533-78; idem, Grace and Freedom: Operative 
Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas, ed. F. E. Crowe and R. M. Doran (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000; originally 1971); H. Bouillard, Conversion et grâce chez s. 
Thomas d’Aquin: étude historique (Paris: Aubier, 1944); M. Flick, L’attimo della giustificazione 
secondo S. Tommaso (Rome: Apud aedes Universitatis Gregorianiae, 1947); P. Wehbrink 
(trans), Thomas von Aquin. Die menschliche Willensfreiheit (Düsseldorf: L. Schwann, 1954; 
selections from the Quaestiones disputatae de malo and de veritate with an introduction by 
G. Siewerth); C. Ernst, O.P. (ed. and comm.), St Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, vol. 
30 (The Gospel of Grace. 1a 2a. 106-114) (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1972); J. P. 
Wawrykow, God’s Grace and Human Action. ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); idem, ‘Grace’, in The Theology of Thomas 
Aquinas, ed. R. Van Nieuwenhove and J. Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005), pp. 192-221; J. F. Wippel, ‘Natur und Gnade (S.th. I-II, qq. 109-
114)’, in Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa theologiae. Werkinterpretationen, ed. A. Speer (Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 2005), pp. 246-70. More generally on grace theology (but with reference 
still to Thomas), J. Auer, Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik, 2 vols 
(Freiburg: Herder, 1951); R. W. Gleason, S.J., Grace (London and New York: Sheed and 
Ward, 1962); N. P. Williams, The Grace of God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1966, 
originally 1930).
8 Thomas, ST Ia IIae.113.6 resp.: ‘quatuor enumerantur quae requiruntur ad 
iustificationem impii, scilicet gratiae infusio; motus liberi arbitrii in Deum per fidem; et 
motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; et remissio culpae. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut dictum 
est, iustificatio est quidam motus quo anima movetur a Deo a statu culpae in statum 
iustitiae. In quolibet autem motu quo aliquid ab altero movetur, tria requiruntur, primo 
quidem, motio ipsius moventis; secundo, motus mobilis; et tertio, consummatio motus, 
sive perventio ad finem. Ex parte igitur motionis divinae, accipitur gratiae infusio; 
ex parte vero liberi arbitrii moti, accipiuntur duo motus ipsius, secundum recessum a 
termino a quo, et accessum ad terminum ad quem; consummatio autem, sive perventio 
ad terminum huius motus, importatur per remissionem culpae, in hoc enim 
iustificatio consummatur.’
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è d’ambedue’ of II.139).9 Grace, then, far from intervening subsequently to 
perfect the hitherto ungraced work of nature, is there from the outset as 
both the antecedent and the subsistent principle of man’s proper striving 
as man, of every creative inflexion of the spirit on the plane of properly 
human being and becoming:
All of this, according to Singleton, is within the proportion of Dante’s 
nature to accomplish, aided, of course, by Virgil’s natural light of 
reason ... Singleton does not seem to understand that the natural 
reason symbolized by Virgil is an immanent power, and as such is 
absolutely impotent to erase the effects of sin from Dante’s soul. For 
this, Dante needs the transcendent power of grace. Since it does in 
fact happen that on the mountain of Purgatory the effects of sin (the 
stains) are erased from Dante’s soul, as the ‘P’s are erased from his 
forehead, that in itself is proof, as we have noted, that Dante has 
already received an infusion of sanctifying grace before he entered 
the world beyond. The erasing of the effects of sin from Dante’s soul 
is an effect of sanctifying grace, not a preparation for it, which also 
means that the whole area of Virgil’s guidance through the world 
beyond is an effect of sanctifying grace, not a preparation for it as 
Singleton also believes.10
Dante’s, in other words, though at every point a sense both of the 
power in man to moral self-determination and of this as the ground of his 
eschatological triumph and tragedy, is at the same time a commitment to 
the priority of grace as the condition of his righteousness, of the individual’s 
knowing himself in the fullness and functionality of his proper humanity. 
To suppose otherwise – to imagine that, for the Dante of the Commedia, 
it is a question of the periodization of these things, of what comes next in 
the order of time – is to implicate him in a species of theological absurdity.
2. Dante’s, for all his commitment to the notion of grace as incomingness, 
is a tendency to see and to celebrate it under the aspect of alongsidedness, 
and indeed of a species of alongsidedness amounting in its intimacy to 
something closer to co-immanence, to a commingling of human and 
divine intentionality at the still centre of existence;11 so, for example, as 
9 By your words you have made me so eager [to come with you that I have returned to 
my first resolve] ... Now on, for a single will is in us both ...
10 Mastrobuono, p. 59.
11 Recently on Dante and grace: S. Rossi, ‘Il trionfo della grazia nell’episodio di 
Bonconte da Montefeltro’, L’Alighieri. Rassegna bibliografica dantesca 35, n.s. 3/4 (1994), 
83-93; C. Ryan, ‘“Natura dividitur contra gratiam”: concetti diversi della natura in 
Dante e nella cultura filosofico-teologica medievale’ , in Dante e la scienza. Atti del Convegno 
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eloquent in respect of the first of these things, of incomingness under the 
aspect of alongsidedness, these passages from Cantos XXV, XXVIII 
and XXIX of the Paradiso, each of them turning on the parallelization 
as distinct from the prioritization of grace with respect to nature in the 
moment of its verification:
 “Spene”, diss’ io, “è uno attender certo
de la gloria futura, il qual produce
grazia divina e precedente merto”.
...
 Quinci si può veder come si fonda
l’esser beato ne l’atto che vede,
non in quel ch’ama, che poscia seconda;
 e del vedere è misura mercede,
che grazia partorisce e buona voglia
...
 per che le viste lor furo essaltate
con grazia illuminante e con lor merto,
si c’hanno ferma e piena volontate.
(Par. XXV.67-69, XXVIII.109-13 and XXIX.61-63)12
Internazionale di Studi, Ravenna 28-30 maggio 1993, ed. P. Boyde and V. Russo (Ravenna: 
Longo, 1995), pp. 363-73; L. Scorrano, ‘Paradiso XXXII. La legge, la grazia’, L’Alighieri. 
Rassegna bibliografica dantesca 37, n.s. 7 (1996), 19-36, subsequently in Tra il ‘ banco’ 
e ‘ l’alte rote’. Letture e note dantesche (Ravenna: Longo, 1996), pp. 103-22; I. Biffi, La 
poesia e la grazia nella Commedia di Dante (Milan: Jaca Book, 1999), especially pp. 29-
35 (‘Un viaggio che parte dalla grazia’); J. T. Chiampi, ‘The role of freely bestowed 
grace in Dante’s journey of legitimation’, in Rivista di Studi Italiani 17 (1999), 1, 89-111; 
J. Trabant, ‘“Gloria” oder “grazia”. Oder: Wonach die “questione della lingua” eigentlich 
fragt’, Romanistisches Jahrbuch 51 (2000), 29-52; P. Cherchi, ‘Da me stesso non vegno 
(Inf. X, 61)’, Rassegna europea di letteratura italiana 18 (2001), 103-106. Notable prior to 
Mastrobuono are G. Getto, ‘L’“epos” della grazia in Paradiso’, in Scrittori e idee in Italia: 
Antologia della critica. (Dalle Origini al Trecento), ed. P. Pullega (Bologna: Zanichelli, 
1982), pp. 209-14; G. Godenzi, ‘Il viaggio spirituale di Dante dal peccato alla grazia’, 
in Quaderni Grigionitaliani. Rivista trimestrale delle valli Grigionitaliane 56 (1987), 3-4, 234-
39; B. Panvini, ‘La concezione tomistica della grazia nella Divina Commedia’, in Letture 
classensi 17 (Ravenna: Longo, 1988), pp. 69-85.
12 “Hope”, I said, “is a sure expectation of future glory, which divine grace produces, 
and preceding merit” ... From this it may be seen that the state of blessedness is founded 
on the act of vision, not on that which loves, which follows after; and the merit, to which 
grace and good will give birth, is the measure of their vision ... wherefore their vision was 
exalted with illuminating grace and with their merit, so that they have their will full and 
established.  Peter Lombard’s text to the effect that ‘est autem spes virtus qua spiritualia 
et aeterna bona sperantur, id est cum fiducia expectantur. Est enim certa expectatio 
futurae beatitudinis, veniens ex Dei gratia et ex meritis praecedentibus vel ipsam spem, 
quam natura praeit caritas; vel rem speratam, id est beatitudinem aeternam’ (III Sent. 
xxvi), though variously cited by Thomas, is glossed, at any rate in the Secunda secundae 
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while exemplary in respect of the second of them, of the resolution of 
alongsidedness in co-immanence, in a ‘commingling of human and divine 
intentionality at the still centre of existence’, these lines from the Piccarda 
canto of the Paradiso, explicit in their sense of willing in man as a matter of 
in-willing, of a reconfiguration of human willing by way of an in-breathing 
of divine willing in the recesses of personality:
 Frate, la nostra volontà quïeta
virtù di carità, che fa volerne
sol quel ch’avemo, e d’altro non ci asseta.
 Se disïassimo esser più superne,
foran discordi li nostri disiri
dal voler di colui che qui ne cerne;
 che vedrai non capere in questi giri,
s’essere in carità è qui necesse,
e se la sua natura ben rimiri.
 Anzi è formale ad esto beato esse
tenersi dentro a la divina voglia,
per ch’una fansi nostre voglie stesse;
 sì che, come noi sem di soglia in soglia
per questo regno, a tutto il regno piace
com’ a lo re che ’n suo voler ne ’nvoglia.
 E ’n la sua volontade è nostra pace:
ell’ è quel mare al qual tutto si move
ciò ch’ella crïa o che natura face.
(Par. III.70-87)13
(17.1 ad 2), in such a way as to stress the notion of hope as an infused virtue of the spirit 
and thus as radically independent of merit: ‘spes dicitur ex meritis provenire quantum 
ad ipsam rem expectatam, prout aliquis sperat se beatitudinem adepturum ex gratia et 
meritis. Vel quantum ad actum spei formatae. Ipse autem habitus spei, per quam aliquis 
expectat beatitudinem, non causatur ex meritis, sed pure ex gratia.’ J.-G. Bougerol, 
La Théologie de l’espérance aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, 2 vols (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 
1985), vol. 1, pp. 97-99. Otherwise on Peter Lombard and the Sentences (in addition to 
the general histories of medieval thought), M. L. Colish, Peter Lombard, 2 vols (Leiden 
and New York: Brill, 1994); J.-G. Bougerol, ‘The Church  Fathers and the Sentences of 
Peter Lombard’, in I. Backus (ed.), The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West from the 
Carolingians to the Maurists, 2 vols (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1997; also Boston: Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2001), vol. 1, pp. 113-64. On Dante and Peter Lombard, M. Papio, 
ad voc. ‘Peter Lombard’ in R. Lansing (ed.), Dante Encyclopaedia (London: Garland, 
2000), pp. 682-83, with bibliography. Also, M. Da Carbonara, Dante e Pier Lombardo ; 
Sent, lib. IV, distt. 43-49 (Città di Castello: Lapi, 1897).
13 Brother, the power of love quiets our will and makes us wish only for that which we 
have and gives us no other thirst. Did we desire to be more aloft, our longings would be 
discordant with his will who assigns us here, which you will see is not possible in these 
circles if to exist in charity here is of necessity, and if you well consider what is love’s 
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Now here, clearly, we have to be careful, for grace, for all its subsisting 
as a matter of alongsidedness and indeed of co-immanence in respect of 
the power in man to significant determination, subsists also both as an 
antecedent and as an extrinsic principle of new life, as a principle, that 
is to say, operative both from beforehand and from beyond. But for all 
that, Dante’s, when it comes to a question famous for its distribution and 
redistribution of emphases, remains a tendency to proceed by way, less of 
antecedence and exteriority than of simultaneity and companionship, of 
what for the sake of capturing the intensity – not to mention the beauty – 
of it we may call a species of formed friendship. No longer, in other words, 
is it a question of grace as a stranger to nature, as visited upon it in all its 
otherwise unspeakable poverty, but of a welcoming home of the one by 
the other in the deepest and most sacred places of historical selfhood. And 
it is this resolution of the antecedent in the alongsided as a way of proposing 
the grace-theological issue in the moment of its positive living out that 
inclines Dante, less to a metaphysic, than to a phenomenology of grace, to 
an account of grace and of gracing in terms, less of its mechanism, than of 
its modality, of the how of its experiencing as a principle of self-actualization.
3. Grace, then, as a matter of its how or showing forth, not only abounds, 
but abounds in every sector of human experience in the living out of 
that experience. Thus it is by grace that the penitent soul knows itself 
in the free passage from seeing and understanding to being and doing 
(the ‘se tosto grazia resolva le schiume / di vostra coscienza sì che chiaro 
/ per essa scenda de la mente il fiume’ of Purg. XIII.88-90),14 and it is by 
nature. Indeed, it is of the essence of this blessed existence to keep itself within the divine 
will, whereby our wills are made one; so that our being thus from threshold to threshold 
throughout this realm is a joy to all the realm as to the king, who inwills us with his will; 
and in his will is our peace. It is that sea to which all moves, both what it creates and 
what nature makes.
14 so may grace soon clear the scum of your conscience that the stream of memory may 
flow down through it pure ...  On synderesis and conscience,  O. Lottin, ‘“Syndérèse” 
et conscience au XIIe et XIIIe siècles’, in Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles 
(Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1948), vol. 2, pp. 103-349; P. Siwek, La conscience 
du libre arbitre (Rome: Herder, 1976); M. G. Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late 
Scholasticism and the Young Luther (Leiden: Brill, 1977); T. Potts, Conscience in Medieval 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980);  idem, ‘Conscience’, in The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), pp. 687-704. On Thomas, L. Elders, ‘La doctrine de la conscience de saint Thomas 
d’Aquin’, Revue Thomiste  83 (1983), 533-57; O. Benetollo, ‘Il problema della formazione 
della coscienza retta’, Divus Thomas  95 (1992), 113-28; G. Cavalcoli, ‘Il concetto di 
coscienza in s. Tommaso’, Divus Thomas 95 (1992), 53-77. More generally on the notion 
of synderesis, and in addition to Lottin above, J. de Blic, ‘Syndérèse ou conscience?’, 
Revue d’ascétique et de mystique 25 (1949), 146-57; M. B. Crowe, ‘The Term Synderesis in 
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grace that it knows itself in its equality to every kind of intemperance 
and extravagance of the spirit (the ‘Beati cui alluma / tanto di grazia, che 
l’amor del gusto / nel petto lor troppo disir non fuma’ of Purg. XXIV.151-
53).15 It is by grace that it knows itself as encircled by the love of God 
(the ‘se Dio m’ha in sua grazia rinchiuso’ of Purg. XVI.40),16 and it is by 
grace that it knows itself in the exhilaration of self-surpassing on the 
planes of knowing and of loving (the ‘Ringrazia, / ringrazia il Sol de li 
angeli, ch’a questo / sensibil t’ha levato per sua grazia’ of Par. X.52-54 
and the ‘Con tutto ’l core e con quella favella / ch’è una in tutti, a Dio feci 
olocausto, / qual conveniesi a la grazia novella’ of Par. XIV.88-90).17 It is 
by grace, moreover, that the mind is caressed by the truth to which it is 
now party (the ‘Grazia, che donnea / con la tua mente’ of Par. XXIV.118-
19),18 and it is by grace that the individual knows himself in the bliss of 
spiritual sonship (the ‘Figliuol di grazia’ of Par. XXXI.112). Grace, then, 
is everywhere present to the individual as the context and co-efficient 
of his every creative inflexion of the spirit, Dante’s in this sense being 
a never less than fervent commitment to its status both as an immanent 
and as an overarching principle of human experience in its historical 
the Scholastics’, The Irish Theological Quarterly 23 (1956), 151-64 and 228-45; T. L. Miethe, 
‘Natural Law, the Synderesis Rule, and St Augustine’, Augustinian Studies 11 (1980), 91-
97; V. J. Bourke, ‘The Background of Aquinas’s Synderesis Principle’, in Graceful Reason. 
Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy presented to James Owens, ed. L. P. Gerson (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), pp. 345-60; R. A. Greene, ‘Synderesis, 
the Spark of Conscience, in the English Renaissance’, Journal of the History of Ideas 52 
(1991), 2, 195-219; idem, ‘Instinct of Nature. Natural Law, Synderesis and Moral Sense’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas 58 (1997), 173-98; I. Sciuto, ‘Sinderesi, desiderio naturale 
e fondamento dell’agire morale nel pensiero medievale. Da San Tommaso a Meister 
Eckhart’, in L’etica e il suo altro, ed. C. Vigna (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1994); idem, La felicità 
e il male. Studi di etica medievale (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1995). Dante on conscience as a 
principle of interrogation and affirmation, Inf. XV.91-93 and (especially) XXVIII.112-17, 
and as a principle of remorse or ‘biting back’, Inf. XIX.118-20, Purg. III.7-9, XIX.131-32 
and  XXXIII. 91-93 (cf. Augustine, Serm. de script. XLVII.xiv.23: ‘Forte alius conscientia 
mordetur, alius in conscientiae, tanquam in eremo, requiescit’; Serm. de temp. ccxi.3: ‘Si 
autem mordet conscientia fragilitatis ...’, etc.).
15 Blessed are they who are so illumined by grace that the love of taste kindles not too 
great a desire in their breasts, and who hunger always so far as is just.
16 and since God has received me so far into his grace [that he wills that I see his court 
in a manner wholly outside modern usage, do not hide from me who you were before 
death ...]
17 Give thanks, give thanks to the sun of the angels who of his grace has raised you to 
this visible one ... with all my heart, and with that speech which is one in all men, I made 
a holocaust to God such as befitted the new grace.
18 the grace that holds amorous discourse with your mind [till now has opened your lips 
aright, so that I approve what has come from them].
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unfolding. But it is under three aspects in particular that, for the Dante of 
the Commedia, grace is most powerfully present to the one graced, namely 
as a principle (a) of encouragement or as that whereby the soul knows itself 
in its power to moral and ontological self-confrontation (the infernal 
phase of its journey into God); (b) of emancipation or as that whereby it 
knows itself in its power to affective self-reconfiguration (the purgatorial 
phase of the journey); and (c) of ecstasy or as that whereby it knows itself in 
its power to self-transcendence (the paradisal phase of the journey). Now 
this, as we have said, is by no means to exclude the many other ways in 
which grace is experienced by the pilgrim spirit, for the ways and means 
of grace are as infinite and infinitely varied as the One from whom it 
proceeds. But it is under these three aspects especially – under the aspects 
of encouragement, emancipation and ecstasis as between them facilitating 
and confirming this or that instance of properly human being in the world 
– that grace as but the overflowing of the Godhead in ever fresh channels 
of creative and recreative concern commends itself to Dante as an object 
of contemplation.
Grace is present to those graced as a principle of encouragement in 
that, irrespective of everything within the economy of personality making 
for fear as the dominant mood of being under the conditions of time and 
space, the soul reaches out to affirm itself in the fullness of its proper 
humanity. Straightaway, then, it is a question in the Inferno of doubt and 
energization, of an empowerment of the crippled spirit in and through 
a movement of grace mediated by Virgil; on the one hand, these lines 
(37-42) from Inferno II on the demonic character not, certainly, of pure 
thought as such, but of pure thought in its endless capacity for reiteration, 
for staving off the moment of decision:
 E qual è quei che disvuol ciò che volle
e per novi pensier cangia proposta,
sì che dal cominciar tutto si tolle,
 tal mi fec’ ïo ’n quella oscura costa,
perché, pensando, consumai la ’mpresa
che fu nel cominciar cotanto tosta.19
19 And like one who unwills what he has willed and with new thoughts changes his resolve, 
so that he quite gives up the thing he had begun, such did I become on that dark slope, for 
by thinking on it I rendered null the undertaking that had been so readily embarked on. 
Cf. Purg. V.13-18: ‘Vien dietro a me, e lascia dir le genti: / sta come torre ferma, che non 
crolla / già mai la cima per soffiar di venti; / ché sempre l’omo in cui pensier rampolla / sovra 
pensier, da sé dilunga il segno, / perché la foga l’un de l’altro insolla.’ On the gnawing of 
reflection and the issuelessness of pure thought, Søren Kierkegaard, The Present Age, trans. 
A Dru (London: Collins, 1962), p. 45: ‘ambiguity enters into life when the qualitative 
distinctions are weakened by a gnawing reflection’; ibid., p. 52: ‘With every means in its 
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while on the other these from the same canto (lines 121-42) on the 
revitalization of self by way of a movement of grace as solicitude from 
on high:
 “Dunque: che è? perché, perché restai?
perché tanta viltà nel core allette?
perché ardire e franchezza non hai?
 poscia che tai tre donne benedette
curan di te ne la corte del cielo,
e ’l mio parlar tanto ben ti promette?”.
 Quali fioretti dal notturno gelo
chinati e chiusi, poi che ’l sol li ’mbianca
si drizzan tutti aperti in loro stelo,
 tal mi fec’ io di mia virtude stanca,
e tanto buono ardire al cor mi corse,
ch’i’ cominciai come persona franca:
 “Oh pietosa colei che mi soccorse!
e te cortese ch’ubidisti tosto
a le vere parole che ti porse!
 Tu m’hai con disiderio il cor disposto
sì al venir con le parole tue,
ch’i’ son tornato nel primo proposto.
 Or va, ch’un sol volere è d’ambedue:
tu duca, tu segnore, e tu maestro”.
Così li dissi; e poi che mosso fue,
 intrai per lo cammino alto e silvestro.
(Inf. II.121-42)20
power reflection prevents people from realizing that both the individual and the age are 
thus imprisoned, not imprisoned by tyrants or priests or nobles or the secret police, but by 
reflection itself, and it does so by maintaining the flattering and conceited notion that the 
possibility of reflection is far superior to a mere decision’; Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, trans. E. 
B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, originally 1932), vol. 2, p. 37, has 
the following: ‘This is the way of succombing to self-reflection without coming to myself. 
My honesty does not go beyond a will to have clarity; a will which does not amount to self-
being. This will as such does not affect my future, does not make me hazard any realization. 
Under its absolute sway I would avoid the risks involved in every manifestation of myself. 
I would like to know what is true, then, before trying it. I no sooner set out to be real than 
self-reflection will cast doubt upon my start and destroy it. I cannot take a step any more; I 
have been paralyzed by my will to be clear.’
20 “Why, why do you hold back? Why do you harbour such cowardice in your heart? 
Why are you not bold and free, when in heaven’s court three such blessed ladies are 
mindful of you, and my words pledge you so great a good?” As little flowers, bent 
down and closed by chill of night, straighten and all unfold on their stems when the 
sun brightens them, such in my faint strength did I become; and so much good courage 
rushed to my heart that I began, as one set free, “Oh, how compassionate was she who 
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Now for Mastrobuono these lines are in the highest degree significant, 
for it is here, he believes that, on the threshold of a discourse turning 
on death and resurrection as the way of emergence, Dante, taking his 
cue from Thomas, sets out his theology of justification, his sense of grace 
(a) as a matter of preliminary disposition, and (b) as that whereby, as 
part of its justification, the soul is renewed in point of willing; and the 
parallel is indeed tempting, the ‘Tu m’hai con disiderio il cor disposto’ of 
line 136 chiming well with the ‘Primo igitur modo accipiendo gratiam, 
praeexigitur ad gratiam aliqua gratiae praeparatio; quia nulla forma 
potest esse nisi in materia disposita’ of ST Ia IIae.112.2 resp.,21 and the 
‘Or va, ch’un sol volere è d’ambedue’ of line 139 with the ‘non fit motio 
a Deo ad iustitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii; sed ita infundit donum 
gratiae iustificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium 
ad donum gratiae acceptandum, in his qui sunt huius motionis capaces’ 
of Ia IIae.113.3 resp.22 But this, for all its suggestion of Dante’s taking 
up and acquiescing in the Thomist text, is not what he has in mind 
here; for his is an essay, not so much in the theology of justification, in 
the complex process whereby the soul in receipt of grace eschews sin, 
espouses God, and is absolved from its guilt,23 as in the kind of existential 
courage whereby the individual commits himself to the business of self-
actualization by way of an encounter with self in the depths. Quickened, 
then, by the grace-proclamation of Virgil and by all this means by way of 
a movement of divine solicitude, the soul squares up to the necessities of its 
presence in the world as a creature of eschatological accountability, this, 
helped me, and how courteous were you, so quick to obey the true words she spoke to 
you! By your words you have made me so eager to come with you, that I have returned to 
my first resolve. Now on, for a single will is in us both; you are my leader and my teacher”. 
So I said to him, and when he moved on, I entered along the deep and savage way.
21 Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, 
since a form can only be in disposed matter.
22 God’s motion to justice does not take place without a movement of free will; but he so 
infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time he moves the free will to accept 
the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus.
23 ST Ia IIae.113.6 resp.: ‘quatuor enumerantur quae requiruntur ad iustificationem 
impii, scilicet gratiae infusio; motus liberi arbitrii in Deum per fidem; et motus liberi 
arbitrii in peccatum; et remissio culpae. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut dictum est, iustificatio 
est quidam motus quo anima movetur a Deo a statu culpae in statum iustitiae. In quolibet 
autem motu quo aliquid ab altero movetur, tria requiruntur, primo quidem, motio ipsius 
moventis; secundo, motus mobilis; et tertio, consummatio motus, sive perventio ad finem. 
Ex parte igitur motionis divinae, accipitur gratiae infusio; ex parte vero liberi arbitrii 
moti, accipiuntur duo motus ipsius, secundum recessum a termino a quo, et accessum 
ad terminum ad quem; consummatio autem, sive perventio ad terminum huius motus, 
importatur per remissionem culpae, in hoc enim iustificatio consummatur.’
Conversations with Kenelm96
therefore, being the first great work of grace in its positive verification. 
The first work of grace in its positive verification is the in-breathing of 
courage, the courage whereby the soul in the grip of ontological dread 
feels able to contemplate the risk of losing all for the sake of finding all, of 
essaying death in the interests of life.
But the grace whereby the individual squares up to the necessities of 
his presence in the world as a creature of eschatological accountability is 
at the same time the grace whereby he knows himself in the truth of his 
moral and ontological freedom, in the freedom to affirm self over against 
everything within the economy of personality making less for being than 
for non-being. Having, then, taken on board the possibility of losing all for 
the sake of finding all, the soul encouraged in respect of its proper destiny 
embarks on the search for freedom thus understood, trusting as it does 
so to the grace whereby that freedom becomes a possibility. This then, 
as far as the Purgatorio is concerned, is where Dante starts. Looking now 
to emancipation as the leading idea, he starts with a referral of the whole 
project to a movement of grace from above:
 Questi non vide mai l’ultima sera;
ma per la sua follia le fu sì presso,
che molto poco tempo a volger era.
 Sì com’ io dissi, fui mandato ad esso
per lui campare; e non lì era altra via
che questa per la quale i’ mi son messo.
 Mostrata ho lui tutta la gente ria;
e ora intendo mostrar quelli spirti
che purgan sé sotto la tua balìa.
 Com’ io l’ho tratto, saria lungo a dirti;
de l’alto scende virtù che m’aiuta
conducerlo a vederti e a udirti.
 Or ti piaccia gradir la sua venuta:
libertà va cercando, ch’è sì cara,
come sa chi per lei vita rifiuta.
(Purg. I.58-72)24
24 This man has not seen his last evening, but by his folly was so near to it that very little 
time was left to run. Even as I said, I was sent to him to rescue him, and there was no 
other way than this along which I have set myself. I have shown him all the guilty people, 
and now I intend to show him those spirits that purge themselves under your charge. 
How I have brought him would be long to tell you; for on high descends the power that 
aids me to conduct him to see you and to hear you. Now may it please you to approve 
his coming. He goes seeking freedom , which is so precious, as he knows who renounces 
life for it.
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And what, as far as the Purgatorio is concerned, is begun in grace is 
consummated in grace, this being the substance of Dante’s final hymn to 
Beatrice as the means of his emergence as a free spirit:
 O donna in cui la mia speranza vige,
e che soffristi per la mia salute
in inferno lasciar le tue vestige,
 di tante cose quant’ i’ ho vedute,
dal tuo podere e da la tua bontate
riconosco la grazia e la virtute.
 Tu m’hai di servo tratto a libertate
per tutte quelle vie, per tutt’ i modi
che di ciò fare avei la potestate.
 La tua magnificenza in me custodi,
sì che l’anima mia, che fatt’ hai sana,
piacente a te dal corpo si disnodi.
(Par. XXXI.79-90)25
These certainly, are passages fraught with every kind of theological 
possibility, not least in respect of the basis they offer for what nowadays 
we would call a theology of culture, a theology turning on the function of 
the cultural encounter generally – of, in effect, the Virgilian and Beatrician 
presence in the life of every man – as a channel of grace in its own right. 
But that for the moment is neither here nor there, what matters at present 
being the notion of grace as a principle of emancipation, as that whereby 
self is freed for self in the untrammeled substance of self. This, then, is 
the second great work of grace in its positive verification. The second 
great work of grace in its positive verification is the freeing of the soul for 
communion with God as the end of all desiring, for the kind of service 
which is but perfect freedom.26
25 O lady, in whom my hope is strong, and who for my salvation did endure to leave in 
hell your footprints, of all those things which I have seen I acknowledge the grace and 
the virtue to be from your power and your excellence. It is you who have drawn me from 
bondage into liberty by all those paths, by all those means by which you had the power 
so to do. Preserve me in your great munificence, so that my soul, which you have made 
whole, may be loosed from the body, pleasing unto you.
26 Purg. XVI.73-81: ‘Lo cielo i vostri movimenti inizia; / non dico tutti, ma, posto ch’i’ 
’l dica, / lume v’è dato a bene e a malizia, / e libero voler; che, se fatica / ne le prime 
battaglie col ciel dura, / poi vince tutto, se ben si notrica. / A maggior forza e a miglior 
natura / liberi soggiacete; e quella cria / la mente in voi, che ’l ciel non ha in sua cura.’ 
E. Travi, ‘“Liberi soggiacete” (Purg. XVI. 80)’, in Dal cerchio al centro (1990), pp. 25-33; 
M. Roddewig, ‘Purgatoio XVI – Zorn und Willensfreiheit’, Deutsches Dante-Jahrbuch 74 
(1999), 123-35; L. Pretto, ‘La ricerca e il senso della libertà nella Divina Commedia’, in Con 
Dante e Cusano alla ricerca della verità (Verona: Mazziana, 2005), pp. 111-39.
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But there is more, for the grace whereby the soul is encouraged in 
respect of the journey ahead and the grace whereby it is sustained in 
its search for freedom, is also the grace whereby it projects itself upon 
its proper ecstasis or self-surpassing on the planes of knowing and 
loving, upon its proper transhumanization. Now here again we need to 
be careful, for inasmuch as he chooses to stress the atemporality of the 
ascent, its accomplishment in the order, less of time, than of being, Dante’s 
looks after all to be a theology of created grace, a theology turning upon 
the notion of entitative renewal; so for example, these lines (22-26) from 
Canto II of the Paradiso:
 Beatrice in suso, e io in lei guardava;
e forse in tanto in quanto un quadrel posa
e vola e da la noce si dischiava,
 giunto mi vidi ove mirabil cosa
mi torse il viso a sé ...27
or these (lines 91-93) from Canto V:
 e sì come saetta che nel segno
percuote pria che sia la corda queta,
così corremmo nel secondo regno.28
or these (lines 34-39) from Canto X:
 e io era con lui; ma del salire
non m’accors’ io, se non com’ uom s’accorge,
anzi ’l primo pensier, del suo venire.
 È Beatrice quella che sì scorge
di bene in meglio, sì subitamente
che l’atto suo per tempo non si sporge.29
or these (lines 97-105) from Canto XXII:
 Così mi disse, e indi si raccolse
al suo collegio, e ’l collegio si strinse;
poi, come turbo, in sù tutto s’avvolse.
 La dolce donna dietro a lor mi pinse
27 Beatrice was gazing upward, and I on her; and perhaps in that time that a bolt 
strikes, flies, and from the catch is released, I saw myself arrived where a wondrous 
thing drew my sight to it ...
28 and as an arrow that strikes the target before the bowcord is quiet, so we sped into 
the second realm.
29 and I was with him, but of my ascent I was no more aware than is a man, before his 
first thought, aware of its coming. It is Beatrice who thus conducts from good to better, 
and so swiftly that her act does not extend through time.
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con un sol cenno su per quella scala,
sì sua virtù la mia natura vinse;
 né mai qua giù dove si monta e cala
naturalmente, fu sì ratto moto
ch’agguagliar si potesse a la mia ala.30
– passages nothing if not secure in their sense of the momentary character 
of the soul’s movement into God, of the a-successionality of it all.31 But the 
30 Thus he spoke to me, then drew back to his company, and the company closed 
together; then like a whirlwind all were gathered upward. My sweet lady, with only a 
sign, thrust me up after them by that ladder, so did her power overcome my nature; nor 
ever here below, where we mount and descend by nature’s law, was motion so swift as 
might match my flight.
31 So too VIII.13-15, XIV.79-84 and XXVII.88-99: ‘Io non m’accorsi del salire in ella; 
/ ma d’esservi entro mi fé assai fede / la donna mia ch’i’ vidi far più bella ... Ma Bëatrice 
sì bella e ridente / mi si mostrò, che tra quelle vedute / si vuol lasciar che non seguir la 
mente / Quindi ripreser li occhi miei virtute / a rilevarsi; e vidimi translato / sol con mia 
donna in più alta salute ... E la virtù che lo sguardo m’indulse, / del bel nido di Leda mi 
divelse, / e nel ciel velocissimo m’impulse ... La mente innamorata, che donnea / con la 
mia donna sempre, di ridure / ad essa li occhi più che mai ardea; / e se natura o arte fé 
pasture / da pigliare occhi, per aver la mente, / in carne umana o ne le sue pitture, / tutte 
adunate, parrebber nïente / ver’ lo piacer divin che mi refulse, / quando mi volsi al suo 
viso ridente. / E la virtù che lo sguardo m’indulse, / del bel nido di Leda mi divelse, / e 
nel ciel velocissimo m’impulse.’ Thomas, ST Ia IIae.113.7 resp.: ‘tota iustificatio impii 
originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione, per eam enim et liberum arbitrium movetur, et 
culpa remittitur. Gratiae autem infusio fit in instanti absque successione. Cuius ratio est 
quia quod aliqua forma non subito imprimatur subiecto, contingit ex hoc quod subiectum 
non est dispositum, et agens indiget tempore ad hoc quod subiectum disponat. Et ideo 
videmus quod statim cum materia est disposita per alterationem praecedentem, forma 
substantialis acquiritur materiae, et eadem ratione, quia diaphanum est secundum se 
dispositum ad lumen recipiendum, subito illuminatur a corpore lucido in actu. Dictum 
est autem supra quod Deus ad hoc quod gratiam infundat animae, non requirit aliquam 
dispositionem nisi quam ipse facit. Facit autem huiusmodi dispositionem sufficientem 
ad susceptionem gratiae, quandoque quidem subito, quandoque autem paulatim et 
successive, ut supra dictum est. Quod enim agens naturale non subito possit disponere 
materiam, contingit ex hoc quod est aliqua disproportio eius quod in materia resistit, 
ad virtutem agentis, et propter hoc videmus quod quanto virtus agentis fuerit fortior, 
tanto materia citius disponitur. Cum igitur virtus divina sit infinita, potest quamcumque 
materiam creatam subito disponere ad formam, et multo magis liberum arbitrium 
hominis, cuius motus potest esse instantaneus secundum naturam. Sic igitur iustificatio 
impii fit a Deo in instanti.’ Already at 110.2 resp.: ‘sicut iam dictum est, in eo qui dicitur 
gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis. Dictum 
est autem supra quod dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur. Uno modo, 
inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum vel 
agendum. Et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est qualitas, sed motus 
quidam animae, actus enim moventis in moto est motus, ut dicitur in III Physic. Alio 
modo adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, secundum quod aliquod habituale 
donum a Deo animae infunditur. Et hoc ideo, quia non est conveniens quod Deus minus 
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a-successionality of it all, suggesting once again a discourse attuned less 
to time than to being as a dominant parameter of consciousness, should 
not be allowed to waylay us here, for Dante’s, in the Commedia, is not, in 
fact, an essay in the entitative and in the strangeness thereof, but rather 
in the opening out of self upon what it already has it in itself to be and to 
become, on the kind of greater humanity, or ‘transhumanity’, present to 
it from beforehand as at once the innermost and ‘ownmost’ (‘eigenst’) of 
its proper possibilities. His, in other words, is the logic and lexis, not of 
modification, but of emergence, of a progressive and progressively ecstatic 
process of self-implementation; so, for example, with their talk of dilation 
(‘dilatarsi’), of ‘magnification’ (‘farsi più grande’) and of ‘issuing forth’ 
(‘di sé uscire’) as a way of seeing and celebrating the process of drawing 
nigh (the ‘appropinquare’ of Par. XXXIII.47), these lines (34-45) from 
Paradiso XXIII:
 Oh Bëatrice, dolce guida e cara!
Ella mi disse: “Quel che ti sobranza
è virtù da cui nulla si ripara.
 Quivi è la sapïenza e la possanza
ch’aprì le strade tra ’l cielo e la terra,
onde fu già sì lunga disïanza”.
 Come foco di nube si diserra
per dilatarsi sì che non vi cape,
e fuor di sua natura in giù s’atterra,
 la mente mia così, tra quelle dape
fatta più grande, di sé stessa uscìo,
e che si fesse rimembrar non sape.32
provideat his quos diligit ad supernaturale bonum habendum, quam creaturis quas 
diligit ad bonum naturale habendum. Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet ut non 
solum moveat eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis formas et virtutes quasdam, 
quae sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinentur ad huiusmodi motus. Et 
sic motus quibus a Deo moventur, fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles; secundum 
illud Sap. VIII, et disponit omnia suaviter. Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad 
consequendum bonum supernaturale aeternum, infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates 
supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum 
aeternum consequendum. Et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est.’ Otherwise, De 
verit. 28. 9, sed contra 1 and resp. ult.: ‘Iustificatio impii est quaedam spiritualis illuminatio. 
Sed illuminatio corporalis fit in instanti, non in tempore ... Nam forma et dispositio ad 
formam completam et abiectio alterius formae, totum est in instanti.’
32 O Beatrice, sweet guide and dear! She said to me, “That which overcomes you is 
power against which naught defends itself. Therein are the wisdom and the power that 
opened the roads between heaven and earth, for which of old there was such long desire”. 
Even as fire breaks from a cloud, and dilates so that it has not room there, and contrary 
to its own nature, falls down to earth, so my mind, becoming greater amid those feasts, 
issued from itself, and of what it became has no remembrance.
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or, with their talk of soaring and strengthening (‘sormontare’ and 
‘avvalorarsi’) as the way of ultimate affirmation, these (lines 52-63 and 
106-14) from Cantos XXX and XXXIII:
 “Sempre l’amor che queta questo cielo
accoglie in sé con sì fatta salute,
per far disposto a sua fiamma il candelo”.
 Non fur più tosto dentro a me venute
queste parole brievi, ch’io compresi
me sormontar di sopr’ a mia virtute;
 e di novella vista mi raccesi
tale, che nulla luce è tanto mera,
che li occhi miei non si fosser difesi;
 e vidi lume in forma di rivera
fulvido di fulgore, intra due rive
dipinte di mirabil primavera.
...
 Omai sarà più corta mia favella,
pur a quel ch’io ricordo, che d’un fante
che bagni ancor la lingua a la mammella.
 Non perché più ch’un semplice sembiante
fosse nel vivo lume ch’io mirava,
che tal è sempre qual s’era davante;
 ma per la vista che s’avvalorava
in me guardando, una sola parvenza,
mutandom’ io, a me si travagliava.33
Now the soul’s movement into God is indeed a movement into 
the strangeness of God, into the a-referentiality – the timelessness, 
spacelessness, everywhereness and nowhereness – of what is as of the 
essence. But for all the strangeness of that movement into God, there can be 
no question here of a metaphysical or magical co-adaptation of the subject 
to the object of its desiring, grace, far from modifying the individual at the 
level of form (albeit of accidental form) and thus in some sense modifying 
33 “Ever does the love which quiets this heaven receive into itself with such like 
salutation, in order to prepare the candle for its flame.” No sooner had these brief words 
come within me than I comprehended that I was surmounting beyond my own power, 
and such new vision was kindled in me that there is no light so bright that my eyes could 
not have withstood it. And I saw a light in the form of a river glowing tawny between 
two banks painted with marvelous spring ... Now will my speech fall more short, even 
in respect to what I remember, than that of an infant which still bathes his tongue at the 
breast. Not because more than one simple semblance was in the living light wherein I was 
gazing, which is ever such as it was before; but through my sight, which was growing 
strong in me as I looked, one sole appearance, even as I changed, was altering itself to me.
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the original project, serving rather to confirm it in its natural capacity 
for self-transcendence as the most immanent of its immanent possibilities. 
This, then is the third great work of grace in its positive verification. The 
third great work of grace in its positive verification is the confirming of 
self in the power to transhumanity, transhumanity, for Dante, being but 
humanity under the aspect of ecstasy.
4. Adolph Harnack, the great German historian of Christian dogmatics, 
pauses in a moment of melancholy to consider the gap in medieval theology 
between God and grace, between on the one hand the superabundant love 
which is God, and, on the other, grace as that whereby that same love is 
known to man under the conditions of time and space. There was, he says, 
among the great theological spirits of the Middle Ages
no recognition of personality, neither of the personality of God, nor of 
man as a person. If even in earthly relations man cannot be otherwise 
raised to a higher stage, than by passing into a person who is superior, 
more mature, and greater, that is, by entering into spiritual fellowship 
with such an one, and attaching one’s self to him by reverence, love, 
and trust, then the same holds good, but in a way that transcends 
comparison, of the rising of man from the sphere of sin and guilt into 
the sphere of God. Here no communications of things avail, but only 
fellowship of person with person; the disclosure to the soul, that the 
holy God who rules heaven and earth is its Father, with whom it can, 
and may, live as a child in its father’s house – that is grace, nay, that 
alone is grace, the trustful confidence in God, namely, which rests on 
the certainty that the separating guilt has been swept away. That was 
seen by Augustine as little as by Thomas, and it was not discerned 
even by the medieval Mystics, who aspired to having intercourse 
with Christ as with a friend ; for it was the man Jesus of whom they 
thought in seeking this. But all of them, when they think of God, 
look, not to the heart of God, but to an inscrutable Being, who, as 
He has created the world out of nothing, so is also the productive 
source of inexhaustible forces that yield knowledge and transformation 
of essence. And when they think of themselves, they think, not of the 
centre of the human ego, the spirit, which is so free and so lofty that 
it cannot be influenced by benefits that are objective, even though 
they be the greatest perceptions and the most glorious investiture, 
and at the same time is so feeble in itself that it can find support only 
in another person. Therefore they constructed the thesis: God and gratia 
(i.e., knowledge and participation in the divine nature), in place of 
the personal fellowship with God, which is the gratia. That gratia, only 
a little separated from God in the thesis, became in course of time 
Dante and the Modalities of Grace 103
always further removed from Him. It appears deposited in the merit 
of Christ, and then in the Sacraments. But in the measure in which 
it becomes more impersonal, more objective, and more external, 
confidence in it is also impaired, till at last it becomes a magical 
means, which stirs to activity the latent good agency of man, and sets 
in motion the standing machine, that it may then do its work, and that 
its work may be of account before God.34
Now this, in so far as it holds good in respect of a literature endlessly 
nuanced in respect of the substance and psychology of grace as the means 
of renewal and of resurrection, and indeed of the precise nature of man’s 
relationship with God under the conditions of the time and space, is indeed 
melancholy. But in so far as it touches on Dante, it helps to account for 
his relative indifference, not, certainly, to grace precisely as such (on the 
contrary!), but to anything resembling a theology of grace. Faith, hope, 
love, atonement, election, yes, all these and much else besides are there as a 
matter of systematic concern, but not grace. How, then, are we to account 
34 A. Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. N. Buchanan (New York: Dover Publications, 
1961), vol. 6, pp. 279-80. John Burnaby, however (Amor Dei. A Study of the Religion of St 
Augustine (The Hulsean Lectures for 1938) (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), p. 
313), commenting on Nygren’s position in his Agape and Eros, Part II, The History of the 
Christian Idea of Love (London: SPCK, 1954) is gentler in Augustine’s regard, seeing there 
a more intimate association between the notion of grace and the working of the Spirit: 
‘It is a conspicuous merit in Nygren’s treatment of Augustine to have decisively rejected 
the superficial criticism which alleges that the Catholic doctrine of grace – as distinct 
from perversions of practice – is “magical” or “mechanical”. What St Thomas calls the 
“infusion” of charity is that same working of the Holy Spirit for which Augustine found 
his locus classicus in the Epistle to the Romans. It is no ‘thing-like’ substance introduced 
from without, but the purely spiritual influence of the divine Person whose dwelling 
is within the believer’s heart.’ Nygren’s text (pp. 522-23) runs as follows: ‘This idea 
of the infusion of grace and love (infusio caritatis) has often been taken to prove that 
Augustine’s conception of grace was magical and naturalistic. Thus Harnack says: “The 
love of God is infused into the soul in portions.” The root error of Augustine’s doctrine of 
grace is supposed to lie in its “objective character” (ihres dinglichen Charakters); indeed, 
he is accused of believing that “love can be poured in like a medicine”. Similarly, W. 
Herrmann finds the weakness of Augustine’s idea of grace in the fact that he failed to 
make it psychologically intelligible how man is converted by the grace of God which 
meets us in the historical Christ, and was content to think of grace as a mysterious power. 
But here the need for caution is indicated by the very fact that Augustine’s idea of the 
“infusion” of Caritas is directly connected with Paul’s saying in Rom. v.5 that “the love of 
God hath been shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost which was given unto 
us”. Nothing was further from Augustine’s intention than a magical or naturalistic idea 
of grace. If we are to apply the alternative “magical and naturalistic” or “personal and 
psychological”, then it is the latter that describes Augustine’s view. Caritas is infused into 
our hearts, not in a manner that is unconnected with our relation to God, but by the fact 
that the Holy Spirit is given to us.’
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for this situation? By way of the status of grace in Dante as but love by 
another name, at which point motion, remotion, magic and metaphysics, 
indeed the entire apparatus of high-scholastic grace-consciousness, give 
way to something simpler and more sublime.
Events and Their Inner Life:  
an Essay in Actual Eschatology
quel giorno più non vi leggemmo avante.
(Inf. V.138)1
1. Preliminary considerations: patterns of eschatological awareness in Dante.  2. Axes of 
concern: the triumph of the innermost over the aftermost (the cases of Francesca da Rimini, 
Pier della Vigna and Guido da Montefeltro).  3. Conclusion: eschatology, immanence and 
the power to terrify.
Inasmuch as eschatology is ever ordinary, Dante’s, in the Commedia, is 
an ordinary eschatology.2 Like most eschatology, it is expectational in 
1 that day we read no farther in it.
2 In general on Christian and Christian-medieval eschatology, R. Bultmann, History 
and Eschatology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957); J. Moltmann, Theology 
of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology (London: SCM Press, 
1968; also New York: Harper and Row, 1967); J. A. T. Robinson, In the End God 
(London and Glasgow: Fontana, 1968); J. Ratzinger, Eschatology (Washington DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1988; originally Eschatologie. Tod und ewiges Leben 
(Regensburg: Verlag, 1977)); W. Verbeke et al. (eds), The Use and Abuse of Eschatology in 
the Middle Ages (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1988); Z. Hayes, Vision of a Future: A 
Study of Christian Eschatology (Wilmington DL: Michael Glazier, 1989); C. W. Bynum 
and P. Freedman (eds), Last Things: Death and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).
On Dante and eschatology, G. Barberi Squarotti, ‘Artificio ed escatologia della Vita 
Nuova’, in L’artificio dell ’eternità. Studi danteschi (Verona: Fiorini, 1972), pp. 35-106; idem, 
‘Retorica ed escatologia’, in Psicoanalisi e strutturalismo di fronte a Dante. Dalla letteratura 
profetica medievale agli odierni strumenti critici (Florence: Olschki, 1972), vol. 2 (Lettura della 
Commedia), pp. 441-65; R. Palgen, Mittelalterliche Eschatologie in Dantes ‘Komödie’. Motive 
und motivketten aus der mittelalterlichen Sagen literatur. Die Timaiosmotive in der Göttlichen 
Komödie (Graz: Hugo-Schuchardtsche Malwinenstiftung, 1975); A. K. Cassell, Dante’s 
Fearful Art of Justice (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1984); C. T. Davis, ‘Poverty and 
Eschatology in the Commedia’, in Dante’s Italy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1984), pp. 42-70; M. P. Ciccarese, ‘Le “Visiones” dell’aldilà nel cristianesimo 
occidentale. Genere letterario e tematiche predantesche’, in La fine dei tempi. Storia ed 
escatologia, ed. M. Naldini (Florence: Nardini, 1994), pp. 101-15 (also, eadem (ed.), Visioni 
dell’aldilà in occidente: fonti, modelli, testi (Florence: Nardini, 1987) and ‘L’anticipazione della 
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character, anticipatory in respect of the moment in which, summoned 
before Christ in judgement, the individual will at last be confirmed in 
the truth of what he has been, of what he is, and of what now he always 
will be. And this, as a way of seeing and understanding it, chimes with 
the typological idea similarly decisive for an overall interpretation of the 
poem, with the notion that events severally disposed on the plane of the 
horizontal may by dint of their shared significance be said to inhabit the 
same space, to relate one with another by way of a complex process of pre- 
and post-shadowing.3 Eschatology and typology are in this sense all of a 
piece, each alike turning on a sense of the continuity of human experience 
in time and eternity, on a resolution of the what is under the aspect of the 
former in terms of the what will be under the aspect of the latter.4 But to 
fine: l’immaginario dell’aldilà nei primi secoli cristiani’, in R. Uglione (ed.) ‘Millennium’: 
l’attesa della fine nei primi secoli cristiani. Atti delle III Giornate Patristiche Torinesi, Torini 23-
24 ottobre 2000 (Turin: CELID, 2002), pp. 183-208); M. A. Palacios, Dante e l’islam. I. 
L’escatologia islamica nella ‘Divina Commedia’. II. Storia e critica di una polemica, trans. R. R. 
Testa and Y. Tawfik, with an introduction by C. Ossola (Parma: Nuova Pratiche Editrice, 
1994 and 1997; based on 2nd edn, 1943); M. Gragnolati, Experiencing the Afterlife. Soul and 
Body in Dante and Medieval Culture (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2005); F. Livi, ‘La Divina Commedia e l’escatologia cristiana’, in Dante e la teologia (Rome: 
Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, 2008), pp. 29-69.
3 E. Auerbach, ‘Figurative Texts Illustrating Certain Passages of Dante’s Commedia’, 
Speculum 21 (1946), 474-89 (also in Studi su Dante, ed. Dante Della Terza,  8th edn (Milan: 
Feltrinelli, 1991) pp. 239-63, with ‘Figura’ at pp. 176-226); idem, Typologische Motive in 
der mittelalterlichen Literatur; Schriftere und Vorträge desPetrarca-Instituts, Koln 2 (Krefeld: 
Scherpe, 1953); J. Chydenius, The Typological Problem in Dante: A Study in the History of 
Medieval Ideas (Helsinki: Societas scientiarum fennica, 1958); idem, The Theory of Medieval 
Symbolism (Helsinki: Societas scientiarum fennica, 1960); A. C. Charity, Events and Their 
Afterlife: The Dialectics of Christian Typology in the Bible and Dante (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966); G. Padoan, ‘La “mirabile visione” di Dante e 1’epistola a 
Cangrande’, in Il pio Enea, l ’empio Ulisse. Tradizione classica e intendimento medievale in Dante 
(Ravenna: Longo, 1977), pp. 30-63. Also, P. Armour, ‘The Theme of Exodus in the 
First Two Cantos of the Purgatorio’, in Dante Soundings. Eight Literary and Historical Essays, 
ed. D. Nolan (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1981), pp. 59-99. More generally on the 
typological issue, C. Spicq, Esquisse d’une histoire de l’éxègese latine au moyen âge (Paris: 
Vrin, 1944); J. Daniélou, Sacramentum futuri. Etudes sur les origines de la typologie biblique 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1950); idem, ‘The Conception of History in the Christian Tradition’, 
Journal of Religion 30 (1950), 3, 171-79; idem, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973; originally 1961); B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the 
Middle Ages, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952); G. W. H. Lampe and K. J. Woollcombe, 
Essays on Typology (London: SCM Press, 1957); H. de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale. Les Quatre 
sens de l’écriture (Paris: Aubier, 1959-1964); idem, ‘A propos de 1’allégorie chrétienne’, 
Recherches de science religieuse 47 (1959), 5-43 (also ‘Typologie et allégorisme’ in vol. 34 
(1947), 180-226); J. N. D. Kelly, ‘The Bible and the Latin Fathers’, in The Church’s Use of 
the Bible, Past and Present, ed. D. E. Nineham (London: SPCK, 1963), pp. 41-56.
4 On concepts of time and eternity in general and in Dante, P. Duhem, Le Système du 
monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic (Paris: Hermann, 1913-17 and 
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live for any length of time with the Commedia is sooner rather than later 
to sense something of its restiveness with this kind of expectationalism, 
with its all being a matter, as far as the ἔσχατος is concerned, of postponed 
intelligence. More exactly, it is to become aware of Dante’s sense of 
the power of the historical instant to signify from out of the depths, 
the horizontal thus giving way to the vertical as a means of stating the 
eschatological issue. Now this needs careful statement, for to speak of the 
verticality of eschatological concern in the Commedia, of its sense of the 
ἔσχατος as dwelling in the depths of the historical instant, is by no means 
to sit lightly to what we have described as the expectational aspect of 
the argument, to the status of the ἔσχατος as coming next or as following on; 
for everywhere built into the consciousness both of Dante himself and of 
his clientèle in the poem is a sense of the truth of their existence as but a 
truth in waiting, as subsisting in anticipation of its definitive statement. In 
reprints, with a selection in Medieval Cosmology. Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void, and 
the Plurality of the Worlds, ed. and trans. R. Ariew (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985)); W. Kneale, ‘Time and Eternity in Theology’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61 
(1960-61), 87-108; W. von Leyden, ‘Time, Number and Eternity in Plato and Aristotle, 
Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1964), 35-52; M. Kneale, ‘Eternity and Sempiternity’, Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society 69 (1968-69), 223-38; E. Stump and N. Kretzmann, ‘Eternity’, 
Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), 429-58; R. C. Dales, ‘Time and Eternity in the Thirteenth 
Century’, Journal of the History of Ideas 49 (1988), 27-45; A. G. Padgett (with reference to 
Boethius and Aquinas), ‘God and Time. Towards a New Doctrine of Divine Timeless 
Eternity’, Religious Studies 25 (1989), 209-15; B. Leftow, ‘Eternity and Simultaneity’, 
Faith and Philosophy 8 (1991), 148-79; K. A. Rogers, ‘Eternity has no Duration’, Religious 
Studies 30 (1994), 1, 1-16; R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum. Theories in Antiquity 
and the Early Middle Ages (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006, originally 1983). In 
relation to Dante, F. Masciandaro, La problematica del tempo nella “Commedia” (Ravenna: 
Longo, 1976); M. M. Chiarenza, ‘Time and Eternity in the Myths of Paradiso XVII’, 
in Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio. Studies in the Italian Trecento in Honor of C. S. Singleton, ed. A. 
S. Bernardo and A. L. Pellegrini (Binghampton, NY: Centre for Medieval and Early 
Renaissance Studies, 1983), pp. 133-50; G. Giacalone, ‘Tempo ed eternità nella Divina 
Commedia’, in Dante Alighieri. La Divina Commedia (Roma: Signorelli, 1988), vol. 3, pp. 
66-82 (subsequently in Atti della Dante Alighieri a Treviso 1984-1989 (Treviso: Matteo, 
1989), pp. 170-81 and Da Malebolge alla Senna. Studi letterari in onore di Giorgio Santangelo 
(Palermo: Palumbo, 1993), pp. 259-78); I. Sciuto, ‘Eternità e tempo in Dante’, in Tempus, 
aevum, aeternitas. La concettualizzazione del tempo nel pensiero tardomedievale. Atti del Colloquio 
Internazionale, Trieste, 4-6 marzo 1999, ed. G. Alliney and L. Cova (Florence: Olschki, 
2000), pp. 1-20; R. Bodei, Tempo ed eternità in Dante e in Petrarca, in Letture classensi 32-34, 
ed. N. Ancarani (Ravenna: Longo, 2005), pp. 67-76. More generally, P. Salm, Pinpoint of 
Eternity. European Literature in Search of the All-encompassing Moment, (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1986). For Dante on eternity as duration, the ‘e io etterno duro’ of Inf. 
III.8, while on eternity as all-at-onceness (tota simul), Par. XVII.13-18 (the ‘il punto / a 
cui tutti li tempi son presenti’ of lines 17-18) and XXIX.10-12 (‘Poi cominciò: “Io dico, e 
non dimando, / quel che tu vuoli udir, perch’ io l’ho visto / là ’ve s’appunta ogne ubi e ogne 
quando”’), where extension is present to the transfigured mind as a matter pre-eminently of 
intension, of the resolution of the quantitative in the qualitative as an inkling of the spirit.
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this sense, the ἔσχατος is indeed the last thing horizontally, the terminus ad 
quem on the plane of temporality. But for all that, there can for Dante be 
no resolution of this matter in terms purely and simply of successionality, 
for his is a sense of ultimacy as a matter of intimacy, of what Kierkegaard 
used to call the ‘infinite contentfulness’ of the moment,5 at which point 
eschatology as often enough an afterthought in the mind of the theologian, 
an item under any other business, moves up the agenda.
2. What amounts, then, to a privileging of the vertical over the horizontal 
as a parameter of eschatological awareness, of the height and depth of 
that awareness over its before and after, is throughout discernible in 
the Commedia, Dante’s at every stage being a preoccupation with the 
kind of awareness whereby self stands in the truth of self as confirmed 
from deep within it, from out of the innermost recesses of personality. 
Turning, then, to the case of Francesca in Inferno V, we have first its 
symptomatology, its registration (a) of the surface sensation of being as 
adrift in respect of its own inner reasons, and (b) of the process of self-
5 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, ed. and trans. R. Thomte in collaboration 
with A. B. Anderson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 86: ‘For 
representation, [the eternal] is a going forth that nevertheless does not get off the spot, 
because the eternal is for representation the infinitely contentful present.’ Among the 
moderns, Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, trans. R. Niebuhr (New York: Meridian 
Books, 1956), p. 35: ‘it would not be worthwhile to speak at all of the fact that all sorts 
of things, ideas or feelings or deeds or works, move out of the past into the future across 
the mysterious boundary line of the present if all this were nothing but a moving, a 
flowing, a becoming and decaying without ultimate meaning or final importance. All 
of this is really important if it has unconditioned meaning, an unconditioned depth, an 
unconditioned reality. That it possesses this unconditioned meaning cannot be made 
a matter of proof or disproof but only of faith in the unconditioned meaning of life.’ 
Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, trans. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970; 
originally 1932), vol. 2, p. 17: ‘Confronting necessity, the existence of an object at all 
times, we have, instead of endless time, the fulfilled time of the moment. As present eternity, 
this fulfilled time confronts Kant’s time at large ... The latter is objective, measurable, 
and can be experienced as reality; the former is the depth of original, free Existenz. 
The latter is validly extant for everyone; the former turns a time that is tied to choice 
and decision into a phenomenon, as current time. Existenz has its time, not time pure and 
simple. Objective time exists for consciousness at large; existential time exists for the 
historical consciousness of Existenz alone’ (emphases those of the translator). Among 
the depth-psychologists and psychoanalysts, Rollo May in Man’s Search For Himself (New 
York: Norton, 1953, p. 269) speaks of eternity, not as a ‘given quantity of time’, but as 
its ‘qualitative significance’. It is the form of man’s relationship to life, ‘not a succession 
of “tomorrows”’. Also, idem, The Discovery of Being (New York: Norton, 1983), p. 137: ‘the 
Eigenwelt, the own world of self-relatedness, self-awareness, and insight into the meaning 
of an event for one’s self, has practically nothing to do with Aristotle’s clock time. The 
essence of self-awareness and insight are that they are “there” – instantaneous, immediate 
– and the moment of awareness has its significance for all time.’
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exoneration whereby the soul in its contritionlessness seeks to sidestep the 
pain of moral and ontological disintegration; on the one hand, then, there 
is the ‘bufera infernal’ passage beginning at line 28, an essay, precisely, in 
freefloatingness, in the agony of self-separation:
 Io venni in loco d’ogne luce muto,
che mugghia come fa mar per tempesta,
se da contrari venti è combattuto.
 La bufera infernal, che mai non resta,
mena li spirti con la sua rapina;
voltando e percotendo li molesta.
 Quando giungon davanti a la ruina,
quivi le strida, il compianto, il lamento;
bestemmian quivi la virtù divina.
 Intesi ch’a così fatto tormento
enno dannati i peccator carnali,
che la ragion sommettono al talento.
 E come li stornei ne portan l’ali
nel freddo tempo, a schiera larga e piena,
così quel fiato li spiriti mali
 di qua, di là, di giù, di sù li mena;
nulla speranza li conforta mai,
non che di posa, ma di minor pena.6
while on the other, there is the ‘Amor ... Amor ... Amor’ sequence beginning 
at line 100 and constituting an essay this time in the substance and 
psychology of self-evasion, in shifting the burden of guilt in the interests 
of a modicum of self-consistency:
 “Amor, ch’al cor gentil ratto s’apprende
prese costui de la bella persona
che mi fu tolta; e ’l modo ancor m’offende.
 Amor, ch’a nullo amato amar perdona,
mi prese del costui piacer sì forte,
che, come vedi, ancor non m’abbandona.
6 I came into a place mute of all light, which bellows like the sea in tempest when it is 
assailed by warring winds. The hellish hurricane, never resting, sweeps along the spirits 
with its rapine; whirling and smiting, it torments them. When they arrive before the 
ruin, there the shrieks, the moans, the lamentations; there they curse the divine power. 
I learned that to such torment are condemned the carnal sinners, who subject reason 
to desire. And as their wings bear the starlings along in the cold season, in wide, dense 
flocks, so does that blast the sinful spirits; hither, thither, downward, upward, it drives 
them. No hope of less pain, not to say of rest, ever comforts them.
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 Amor condusse noi ad una morte.
Caina attende chi a vita ci spense”.
Queste parole da lor ci fuor porte.7
7 Love, which is quickly kindled in a noble heart, seized this one for the fair form that 
was taken from me – and the way of it afflicts me still. Love, which absolves no one from 
loving, seized me so strongly with delight in him, that, as you see, it does not leave me 
even now. Love brought us to one death. Caina awaits him who quenched our life.  On 
contrition as the breaking down of hardheartedness and as the condition, therefore, of 
regeneration, [Aquinas], ST IIIa supp. 1.1 resp.: ‘Respondeo dicendum quod, ut dicitur 
Eccli. 10:15, initium omnis peccati est superbia, per quam homo sensui suo inhaerens, a 
mandatis divinis recedit. Et ideo oportet quod illud quod destruit peccatum, hominem a 
proprio sensu discedere faciat. Ille autem qui in suo sensu perseverat, rigidus, et durus 
per similitudinem vocatur; sicut durum in materialibus dicitur quod non cedit tactui; 
unde et frangi dicitur aliquis quando a suo sensu divellitur. Sed inter fractionem, et 
comminutionem, sive contritionem in rebus materialibus, unde haec nomina ad spiritualia 
transferuntur, hoc interest, ut dicitur, quod frangi dicuntur aliqua quando in magnas 
partes dividuntur, sed comminui vel conteri, quando ad partes minimas reducitur hoc 
quod in se solidum erat. Et quia ad dimissionem peccati requiruntur quod affectum 
peccati homo totaliter dimittat, quem per quamdam continuitatem, et soliditatem in sensu 
suo habebat; ideo actus ille quo peccatum dimittitur, contritio dicitur per similitudinem.’ 
Bernard, In festo omnium sanct. I.x (PL 183, 458A): ‘Equum indomitum flagella domant; 
animam immitem contritio spiritus et assiduitas lacrymarum’; Aelred of Rievaulx, Serm. 
de oner. XX (PL 195, 441A): ‘Scopa terens cordis contritio est, qua Babylon in anima 
nostra teritur et conteritur, et omnes spurcitiae ejus egeruntur’, etc.
Augustine on the alienation of responsibility in circumstances of far-offness, De civ. Dei 
xiv.14: ‘Sed est peior damnabilior superbia qua etiam in peccatis manifestis suffugium 
excusationis inquiritur, sicut illi primi homines, quorum et illa dixit: “Serpens seduxit 
me, et manducavi”, et ille dixit: “Mulier, quam dedisti mecum, haec mihi dedit a ligno, 
et edi”. Nusquam hic sonat petitio veniae, nusquam inploratio medicinae. Nam licet 
isti non, sicut Cain, quod commiserunt negent, adhuc tamen superbia in aliud quaerit 
referre quod perperam fecit, superbia mulieris in serpentem, superbia viri mulierem. Sed 
accusatio potius quam excusatio vera est ubi mandati divini est aperta transgressio’; De 
lib. arb. III.ii.5: ‘Verumtamen maximam partem hominum ista quaestione torqueri non 
ob aliud crediderim, nisi quia non pie quaerunt, velocioresque sunt ad excusationem, 
quam ad confessionem peccatorum suorum’; En. in psalm. vii.19 (v. 18): ‘Ista confessio 
ita Dominum laudat, ut nihil possint impiorum valere blasphemiae, qui volentes 
excusare facinora sua, nolunt suae culpae tribuere quod peccant, hoc est, nolunt suae 
culpae tribuere culpam suam. Itaque aut fortunam, aut fatum inveniunt quod accusent; 
aut diabolum, cui non consentire in potestate nostra esse voluit qui nos fecit; aut aliam 
naturam inducunt, quae non sit ex Deo, fluctuantes miseri et errantes, potius quam 
confitentes Deo, ut eis ignoscat’, etc. Peter Lombard, Comm. in ps. XL, v. 4: ‘Miserere ita: 
“Sana” per flagella “animam meam”, quoniam nullo modo excuso peccatum, sed accuso 
dicens: “Quia peccavi tibi”, non accuso fortunam, non dico: Hoc mihi facit fatum; non 
dico: Adulterum me fecit Venus, et latronem Mars, et avarum Saturnus’; Bernard, Cant. 
cantic. xvi.11: ‘[Confessio] oportet autem esse et simplicem. Non intentionem (forte quia 
latet homines) excusare delectet, si sit rea ... Primum illud non confessio est, sed defensio; 
nec placat, sed provocat ... Jam a postremo primi hominis dehortetur, exemplum, nec 
culpam siquidem diffitentis, nec tamen consequentis veniam non dubium quin ob reatus 
mulieris admistionem (Gen. 3:2). Genus excusationis est, cum argueris tu, alium incusare 
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But of the strategies of self-preservation in the context of catastrophe 
Dante will have nothing, his being straightaway a referral of the horizontal 
to the vertical as the dominant axis of awareness, of the strategic to the 
synderectic as a principle of self-interpretation. ‘Tell me’, then, he has 
the poet-pilgrim say, ‘how was it with you in the moment of love’s sweet 
sighs, in the moment of knowing and of being known by love in its power 
both to delight and to destroy?’ (‘Ma dimmi: al tempo d’i dolci sospiri, / 
a che e come concedette amore / che conosceste i dubbiosi disiri?’; lines 
118-20),8 a question which, for all its apparent innocence, leaves no room 
for manoeuvre, nowhere else for Francesca to look other than into the 
recesses of her soul there to contemplate yet again the enormity of it all, 
the awesome moment of moral and ontological self-delivery:
 E quella a me: “Nessun maggior dolore
che ricordarsi del tempo felice
ne la miseria; e ciò sa ’l tuo dottore.
 Ma s’a conoscer la prima radice
del nostro amor tu hai cotanto affetto,
dirò come colui che piange e dice.
 Noi leggiavamo un giorno per diletto
di Lancialotto come amor lo strinse;
soli eravamo e sanza alcun sospetto.
 Per più fiate li occhi ci sospinse
quella lettura, e scolorocci il viso;
ma solo un punto fu quel che ci vinse.
 Quando leggemmo il disïato riso
esser basciato da cotanto amante,
questi, che mai da me non fia diviso,
 la bocca mi basciò tutto tremante.
Galeotto fu ’l libro e chi lo scrisse:
quel giorno più non vi leggemmo avante”. 
(Inf. V.121-38)9
... In animam etenim suam peccat qui se excusat, repellens proinde a se indulgentiae 
medicinam, et sic vitam sibi proprio ore intercludens’; idem, De grad. humil. xvii.45: ‘Si 
autem et de illa, sicut Adam vel Eva, convincitur, aliena suasione excusare se nititur’, etc.
8 But tell me, in the time of the sweet sighs, by what and how did Love grant you to 
know the dubious desires?
9 And she to me, “There is no greater sorrow than to recall, in wretchedness, the happy 
time; and this your teacher knows. But if you have such great desire to know the first 
root of our love, I will tell as one who weeps and tells. One day, for pastime, we read of 
Lancelot, how love constrained him; we were alone, suspecting nothing. Several times 
that reading urged our eyes to meet and took the colour from our faces, but one moment 
alone it was that overcame us. When we read how the longed-for smile was kissed by so 
great a lover, this one, who never shall be parted from me, kissed my mouth all trembling. 
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Straightaway, then, the ἔσχατος, hitherto subsisting on the far limit 
of human experience in its moment-by-moment unfolding, is brought 
forward into the centre of that experience, at which point its power to 
terrify is intensified beyond words. Nothing, clearly, is lost here by way of 
horizontality, the terrified subject living on in a state of fear and trembling, 
of living dread in respect of the last judgement and of the second death. 
But everything is gained by way of immediacy, of a sense on the part of 
the subject of her standing even now in the truth of her existence under 
the conditions of time and eternity, at which point verticality – meaning 
by this the knowledge of self urged upon self from out of the depths – once 
again takes over as the dominant axis of concern. 
As a further example of the ascendancy of the vertical over the 
horizontal as a plane of eschatological awareness in the Commedia we may 
take the case of Pier della Vigna in Inferno XIII, where again it is a question 
of self as summoned into its own presence from out of the recesses of self. 
Here too Dante starts out with the symptomatology of the case, with (a) 
the kind of paranoia characteristic of being in its remotion and referable 
to dividedness at the point of fundamental willing, and (b) the kind of self-
exoneration functioning in circumstances of contritionlessness as the sole 
means of self-intelligibility in the individual, of his standing significantly 
in his own company. On the one hand, then, as an essay in the pathology 
of captivity and enslavement, in being under the aspect of intimidation, 
we have the ‘Non fronda verde’ passage beginning at line 1:
 Non era ancor di là Nesso arrivato,
quando noi ci mettemmo per un bosco
che da neun sentiero era segnato.
 Non fronda verde, ma di color fosco;
non rami schietti, ma nodosi e ’nvolti;
non pomi v’eran, ma stecchi con tòsco.10
A Gallehault was the book and he who wrote it; that day we read no farther in it.” 
10 Nessus had not yet reached the other side when we moved forward through a wood 
which was not marked by any path. No green leaves, but of dusky hue; no smooth 
boughs, but gnarled and warped; no fruits were there, but thorns with poison.  Thomas 
on despair as, under one at least of its aspects, the gravest of sins, ST IIa IIae.20.3 resp.: 
‘Et ideo illud quod primo et per se habet aversionem a Deo est gravissimum inter peccata 
mortalia. Virtutibus autem theologicis opponuntur infidelitas, desperatio et odium Dei. 
Inter quae odium et infidelitas, si desperationi comparentur, invenientur secundum se 
quidem, idest secundum rationem propriae speciei, graviora. Infidelitas enim provenit ex 
hoc quod homo ipsam Dei veritatem non credit; odium vero Dei provenit ex hoc quod 
voluntas hominis ipsi divinae bonitati contrariatur; desperatio autem ex hoc quod homo 
non sperat se bonitatem Dei participare. Ex quo patet quod infidelitas et odium Dei sunt 
contra Deum secundum quod in se est; desperatio autem secundum quod eius bonum 
participatur a nobis. Unde maius peccatum est, secundum se loquendo, non credere Dei 
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and, as similarly attuned to the notion of antagonism as a principle of 
cosmic interpretation, to the soul’s inability to see in the world anything 
other than ill will,  the ‘Perché mi schiante’ passage beginning at line 31:
 Allor porsi la mano un poco avante
e colsi un ramicel da un gran pruno;
e ’l tronco suo gridò: “Perché mi schiante?”.
 Da che fatto fu poi di sangue bruno,
ricominciò a dir: “Perché mi scerpi?
non hai tu spirto di pietade alcuno?
 Uomini fummo, e or siam fatti sterpi:
ben dovrebb’ esser la tua man più pia,
se state fossimo anime di serpi”.11
while on the other hand, and as an essay this time in the kind of deflection 
whereby self is saved from the otherwise intolerable sensation of its 
inconsistency, of its delivery of self despite self to its own annihilation, there 
is the  ‘’nfiammati infiammar sì Augusto’ passage beginning at line 64:
 La meretrice che mai da l’ospizio
di Cesare non torse li occhi putti,
morte comune e de le corti vizio,
 infiammò contra me li animi tutti;
e li ’nfiammati infiammar sì Augusto,
che ’ lieti onor tornaro in tristi lutti.12
veritatem, vel odire Deum, quam non sperare consequi gloriam ab ipso. Sed si comparetur 
desperatio ad alia duo peccata ex parte nostra, sic desperatio est periculosior, quia per 
spem revocamur a malis et introducimur in bona prosequenda; et ideo, sublata spe, 
irrefrenate homines labuntur in vitia, et a bonis laboribus retrahuntur. Unde super illud 
Proverb. XXIV, “si desperaveris lapsus in die angustiae, minuetur fortitudo tua” dicit 
Glossa, nihil est execrabilius desperatione, quam qui habet et in generalibus huius vitae 
laboribus, et, quod peius est, in fidei certamine constantiam perdit’. Et Isidorus dicit, “in 
libro de summo bono, perpetrare flagitium aliquod mors animae est, sed desperare est 
descendere in Infernum”.’ Rarely, however, do the old theologians approach either the 
substance or intensity of Dante’s sense of despair as inauthentic drivenness, as obsessive 
recourse to the self-consciously inauthentic solution, though Augustine comes close to 
it when he speaks of desperation as perseverance in impiety: ‘in peccatis suis desperata 
atque impia mentis obstinatione perserverantibus’ (Exp. inc. ep. ad Rom.); or as the ‘piling 
up’ of transgressions: ‘et ex ipsa desperatione delicta cumulantes’ (En. in psalm. cxliv.24; 
v. 20), etc.
11 Then I stretched my hand a little forward and plucked a twig from a great thornbush, and 
its stub cried, “Why do you break me?” And when it had become dark with blood, it began to 
cry, “Why do you tear me? Have you no spirit of piety? We were men, and now are turned to 
stocks. Truly your hand ought to be more merciful had we been souls of serpents”.
12 The harlot that never turned her whorish eyes from Caesar’s household – the common 
death and vice of courts – inflamed all minds against me; and they, inflamed, did so 
inflame Augustus that my glad honours were changed to dismal woes.
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Here again, however, Dante intervenes to banish the mists of illusion 
and of self-deception in favour of an act of self-recognition, of the kind of 
clear-sightedness which, captive for the most part to mere strategy and 
to the bad faith thereof, rises up in the critical instant to confront the 
individual with the truth of what he actually is as an agent of radical 
undoing – a situation confirmed at the level of style by the tortured 
substance of sound and syntax:
 L’animo mio, per disdegnoso gusto,
credendo col morir fuggir disdegno,
ingiusto fece me contra me giusto.
(Inf. XIII.70-71)13
Survival at this depth being out of the question, the soul straightaway 
surfaces to take up the routine psalmody of self-recommendation (the ‘Per 
le nove radici d’esto legno / vi giuro che già mai non ruppi fede / al mio 
segnor, che fu d’onor sì degno’ of lines 73-75),14 this being the way in hell 
of pseudo-sanity, of affirming self in the unaffirmability of self. But as 
Pier della Vigna knows full well (for this is what it means to be in hell) the 
routine is just that – a routine – the whole thing, therefore, functioning as 
but a further co-efficient of despair.
As a third and for the moment final instance of this sense in Dante 
of the ἔσχατος as a matter less of the forthcoming than of the indwelling 
we may take the case of Guido da Montefeltro in Canto XXVII of the 
Inferno, where again it is a question of Dante’s gradually constraining the 
speaker, and thus by extension the reader, to the truth of his existence 
as inwardly abiding and thus as forever rising up after the manner of 
the Leviathan to tax him in conscience. First, then, comes the familiar 
moment of exoneration, the moment designed to save the subject from the 
pain and perplexity of self-acknowledgement:
 Io fui uom d’arme, e poi fui cordigliero,
credendomi, sì cinto, fare ammenda;
e certo il creder mio venìa intero,
 se non fosse il gran prete, a cui mal prenda!,
che mi rimise ne le prime colpe;
e come e quare, voglio che m’intenda.
13 My mind, in scornful temper, thinking by dying to escape from scorn, made me 
unjust against my just self.  S. Vazzana, ‘Il “disdegnoso gusto” di Pier de le Vigne’, 
L’Alighieri, n.s. 39, 11 (1998), 91-94.
14 By the new roots of this tree I swear to you that I never broke faith with my lord, who 
was so worthy of honour.
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 Mentre ch’io forma fui d’ossa e di polpe
che la madre mi diè, l’opere mie
non furon leonine, ma di volpe.
 Li accorgimenti e le coperte vie
io seppi tutte, e sì menai lor arte,
chal fine de la terra il suono uscie.
 Quando mi vidi giunto in quella parte
di mia etade ove ciascun dovrebbe
calar le vele e raccoglier le sarte,
 ciò che pria mi piacëa, allor m’increbbe,
e pentuto e confesso mi rendei;
ahi miser lasso! e giovato sarebbe.
(Inf. XXVII.67-84)15
But then, and again in a manner decisive for any exact understanding 
of what is going on in the Inferno, of Dante’s sense of reprobation as a 
matter of recognition, comes the change of direction, the constraining 
of the horizontal to the vertical as the axis of ontological intelligence. 
Impressed, therefore, by the inadequacy of every strategy of the spirit 
to the business in hand and constrained to what comes next by a sort of 
grim inevitability, the soul once more settles on the moment of its delivery, 
on the moment in which, despite every inclination to the contrary (for the 
inauthentic choice in hell is inauthentic only in the degree to which it is 
irradiated by a sense of authentic possibility, by a commitment at some 
level of consciousness to the what might be of historical selfhood), it opted 
and opts still for its annihilation, for its ceasing to be in any recognizably 
human sense of the term:
 Ma come Costantin chiese Silvestro
d’entro Siratti a guerir de la lebbre,
così mi chiese questi per maestro
 a guerir de la sua superba febbre;
domandommi consiglio, e io tacetti
perché le sue parole parver ebbre.
15 I was a man of arms and then a corded friar, trusting, so girt, to make amends; and 
certainly my hope would have come full, but for the high priest – may ill befall him! – 
who set me back in my first sins; and how and wherefore I would have you hear from me. 
While I was the form of the flesh and bones my mother gave me, my deeds were not those 
of the lion, but of the fox. I knew all wiles and covert ways, and plied the art of them so 
well that to the ends of the earth their sound went forth. When I saw myself come to that 
part of my life when every man should lower the sails and coil up the ropes, that which 
before had pleased me grieved me then, and with repentance and confession I turned 
friar, and – woe is me! – it would have availed.
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 E’ poi ridisse: “Tuo cuor non sospetti;
finor t’assolvo, e tu m’insegna fare
sì come Penestrino in terra getti.
 Lo ciel poss’io serrare e diserrare,
come tu sai; però son due le chiavi
che ’l mio antecessor non ebbe care”.
 Allor mi pinser li argomenti gravi
là ’ve ’l tacer mi fu avviso ’l peggio,
e dissi: “Padre, da che tu mi lavi
 di quel peccato ov’io mo cader deggio,
lunga promessa con l’attender corto
ti farà triunfar ne l’alto seggio”.
(Inf. XXVII.94-111)16
True, with Francis and the pantomimics of the dark angel we are 
once again on the plane of the horizontal, of the what happens next of being 
under the aspect of eventuality.17 But the what happens next of being under 
the aspect of eventuality is a function in the Commedia of the what already 
16 But as Constantine sought out Sylvester within Soracte to cure his leprosy, so this 
one sought me out as the doctor to cure the fever of his pride. He asked counsel of me, 
and I kept silent, for his words seemed drunken. Then he spoke again, “Let not your heart 
mistrust. I absolve you here and now, and do you teach me how I may cast Penestrino 
to the ground. I can lock and unlock heaven, as you know; for which the keys are two, 
which my predecessor did not hold dear”. Thereon the weighty arguments pushed me to 
where silence seemed to me the worst, and I said, “Father, since you do wash me of that 
sin into which I must now fall, long promise with short keeping will make you triumph 
on the high seat”.
17 On the notion of ius diaboli, of the devil’s right to the body in its sinfulness, Augustine, 
Contra sec. Iul. resp.imper. opus ii.24: ‘Necessario quippe sequitur, quia per commixtionem 
corporum origo progenitis est, si per originem malum in hominibus, per malum ius 
diaboli in homines, diabolum esse auctorem hominum, a quo est origo nascentium’; De 
nupt. et concup. II.xxvii.44, etc., and also in both Gregory the Great and Bede. See too, 
however, and in a manner possibly decisive for Dante, Anselm in the Cur Deus homo at 
I.vii: ‘Sed et illud quod dicere solemus, Deum scilicet, debuisse prius per justitiam contra 
diabolum agere, ut liberaret hominem, quam per fortitudinem; ut, cum diabolus eum, in 
quo nulla mortis erat causa, et qui Deus erat, occideret, juste potestatem, quam super 
peccatores habebat, amitteret; alioquin injustam violentiam fecisset illi, quoniam juste 
possidebat hominem, quem non ipse violenter attraxerat, sed idem homo se sponte ad 
illum contulerat, non video quam vim habeat’, with this later in the same chapter: ‘Et 
puto illos, qui diabolum aliquam opinantur habere in possidendo homine justitiam, ad 
hoc inde adduci, quia vident hominem diaboli vexationi subjacere juste, et Deum hoc 
juste permittere: et idcirco putant diabolum illam juste inferre’. Otherwise, Jude 9: 
‘Cum Michael Archangelus cum diabolo disputans altercaretur de Moysi corpore, non 
est ausus iudicium inferre blasphemiae: sed dixit: Imperet tibi dominus’. A. McGrath, 
Iustitia Dei. A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification: The Beginnings to the Reformation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 58 ff.
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is of that being, the eventual, in respect of the existential, constituting 
but a marker, a place-holder, a means of accessibility in respect of its 
otherwise dark substance. Never, in other words, is the ἔσχατος present to 
the individual as a matter merely of denouement or of foreclosure. On the 
contrary, it subsists as the ‘infinitely contentful’ character of the moment, 
as that whereby, in and through a turning back of self upon the instant as 
apt both to signify and to signify ultimately, he is once again summoned 
into his own presence in the unnegotiability of that presence.
3. One of the remarkable things about the Commedia, or, more exactly, 
about Dante’s cast of characters in the Commedia, is their continuing 
preoccupation with the past, with the situation which, though now behind 
them, continues to fill them with misgiving; so, for example, as bearing 
on the city as the first of the three great medieval estates, and on this as a 
cause for melancholy, these lines (97-111) from Paradiso XV:
 Fiorenza dentro da la cerchia antica,
ond’ ella toglie ancora e terza e nona,
si stava in pace, sobria e pudica.
 Non avea catenella, non corona,
non gonne contigiate, non cintura
che fosse a veder più che la persona.
 Non faceva, nascendo, ancor paura
la figlia al padre, che ’l tempo e la dote
non fuggien quinci e quindi la misura.
 Non avea case di famiglia vòte;
non v’era giunto ancor Sardanapalo
a mostrar ciò che ’n camera si puote.
 Non era vinto ancora Montemalo
dal vostro Uccellatoio, che, com’ è vinto
nel montar sù, così sarà nel calo.18
while as bearing on the empire as the second of them, these (lines 85-97) 
from Purgatorio XVI:
 Esce di mano a lui che la vagheggia
prima che sia, a guisa di fanciulla
18 Florence, within her ancient circle from which she still takes the tierce and nones, 
abode in peace, sober and chaste. There was no necklace, no coronal, no embroidered 
gowns, no girdle that was more to be looked at than the person. Not yet did the daughter 
at her birth cause fear for the father, for the time and the dowry did not outrun due 
measure on this side and that. Houses empty of family there were none, nor had 
Sardanapalus arrived yet to show what could be done in the chamber. Not yet was 
Montemalo surpassed by your Uccellatoio, which, as it had been passed in the uprising, 
so shall it be in the fall.
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che piangendo e ridendo pargoleggia,
 l’anima semplicetta che sa nulla,
salvo che, mossa da lieto fattore,
volontier torna a ciò che la trastulla.
 Di picciol bene in pria sente sapore;
quivi s’inganna, e dietro ad esso corre,
se guida o fren non torce suo amore.
 Onde convenne legge per fren porre;
convenne rege aver, che discernesse
de la vera cittade almen la torre.
 Le leggi son, ma chi pon mano ad esse?19
and on the Church as the third of them, these (lines 40-57) from Paradiso 
XXVII:
 Non fu la sposa di Cristo allevata
del sangue mio, di Lin, di quel di Cleto,
per essere ad acquisto d’oro usata;
 ma per acquisto d’esto viver lieto
e Sisto e Pïo e Calisto e Urbano
sparser lo sangue dopo molto fleto.
 Non fu nostra intenzion ch’a destra mano
d’i nostri successor parte sedesse,
parte da l’altra del popol cristiano;
 né che le chiavi che mi fuor concesse,
divenisser signaculo in vessillo
che contra battezzati combattesse;
 né ch’io fossi figura di sigillo
a privilegi venduti e mendaci,
ond’ io sovente arrosso e disfavillo.
 In vesta di pastor lupi rapaci
si veggion di qua sù per tutti i paschi:
o difesa di Dio, perché pur giaci?20
19 From his hands, who fondly loves it before it exists, comes forth after the fashion 
of a child that sports, now weeping, now laughing, the little simple soul, which knows 
nothing, save that, proceeding from a glad maker, it turns eagerly to what delights it. 
First it tastes the savour of a trifling good; there it is beguiled and runs after it, if guide or 
curb bend not its love. Wherefore it was needful to impose law as a bridle, it was needful 
to have a ruler who could discern at least the tower of the true city. Laws there are, but 
who puts his hand to them?
20 The spouse of Christ was not nurtured on my blood and that of Linus and of Cletus, 
to be employed for gain of gold; but for gain of this happy life Sixtus and Pius and 
Calixtus and Urban shed their blood after much weeping. It was not our purpose that 
one part of the Christian people should sit on the right of our successors, and one part 
on the left, nor that the keys which were committed to me should become the ensign on 
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At every point the pattern is the same, the soul in its election living 
out still the agony of the historical instant, the blasphemous substance 
of what was and still is under the conditions of time and space. How 
are we to account for this situation? By way (a) of an anthropology and 
ethic committed as of the essence to the intrinsic dignity of the human 
project in its power to moral and ontological self-implementation; (b) of 
a secure sense of history as the whereabouts of that self-implementation, 
and (c) of total seriousness on both counts. And with this we are back 
to our main theme, for in the degree to which Dante takes seriously the 
greatness and the locatedness of the human project he is committed willy 
nilly to an immanent eschatology, to an eschatology which, though by no 
means indifferent to its expectational aspect, turns upon the historical 
instant and the ‘contentfulness’ thereof as the whereabouts of ultimate 
self-interpretation. Its expectational aspect, everywhere dominant as a 
paradigm of consciousness, is in this sense but the forward projection 
of something more dreadful, of an immanent absolute empowered from 
within to devastate the spirit.
a banner of warfare on the baptized; nor that I should be made a figure on a seal to sold 
and lying privileges, whereat I often blush and flash. Rapacious wolves, in shepherd’s 
garb, are seen from here above in all the pastures. O defence of God, wherefore does 
thou still lie still?

Two Dantes or One? An Essay in 
Transcendence and Theatricality
Dante was attached, simultaneously, to 
Christianity and to paganism. This was 
not a half-way position, nor a wavering 
between two conceptions of life according 
to mood or circumstance. The attachment 
to paganism was more like that which 
a man may feel to his youth, except that 
paganism was a stage in the history of 
Dante’s race, not of himself individually. 
Yet there is a sense in which the pagan 
‘object’ of his attachment was not 
something past and done with, existing 
only in history or legend or works of 
art; rather it was a permanent part of 
himself, an alter ego; it was that second 
self which his imagination took into the 
Other World in the form of Virgil and 
which, once it had assumed this form, 
was allowed to take charge of, to guide 
and govern the Christian protagonist of 
the resulting poem.1
1.  Introduction: ego, alter ego and the problem of authorial intentionality – a preliminary 
response.  2. Piety, Peripateticism and sin as unreason: ‘The Theology of the Inferno’.  3. 
Irreconcilability in the depths: ‘The Two Dantes’.  4. Two Dantes or one?: dimensionality, 
decorum and the comprehensive geometry of the text.
Kenelm Foster’s tripartite essay on the two Dantes, published in 1977, 
represents a point of arrival in respect of a lifelong meditation on the 
issues it raises, on, as he himself saw it, the co-presence in Dante of 
orders of philosophical and theological concern never quite reconciled 
1 Kenelm Foster, O.P., ‘The Two Dantes (I)’, in The Two Dantes (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1977), p. 156.
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one with the other or brought home to a unified and internally consistent 
spirituality. Encouraged as he was by the massive and massively erudite 
initiative of Bruno Nardi and of Etienne Gilson, responsible between 
them for rescuing Dante from those who would see in him a more or less 
fully professed Thomist,2 and coming to Dante as he did from the point 
of view of one committed by profession to the Thomist way in philosophy 
and theology, he was more than ordinarily sensitive to what in Dante 
amounts to the difficulty of his particular kind of bi-culturalism, to his 
living out at one and the same time the exigencies both of a Christian 
and a Peripateticizing conscience. But for all his insight and tact in 
seeing and setting up the question, Kenelm’s sense of the alterity of it all 
– certainly if by this we mean the survival into the Commedia of distinct 
and mutually irreducible egos, of a Christian and of a pagan ego – is 
open to question; for decisive as the idea is for the moments of Dante’s 
meditation represented by the Convivio and the Monarchia as committed 
to the resolution of high-level issues in the areas of moral philosophy and 
of political theology, there are forces at work in the Commedia tending to 
soften and ultimately to liquidate the kind of alternativism which Kenelm 
Foster sees as a dominant feature even here of Dantean spirituality. On 
the one hand, then, there are the theological forces whereby each successive 
emphasis in the areas both of moral and of natural philosophy is rendered 
transparent to the innermost reasons of the text as a product of Christian 
piety, while on the other hand there are the theatrical forces whereby those 
same emphases, distributed among the poem’s players such that each 
only ever speaks in character, serve merely to confirm its consistency 
2 Kenelm on Nardi and Gilson, on Dante and Thomism, and on his own sense of the 
‘humanistic’ problem in Dante: ‘This question of the continuity of the Comedy with the 
minor works was a good deal debated by Dante scholars in the 1940s and ’50s. As I 
had occasion to write some years ago and feel able to repeat today, “after Nardi’s and 
Gilson’s work in the 1930s it had become evident that Dante could no longer be called 
a Thomist without very considerable qualifications; and in particular that the Convivio 
and the Monarchia show clear traces of a certain dualism – in assertions, more or less 
explicit, of the independence of philosophy from theology and of the civil power from 
the Church, and of the twofold ‘final end’ of man ... The question then arose whether 
this dualism persisted into the Comedy, and if so precisely to what effect; the result being 
... to concentrate attention on the contrasted symbols of Virgil and Beatrice, and more 
generally to raise the issue of the ‘humanism’ or otherwise of the Comedy”. This was 
written when I was still inclined to date the Monarchia before the Comedy: yet I would 
still maintain that there is a fundamental difference ... between the Comedy and the two 
other works taken together. This seems to me clear even supposing that the Monarchia 
belongs to the last decade of the poet’s life and that doctrinally there is agreement between 
it and the Comedy where both works touch on the same themes’. (ibid., pp. 163-64; the 
reference here is to his piece entitled ‘Dante Studies in England, 1921-64’, Italian Studies 
20 (1965), 7).
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at the level of authorial intentionality. Now Kenelm, whose inclination 
was always to turn back upon the leading proposition with a view to its 
further refinement, would himself have gone along with this, for his too 
was a sense both of the maturity of the Commedia in its bringing home of 
each subsequent inflexion of the spirit to its depth-dimensionality and of 
its decorum, its proportioning of each subsequent intervention in the text 
to the properties of personality. But this, when it comes to the valedictory 
statement, is not what he chooses to emphasize. Rather, it is a question 
as far as the Commedia is concerned of irresolution and of the melancholy 
thereof, of a work which, for all its perspectivization both of the moral and 
the political issues upon which it touches, remains less than equal to the 
restiveness of its cultural premises.
2. One of Kenelm’s earliest accounts of the rationalist or (as he himself 
used to say) the ‘humanistic’ component of Dante’s thought tending even 
in the Commedia to subsist over against its theological component comes 
in his essay ‘The Theology of the Inferno’ published in 1957 as part of the 
volume entitled God’s Tree: Essays in Dante and Other Matters, an initiative 
predating the Two Dantes, therefore, by twenty years.3 Setting out to 
explore the theological programme of the Inferno, but also to call into 
question its status as a stable expression of the Catholic mind, the essay 
begins by noting that Dante’s genius in the Commedia can be admired in 
the wrong way; for Dante, Kenelm maintains, was not really a theologian 
at all. Enamoured as he was of theology, and given to searching her 
somewhat after the manner of a lover, he was first and foremost a maker 
of images, his, therefore, as far as theology is concerned, being something 
closer to ‘usage’ – Gilson’s ‘usage défini’ – than to anything more professional 
or systematic:
Again, his great intellect can be admired in the wrong way: Dante 
did not put the Summa theologiae into verse, for he could not possibly 
have put it into prose. The epitaph composed by Giovanni di Virgilio, 
“Theologus Dantes” etc., cannot, as M. Gilson has said, be taken à la 
lettre. It might be less misleading to deny that Dante was a theologian; 
it is safer to call him a magnificent amateur. Essentially he was a 
poet, a maker of images, using doctrine poetically, searching it as a 
lover. His speculative enthusiasm was superbly pure and strong, but 
it ran in certain directions. So Dante’s teaching remains a selection, 
as it were, within the doctrinal materials at his disposal. Of these, as 
Gilson says, he made a certain usage défini. (pages 50-51)
3 God’s Tree. Essays on Dante and Other Matters (London: Blackfriars Publications, 1957), 
with ‘The Theology of the Inferno’ at pp. 50-66.
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The passage is problematic. It is problematic in respect (a) of the ‘for he 
could not possibly have put it into prose’ formula with which it begins (for 
it is a question here, not of power, but of preference, not of Dante’s being 
unable to pursue the theological project in the way Thomas had, but of his 
not wishing to), and (b) of its sense of Dante as but a ‘magnificent amateur’ 
in theology, a way of putting it which, whether or not acceptable at the 
time of God’s Tree, smacks nowadays of a certain cultural ‘incorrectness’, 
a certain lack of tact when it comes to our now revised sense of poetry 
and the theological project.4 True, Dante was no Thomas, the Commedia 
lacking the power of the great summae to systematic awareness, to an 
orderly statement of the theological situation in its totality. But by the 
same token Thomas was no Dante, the great summae lacking the power 
of the Commedia to engender a sense of the ontological agony and ecstasy 
of it all, to take us into‘the deepest places of human self-destruction and 
despair as well as the highest places of courage and salvation’,5 at which 
point ‘magnificent amateurism’ as a way of describing Dante’s intervention 
commends itself only for its inadequacy to the business in hand. Be that 
as it may, however, the way is now open, Kenelm thinks, for a critique of 
his sense of moral evil in the Inferno; for Dante’s, he says, was everywhere 
a tendency, and a none too healthy one at that, to rely on reason alone as 
the way of getting to grips with this issue:
This need for clear knowledge was of course innate in Dante; but it 
was also in this case in line with his principles. He thought that he 
could pretty thoroughly know evil, and this in virtue of his human 
reason alone – aided of course by Aristotle’s. The mind of Aristotle, 
indeed, had explored most of the manifestations of human vice. In 
Dante’s view (it seems) the Inferno, considered simply as a lecture on 
human depravity, did not say very much more than the Nicomachean 
Ethics. He does not seem perhaps to have very keenly appreciated 
the enormous difference that Christianity had in fact made: he sees 
his Inferno mainly as an outline of human evil drawn by human wit. 
Unlike the Paradiso it contains, as he presents it, little that cannot be 
understood. It unveils iniquity. (p.51)
Evil, then, as envisaged by Dante in the Inferno, appears to be no 
more than an affront to right reason, to the customary co-ordinates 
of Peripatetic consciousness, with the result, Kenelm goes on, that the 
4 Recently on the relationship in Dante of the idea and the image, F. Livi, Dante e la 
teologia. L’ immaginazione poetica nella ‘Divina Commedia’ come interpretazione del dogma, (Rome: 
Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, 2008); V. Montemaggi and M. Treherne (eds), Dante’s 
‘Commedia’. Theology as Poetry (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).
5 Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (Collins: Glasgow, 1962; originally 1952), p. 128.
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sinners in Dante’s hell ‘would be sinners in any world that is human 
at all’:
For my present purpose, however, the chief interest of Limbo is that 
it points to the very natural or rational character of the Inferno as a 
whole. For, as a vice is understood in terms of the contrary virtue, so 
it is the virtue of the great pagans in Dante’s Limbo which implicitly 
(though I do not say the poet intended this) sets the standard by 
which most of the other inhabitants of Hell have failed to live, and, 
failing, have incurred damnation. I say ‘most’ of these, because the 
Heretics and Simonists, at least, are exceptions; they are Christian 
sinners, in the sense that their sins presuppose a Christian world. 
But most of the damned appear to have sinned against the norm of 
reason, the regula rationis, rather than against that regula divinae legis 
which St Thomas distinguished from it. They would be sinners in 
any world that is human at all. (p.54)
Again, the passage, is problematic, for quite apart from the propriety 
of – at any rate without ado – talking about ‘sin’ in anything other than 
a specifically Christian context, the question arises as to how far it can 
be thought of as a matter merely of irrationality or of unreasonableness. 
Irrationality and unreasonableness enter into it, but the term ‘sin’ 
connotes something both more and other than this, something closer to 
dividedness, and thus to Godlessness, at the point of willing, by which 
stage Aristotle and the Ethics have been left far behind. And this, as his 
essay goes on, is Kenelm’s own sense of it, evil, he says, amounting to 
nothing but ingratitude in respect of the goodness which is God:
Love then is the reflection in creatures of the divine Unity and also 
the response to the divine Goodness reflected in creatures. The same 
God is reflected, from our point of view, twice over; and the one 
reflection (that of Unity) appears as tending to the other (that of 
Goodness). And since it is one God who is twice reflected, these two 
reflections – love derived from Unity and goodness derived from the 
Good – are ultimately the same; and it will be equally true to say that 
love pursues goodness and goodness pursues love: in short, that love 
loves love. That is why, in the last resort, the violation of goodness 
(i.e. evil) is the refusal of a lover, is ingratitude.’ (p.62; italics original).
This notwithstanding, however, his even so remains a ‘humanistic’ 
account of what is going on in the Inferno, an account turning less on 
the notion of dividedness in the depths than on that of unreason on the 
surface, at which point the tragedy of it all – the tragedy of unreason as 
but a consequence of man’s first disobedience – disappears from view.
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3. This, then, is where Kenelm begins in the ‘The Two Dantes’ essays of 
1977, his sense of the intractability of it all, of Dante’s entertaining in one 
and the same moment both the pagan and the pious, having if anything 
sharpened in the meantime. The opening sequence of the first essay, 
unsurpassed in the Dante literature of the English-speaking world for 
its quiet combination of tact and precision, sets up the question. Dante’s, 
Kenelm says, was a living-out in his own person of the great phases 
of world history, his capacity for rejoicing in its successive moments, 
however, issuing in a spirituality never wholly at one with itself, never 
wholly settled in point of root intentionality. Reproduced in part at the 
head of this essay, the passage in question is worth reading over in full:
Dante was attached, simultaneously, to Christianity and to 
paganism. This was not a half-way position, nor a wavering between 
two conceptions of life according to mood or circumstance. The 
attachment to paganism was more like that which a man may feel to 
his youth, except that paganism was a stage in the history of Dante’s 
race, not of himself individually. Yet there is a sense in which the 
pagan ‘object’ of his attachment was not something past and done 
with, existing only in history or legend or works of art; rather it was 
a permanent part of himself, an alter ego; it was that second self which 
his imagination took into the Other World in the form of Virgil and 
which, once it had assumed this form, was allowed to take charge of, 
to guide and govern the Christian protagonist of the resulting poem. 
Because the hero of the Divine Comedy is a Christian the poem is 
Christian, but through two-thirds of it the hero is guided by a pagan. 
And even ‘guided’ is too weak a term; Virgil in the poem is the hero’s 
‘leader’, ‘master’ , ‘teacher’, ‘lord’. Above all he is Dante’s ‘father’ – ‘my 
sweet father’, ‘sweet and dear father’, ‘my more than father’. Seldom in 
literature has the filial sentiment, blending reverence and affection, 
been so finely expressed as in this relationship which carries the 
central narrative line through so much of the great poem. And it is 
of its essence that the father here is a pagan, the son a Christian; 
simultaneously so close and so separated. (page 156)
Wedded in one and the same moment both to Christianity and to 
paganism, the latter subsisting as an alter ego or alternative presence in the 
world, Dante’s was a simultaneous commitment (a) to the need for grace 
as that whereby man as man comes home to God as the beginning and 
end of his happiness, and (b) to the possibility even so of his affirming 
himself, albeit within certain clearly defined limits, by way of the ordinary 
processes of seeing, understanding and choosing, each of these things, 
however, – the grace-theological and the moral-philosophical – forever 
Two Dantes or One? 127
vying one with the other and seeking the upper hand. At once a principle 
and a product of this situation, Kenelm thinks, is his treatment of the noble 
pagans of antiquity, of those who, knowing not the Christ, are nonetheless 
confirmed in a state, not of atrocious, but of attenuated suffering, in the 
melancholy of unfulfilled because unfulfillable yearning.6 How, then, are 
6 In addition to the commentaries on Inferno IV and on the Dantean limbo, C. Grabher, 
‘Il Limbo dantesco e il nobile castello’, Studi danteschi 29 (1950), 41-60; A. Camilli, ‘La 
teologia del Limbo dantesco’, Studi danteschi 30 (1951), 209-14; F. Montanari, ad voc. 
‘Limbo’, in the Enciclopedia dantesca, 6 vols (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 
1970-78), vol. 3, pp. 651-54; F. Forti, ‘Il Limbo e i Megalopsicoi della “Nicomachea”’, in 
Magnanimitade. Studi su un tema dantesco (Bologna, Pàtron, 1977), pp. 9-48; G. Padoan, 
‘Il Limbo dantesco’, in Il pio Enea, l’empio Ulisse: Tradizione classica e intendimento medievale 
in Dante (Ravenna: Longo, 1977), pp. 103-24 (originally in Lettere Italiane 21 (1969), 4, 
369-88); A. A. Iannucci, ‘Limbo: the Emptiness of Time’, Studi Danteschi 52 (1979-80), 
69-128; idem, ‘Il limbo dei bambini’, in Sotto il segno di Dante. Scritti in onore di Francesco 
Mazzoni, ed. L. Coglievina and D. De Robertis (Florence: Le Lettere, 1998), pp. 153-
164; idem, ‘Dante’s Limbo: at the Margins of Orthodoxy’, in Dante and the Unorthodox: 
The Aesthetics of Transgression, ed. by J. L. Miller (Waterloo (Ontario-Canada): Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2005), pp. 63-82; F. Giardinazzo, ‘La passione dell’intelligenza 
nel limbo dantesco’, in Cercare il volume. Studi danteschi (Rimini: Guaraldi,1998), pp. 89-
112; M. P. Stocchi, ‘Canto IV. A Melancholy Elysium’, in Lectura Dantis. Inferno. A Canto-
by-Canto Commentary, ed. by A. Mandelbaum et al. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998), pp. 50-62; F. Tateo, ‘Figure della didattica e canoni della cultura antica 
nel limbo dantesco’, in Studi sulla tradizione classica per Mariella Cagnetta, ed. L. Canfora 
(Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1999), pp. 507-24 (subsequently ‘Gli antichi a confronto (If. 
IV)’ in Simmetrie dantesche (Bari: Palomar, 2001), pp. 13-34); G. C. Alessio, ‘Il canto 
IV dell’ Inferno’, in Regnum celorum vïolenza pate. Dante e la salvezza dell’umanità. Letture 
Dantesche Giubilari, Vicenza, October 1999 - June 2000, ed. G. Cannavò (Montella, Avellino: 
Accademia Vivarium Novum, 2002), pp. 37-56. On Dante and pagan salvation, F. 
Ruffini, ‘Dante e il problema della salvezza degli infedeli’, Studi danteschi 14 (1930), 79-92; 
B. Quilici, Il destino dell’ infidele virtuoso nel pensiero di Dante (Florence: Ariani, 1936); G. 
Busnelli, ‘La colpa del “non fare” degl’infedeli negativi’, Studi danteschi 23 (1938), 79-97; 
C. Filosa, ‘La “virtù” dei romani nel giudizio di S. Agostino e di Dante’, in Atti del congresso 
internazionale di Studi Danteschi, Roma 8-10 aprile 1965 (Florence: Le Monnier, 1965), pp. 
195-210; G. Rizzo, ‘Dante and the Virtuous Pagans’, in W. De Sua and G. Rizzo (eds), 
A Dante Symposium in Commemoration of the 700th Anniversary of the Poet’s Birth (1265-1321) 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 115-40; G. Cambon, 
‘Dante’s Noble Sinners: Abstract Examples or Living Characters?’, in Dante’s Craft. 
Studies in Language and Style (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 
67-79; T. O’H. Hahn, ‘I “gentili” e “un uom nasce a la riva / de l’Indo” (Par. XIX, vv.70 
sqq.)’, L’Alighieri. Rassegna bibliografica dantesca 18 (1977), 2, 3-8; D. Thomson, ‘Dante’s 
Virtuous Romans’, Dante Studies 96 (1978), 145-62; R. Morghen, ‘Dante tra l’“umano” e 
la storia della salvezza’, in L’Alighieri. Rassegna bibliografica dantesca 21 (1980), 1, 18-30; N. 
Iliescu, ‘Will Virgil be saved?’, Mediaevalia 12 (1986), 93-114 and as ‘Sarà salvo Virgilio?’ 
in Dante. Summa medievalis. Proceedings of the Symposium of the Center for Italian Studies, SUNY 
Stony Brook, ed. by C. Franco and L. Morgan (Stony Brook (N.Y.): Forum Italicum, 
1995), pp. 112-33; M. Allan, ‘Does Dante hope for Vergil’s Salvation?’, Modern Language 
Notes 104 (1989), 1, 193-205; M. Picone, ‘La “viva speranza” di Dante e il problema 
della salvezza dei pagani virtuosi. Una lettura di Paradiso 20’, Quaderni di Italianistica 10 
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we to account for this situation? Can it be a question, Kenelm wonders, of 
implicit faith, of the kind of faith which, lacking any specifically Christian 
content, is nonetheless sustained by a sense of the providentiality of it all 
and of what this might mean by way of a presiding deity?7 No, he says, 
(1989), 1-2, 251-68; idem, ‘Auctoritas classica e salvezza cristiana: una lettura tipologica 
di Purgatorio XXII’, in Studi in memoria di Giorgio Varanini (Pisa: Giardini, 1992), vol. I 
(Dal Duecento al Quattrocento), pp. 379-95; T. Barolini, ‘Q: Does Dante hope for Vergil’s 
Salvation?’, Modern Language Notes 105 (1990), 138-44 and 147-49 (subsequently in Dante 
and the Origins of Italian Literary Culture (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 
pp. 151-57); G. Cremascoli, ‘Paganesimo e mondo cristiano nel commento a Dante 
di Benvenuto da Imola’, in P. Palmieri and C. Paolazzi, Benvenuto da Imola, lettore degli 
antichi e dei moderni (Ravenna: Longo, 1991), pp. 111-25; B. D. Schildgen, ‘Dante and 
the Indus’, Dante Studies 111 (1993), 177-93; eadem, ‘Dante’s Utopian Political Vision, 
the Roman Empire, and the Salvation of Pagans’, Annali d’Italianistica 19 (2001), 51-69; 
G. Muresu, ‘Le “vie” della redenzione (Paradiso VII)’, Rassegna della letteratura italiana 
98 (1994), 1-2, 5-19 (and in Il richiamo dell’antica strega. Altri saggi di semantica dantesca 
(Roma: Bulzoni, 1997), pp. 203-24); M. L. Colish, ‘The Virtuous Pagan. Dante and 
Christian Tradition’, in W. Caferro and D. G. Fisher (eds), The Unbounded Community. 
Papers in Christian Ecumenism in Honor of Jaraslov Pelikan (New York: Garland, 1996), pp. 
43-91 (and in The Fathers and Beyond. Church Fathers between Ancient and Medieval Thought 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 1-40); P. Boitani, ‘Cristianesimo e tradizione pagana’, 
in Lo spazio letterario del Medioevo (Rome: Salerno, 1999-2005), vol. 2 (Il Medioevo volgare), 
pp. 181-204 (subsequently as ‘Tradizione classica e tradizione cristiana’, in Letteratura 
europea e medioevo volgare (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), pp. 21-43); N. Cacciaglia, ‘“Per 
fede e per opere” (una lettura del tema della salvezza nella Divina Commedia)’, in Critica 
Letteraria 30 (2002), 2-3, 265-274 (also in Annali dell’Università per Stranieri di Perugia 
29 (2002), 123-131); G. Cannavò (ed.), Regnum celorum vïolenza pate. Dante e la salvezza 
dell’umanità. Letture Dantesche Giubilari, Vicenza, October 1999 - June 2000 (above), with A. 
M. Chiavacci Leonardi, ‘La salvezza degli infedeli: il canto XX del Paradiso’ at pp. 193-
203; B. Martinelli, ‘Canto XIX’, in Lectura Dantis Turicensis. Paradiso, ed. G. Güntert and 
M. Picone (Florence: Cesati, 2002), pp. 281-305 (revised with the title ‘La fede in Cristo. 
Dante e il problema della salvezza (Paradiso XIX)’, Rivista di Letteratura Italiana 20 (2002), 
2, 11-39 and in Dante. L’“altro viaggio” (Pisa: Giardini, 2007), pp. 289-319); G. Inglese, 
‘Il destino dei non credenti. Lettura di Paradiso XIX’, La Cultura. Rivista trimestrale di 
filosofia letteratura e storia 42 (2004), 2, 315-29; A. Lanza, ‘Giustizia divina e salvezza 
dei ‘senza fede’, in Dante eterodosso (Bergamo: Moretti Honegger, 2004), pp. 113-24; C. 
O’Connell Baur, Dante’s Hermeneutics of Salvation. Passages to Freedom in the ‘Divine Comedy’ 
(Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007). More generally on 
the soteriological issue, M. Frezza, Il problema della salvezza dei pagani da Abelardo al Seicento 
(Naples: Fiorentino, 1962); R. V. Turner, ‘“Descendit ad Inferos”. Medieval Views on 
Christ’s Descent into Hell and the Salvation of the Ancient Just’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas 27 (1966), 173-94.
7 Thomas, ST at IIa IIae.2.7 ad 3: ‘Ad tertium dicendum quod multis gentilium facta fuit 
revelatio de Christo, ut patet per ea quae praedixerunt. Nam Iob XIX dicitur, “scio quod 
redemptor meus vivit”. Sibylla etiam praenuntiavit quaedam de Christo, ut Augustinus 
dicit. Invenitur etiam in historiis Romanorum quod tempore Constantini Augusti 
et Irenae matris eius inventum fuit quoddam sepulcrum in quo iacebat homo auream 
laminam habens in pectore in qua scriptum erat, “Christus nascetur ex virgine et credo 
in eum. O sol, sub Irenae et Constantini temporibus iterum me videbis”. Si qui tamen 
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this will not do, for given the notion of implicit faith as a gift to theologians 
in moments such as this, Dante seems not to have heard of it:
Now it had always been accepted in the Church that the Old 
Testament was the record of the first stage in God’s self-revelation 
to mankind; and, by the same token, of a kind of inchoate faith in 
the Christ to come on the part of the pious Jews. And this reading of 
the Bible was expressed theologically by speaking of faith in Christ 
as passing through stages of gradually increasing explicitness. 
Foreshadowings of Christianity were also looked for in the records of 
paganism, though less seriously and systematically. Still, since Dante 
himself looked in that direction for ‘prophecies’ of Christ – taking 
the Sibylline oracles, for example, to be such, as so many medieval 
Christians did – one might expect to find some suggestion in the 
Comedy that pagans too might be saved by an implicit faith in Christ 
analogous to that of the Hebrew patriarchs and prophets. But it is 
hard to find even a hint of this. Indeed, apart from the Jewish heroes 
and heroines whom Virgil saw being led out of Limbo by Christ in 
person after his Passion, there seems to be no certain case of merely 
implicit faith in Christ in the whole Comedy. (p. 177)8
salvati fuerunt quibus revelatio non fuit facta, non fuerunt salvati absque fide mediatoris. 
Quia etsi non habuerunt fidem explicitam, habuerunt tamen fidem implicitam in divina 
providentia, credentes Deum esse liberatorem hominum secundum modos sibi placitos et 
secundum quod aliquibus veritatem cognoscentibus ipse revelasset, secundum illud Iob 
XXXV, “qui docet nos super iumenta terrae”.’ Thus with reference to Cornelius in Acts 
10:4, ibid. IIa IIae.10.4 ad 3: ‘Ad tertium dicendum quod per infidelitatem non corrumpitur 
totaliter in infidelibus ratio naturalis, quin remaneat in eis aliqua veri cognitio, per quam 
possunt facere aliquod opus de genere bonorum. De Cornelio tamen sciendum est quod 
infidelis non erat, alioquin eius operatio accepta non fuisset Deo, cui sine fide nullus 
potest placere. Habebat autem fidem implicitam, nondum manifestata Evangelii veritate. 
Unde ut eum in fide plene instrueret, mittitur ad eum Petrus.’ William of Ockham, in 
the Dialogus (pt 1, bk 4, ch. 3), has: ‘Hoc per exemplum de Cornelio centurione de quo 
habetur Actuum 10 c. patere videtur. Qui antequam de Christo fidem haberet explicitam 
fuit fidelis quia iustus et timens Deum et per consequens fidem habuit saltem implicitam. 
Et ita fides implicita sufficit ad hoc quod aliquis sit catholicus et fidelis’, etc.
8 See too p. 185: ‘The conclusion then seems clear, that while Dante allows in principle for the 
salvation of pagans, he represents this, in his poem, as extremely exceptional; not necessarily 
so, perhaps, in respect of the number of pagans who might be saved, but certainly in respect 
of the way they may be saved. For this way must be by an explicit faith in Christ; which, in 
the two cases described by Dante, required the working of miracles. Thus the episode would 
seem to show that for Dante grace and the faith that lays hold of it was emphatically not 
available to all men through the ordinary workings of Providence; or at least it had nothing 
of that “normality” which we nowadays tend to attribute to it by extending to the utmost 
the concept of implicit faith. Medieval theology possessed this concept, but did little with it; 
Dante seems hardly aware of it.’ G. Whatley, ‘The Uses of Hagiography: the Legend of Pope 
Gregory and the Emperor Trajan in the Middle Ages’, Viator 15 (1984), 25-63.
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If not, then, of implicit faith, can it be a question of negative unbelief, of 
the kind of unbelief proper to those knowing no better? No, says Kenelm, 
neither will this do, Virgil, anxious as he is to confirm the collective 
innocence of the noble pagans (the ‘ei non peccaro’ of Inf. IV.34),9 admitting 
as far as he personally is concerned to an element of recalcitrance, to his 
having rebelled against the law of God (the ‘perch’ i’ fu’ ribellante a la 
sua legge’ of Inf. I.125). How, therefore, given the disqualification both 
of implicit faith and of negative unbelief as ways around the problem 
of pagan righteousness and reprobation, are we to account for Dante’s 
position here, for his concern to separate out the noble spirits of antiquity 
and to make a special case of them? The answer, Kenelm thinks, lies deep 
within him, for piety, in Dante, is always challenged by paganism, by a 
counter-commitment to Aristotle – not Peter, Paul, Augustine, Bernard, 
Thomas or even Christ himself, but Aristotle – as spokesman for properly 
human happiness here and now; so, for example, to look back for a moment 
to the Convivio, these lines from Book IV (vi.7-16), secure in their sense of 
the Ethics as a point of arrival in the area of moral philosophy:
Veramente Aristotile, che Stagirite ebbe sopranome, e Zenocrate 
Calcedonio, suo compagnone, [per lo studio loro], e per lo ’ngegno 
[eccellente] e quasi divino che la natura in Aristotile messo avea, 
questo fine conoscendo per lo modo socratico quasi e academico, 
limaro e a perfezione la filosofia morale redussero, e massimamente 
Aristotile. E però che Aristotile cominciò a disputare andando 
in qua e in lae, chiamati furono – lui, dico, e li suoi compagni – 
Peripatetici, che tanto vale quanto ‘deambulatori’. E però che la 
perfezione di questa moralitade per Aristotile terminata fue, lo nome 
de li Academici si spense, e tutti quelli che a questa setta si presero 
Peripatetici sono chiamati; e tiene questa gente oggi lo reggimento del 
mondo in dottrina per tutte parti, e puotesi appellare quasi cattolica 
oppinione. Per che vedere si può, Aristotile essere additatore e 
conduttore de la gente a questo segno.
(Conv. IV.vi.15-16)10
9 [Now, before you go farther, I will have you know] that they did not sin. Purg. VII.7-9 and 
25-36: ‘“Io son Virgilio; e per null’ altro rio / lo ciel perdei che per non aver fé”. / Così rispuose 
allora il duca mio. / ... / “Non per far, ma per non fare ho perduto / a veder l’alto Sol che tu 
disiri / e che fu tardi per me conosciuto. / Luogo è là giù non tristo di martìri, / ma di tenebre 
solo, ove i lamenti / non suonan come guai, ma son sospiri. / Quivi sto io coi pargoli innocenti 
/ dai denti morsi de la morte avante / che fosser da l’umana colpa essenti; / quivi sto io con quei 
che le tre sante / virtù non si vestiro, e sanza vizio / conobber l’altre e seguir tutte quante”.’
10 However, it was Aristotle (surnamed the Stagirite) and his noted companion 
Xenocrates of Chalecedon, who, thanks to the unique – one might say divine – intelligence 
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while as far as the Commedia is concerned, these from Inferno IV, no less 
complete in their commitment to the philosopher as the master of those 
who know and thus, once again, as the guide to a certain kind of properly 
human happiness:
 Poi ch’innalzai un poco più le ciglia,
vidi ’l maestro di color che sanno
seder tra filosofica famiglia.
 Tutti lo miran, tutti onor li fanno:
quivi vid’ ïo Socrate e Platone,
che ’nnanzi a li altri più presso li stanno.
(Inf. IV.130-35)11
Now Thomas, Kenelm notes, is more circumspect, the Ethics for 
him pointing to a species of happiness, not sufficient unto itself and 
thus qualitatively distinct in respect of what comes next, but merely 
proportionate to our circumstances here and now. Not so, however, 
Dante, who, inclined as he was to read with a dash of enthusiasm, saw 
in it a recipe for perfect happiness – or for perfect happiness, at any 
rate, of a certain sort – this side of death. True, there is more to come, 
but what awaits us in the next life must be something other than what 
we have or can have in this life, something not merely human but more 
than human in kind – a notion which, taken up in the Convivio and the 
Monarchia for the purposes of resolving a set of ‘high-level’ concerns in 
the areas of moral philosophy and political theology, subsists both into 
the Dantean limbo and into the fabric generally of the first canticle of the 
Commedia. With this, then, we are home, Dante, even here, being captive 
to an antique but still powerfully insistent habit of mind. True, he is no 
Boethius of Dacia with, in the De summo bono, his state-of-the-art essay 
with which nature had endowed Aristotle, refined moral philosophy and brought it to 
perfection through pursuing their study of this end by much the same method as Socrates 
and the Academics; in this, Aristotle played the major role. Since he began to hold public 
disputations during which he walked up and down, he and his companions were called 
Peripatetics, or ‘people who walk around’. Since it was Aristotle who brought this 
doctrine to its final perfection, the name ‘Academics’ was eclipsed, and all who adhered 
to this school of thought were called Peripatetics. Today, the teaching of this group holds 
sway everywhere, and may almost be said to be the universal opinion. It is evident, 
therefore, that Aristotle has directed and led people to the goal we have been discussing. 
Cf. Conv. II.v.7: ‘Queste oppinioni sono riprovate per false nel secondo De Celo et Mundo 
da quello glorioso filosofo al quale la natura più aperse li suoi segreti ...’, etc.
11 When I raised my eyes a little higher, I saw the Master of those who know, seated in a 
philosophic family. All look to him, all do him honour. There, nearest to him and in front 
of the rest, I saw Socrates and Plato.
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on the Aristotelian ‘model man’.12 But neither is he a Thomas Aquinas, 
with, in the Prima secundae, his no less state-of-the-art meditation on the 
referability of each and every righteous inflexion of the spirit to a prior 
movement of grace as its point of departure;13 for Dante’s, even into the 
12 p. 219, with, a little further down on that page: ‘Now, probably neither of these 
texts I have glanced at – almost certainly not the De Summo Bono – would have met 
with Dante’s entire approval; not even when writing the Convivio. But they are, I think, 
extremely indicative of a temper, an approach, a way of thinking about and formulating 
the situation of man on earth without which neither Convivio IV, nor Monarchia III.xv, 
nor the Dantean Limbo would in fact have been possible. What had emerged here and 
there in the West was the conception of a humanist ethic based more or less exclusively 
on the “natural order” – of an area of human activity that would be self-contained and 
autonomous; virtually independent of grace whether elevans or sanans. It was against 
just such a conception that the Augustinian Petrarch was later fiercely to react; but in 
the meantime it had deeply affected the Aristotelian Dante.’ For the De summo bono of 
Boethius of Dacia, M. Grabmann, Mittelalterlisches Geistesleben: Abhandlungen zur Geschichte 
der Scholastik und Mystik (München: Hueber, 1936), vol. 2, pp. 200-24, and, for the Quaestio 
de felicitate of James of Pistoia, Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi in onore di B. Nardi (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1955), vol. 2, pp. 427-63. E. Gilson, ‘Boèce de Dacie et la double vérité’, Archives 
d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 22 (1955), 81-99, and on James of Pistoia, P. 
O. Kristeller, ‘A Philosophical Treatise from Bologna dedicated to Guido Cavalcanti: 
Magister Jacobus de Pistorio and his “Questio de felicitate”’, Medioevo e Rinascimento 
(above), vol. 1, pp. 425-63. More generally, M. Grabmann, ‘L’aristotelismo italiano al 
tempo di Dante con particolare riguardo all’Università di Bologna’, Rivista di filosofia 
neoscolastica 38 (1946), 260-77; C. I. Ermatinger, ‘Averroism in the Early Fourteenth 
Century’, Medieval Studies 16 (1954), 35-56; A. Maier, ‘Die Bologneser Philosophen 
des 14. Jahrhunderts’, Studi e memorie per la Storia dell’Università di Bologna, new series, 1 
(1956), 299-312; M. Corti, Dante a un nuovo crocevia (Florence: Sansoni, 1982).
13 ST Ia IIae.109.2 resp.: ‘natura hominis dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, 
in sui integritate, sicut fuit in primo parente ante peccatum; alio modo, secundum 
quod est corrupta in nobis post peccatum primi parentis. Secundum autem utrumque 
statum, natura humana indiget auxilio divino ad faciendum vel volendum quodcumque 
bonum, sicut primo movente, ut dictum est. Sed in statu naturae integrae, quantum 
ad sufficientiam operativae virtutis, poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et operari 
bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisitae, non autem 
bonum superexcedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusae. Sed in statu naturae corruptae 
etiam deficit homo ab hoc quod secundum suam naturam potest, ut non possit totum 
huiusmodi bonum implere per sua naturalia. Quia tamen natura humana per peccatum 
non est totaliter corrupta, ut scilicet toto bono naturae privetur; potest quidem etiam in 
statu naturae corruptae, per virtutem suae naturae aliquod bonum particulare agere, 
sicut aedificare domos, plantare vineas, et alia huiusmodi; non tamen totum bonum sibi 
connaturale, ita quod in nullo deficiat. Sicut homo infirmus potest per seipsum aliquem 
motum habere; non tamen perfecte potest moveri motu hominis sani, nisi sanetur auxilio 
medicinae. Sic igitur virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturae indiget homo in 
statu naturae integrae quantum ad unum, scilicet ad operandum et volendum bonum 
supernaturale. Sed in statu naturae corruptae, quantum ad duo, scilicet ut sanetur; et 
ulterius ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur, quod est meritorium. Ulterius autem 
in utroque statu indiget homo auxilio divino ut ab ipso moveatur ad bene agendum’ – 
notable for its sense of autonomy as stretching, strictly speaking, only to matters of moral 
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Commedia, is a separating out of these things, a distinction between them 
for the purpose of recognizing and of rejoicing in their perseitas, this, in 
fact, being Kenelm’s point of arrival in these essays, the point-towards-
which of his troubled meditation:
From all the above, in any event, we may conclude, I think, that Dante 
shows a marked tendency, through the Convivio and the Monarchia 
and even in the Comedy, to reduce to a minimum the conceivable 
contacts between human nature and divine grace; even if we are 
persuaded, by the evidence adduced in the last few pages, or on other 
grounds, that he did allow a bare possibility of such contact for all 
adult human beings. And that tendency, with its consequences, is 
what I have taken as characteristic of the ‘other’, the second Dante 
implied in the title of this essay. And perhaps it reveals an important 
defect, from the Christian point of view, in this great Christian’s 
thinking about man: an over-readiness to conceive of moral virtue in 
isolation from Charity, ‘the first and greatest commandment’. After 
all, a certain practice and cult of moral virtue is quite compatible 
with the radical perversity of indifference to God. But Christianity 
requires that the moral virtues themselves be offered to God as a 
way – as the way – of cooperating with his grace. In this perspective 
the natural virtues themselves, ordered under Charity (‘the mother 
of the virtues’), become as it were organs of grace, are no longer just 
humanly ‘acquired’ but divinely ‘infused’. Guided by this insight 
St Thomas could take over the whole achievement of Aristotle, as 
a philosophical moralist, while giving it an entirely new setting and 
direction. In Dantean terms this means the difference between Limbo 
and the Purgatorio; in which we see repentant man recovering, under 
indifference (‘building houses, planting vines, and the like’); De ver. 24.14 passim, etc. On 
Dante and Thomas, B. Nardi, Nel mondo di Dante (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
1944); idem, Saggi e note di critica dantesca (Milan: Ricciardi, 1966); idem, Saggi di filosofia 
dantesca, 2nd edn (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1967); idem, Dante e la cultura medievale, 
ed. P. Mazzantini with an introduction by T. Gregory (Rome: Laterza, 1983, originally 
Bari: Laterza, 1942); idem, Dal ‘Convivio’ alla ‘Commedia’: sei saggi danteschi, with a preface 
by O. Capitani (Rome: Nella sede dell’Istituto, 1992, originally 1960); E. Gilson, Dante 
and Philosophy, trans. D. Moore (New York: Harper and Row, 1963; originally Dante et 
la philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 1939), second edn 1953). In Kenelm himself, see especially 
The Mind in Love, Aquinas Society of London 25 (London: Blackfriars, 1956, and in J. 
Freccero (ed.), Dante. A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1965), pp. 43-60); ‘The Tact of St Thomas’, in God’s Tree: Essays on Dante and Other 
Matters (London: Blackfriars, 1957), pp. 141-49; ‘Religion and Philosophy in Dante’, in 
The Mind of Dante (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 47-78; ‘Tommaso 
d’Aquino’, in the Enciclopedia dantesca, 6 vols (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 
1970-78), vol. 5, pp. 626-49; Dante e San Tommaso (Rome: Casa di Dante, 1975; lecture of 
17 November, 1974 at the Casa di Dante in Rome). 
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grace, the lost or diminished natural virtues, but only in preparation 
for something that is utterly beyond their own range, a love-union 
with the Infinite. In the Purgatorio Aristotelianism is integrated into 
Christianity; in the Dantean Limbo it is not. (pp. 252-53)
In the event, the passage is as troubling as it is troubled; for in the degree 
to which Dante was himself aware of the tensions at work deep within 
him (a situation confirmed in the course of his encounter with Beatrice 
in the earthly paradise), then his courage in seeking to address and as far 
as may be to resolve this situation by way of the fresh mechanism of the 
Commedia – by way of what we have described and shall describe again 
as the twofold theologism and theatricality of the text – is all the more 
impressive, all the more likely to confirm us in a sense of his having at last 
come of age as a theological spirit. How far Kenelm himself was persuaded 
of this I cannot be sure, for I remember his asking me a shade anxiously 
what, soon after its publication, I thought of the Two Dantes volume, to 
which I replied then as I would reply now that I was much impressed by it. 
But how far this was anxiety in respect of precisely this issue, as distinct 
from matters arising from the book generally, I cannot say.
4. What, then, are we to make of the two Dantes thesis, of Kenelm’s account 
of Dantean spirituality – by which we mean the mature spirituality of the 
Commedia – as, if not captive to, then at any rate detained by its pagan 
component? The first thing to say is that there can be no underestimating, 
still less any denying, what Kenelm describes as the ‘humanistic’ element 
of that spirituality, just as there can be no denying the way in which, 
in key moments both of natural- and of moral-philosophical clarification 
(Virgil’s account of the structure of hell in Canto XI of the Inferno for 
example), this element subsists into the Commedia. But by the same token 
there can be no passing over either (a) the way in which Dante is careful 
to bring home the moral and metaphysical moments of the argument to 
their theological ground, to what actually matters about them in respect 
of the soul’s journey into God, or (b) the care with which he distributes 
the alternative voice with a view to its neutralization as a principle of 
instability in the poem. Taking, then, the first, of these things we may say 
that while there is much to be said for seeing and interpreting hell in terms 
of its unreasonableness, there can be no question of its being exhausted by 
this, for unreason, within the economy of the text generally, points on to 
something more serious than itself, namely to the the truth of separation 
from self and from God as the ground of its sinfulness and root of its 
effrontery, at which point its theological substance moves clearly into 
view. Now for Kenelm too unreason as a high-level inflexion of the spirit 
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points on to something more serious than itself, namely, to ingratitude 
and lovelessness. But for all his discerning in the depths of unreason its 
status as a matter of impiety, he remains unwilling to develop his sense of 
this first canticle of the poem in terms of its specifically Christian content, 
preferring instead to look in the direction of its Peripatetic component, 
of its accountability, less to the gospels, than to the Philosopher; so, for 
example, these lines from his introduction to the 1961 Warwick Chipman 
translation of the Inferno, oddly reluctant in its endorsement of the 
‘religious’ as distinct from the philosophical substance the text:
And the sin he encounters on his way is, I repeat, largely sin against 
the light of reason alone, apart from any ‘higher’ considerations. It 
is wrongdoing very much on the human level and in the give and 
take of ordinary social discourse. A strong social emphasis marks 
the Inferno; and, since the poet was deeply involved in politics and 
his world was that of the medieval commune, the more or less self-
governing city-state, a strong political emphasis too. It is true that 
all wrong-doing, however social or political its circumstances, had 
for Dante a deep religious significance. Since human nature is God’s 
creation, to injure man is to offend God. And certainly the Inferno 
could only have been written by a believing Christian. Nevertheless 
the measure of right and wrong that governs, immediately, the 
greater part of it is a rational, not a specifically Christian, measure; 
it is drawn from moral philosophy (especially Aristotle) rather than 
from the Gospels.14
Now the Inferno – the Inferno, perhaps, more than either the Purgatorio or 
the Paradiso – is a canticle of layered consciousness, both of surface and of 
deep awareness, and there can be no gainsaying the presence of Aristotle 
at the first of these levels, at the point of moral-philosophical elucidation. 
And neither can there be any gainsaying Dante’s preoccupation in 
the Inferno with the socially detrimental character of sin as a matter of 
separation in the depths, with its power, not only to destroy the sinner, 
but, in destroying him, to separate out one man from another and thus to 
shatter the unity of the Spirit and the bond of peace. Unreason, therefore, 
both in itself and as a matter of social annihilation is everywhere in the 
text and everywhere decisive for its interpretation. But – and this now is 
the point – layered as it is in consciousness, and this in such a way as to 
free the text for the development of this or that discrete emphasis, each 
layer of awareness, within the economy of the whole, remains transparent 
14 W. Chipman (trans), Inferno (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), p. xiii.
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to the others, invoking them as it does so for the purposes of a statement 
ultimately one in conception. Each, in other words, susceptible as it is 
to development in its own right and on its own terms, coalesces with 
the others to form a single and ultimately undifferentiated stratum of 
awareness, a movement of the spirit comprehending in a single sweep both 
its surface and its deep reasons, herein precisely lying the triumph of the 
Commedia as testimony to its inner consistency, to an overcoming in Dante 
of everything in him making for alternativism at the point of ultimate 
concern.
But that is not all, for in addition to the transparency of every surface 
emphasis in the text to the theological substance  by which it is indwelt 
and in terms of which it stands ultimately to be interpreted, there is 
the kind of theatricality operative on the plane of the horizontal and 
responsible for ensuring over against the heterodox and thus disruptive 
voice the unity of what fundamentally is being said in the poem. Given, 
in other words, what amounts in the Commedia to its decorum, to Dante’s 
distribution of the discordant voice, then the claim to moral innocence 
voiced by Virgil in Inferno IV or Purgatorio VII and all this implies by way 
of antique righteousness need not worry us; for Virgil, in insisting in the 
way he does upon his sinlessness, says what Virgil would say, indeed the 
only thing he can say. Now here again we have to be careful, for Kenelm, 
himself alert to the nature of the text as drama, is as sensitive as any 
to the particularity of the Virgilian utterance, to Virgil’s speaking out 
of the properties of personality as reconstructed by Dante in his poem; 
so, for example, from the Chipman translation of the Inferno mentioned a 
moment ago, these nicely calibrated remarks on the difference as far as 
the Dantean Virgil is concerned between knowing Christianity and merely 
knowing of it or about it:
This ‘Virgil’ believes in God. He knows that an original goodness 
glows through all creation; moreover he knows how creatures can 
deny and dishonour that Goodness and besmirch and violate its 
effects, particularly the noblest effect of which man has experience, 
his own rational nature. Virgil even knows something of the fall of 
the angels. “Behold Dis”, he says at the end, pointing to Satan; and 
we can suppose that he, like his pupil, knew that it was through pride 
that “he who was so fair ... raised his brow against his Maker”. He is 
aware too of the Church even if, in the great ecclesiastical Canto XIX, 
he will tactfully step aside and leave that unforgettable indictment of 
clerical materialism to flow from Catholic lips. But Virgil only knows 
of the Christian revelation, he has not personally received it; and 
though familiar with the topography of Hell, there is something about 
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damnation itself that always escapes him. No wonder; never having 
known God incarnate, how can he understand a condition which is 
only definable as the consequence of a rejection of that God?15
to which, from the Two Dantes, we might add these on Virgil’s particular 
kind of piety in the poem, piety yes, but piety at a remove, lived out at a 
distance from the real thing:
Virgil’s own kind of piety is a fact entwined in the narrative of the 
Inferno and Purgatorio, more or less visible as the occasion requires. It 
is always in character; never Christian, always at a certain remove, 
like his discernment of those points of doctrine which he has to leave 
to Beatrice to instruct Dante in.16
Kenelm’s too, therefore, is a sense of Dante’s decorum, of his proceeding 
by way of what might reasonably be expected of his characters. But – 
and this now is the point – for all his discerning in this respect, he is not 
averse to lifting that same Virgil from the context in which Dante has 
so carefully placed him with a view to fashioning from him an alter ego 
or alternative self functioning in the poem as a principle of disruption, 
as tending, not merely to differentiate, but to damage and ultimately to 
destroy its consistency as a specifically Christian utterance. True, by the 
time we reach purgatory there is something of a recovery, a fresh sense of 
how one thing stands to be integrated with another, the Aristotelian with 
the Christian and the pagan with the pious. But by the time we reach 
purgatory we are a good third of the way into it, our sense of the shape 
and structure of the poem having long since crystallized. Now it may be 
that neither transparency nor theatricality, taken alone, is enough to do 
anything about this, transparency coming in degrees, and theatricality 
never above privileging one party in particular as spokesman for the 
author. Taken together, however, they are just about invincible, for 
operative as they are on the planes respectively of the vertical and of the 
horizontal they comprehend absolutely the space they describe, every 
contingency in the area of thought and expression. Operative as they are 
on the twin axes of awareness, they carry all before.
15 Inferno (previous note), p. xiv.
16 The Two Dantes (note 1 above), p. 244.

Complementarity and Coalescence:  
Dante and the Sociology of Authentic Being
S’io era corpo, e qui non si concepe
com’ una dimensione altro patio,
ch’esser convien se corpo in corpo repe,
 accender ne dovria più il disio
di veder quella essenza in che si vede
come nostra natura e Dio s’unio.
(Par. II.37-42)1
1.  Introduction: the social dimension of the Inferno and a moment of misgiving.  2. The 
New Testament perspective: Pauline and Johannine collectivity.  3. The sociology of 
estrangement: self-denial and social denial.  4. The sociology of emergence: co-presence, 
co-immanence and the revised dimensionality of being.
Kenelm Foster, not far into his preliminary meditation on the theology of 
the Inferno, has this to say about its social aspect, its sense of sin as civic:
In fact, there is generally a very human quality about the Inferno, not 
unconnected, I think, with the strong social and political emphasis 
that has often been remarked in it. Most of the damned have violated 
human nature in some way, in themselves or in their fellow men; 
and the deeper damnations are reserved for the sinners against their 
fellows. In the circles of ‘frode’ – if one excepts Satan himself – all the 
sins punished are sins against one’s neighbour. I fancy that Ezra Pound 
said somewhere that the damned in the lower circles of Inferno were 
all ‘damned for money’. This, if he said it, was an exaggeration, but 
certainly the lower circles of Malebolge and Cocito are malevolently 
anti-social, although this aspect is not everywhere stressed by the poet, 
and in one case – Canto XIX – the society in question is ‘supernatural’ 
1 If I was body (and here we conceive not how one bulk could brook another, which 
must be if body enters body), the more should longing enkindle us to see that essence 
wherein we behold how our nature and God united themselves.  I am grateful to the 
President and staff of the John Cabot American University in Rome where, by their kind 
invitation, this paper was first delivered.
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– the Church. The phrase Charles Williams applied to Geryon, the 
symbol of Deceit, might indeed be applied to all that lower Hell into 
which Geryon carried Dante (canto XVII): it is ‘the City infernalized’.2
This, as far as it goes, is unexceptionable, many and possibly most 
of the sins punished in hell having about them the nature of injury, of 
doing down the next man. But for all that, there is a sense in the Inferno 
in which every dysfunctionality on the surface of things, including every 
specifically social dysfunctionality, is reducible to dysfunctionality in 
the depths, to the kind of dysfunctionality whereby, having established 
himself at the centre of his own universe, the individual cannot but live 
in a state of resentment with regard to the next man, with regard, that 
is to say, to all those who have similarly established themselves at the 
centre of their universe. Strictly speaking, therefore, the social emphases 
of the Inferno, prominent as they are in the text and decisive for its overall 
interpretation, stand to be referred to something both prior and more 
profound than themselves, to the tragic substance of self as divided in the 
forum of conscience. Short of this, of a referral of dividedness in the open 
forum to dividedness in the innermost reaches of personality, the root 
cause of every instance of antagonism on the surface remains hidden from 
view, obscured by its mere phenomenology or showing forth. That said, 
however, there is no denying the social character of Dante’s discourse 
in the Inferno and thus the possibility of seeing and setting this up as an 
object of enquiry in its own right, especially in that it is here, at the point 
of being under the aspect of collectivity, that we discover some of his most 
radiant emphases in the area of moral philosophy and theology.
2. In proposing the social aspect of the Commedia as an object of enquiry in 
its own right, we need for a moment to look back to the New Testament as a 
point of departure; for the New Testament, if not systematically then even so 
unmistakably, commends two kinds of collectivity or social configuration, 
the one Pauline and the other Johannine in origin. On the one hand, then, 
there is Paul’s sense of the common life as a matter of complementarity, each 
individual facilitating that life by bringing to it what he or she does best, 
the substance of his or her genius or vocation; so, for example, as a classic 
instance of his anthropomorphism, of his sense  of the indispensability of 
each member of the body of Christ to the proper operation of the whole, 
these lines from I Corinthians 12, an essay in functionality as a matter of 
co-functionality, in collectivity as a matter of cooperation:
2 Kenelm Foster, O.P., God’s Tree. Essays on Dante and Other Matters (London: Blackfriars, 
1957), pp. 54-55.
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Vos autem estis corpus Christi et membra de membro, et quosdam 
quidem posuit Deus in ecclesia primum apostolos, secundo 
prophetas, tertio doctores, deinde virtutes exin gratias curationum, 
opitulationes, gubernationes, genera linguarum. Numquid omnes 
apostoli, numquid omnes prophetae, numquid omnes doctores, 
numquid omnes virtutes, numquid omnes gratiam habent curationum, 
numquid omnes linguis loquuntur, numquid omnes interpretantur?
(I Cor. 12:27-30)3
Uppermost in Paul’s mind as he considers the nature and the 
mechanism of the common life are two things: first, the importance of 
the individual’s seeking and living out his or her proper calling, as but 
part of the body of Christ; and, following on from this, the possibility of 
defining the relationship between one man and another in terms of the 
kind of proximity whereby the one is present to the other as an extrinsic 
principle of his well-being. Self, in other words, comes alongside and 
engages with the other-than-self as part of what it means to be in Christ, 
a notion which, though less than adequate to all this might mean for 
Paul, nonetheless gives satisfactory expression to one aspect of it, to how 
Christian neighbourliness might be usefully understood.
But there is in the New Testament a further model of the collective life, 
one which, while both acknowledging the Pauline model, deepens it in 
favour of something closer to coalescence than to contiguity as a way of 
developing this issue, to a sense of collectivity as involving the occupation 
by the many of one and the same spiritual space. Each individual, in other 
words, is present to his or her neighbour, not only nor even primarily as a 
fellow labourer, but as an inward and abiding presence, as a principle of 
being operative from out of the recesses of being. Fundamental here are 
the farewell discourses of Christ prior to his passion as recorded in the 
fourth gospel, discourses designed by way of a series of immanences to 
confirm in circumstances of faith the co-inherence both of man and God 
and of man and man as party to a common undertaking. First, then, and 
as quickened by a sense of imminent catastrophe, there is Christ’s sense 
of his being in the Father, of the Father’s being in him, and of this as the 
3 Now you are Christ’s body, and each of you a limb or organ of it. Within our 
community God has appointed, in the first place apostles, and in the second place 
prophets, thirdly teachers; then miracle workers, then those who have gifts of healing, or 
ability to help others or power to guide them, or the gift of ecstatic utterance of various 
kinds. Are all apostles? all prophets? all teachers? Do all work miracles? Have all gifts 
of healing? Do all speak in tongues of ecstasy? Can all interpret them? (REB). Eph. 
4:11-12: ‘Et ipse dedit quosdam quidem apostolos, quosdam autem prophetas, alios vero 
evangelistas, alios autem pastores et doctores ad consummationem sanctorum in opus 
ministerii in aedificationem corporis Christi’, etc.
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basis of his messianic status; so, for example, John 10:37-38 and 14:10-11: 
‘Si non facio opera Patris mei, nolite credere mihi; si autem facio, et si 
mihi non vultis credere operibus, credite ut cognoscatis et credatis quia 
in me est Pater et ego in Patris ... non credis quia ego in Patre et Pater in 
me? Est verba quae ego loquor vobis a me ipso non loquor, Pater autem 
in me manens, ipse facit opera. Non creditis quia ego in Patre et Pater in 
me est.’ 4 To the fore, then, in this second moment of the gospel meditation 
is an emphasis on the mutual indwellingness of the One who sends and 
of the one who is sent, this in turn determining the relationship one with 
another of those naming the name; for in the degree to which a man names 
the name he not only indwells the Christ, in turn to be indwelt by him, but 
he indwells all those professing the Christ, again to be indwelt by them:
Non pro his autem rogo tantum, sed pro eis qui credituri sunt per 
verbum eorum in me, ut omnes unum sint sicut tu, Pater, in me et 
ego in te ut et ipsi in nobis unum sint, ut mundus credat quia tu me 
misisti. Et ego claritatem quam dedisti mihi dedi eis ut sint unum 
sicut nos sumus, ego in eis et tu in me ut sint consummati in unum ...
(John 17:20-22)5
Here, therefore, in the Johannine phase of the argument, it is a question, 
less of complimentarity, than of co-immanence as the form of collective 
consciousness, of how one man might be said to enter into the humanity of 
another there to shape and substantiate it from deep within itself.
3. Coming now to Dante, these models of collective being, the Pauline 
model of contiguity and the Johannine model of co-inherence, bring us 
to one of the most luminous aspects of his spirituality in the Commedia, to 
his rejoicing in the rich configuration of man’s collective life in the Spirit. 
Let us begin, however, if only because this is where Dante himself begins, 
at the opposite end, with the kinds of tension and antagonism tending 
to undermine and ultimately to destroy complementarity and mutual 
4 If I am not acting as my Father would, do not believe me. But if I am, accept the 
evidence of my deeds, even if you do not believe me, so that you may recognize and know 
that the Father is in me, and I in the Father ... Do you not believe that I am in the Father 
and the Father in me; I am not myself the source of the words I speak to you; it is the 
Father who dwells in me doing his own  work. Believe me when I say that I am in the 
Father and the Father in me.
5 But it is not for these alone that I pray, but for those also who through their words put their 
faith in me; may they all be one: as you, Father, are in me, and I in you, so also may they be in 
us, that the world may believe that you sent me. The glory which you gave me I have given to 
them, that they may be one as we are one; I in them and you in me, may they be perfectly one.
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immanence thus understood as models of man’s being together as man. 
Dante’s, then, with Aristotle’s, is a sense of the psychosomatic structure 
of man’s presence in the world, the rational part of his nature constituting 
the species intelligibilis or intelligible and operative principle of the whole. 
But there is a difference, for happy as he is to talk with Aristotle and the 
Aristotelians about human nature in terms of the specification of the whole 
by way of the psyche rather than of the soma, he is happier, whenever the 
opportunity presents itself, to proceed in affective categories, to discuss the 
whole thing in terms of the complexity of properly human loving. Man as 
man, then, loves variously: like the stones he cleaves to the ground, like the 
plants he seeks out the goodness of the soil and the sunlight as conditions 
of his proper well-being, like the animals he craves the pleasure of eating, 
sleeping and procreating, and like the angels he yearns for an uncluttered 
act of intellection, for an orderly understanding both of self and of the world 
beyond self; so, for example, as testimony to a uniform pattern of thought in 
Dante, and indeed to a uniform pattern of rejoicing, these lines from Book 
III of the Convivio, a hymn to the openness of being in general and of human 
being in particular to celebration under the aspect of its multiple affectivity:
Onde è da sapere che ciascuna cosa, come detto è di sopra, per la 
ragione di sopra mostrata ha ’l suo speziale amore. Come le corpora 
simplici hanno amore naturato in sé a lo luogo proprio, e però la terra 
sempre discende al centro; lo fuoco ha [amore a] la circunferenza 
di sopra, lungo lo cielo de la luna, e però sempre sale a quello. Le 
corpora composte prima, sì come sono le minere, hanno amore a 
lo luogo dove la loro generazione è ordinata, e in quello crescono e 
acquistano vigore e potenza; onde vedemo la calamita sempre da la 
parte de la sua generazione ricevere vertù. Le piante, che sono prima 
animate, hanno amore a certo luogo più manifestamente, secondo che 
la complessione richiede; e però vedemo certe piante lungo l’acque 
quasi c[ontent]arsi, e certe sopra li gioghi de le montagne, e certe ne 
le piagge e dappiè monti: le quali se si transmutano, o muoiono del 
tutto o vivono quasi triste, disgiunte dal loro amico. Li animali bruti 
hanno più manifesto amore non solamente a li luoghi, ma l’uno l’altro 
vedemo amare. Li uomini hanno loro proprio amore a le perfette 
e oneste cose. E però che l’uomo, avvegna che una sola sustanza 
sia, tuttavia [la] forma, per la sua nobilitade, ha in sé e la natura 
[d’ognuna di] queste cose, tutti questi amori puote avere e tutti li ha.
(Conv. III.iii.2-5)6
6 It should be explained here that, as was said above, for the reason given there, every 
being has a love specific to it. Just as simple bodies have an inborn love for the place 
proper to them – so that earth always descends to the centre, while fire has an inborn love 
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But if man as man loves by way of the many impulses proper to his 
complex nature, then how are these impulses to be organized, fitted in with 
one another within the economy of the whole?  By way, Dante thinks, of 
their bringing home to the kind of love given with the act itself of existence 
and inclining the individual to seek out God as the beginning and end of all 
seeking, herein alone lying the ground and legitimacy of his every affective 
inflexion of the spirit. The key passages here, the first of them touching on 
the species of human loving precisely as such and the second of them on the 
gathering in of one kind of love to another, run as follows:
 “Né creator né creatura mai”
cominciò el, “figliuol, fu sanza amore,
o naturale o d’animo; e tu ’l sai.
 Lo naturale è sempre sanza errore,
ma l’altro puote errar per malo obietto
o per troppo o per poco di vigore.
 Mentre ch’elli è nel primo ben diretto,
e ne’ secondi sé stesso misura,
esser non può cagion di mal diletto;
 ma quando al mal si torce, o con più cura
o con men che non dee corre nel bene,
contra ’l fattore adovra sua fattura.
 Quinci comprender puoi ch’esser convene
amor sementa in voi d’ogne virtute
e d’ogne operazion che merta pene”
...
 Però, là onde vegna lo ’ntelletto
de le prime notizie, omo non sape,
e de’ primi appetibili l’affetto,
 che sono in voi sì come studio in ape
di far lo mele; e questa prima voglia
for the circumference above us bordering the heaven of the Moon, and therefore always 
rises upwards towards that – so primary compound bodies, such as minerals, have a 
love for the place suited to their generation; in that place they grow, and from it they 
derive their vigour and power. That is why, as we observe, the magnet always receives 
power from the quarter in which it was generated. Plants, which are the primary form 
of animate life, even more clearly have a love for certain places, in accordance with what 
their constitution requires; so we see some deriving pleasure, as it were, when alongside 
water, others when on the ridges of mountains, others when on slopes and on foothills; if 
they are transplanted, they either die completely or live a sad life, as it were, like beings 
separated from their friends. Human beings have their specific love for what is perfect 
and just. And since the human being, despite the fact that his whole form constitutes a 
single substance in virtue of its nobility, has a nature that embraces all these features, he 
can have all these loves, and indeed does have them.
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merto di lode o di biasmo non cape.
 Or perché a questa ogn’ altra si raccoglia,
innata v’è la virtù che consiglia,
e de l’assenso de’ tener la soglia.
 Quest’ è ’l principio là onde si piglia
ragion di meritare in voi, secondo
che buoni e rei amori accoglie e viglia.
 Color che ragionando andaro al fondo,
s’accorser d’esta innata libertate;
però moralità lasciaro al mondo.
(Purg. XVII. 91-102 and XVIII.55-69)7
7 He began: “Neither creator nor creature, my son, was ever without love, either natural 
or of the mind, and this you know. The natural is always without error; but the other 
may err either through an evil object, or through too much or too little vigour. While it is 
directed on the primal good, and on secondary goods observes right measure, it cannot be 
the cause of sinful pleasure. But when it turns awry to evil, or speeds to good with more 
zeal, or with less, than it ought, against the creator works his creature. Hence you can 
comprehend that love must needs be the seed in you of every virtue and of every action 
deserving punishment ... Therefore, whence comes the intelligence of the first cognitions 
man does not know, nor whence the affection for the first objects of desire, which exist in 
you even as zeal in the bee for making honey; and this primal will admits no deserving of 
praise or blame. Now in order that to this will every other will may be conformed, there is 
innate in you the faculty that counsels and that ought to hold the threshold of consent. This 
is the principle wherefrom is derived the reason of desert in you, according as it garners 
and winnows good and evil loves. Those who in their reasoning went to the root of the 
matter took note of this innate liberty, and accordingly bequeathed ethics to the world.” 
Thomas on natural and elective love (dilectio naturalis and dilectio electiva), ST Ia.60.2 resp.: 
‘in Angelis est quaedam dilectio naturalis et quaedam electiva. Et naturalis dilectio in eis 
est principium electivae, quia semper id quod pertinet ad prius, habet rationem principii; 
unde, cum natura sit primum quod est in unoquoque, oportet quod id quod ad naturam 
pertinet, sit principium in quolibet. Et hoc apparet in homine et quantum ad intellectum, 
et quantum ad voluntatem. Intellectus enim cognoscit principia naturaliter, et ex hac 
cognitione causatur in homine scientia conclusionum, quae non cognoscuntur naturaliter 
ab homine, sed per inventionem vel doctrinam. Similiter in voluntate finis hoc modo se 
habet, sicut principium in intellectu, ut dicitur in II Physic. Unde voluntas naturaliter 
tendit in suum finem ultimum, omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac 
naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates, cum quidquid homo vult, velit propter 
finem. Dilectio igitur boni quod homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, est dilectio naturalis, 
dilectio autem ab hac derivata, quae est boni quod diligitur propter finem, est dilectio 
electiva.’ O. Ciacci, ‘La teoria dell’amore: Canto XVII del Purgatorio’, in Nuove interpretazioni 
dantesche (Perugia: Volumina, 1974), pp. 75-95; K. Foster, O.P., ‘The Human Spirit in 
Action: Purgatorio XVIII’, in The Two Dantes (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1977), 
pp. 107-119; B. Nardi, ‘Filosofia dell’amore nei rimatori italiani del Duecento e in Dante’, 
in Dante e la cultura medievale, ed. P. Mazzantini (Bari: Laterza, 1983, originally 1942), pp. 
9-79; G. Morgan, ‘Natural and Spiritual Movements of Love in the Soul: an Explanation 
of Purgatorio XVIII. 16-39’, Modern Language Review 80 (1985), 2, 320-29; S. F. Di Zenzo, 
‘La dottrina dell’amore nel Purgatorio dantesco’, Avallon 18 (1988), 99-114; C. Fordyce, ‘Il 
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Man as man, Dante suggests, knows himself in two kinds of loving. 
He knows himself in the kind of connatural loving given with the act itself 
of existence and calling him from beforehand into the presence of God 
as the first and final cause of all loving (‘amore naturale’), and he knows 
himself in the kind of contingent loving generated by his encounter with 
the world around him (‘amore d’animo’), his task as a creature of moral 
accountability being to gather in the latter to the former as the principle 
of his proper well-being, this gathering in of the one to the other being 
the province of free will, of that faculty of the rational soul empowered to 
decisive intervention. Only in the degree to which he is successful in this, 
in bringing home occasional to essential loving, will he know himself 
in the integrity and intelligibility of his presence in the world and in his 
acceptability in the sight of God. Short of this, he knows himself, and 
is known to his maker, only under the aspect of effrontery. But that is 
not all, for in the moment of his disinclination to bring home one species 
of loving to another, the next man, inasmuch as he is known to him at 
all, is known to him by way only of intimidation, as forever looking to 
see him off as a competitor and an intruder, at which point the social 
aspect of it all – sin under the aspect of savagery – moves into view; so, 
for example, the cases of the avaricious and of the prodigal in Canto VII 
of the Inferno and of the counterfeiters in Canto XXX, each of whom, 
divided against self in the recesses of self, lives at enmity with the world 
beyond self, the crisis of collectivity being in this sense nothing but the 
crisis of personality writ large:
 Qui vid’ i’ gente più ch’altrove troppa,
e d’una parte e d’altra, con grand’ urli,
voltando pesi per forza di poppa.
 Percotëansi ’ncontro; e poscia pur lì
si rivolgea ciascun, voltando a retro,
gridando: “Perché tieni?” e “Perché burli?”
...
 E l’un di lor, che si recò a noia
forse d’esser nomato sì oscuro,
col pugno li percosse l’epa croia.
 Quella sonò come fosse un tamburo;
e mastro Adamo li percosse il volto
problema di amore e libero arbitrio nella Commedia di Dante’, Romance Review 4 (1994), 
1, 35-51;  S. Wenzel, ‘Dante’s Rationale for the Seven Deadly Sins (Purgatorio XVII)’ in 
Dante. The Critical Complex, 8 vols, ed. R. Lansing (New York and London, 2003), vol. 3, pp. 
227-31 (and in Elucidations. Medieval Poetry and its Religious Backgrounds (Louvain and Paris: 
Walpole and Peeters, 2010), pp. 113-19; originally 1965).
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col braccio suo, che non parve men duro,
 dicendo a lui: “Ancor che mi sia tolto
lo muover per le membra che son gravi,
ho io il braccio a tal mestiere sciolto”
(Inf. VII.26-30 and XXX.100-108)8
Both psychologically and socially, then, it is a question of hostility. 
Ranged over against self in the forum of conscience and forever living 
out the fragility of this situation, the individual impressed by a sense of 
his vulnerability in the world only ever knows his neighbour in a spirit 
of resentment, of, at best, inconvenience and, at worst, menace, herein, in 
the a-sociology of the Inferno, in its sense of being as but a matter of over-
againstness, lying the twofold substance and sadness of it all.
4. What, then, of being in its authenticity, of being as gathered on the plane 
of loving? In circumstances of inauthentic being communication gives way 
as we have seen to communicationlessness. Established at the centre of 
his universe, the individual neither knows nor is known by the next man, 
preferring instead to subsist as a stranger to every kind of creative communion. 
But in circumstances of authentic being, of being as transparent to its own 
innermost reasons, a new species of collectivity emerges, repudiation giving 
way to recognition as a habit of mind, to a sense of the next man as present 
to self, less as an impediment, than as a means of affirmation. To take, then, 
the Pauline model of contiguity, of being as a matter of being alongside, we 
have first of all the Charles Martel passage of Paradiso VIII, a passage for 
all its soaring substance alert to the notion of being and becoming in man as 
a matter of civic being and becoming, of the individual’s bringing what he is 
and what he has by way of the unprecedented and unparalleled properties 
of personality to the collective enterprise:
 Ond’ elli ancora: “Or dì: sarebbe il peggio
per l’omo in terra, se non fosse cive?”.
“Sì”, rispuos’ io; “e qui ragion non cheggio”.
 “E puot’ elli esser, se giù non si vive
diversamente per diversi offici?
8 Here I saw far more people than elsewhere, both on the one side and on the other, 
howling loudly, rolling weights, which they pushed with their chest; they clashed 
together, and then right there each wheeled round, rolling back his weight, shouting, 
“Why do you hoard?” and “Why do you squander?” ... And one of them, who took offence 
perhaps at being named so darkly, with his fist struck him on his stiff paunch; it sounded 
like a drum; and Master Adam struck him in the face with his arm, which seemed no less 
hard, saying to him, “Though I am kept from moving by the weight of my limbs, which 
are heavy, I have a free arm for such a need”.
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Non, se ’l maestro vostro ben vi scrive”.
 Sì venne deducendo infino a quici;
poscia conchiuse: “Dunque esser diverse
convien di vostri effetti le radici:
 per ch’un nasce Solone e altro Serse,
altro Melchisedèch e altro quello
che, volando per l’aere, il figlio perse.
 La circular natura, ch’è suggello
a la cera mortal, fa ben sua arte,
ma non distingue l’un da l’altro ostello.
 Quinci addivien ch’Esaù si diparte
per seme da Iacòb; e vien Quirino
da sì vil padre, che si rende a Marte.
 Natura generata il suo cammino
simil farebbe sempre a’ generanti,
se non vincesse il proveder divino.
 Or quel che t’era dietro t’è davanti:
ma perché sappi che di te mi giova,
un corollario voglio che t’ammanti.
 Sempre natura, se fortuna trova
discorde a sé, com’ ogne altra semente
fuor di sua regïon, fa mala prova.
 E se ’l mondo là giù ponesse mente
al fondamento che natura pone,
seguendo lui, avria buona la gente.
 Ma voi torcete a la religïone
tal che fia nato a cignersi la spada,
e fate re di tal ch’è da sermone;
 onde la traccia vostra è fuor di strada”.
(Par. VIII.115-48)9
9 Whereupon he again, “Now say, would it be worse for man on earth if he were not a 
citizen?” “Yes”, I replied, “and here I ask for no proof”. “And can it be that, unless men 
below live in diverse ways for diverse duties? Not if your master writes well of this for 
you.” Thus he came deducing far as here, then he concluded, “Therefore the roots of your 
works must be diverse, so that one is born of Solon and another Xerxes, one Melchizidek 
and another he who flew through the air and lost his son. Circling nature, which is a seal 
on mortal wax, performs its arts well, but does not distinguish one house from another. 
Whence it happens that Esau differs in the seed from Jacob, and Quirinus comes from 
so base a father that he is ascribed to Mars. The begotten nature would always make its 
course like its begetters did not divine provision overrule. Now that which was behind 
you is before you; but, that you may know that I delight in you, I will have a corollary 
cloak you round. Ever does Nature, if she find fortune discordant with herself, like any 
kind of seed out of its proper region, come to ill result. And if the word there below 
would give heed to the foundation which Nature lays, and followed it, it would have 
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Eloquent as this is, however, in respect of alongsidedness as a 
model of collective being, it is only with Thomas, a little further down 
the line, that we glimpse something of its refined and indeed rapturous 
substance; for with Thomas it is a question, not simply of citizenship, but 
of companionship, of a species of co-presencing apt by way of those same 
properties of personality to confirm each alike in a sense of the fullness 
and incontrovertibility of his own presence in the world, in the deep 
substance of his own humanity:
 Tu vuo’ saper di quai piante s’infiora
questa ghirlanda che ’ntorno vagheggia
la bella donna ch’al ciel t’avvalora.
 Io fui de li agni de la santa greggia
che Domenico mena per cammino
u’ ben s’impingua se non si vaneggia.
 Questi che m’è a destra più vicino,
frate e maestro fummi, ed esso Alberto
è di Cologna, e io Thomas d’Aquino.
 Se sì di tutti li altri esser vuo’ certo,
di retro al mio parlar ten vien col viso
girando su per lo beato serto.
 Quell’ altro fiammeggiare esce del riso
di Grazïan, che l’uno e l’altro foro
aiutò sì che piace in paradiso.
 L’altro ch’appresso addorna il nostro coro,
quel Pietro fu che con la poverella
offerse a Santa Chiesa suo tesoro.
 La quinta luce, ch’è tra noi più bella,
spira di tale amor, che tutto ’l mondo
là giù ne gola di saper novella:
 entro v’è l’alta mente u’ sì profondo
saver fu messo, che, se ’l vero è vero,
a veder tanto non surse il secondo.
 Appresso vedi il lume di quel cero
che giù in carne più a dentro vide
l’angelica natura e ’l ministero.
 Ne l’altra piccioletta luce ride
its people good. But you wrest to religion one born to girt on the sword, and you make 
a king one that is fit for sermons, so that your track is off the road”. On the specificity, 
well-nigh, of this or that instance of properly human being in its historical instantiation, 
DVE I.iii.1: ‘Cum igitur homo non nature instinctu, sed ratione moveatur, et ipsa ratio vel 
circa discretionem vel circa iudicium vel circa electionem diversificetur in singulis, adeo 
ut fere quilibet sua propria specie videatur gaudere, per proprios actus vel passiones, ut 
brutum anirnal, neminem alium intelligere opinamur.’ 
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quello avvocato de’ tempi cristiani
del cui latino Augustin si provide.
 Or se tu l’occhio de la mente trani
di luce in luce dietro a le mie lode,
già de l’ottava con sete rimani.
 Per vedere ogne ben dentro vi gode
l’anima santa che ’l mondo fallace
fa manifesto a chi di lei ben ode.
 Lo corpo ond’ ella fu cacciata giace
giuso in Cieldauro; ed essa da martiro
e da essilio venne a questa pace.
 Vedi oltre fiammeggiar l’ardente spiro
d’Isidoro, di Beda e di Riccardo,
che a considerar fu più che viro.
 Questi onde a me ritorna il tuo riguardo,
è ’l lume d’uno spirto che ’n pensieri
gravi a morir li parve venir tardo:
 essa è la luce etterna di Sigieri,
che, leggendo nel Vico de li Strami,
silogizzò invidïosi veri.
(Par. X.91-138)10
Here, then, patient demonstration (the ‘Sì venne deducendo infino a 
quici’ of VIII.121) gives way to something closer to concelebration as a 
10 You wish to know what plants these are that enflower this garland, which amorously 
circles round the fair lady who strengthens you for heaven. I was of the lambs of the holy 
flock which Dominic leads on the path where there is good fattening if they do not stray. 
He that is next beside on the right was my brother and my master, and he is Albert of 
Cologne, and I, Thomas of Aquino. If thus of all the rest you would be informed, come, 
following my speech with your sight. The next flaming comes from the smile of Gratian, 
who served the one and the other court so well that it pleases in  paradise. The other who 
next adorns our choir was that Peter who, like the poor widow, offered his treasure to 
Holy Church. The fifth light, which is the most beautiful among us, breathes with such 
love that all the world there below thirsts to know tidings of it. Within it is the lofty mind 
to which was given wisdom so deep that, if the truth be true, there never rose a second 
of such full vision. At its side behold the light of that candle which, below in the flesh, 
saw deepest into the angelic nature and its ministry. In the next little light smiles that 
defender of the Christian times of whose discourse Augustine made use. If now you are 
bringing your mind’s eye from light to light after my praises, you are already thirsting 
for the eighth. Therewithin, through seeing every good, the sainted soul rejoices who 
makes the fallacious world manifest to any who listen well to him. The body from which 
it was driven lies down below in Cieldauro, and he came from martyrdom and exile to 
this peace. See, flaming beyond, the glowing breath of Isidore, of Bede, and of Richard 
who in contemplation was more than man. This one from whom your look returns to me 
is the light of a spirit to whom, in his grave thoughts, it seemed that death came slow. It is 
the eternal light of Siger who, lecturing in Straw Street, demonstrated invidious truths.
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mode of existence, Thomas’s, whatever else it is, being an ode to friendship 
as the way of properly human affirmation. Fully and unambiguously 
himself, in other words, and operating from out of a space wholly his own, 
one individual comes alongside another to reassure him in respect both of 
the distinctiveness and the decisiveness of his presence – of the presence 
of each alike – in the world as party to the common undertaking and the 
universal hymn of praise.
But that is not all, for the argument stands now to be developed in 
terms of the way in which, operating as it does from out of his own space, 
each of those party to the universal proclamation may be said to operate 
from out of the same space, from out of a consummate act of indwelling. 
The model is Trinitarian, Dante’s Trinitarianism having about it both a 
processional and a perichoretic aspect. First, then, on the processional 
side, there is his sense of the Son’s issuing from the Father by way of 
filiation or of begottenness, and of the Spirit’s issuing from the Father and 
the Son together by way of spiration or of a species of breathing-forth; so, 
for example, these two passages from Paradiso X (lines 1-6 and 49-51), 
the former, in its attentiveness to the filioque (to the doctrine of the Spirit’s 
proceeding from both the Father and the Son), recalling the Augustine 
of the De trinitate, and the latter, more attuned to issues of filiation and 
spiration, the Thomas of the Summa theologiae:
 Guardando nel suo Figlio con l’Amore 
che l’uno e l’altro etternalmente spira, 
lo primo e ineffabile Valore 
 quanto per mente e per loco si gira 
con tant’ ordine fé, ch’esser non puote 
sanza gustar di lui chi ciò rimira.
 ...
 Tal era quivi la quarta famiglia 
de l’alto Padre, che sempre la sazia, 
mostrando come spira e come figlia.11
11 Looking upon his Son with the love which the one and the other eternally breathe 
forth, the primal and ineffable power made everything that revolves through the mind 
or through space with such order that he who contemplates it cannot but taste of him ... 
Such was here the fourth family of the exalted Father who ever satisfies it, showing how 
he breathes forth and how he begets.
Most recently on the filioque (Augustine, De trin. XV.v.29; 45; Anselm, Pros. xxiii, etc.), 
A. Riaud, Le Filioque: origine et rôle de la troisième personne de la Trinité (Paris: Fraternités 
du Saint-Esprit, 1989); R. Simon, Das Filioque bei Thomas von Aquin: eine Untersuchung 
zur dogmengeschichtlichen Stellung, theologischen Struktur und ökumenischen Perspektive 
der thomanischen Gotteslehre (Frankfurt am Main and New York: P. Lang, 1994); P. 
Gemeinhardt, Die Filioque-Kontroverse zwischen Ost- und Westkirche im Frühmittelalter (Berlin 
and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002); D. Ngien, Apologetic for Filioque in Medieval 
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On the perichoretic side, by contrast, there his sense of the mutual 
indwelling or ‘inseatedness’ of the three Persons of the Trinity, a model 
open to contemplation under the aspect, less now of extensivity, than of 
intensivity or co-dimensionality;12 so, for example, again from the Paradiso, 
Theology (Bletchley and Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 2005). Thomas on filiation and 
spiration, ST Ia.28.4 resp.: ‘Processio autem verbi dicitur generatio secundum propriam 
rationem qua competit rebus viventibus. Relatio autem principii generationis in viventibus 
perfectis dicitur paternitas; relatio vero procedentis a principio dicitur filiatio. Processio 
vero amoris non habet nomen proprium ... Sed vocatur relatio principii hujus processionis 
spiratio.’ On the procession of the Spirit from the Father by way of the Son, ST Ia.36. 
2-3, and on the procession of the Spirit from the Son, ScG IV.xxiv-xxv. Notable among 
the finer points of Dantean Trinitarianism are (a) its appropriation of creative power in 
the Par. X.1-6 passage to the Father (the ‘con tant’ ordine fé’ of line 5; cf. Thomas, ST 
Ia.45.6 ad 2: ‘patri attribuitur et appropriatur potentia, quae maxime manifestatur in 
creatione; et ideo attribuitur patri creatorem esse. Filio autem appropriatur sapientia, per 
quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur de Filio per quem omnia facta sunt. 
Spiritui Sancto autem appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio, deducens res 
in debitos fines, et vivificatio’); (b) its sense of the dispositive role of the Spirit in respect 
of the Word as a principle of creation (the ‘Però se ’l caldo amor la chiara vista / de 
la prima virtù dispone e segna, / tutta la perfezione quivi s’acquista’ of Par. XIII.79-
81); and (c) its linking of divine subsistence with the splendour of the Son in particular 
(the Idea or λόγος) as the in-and-through-which of the creative initiative (the ‘Ciò che 
non more e ciò che può morire / non è se non splendor di quella idea / che partorisce, 
amando, il nostro Sire’ of Par. XIII.52-54, for which the ‘Qui cum sit splendor gloriae, et 
figura substantiae ejus, portansque omnia verbo virtutis suae’ of Heb. 1:3). In respect of 
the first and third of these emphases, Thomas, ST Ia.46.3 resp.: ‘Sicut enim principium 
effectivum appropriatur patri, propter potentiam, ita principium exemplare appropriatur 
filio, propter sapientiam, ut sicut dicitur, omnia in sapientia fecisti, ita intelligatur Deum 
omnia fecisse in principio, idest in filio; secundum illud apostoli ad Coloss. I, in ipso, 
scilicet filio, condita sunt universa.’
12 For the terminology (περιχώρησις), Gregory Nazianzen, Epistula ci.6; xxii.4; Pseudo-
Cyril, De sacro. trin. xxiv; John of Damascus De fide ortho. i.14, etc. On the notion of 
perichoresis as dance (a pseudo-etymology), Hilary, De trin. ix.69. Historically and 
dogmatically, A. Deneffe, ‘Perichoresis, circumincessio, circuminsessio,’ in Zeitschrift 
für katholische Theologie 47 (1923), 497-532; D. F. Stramara Jr, ‘Gregory of Nyssa’s 
Terminology for Trinitarian Perichoresis’, Vigiliae Christianae 52 (1998), 3, 257-63; R. 
Cross, ‘Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication in John of Damascus’, 
Medieval Studies 62 (2000), 69-124. For an up-to-date implementation of the idea, E. L. 
Simmons, ‘Quantum Perichoresis: Quantum Field Theory and the Trinity’, Theology and 
Science 4 (2006), 2, 137-50. As part of a more general synthesis, J. Macquarrie, Principles 
of Christian Theology, rev. edn (London: SCM Press, 1966), pp. 174ff.; J. N. D. Kelly, 
Early Christian Doctrines, 5th edn (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1977), pp. 263ff.; 
T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988); idem, Trinitarian Perspectives: Towards Doctrinal Agreement 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), especially pp. 32-33, 93ff. and 121-23; C. Gunton, The 
Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997); P. S. Fiddes, 
Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 
2000), pp. 71ff. More generally still on Trinitarian theology, E. J. Fortman, The Triune 
God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity (London: Hutchinson, 1972); D. Brown, 
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these passages from Cantos XXIV and XXXIII (139-41 and 124-26 
respectively), the first a meditation on the grammar of Trinitarianism, and 
the second on the notion of inseatedness (the ‘in te sidi’ of XXXIII.124) 
and on this as a matter of love and laughter:
 e credo in tre persone etterne, e queste
credo una essenza sì una e sì trina,
che soffera congiunto ‘sono’ ed ‘este’.
...
 O luce etterna che sola in te sidi,
sola t’intendi, e da te intelletta
e intendente te ami e arridi!13
Dante’s, then, to go by the rapt emphases of Paradiso XXXIII, is a 
privileging of essence over economy as a way of seeing and celebrating the 
three-in-oneness of the Godhead, this in turn encouraging him in the most 
resplendent of his social formulations in the Commedia, in what amounts to 
his last word on the nature of one man’s being with another at the point of 
emergence; for to be with the next man at the point of emergence is to be, not 
so much with him, as within him, as, somewhat after the manner of the Persons 
themselves of the Godhead, indwelling and indwelt one by the other. This 
at any rate is the implication, indeed the substance, of Dante’s initiative in 
the ninth canto of the Paradiso when, proceeding once again neologistically 
The Divine Trinity (London: Duckworth, 1985), especially pp. 272ff.
Otherwise on the Trinity in Dante: Inf. III.4-6: ‘Giustizia mosse il mio alto fattore; / 
fecemi la divina podestate, / la somma sapienza e ’l primo amore’, with reference to the 
opus ad extra of the Trinity as a principle of cosmic organization; Par. XXXIII.115-20: ‘Ne 
la profonda e chiara sussistenza / de l’alto lume parvermi tre giri / di tre colori e d’una 
contenenza; / e l’un da l’altro come iri da iri / parea reflesso, e ’l terzo parea foco / che 
quinci e quindi igualmente si spiri’, with reference to the annular imagery of, especially, 
Joachim of Fiore (L. Tondelli (ed.), Il libro delle figure dell ’abate Gioachino da Fiore, 2nd edn 
(Turin: Società editrice internazionale, 1990)). G. Busnelli, ‘Dalla luce del cielo della 
luna alla trina luce dell’Empireo’, Studi danteschi 27 (1943), 95-116; M. Apollonio, ‘Una 
meditazione trinitaria’, in Dante. Storia della Commedia (Milan: Vallardi, 1951), pp. 182-90; 
G. Fallani, Dante poeta teologo (Milan: Marzorati, 1965), pp. 211-25; idem, ad voc. ‘Trinità’, 
in the Enciclopedia dantesca, 6 vols (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970-78), 
vol. 5, pp. 718-21; P. Priest, Dante’s Incarnation of the Trinity (Ravenna: Longo, 1982); V. 
Crupi, ‘Dal Paradiso di Dante: l’impronta trinitaria nella creazione’, Nuova Umanità 135-
36 (2001), 433-63 (subsequently in Saggi danteschi (Cosenza: Luigi Pellegrini, 2003), 
pp. 33-68, with ‘La Trinità nell’esegesi dantesca’ in the same volume, pp. 69-105); G. 
Montanari, ‘Terza parte; saggio teologico. Una terzina da rivedere: Par. XXXIII, 124-
126 sulla Trinità?’, in Socrate, Cristo, Dante e la Bibbia: saggi di filologia estetica e sull ’ebraismo 
fondamento della cultura (Ravenna: Girasole, 2002), pp. 93-123.
13 And I believe in three eternal persons, and these I believe to be one essence, so one 
and so threefold as to comport at once with are and is ... O light eternal, who alone abidest 
in thyself, and, known to thyself and knowing, lovest and smilest on thyself!
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(the ‘com’ a lo re che ’n suo voler  ne ’nvoglia’ of Par. III.84 or the ‘D’i Serafin 
che più s’india’ of IV.28), he speaks of the kind of ‘inhimming’, ‘inyouing’ 
and ‘inmeing’ whereby one instance of being in its blessedness may be said 
to indwell another, a way of thinking and of speaking designed, not so much 
to liquidate otherness as a property of historical selfhood, as to confirm 
the radical nature of one man’s presence to another in the moment of self-
actualization. In the moment of self-actualization, Dante maintains, one man 
is present to another, not merely as a companion or fellow breaker of bread, 
but as an immanently operative principle of being and becoming, at which 
point diversity gives way to identity as a principle of social intelligence, as 
a way of conceiving and articulating the dialectic in human experience of 
being in self and being with another, of Selbstsein and Mitsein:
 “Dio vede tutto, e tuo veder s’inluia”,
diss’ io, “beato spirto, sì che nulla
voglia di sé a te puot’ esser fuia.
 Dunque la voce tua, che ’l ciel trastulla
sempre col canto di quei fuochi pii
che di sei ali facen la coculla,
 perché non satisface a’ miei disii?
Già non attendere’ io tua dimanda,
s’io m’intuassi, come tu t’inmii”.
(Par. IX.73-81)14
Thus Trinitarianism once again encourages and facilitates, as 
Trinitarianism always, does a rethinking of the social issue in human 
experience; for if on the one hand there is a sense in which to be as man is 
to stand alone in respect of that which matters alone (this being the point 
of Dante’s preference for the first-person singular in the Commedia), there 
is also a sense in which that same being both knows and is known by way 
of its brooking no dimensionality, no impediment to the mutual informing 
of self and the other-than-self in the moment of affirmation.
14 “God sees all, and into him your vision sinks, blessed spirit”, I said, “so that no 
wish may steal itself from you. Why then does your voice, which ever gladdens heaven 
– together with the singing of those devout fires that make themselves a cowl with six 
wings – not satisfy my longings? Surely I should not wait for your request, were I in 
you, even as you are in me”. Cf. Par. XXII.124-29: ‘“Tu se’ sì presso a l’ultima salute”, / 
cominciò Bëatrice, “che tu dei / aver le luci tue chiare e acute; / e però, prima che tu più 
t’inlei, / rimira in giù, e vedi quanto mondo / sotto li piedi già esser ti fei”.
Dante and the Protestant Principle
Cum essem parvulus, loquebar ut 
parvulus, sapiebam ut parvulus, 
cogitabam ut parvulus. Quando factus 
sum vir, evacuavi quae erant parvuli.
(I Cor. 13:11)1
La maggiore parte de li uomini vivono 
secondo senso e non secondo ragione, a 
guisa di pargoli.
(Conv. III.iv.3)2
1. Introduction: Protestantism and the protestant principle – preliminary 
considerations. 2. The Dantean protest: patterns of sacramentalism (Dante, grace 
and the historical encounter) and superintendence (Dante, episcopacy and self-
episcopacy). 3. Conclusion: ecclesiality, existentiality and the whereabouts of the 
Dantean protest.
The first thing to say, lest the reader be tempted to pass by on the other 
side, is that what follows in this essay has nothing to do with fashioning 
from Dante a protestant in anything like the most obvious sense of 
the term, with making of him a sixteenth-century reformer avant la 
lettre.3 On the contrary, it is a question of looking beneath and beyond 
protestantism in any of its historical manifestations to discern as far 
as may be something of what Paul Tillich – attuned as he was to the 
restiveness of Christianity vis-à-vis its own formalities – used to call the 
protestant principle; so, for example, this from the Protestant Era on the 
1 When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; 
but when I becam a man, I put away childish things (AV).
2 The greater part of mankind live according to sense rather than reason, like children.
3 On protestant readings and appropriations of Dante, E. Moore, ‘Dante as a Religious 
Teacher’, in Studies in Dante. Second Series (Miscellaneous Essays) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1899; reprint 1968), pp. 1-78 (especially pp. 7-8); A. Valensin, Le Christianisme de Dante 
(Paris: Aubier, 1954), pp. 15-16. See too M. Caesar (ed.), Dante. The Critical Heritage 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1989).
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distinction to be drawn between the institutional expression of the idea 
and the idea itself, the idea by which the institution is at once authorized 
from deep within itself and by which it is called to account:
Protestantism has a principle that stands beyond all its realizations. It 
is the critical and dynamic source of all protestant realizations, but it 
is not identical with any of them. It cannot be confined by a definition. 
It is not exhausted by any historical religion; it is not identical with 
the structure of the Reformation or early Christianity or even with a 
religious form at all. It transcends them as it transcends any cultural 
form. On the other hand, it can appear in all of them; it is a living, 
moving, restless power in them; and this is what it is supposed to be 
in a special way in historical protestantism. The protestant principle, 
in name derived from the protest of the ‘protestants’ against decisions 
of the Catholic majority, contains the divine and human protest 
against any absolute claim made for a relative reality, even if this 
claim is made by a protestant church. The protestant principle is the 
judge of every religious and cultural reality, including the religion 
and culture which calls itself ‘protestant’.
The protestant principle, the source and judge of protestantism, is 
not to be confused with the ‘Absolute’ of German idealism or with the 
‘Being’ of ancient and recent philosophy. It is not the highest ontological 
concept derived from an analysis of the whole of being; it is the 
theological expression of the true relation between the unconditional 
and the conditioned or, religiously speaking, between God and man. 
As such, it is concerned with what theology calls ‘faith’, namely, the 
state of mind in which we are grasped by the power of something 
unconditional which manifests itself to us as the ground and judge of 
our existence. The power of grasping us in the state of faith is not a being 
beside others, not even the highest; it is not an object among objects, 
not even the greatest; but it is a quality of all beings and objects, the 
quality of pointing beyond themselves and their finite existence to the 
infinite, inexhaustible, and unapproachable depth of their being and 
meaning. The protestant principle is the extension of this relationship. 
It is the guardian against the attempts of the finite and conditioned to 
usurp the place of the unconditional in thinking and acting. It is the 
prophetic judgment against religious pride, ecclesiastical arrogance, 
and secular self-sufficiency and their destructive consequences.4
4 Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. J. L. Adams (London: Nisbet, 1951), pp. 239-40; 
cf., idem, Systematic Theology, Part II. Being and God (London: SCM Press, 1978; originally 
1951), p. 227: ‘The Protestant principle is the restatement of the prophetic principle as 
an attack against a self-absolutizing and, consequently, demonically distorted church.’
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to which, as similarly alert to the ideal transparency of the historically 
conditional in the life of the Church to the eternally unconditional, and 
to this as the main business of theology, we may add these lines – more 
than ever Tillichian in their combination of power and precision – from 
his Theology of Culture:
The criterion of every concrete expression of our ultimate concern is 
the degree to which the concreteness of the concern is in unity with its 
ultimacy. It is the danger of every embodiment of the unconditional 
element, religious and secular, that it elevates something conditioned, 
a symbol, an institution, a movement as such to ultimacy. This danger 
was well known to the religious leaders of all types, and the whole 
work of theology can be summed up in the statement that it is the 
permanent guardian of the unconditional against the aspiration of its 
own religious and secular appearances.5
Thus to live with the protestant principle is to review in respect of their 
power to new life every received and accredited emphasis in the areas of 
moral, social, cultural and – as the encompassing of all these things – religious 
concern. In all these areas, Tillich thinks, it is a question of rethinking every 
settled habit of mind in respect of its accountability to the agapeic and thus 
subversive substance of the gospel kerygma, its extraordinary capacity for 
turning things on their head. This, then, is what Tillich has in mind when 
he speaks of the protestant principle. What he has in mind is the kind of 
discerning originating with Christ himself and present to his Church as that 
whereby it is saved from the demonic possibilities of its own historical forms.
2. Given the challenge mounted by Christianity to each of its successive 
solutions in the historical order, where, then, is the ‘protest’ in Dante? In 
reply to this, we cannot, alas, look to his critique of the contemporary 
5 The Theology of Culture, ed. R. C. Kimball (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980; originally 1959), p. 29. Similarly in The Protestant Era cit. (previous 
note), p. 246: ‘In the power of the protestant principle, protestantism must fight not only against 
other ideologies but also against its own. It must reveal the “false consciousness” wherever it 
hides. It must show how the “man-made God” of Catholicism was in the interest of the feudal 
order, of which the medieval church was part; how the ideology of Lutheranism was in the 
interest of the patriarchal order, with which Lutheran orthodoxy was associated; how the 
idealistic religion of humanistic protestantism is in the interest of a victorious bourgeoisie. The 
creation of these ideologies – religiously speaking, idols – representing man’s will to power, 
occurs unconsciously. It is not a conscious falsification or a political lie. If this were the case, 
ideologies would not be very dangerous. But they are dangerous precisely because they 
are unconscious and are therefore objects of belief and fanaticism. To reveal these concrete 
ideologies is one of the most important functions of the protestant principle, just as it was one 
of the main points in the attack of the prophets on the religious and social order of their times.’
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Church in what appears to him to be its lovelessness, for this is a critique 
inaugurated and sustained, not from beyond, but from within, his general 
ecclesiology, from out of a prior and settled sense of what the Church actually 
is.6 What, then, for Dante, is the Church? The Church, he thinks, is nothing 
but the continuing presence of Christ to us under the conditions of time and 
space, its responsibility, therefore, being that of caring for the flock by way 
(a) of a faithful proclamation of the gospel message, and (b) of an integral 
administration of the keys as the power to discernment and to absolution 
made over to Peter by Christ in the Matthean commission; thus on the life 
of Christ as the intelligible form of the Church and on the role of the pope as 
pastor, this passage (xv.2-3) from the third book of the Monarchia:
Ad evidentiam autem minoris sciendum quod natura Ecclesie forma 
est Ecclesie: nam, quamvis natura dicatur de materia et forma, per 
prius tamen dicitur de forma, ut ostensum est in Naturali auditu 
[Physics II. i]. Forma autem Ecclesie nichil aliud est quam vita Cristi, 
tam in dictis quam in factis comprehensa: vita enim ipsius ydea fuit 
et exemplar militantis Ecclesie, presertim pastorum, maxime summi, 
cuius est pascere agnos et oves.7
while on the integral preaching of the word, these lines (103-17) from 
Paradiso XXIX:
6 On Dante’s critique of the contemporary Church, G. Cattani, ‘Il sacro zelo di San Pier 
Damiani a sostegno del sacro zelo di Dante nell’invettiva religiosa della Commedia (Par. 
c. XXI)’, in San Pier Damiani. Atti del Convegno di studi nel IX centenario della morte (Florence: 
Società Torricelliana di Scienze e Lettere, 1973), pp. 43-59; K. Foster, O.P., ‘The Canto 
of the Damned Popes, Inferno XIX’, in The Two Dantes and Other Studies (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1977), pp. 86-106; A. Comollo, ‘Il topos della corruzione della Chiesa 
nella Commedia e negli autori cattolici del tempo’, in Il dissenso religioso in Dante (Florence: 
Olschki, 1990), pp. 79-104 (with a number of essays bearing on this subject); E. Airava, ‘I 
papi buoni e cattivi nella Divina Commedia’, Settentrione. Rivista di Studi Italo-Finlandesi, n.s. 3 
(1996), 115-26; A. Lanza, ‘I falsi pastori della Chiesa di Roma’, in Dante all’ inferno. I misteri 
eretici della Commedia (Rome: Tre Editori. 1999), pp, 143-55; N. Enright, ‘Dante and the 
Scandals of a Beloved Church’, Logos. A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 7 (2004), 
4, 17-36; R. Imbach, ‘Zum Heil der Welt, die übel lebt. Dantes Kirchenkritic und ihre 
Bedeutung’, in Die Kirchenkritic der Mystiker. Prophetie aus Gottesfahrung. I. Mittelalter, ed. M. 
Delgado et al. (Fribourg-Stuttgart: Academic Press Fribourg-Kohlhammer, 2004), pp. 
273-83; I. Castiglia, ‘La lupa e l’orsa. L’invettiva contro il “clericus carnalis” nel Canto XIX 
dell’Inferno’, Dante. Rivista internazionale di studi su Dante Alighieri 7 (2010), 35-55.
7 To clarify the minor premiss it must be borne in mind that the church’s nature is the 
form of the church; for although ‘nature’ is used with reference to matter and to form, 
nonetheless it refers first and foremost to form, as is shown in the Physics. Now the ‘form’ 
of the church is simply the life of Christ, including both his words and his deeds; for his 
life was the model and exemplar for the church militant, especially for the pastors, and 
above all for the supreme pastor, whose task is to feed the lambs and the sheep.
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 Non ha Fiorenza tanti Lapi e Bindi
quante sì fatte favole per anno
in pergamo si gridan quinci e quindi:
 sì che le pecorelle, che non sanno,
tornan del pasco pasciute di vento,
e non le scusa non veder lo danno.
 Non disse Cristo al suo primo convento:
‘Andate, e predicate al mondo ciance’;
ma diede lor verace fondamento;
 e quel tanto sonò ne le sue guance,
sì ch’a pugnar per accender la fede
de l’Evangelio fero scudo e lance.
 Ora si va con motti e con iscede
a predicare, e pur che ben si rida,
gonfia il cappuccio e più non si richiede.8
and, on the power of the keys and Peter’s injunction to admit the contrite 
in spirit, these (lines115-29) from Purgatorio IX:
 Cenere, o terra che secca si cavi,
d’un color fora col suo vestimento;
e di sotto da quel trasse due chiavi.
 L’una era d’oro e l’altra era d’argento;
pria con la bianca e poscia con la gialla
fece a la porta sì, ch’i’ fu’ contento.
 “Quandunque l’una d’este chiavi falla,
che non si volga dritta per la toppa”,
diss’ elli a noi, “non s’apre questa calla.
 Più cara è l’una; ma l’altra vuol troppa
d’arte e d’ingegno avanti che diserri,
perch’ ella è quella che ’l nodo digroppa.
 Da Pier le tegno; e dissemi ch’i’ erri
anzi ad aprir ch’a tenerla serrata,
pur che la gente a’ piedi mi s’atterri.”9
8 Florence has not so many Lapos and Bindos as fables such as these that are shouted 
the year long from the pulpits on every side; so that the poor sheep, who know naught, 
return form the pasture fed with wind – and not seeing the harm does not excuse them. 
Christ did not say to his first company, “Go and preach idle stories to the world”, but 
he gave them the true foundation; and that alone sounded on their lips, so that to fight 
for kindling of the faith they made shield and lance of the gospel. Now men go forth to 
preach with jests and with buffooneries, and so there be only a good laugh, the cowl puffs 
up and nothing more is asked.
9 Ashes, or earth that is dug out dry, would be of one colour with his vesture, and from 
beneath it he drew two keys, the one of gold and the other of silver. First with the white 
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Here, though, we need to be careful, for committed as it is to the care 
of Peter and to those standing in the line of Petrine descent, the Church as 
but the body of Christ in its continuing presence to us is committed to one 
whose authority is not that of Christ himself, but of a delegate and appointee. 
On the one hand, then, these passages from the Monarchia (III.iii.7 and III.
vii.4-8) on equivalence and non-equivalence in the area of proper authority:
Summus nanque Pontifex, domini nostri Iesu Cristi vicarius et Petri 
successor, cui non quicquid Cristo sed quicquid Petro debemus, 
zelo fortasse clavium, necnon alii gregum cristianorum pastores, et 
alii quos credo zelo solo matris Ecclesie promoveri, veritati quam 
ostensurus sum de zelo forsan   ut dixi   non de superbia contradicunt 
... Et si quis instaret de vicarii equivalentia, inutilis est instantia; 
quia nullus vicariatus, sive divinus sive humanus, equivalere potest 
principali auctoritati: quod patet de levi. Nam scimus quod successor 
Petri non equivalet divine auctoritati saltem in operatione nature: non 
enim posset facere terram ascendere sursum, nec ignem descendere 
deorsum per offitium sibi commissum. Nec etiam possent omnia sibi 
commicti a Deo, quoniam potestatem creandi et similiter baptizandi 
nullo modo Deus commictere posset, ut evidenter probatur, licet 
Magister contrarium dixerit in quarto.  Scimus etiam quod vicarius 
hominis non equivalet ei, quantum in hoc quod vicarius est, quia 
nemo potest dare quod suum non est. Auctoritas principalis non est 
principis nisi ad usum, quia nullus princeps se ipsum auctorizare 
potest; recipere autem potest atque dimictere, sed alium creare non 
potest, quia creatio principis ex principe non dependet. Quod si ita est, 
manifestum est quod nullus princeps potest sibi substituere vicarium 
in omnibus equivalentem: qua re instantia nullam efficaciam habet.10
and then with the yellow he did so to the gate that I was content. “Whenever one of these 
keys fails so that it does not turn rightly in the lock”, he said to us, “this passage does 
not open. The one is more precious; but the other requires great skill and wisdom before 
it will unlock, for this is the one that disentangles the knot. From Peter I hold them, 
and he told me to err rather in opening than in keeping shut, if but the people prostrate 
themselves at my feet”. Otherwise on the power of the keys, Mon. III.i.5: ‘et queritur 
utrum auctoritas Monarche romani, qui de iure Monarcha mundi est, ut in secundo 
libro probatum est, inmediate a Deo dependeat an ab aliquo Dei vicario vel ministro, 
quem Petri successorem intelligo, qui vere claviger est regni celorum’; Inf. XIX.100-
105; XXVII.100-105; Par. XXIII.136-39; XXIV. 34-39; XXVII.46-51; XXXII.124-26, 
etc. P. Armour, The Door of Purgatory. A Study of Multiple Symbolism in Dante’s ‘Purgatorio’ 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 76-99; C. Ross, ‘Canto IX. The Ritual Keys’, in 
Lectura Dantis. Purgatorio, ed. A. Mandelbaum et al. (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 2008) , pp. 85-94.
10 For the supreme Pontiff, the vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ and Peter’s successor, to 
whom we owe not what is due to Christ but what is due to Peter, perhaps motivated by 
a zealous concern for the keys, and with him other shepherds of the Christian flock and 
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while on the other, these (III.xvi.10 and 15) from the final moments of the 
book on the status of imperial no less than of papal office as a product of 
divine intentionality:
Propter quod opus fuit homini duplici directivo secundum duplicem 
finem: scilicet summo Pontifice, qui secundum revelata humanum 
genus perduceret ad vitam ecternam, et Imperatore, qui secundum 
phylosophica documenta genus humanum ad temporalem felicitatem 
dirigeret ... Sic ergo patet quod auctoritas temporalis Monarche sine 
ullo medio in ipsum de fonte universalis auctoritatis descendit: qui 
quidem fons, in arce sue simplicitatis unitus, in multiplices alveos 
influit ex habundantia bonitatis.11
It is, then, from out of a sense of the Church thus understood, as that 
whereby man is confirmed in his ultimate happiness in and through God’s 
provision for him by way of the Christ and of those commissioned by the 
Christ in expectation of his coming again, that Dante embarks on his litany 
of indictment; so, for example, the ‘I’ non so s’ i’ mi fui qui troppo folle’ 
passage of Inf. XIX.88-105 on clerical greed and on the blasphemy thereof:
others who I believe act only out of zealous concern for Mother Church: these people 
oppose the truth I am about to demonstrate – perhaps, as I said, out of zealous concern and 
not out of pride ... And if anyone were to base an objection on a vicar’s being equivalent, 
the objection has no force, for no vicariate, human or divine, can be equivalent to the 
primary authority; and this is easy to see. For we know that Peter’s successor is not the 
equivalent of divine authority at least as regards the workings of nature, for he could 
not make earth rise nor fire descend by virtue of the office entrusted to him. Nor could 
all things be entrusted to him by God, since God certainly could not entrust to him the 
power to create and the power to baptize, as is quite apparent, although Peter Lombard 
expressed the contrary opinion in his fourth book. We also know that a man’s vicar, in 
as much as he is his vicar, is not equivalent to him, because no one can give away what 
does not belong to him. A prince’s authority belongs to a prince only as something for his 
use, for no prince can confer authority on himself; he can accept it and renounce it, but 
he cannot create another prince, for the creation of a prince is not dependent on a prince. 
If this is the case, it is clear that no prince can appoint a vicar to take his place who is 
equivalent to him in all things; thus the objection has no force.
11 It is for this reason that man had need of two guides corresponding to his twofold 
goal: that is to say the supreme Pontiff, to lead mankind to eternal life in conformity with 
revealed truth, and the Emperor, to guide mankind to temporal happiness in conformity 
with the teachings of philosophy ... Thus it is evident then that the authority of the 
temporal monarch flows down into him without any intermediary from the fountainhead 
of universal authority; this fountainhead, though one in the citadel of its own simplicity 
of nature, flows into many streams from the abundance of his goodness. On the precise 
relationship of imperial and philosophical authority as twin co-efficients in respect of the 
happiness of this life (the ‘secundum phylosophica documenta’ of III.xvi.10), J. Took, 
‘“Diligite iustitiam qui iudicatis terram”: Justice and the Just Ruler in Dante’, in Dante and 
Governance, ed. J. R. Woodhouse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 137-51.
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 Io non so s’i’ mi fui qui troppo folle,
ch’i’ pur rispuosi lui a questo metro:
“Deh, or mi dì: quanto tesoro volle
 Nostro Segnore in prima da san Pietro
ch’ei ponesse le chiavi in sua balìa?
Certo non chiese se non ‘Viemmi retro’.
 Né Pier né li altri tolsero a Matia
oro od argento, quando fu sortito
al loco che perdé l’anima ria.
 Però ti sta, ché tu se’ ben punito;
e guarda ben la mal tolta moneta
ch’esser ti fece contra Carlo ardito.
 E se non fosse ch’ancor lo mi vieta
la reverenza de le somme chiavi
che tu tenesti ne la vita lieta,
 io userei parole ancor più gravi;
ché la vostra avarizia il mondo attrista,
calcando i buoni e sollevando i pravi”.12
or the ‘tosto libere fien de l’avoltero’ passage of Par. IX.133-42 on the 
Church’s desertion the Nazarene in favour of the decretalists:
 Per questo l’Evangelio e i dottor magni
son derelitti, e solo ai Decretali
si studia, sì che pare a’ lor vivagni.
 A questo intende il papa e ’ cardinali;
non vanno i lor pensieri a Nazarette,
là dove Gabrïello aperse l’ali.
 Ma Vaticano e l’altre parti elette
di Roma che son state cimitero
a la milizia che Pietro seguette,
 tosto libere fien de l’avoltero.13
12 I do not know if here I was overbold, in answering him in just this strain: “Pray now 
tell me how much treasure did our Lord require of St Peter before he put the keys into his 
keeping? Surely he asked nothing save ‘Follow me’. Nor did Peter or the others take gold 
or silver of Matthias when he was chosen for the office which the guilty soul had lost. 
Therefore stay right here, for you are justly punished; and guard well the ill-got gain that 
made you bold against Charles. And were it not that reverence for the great keys which 
you held in the glad life even now forbids it to me, I would use yet harder words, for your 
avarice afflicts the world, trampling down the good and exalting the poor.”
13 For this the gospel and the great doctors are deserted, and only the decretals are 
studied, as may be seen from their margins. Thereon the pope and the cardinals are 
intent. Their thoughts go not to Nazareth whither Gabriel spread his wings. But the 
Vatican and the other chosen parts of Rome which have been the burial place for the 
soldiery that followed Peter shall soon be free from this adultery.
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or the ‘il luogo mio, il luogo mio, il luogo mio’ passage of Par. XXVII.16-27 
on the stench of ecclesiastical corruption:
 La provedenza, che quivi comparte
vice e officio, nel beato coro
silenzio posto avea da ogne parte,
 quand’ ïo udi’: “Se io mi trascoloro,
non ti maravigliar, ché, dicend’ io,
vedrai trascolorar tutti costoro.
 Quelli ch’usurpa in terra il luogo mio,
il luogo mio, il luogo mio, che vaca
ne la presenza del Figliuol di Dio,
 fatt’ ha del cimitero mio cloaca
del sangue e de la puzza; onde ’l perverso
che cadde di qua sù, là giù si placa”.14
For Dante, then, papacy, piracy and profligacy – indeed papacy, piracy 
and prostitution (the ‘puttana sciolta’ passage of Purg. XXXII.148-60)15 – 
flow one into the other, reinforcing as they do so their joint capacity for 
scandalizing the pious spirit. But – and this now is the point – Dante’s, for 
all the strength of its indictment, is a discourse contained by, rather than 
challenging, his ecclesiology, his sense of the Church in its hierocracy, 
its apostolicity and its sacramentality. None of this is at stake. What is at 
stake is not the idea, but the practicality of it all, the maladministration by 
those entrusted with it, of Christ’s substance and legacy. 
If not here, then, where is the Dantean protest, that element of restiveness 
and of rethinking marking him out as a Christian poet and prophet? The 
answer is twofold, Dante’s being a sense (a) of the cultural encounter 
generally, as distinct from the ecclesiastical encounter in particular, as 
a channel of grace, and (b) of episcopacy as, whatever else it is, a matter 
of self-episcopacy, of self-oversight on the plane of properly human being 
and doing, these things between them making for an opening-out of the 
14 The providence which there assigns turn and office had imposed silence on the blessed 
choir on every side, when I heard, “If I change colour, marvel not, for, as I speak, you shall 
see all these change colour. He who on earth usurps my place, my place, my place, which 
in the sight of the Son of God is vacant, has made my burial-ground a sewer of blood and 
of stench, so that the perverse one who fell from here above takes comfort there below”. 
15 [Secure, like a fortress on a high mountain, there appeared to me] an ungirt harlot [sitting 
upon it, with eyes quick to rove around]. The passage in its entirety runs as follows: ‘Sicura, 
quasi rocca in alto monte, / seder sovresso una puttana sciolta / m’apparve con le ciglia intorno 
pronte; / e come perché non li fosse tolta, / vidi di costa a lei dritto un gigante; / e basciavansi 
insieme alcuna volta. / Ma perché l’occhio cupido e vagante / a me rivolse, quel feroce drudo / 
la flagellò dal capo infin le piante; / poi, di sospetto pieno e d’ira crudo, / disciolse il mostro, e 
trassel per la selva, / tanto che sol di lei mi fece scudo / a la puttana e a la nova belva.’
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ecclesiastical upon the existential, upon existence itself, in all the myriad 
determinacy of existence, as enlisted and empowered as a means of divine 
purposefulness. To take then, the first of these things – the status of the 
cultural encounter generally, as distinct from the ecclesiastical encounter 
in particular, as a means of grace – we may begin by noting that references 
in the Commedia to the sacraments, even to the sacraments of baptism and 
the eucharist, are few and far between and, as often as not, either allusive 
or parodistic;16 so, for example, as regards baptism, the ‘cleansing with the 
reed’ episode of Purg. I.94-99 and 130-36 or the Lethe and Eunoè episodes 
of Purg. XXXI.91-105 and XXXIII.127-45, and, as regards the eucharist, 
the cases of Ugolino and of Lucifer, each alike suggestive of the substance 
and significance of the sacrament in question, but at an imaginative remove, 
indirectly rather than in any sense systematically. How, then, are we to 
account for this situation? By way not so much of the attenuated importance 
of these things in a discourse of anagogical inspiration (the sacramental 
phase of the religious life now slipping into the past), but of a preoccupation 
in Dante with the encounter itself, in all the incarnational intensity of the 
encounter, as a means of grace and principle of salvation. This at any rate, or 
something close to it, is the implication of the Virgilian and the Beatrician 
moment of the text, each alike present to him as soteriologically significant; 
on the one hand, then, as regards the Virgilian moment, these lines (40-
54) from Canto XXX of the Purgatorio, secure in their sense of the salvific 
substance of it all, of the encounter itself as the way of emergence:
 Tosto che ne la vista mi percosse
l’alta virtù che già m’avea trafitto
prima ch’io fuor di püerizia fosse,
 volsimi a la sinistra col respitto
col quale il fantolin corre a la mamma
quando ha paura o quando elli è afflitto,
 per dicere a Virgilio: ‘Men che dramma
di sangue m’è rimaso che non tremi:
16 To the fore among Dante’s references to baptism, Inf. IV.31-36 and Par. XXV.1-12 on 
baptism as the ‘portal of faith’ (Inf. IV.36), Par. XXXII.76-84 on baptism as confirmation 
of being in Christ, and Par. XX.127-29 on the baptism of grace preceding baptism proper 
by a thousand years (‘Quelle tre donne li fur per battesmo / che tu vedesti da la destra rota, 
/ dinanzi al battezzar più d’un millesmo’). On marriage, after Matt. 22:30 and in addition 
(but metaphorically) to the Neque nubent of Purg. XIX.136-38, Inf., XIX.1-4, Par. X.139-44, 
XI.55-66 and XXXI.1-3. On ordination, and apart from the ‘sommo officio’ and ‘ordini 
sacri’ moment of Inf. XXVII.85-93 (itself scarcely systematic), the crowning and mitring 
moment of Purg. XXVII ult. (but see below on this passage). P. Armour, The Door of Purgatory. 
A Study of Multiple Symbolism in Dante’s ‘Purgatorio’ (note 9 above), pp. 5 ff.; E. Ardissino, ‘La 
storia dell’eterno e il rinnovamento battesimale del poeta’, in Tempo liturgico e tempo storico nella 
“Commedia” di Dante (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), pp. 89-108.
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conosco i segni de l’antica fiamma’.
 Ma Virgilio n’avea lasciati scemi
di sé, Virgilio dolcissimo patre,
Virgilio a cui per mia salute die’mi;
 né quantunque perdeo l’antica matre,
valse a le guance nette di rugiada,
che, lagrimando, non tornasser atre.17
while on the other, and as far now as the Beatrician moment of his experience 
is concerned, these (lines 70-93) from Canto XXXI of the Paradiso, similarly 
committed to the status of the encounter, in all the particularity of the 
encounter, as the in-and-through-which of new life:
 Sanza risponder, li occhi sù levai,
e vidi lei che si facea corona
reflettendo da sé li etterni rai.
 Da quella regïon che più sù tona
occhio mortale alcun tanto non dista,
qualunque in mare più giù s’abbandona,
 quanto lì da Beatrice la mia vista;
ma nulla mi facea, ché süa effige
non discendëa a me per mezzo mista.
 “O donna in cui la mia speranza vige,
e che soffristi per la mia salute
in inferno lasciar le tue vestige,
17 As soon as on my sight the lofty virtue smote that had already pierced me before I was out 
of my boyhood, I turned to the left with the confidence of a little child that runs to his mother 
when he is frightened or in distress, to say to Virgil, “Not a drop of blood is left in me that does 
not tremble: I know the tokens of the ancient flame”. But Virgil had left us bereft of himself, 
Virgil sweetest father, Virgil to whom I gave myself for my salvation; nor did all that our 
ancient mother lost keep my dew-washed cheeks from turning dark again with tears.  See too 
as regards the soteriological significance of the Virgilian moment of his experience in the case 
now of Statius, the ‘Per te poeta fui, per te cristiano’ moment of Purg. XXII.55-75:‘“Or quando 
tu cantasti le crude armi / de la doppia trestizia di Giocasta”, / disse ’l cantor de’ buccolici carmi, 
/ “per quello che Clïò teco lì tasta, / non par che ti facesse ancor fedele / la fede, sanza qual ben 
far non basta. / Se così è, qual sole o quai candele / ti stenebraron sì, che tu drizzasti / poscia 
di retro al pescator le vele?”. / Ed elli a lui: “Tu prima m’invïasti / verso Parnaso a ber ne le sue 
grotte, / e prima appresso Dio m’alluminasti. / Facesti come quei che va di notte, / che porta il 
lume dietro e sé non giova, / ma dopo sé fa le persone dotte, / quando dicesti: ‘Secol si rinova; / 
torna giustizia e primo tempo umano, / e progenïe scende da ciel nova’. / Per te poeta fui, per te 
cristiano: / ma perché veggi mei ciò ch’io disegno, / a colorare stenderò la mano”’. T. Barolini, 
Dante’s Poets. Textuality and Truth in the Comedy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1984), especially pp. 256-69; G. Brugnoli, ‘Statius christianus’, Italianistica 17 (1988), 1, 9-15; 
C. Kallendorf and H. Kallendorf, ‘“Per te poeta fui, per te cristiano” (Purg. 22.73). Statius as 
Christian, from “Fact” to “Fiction”’, Deutsches Dante-Jahrbuch 77 (2002), 61-72; P. M. Clogan, 
‘Dante and Statius: Revisited’, Medievalia et Humanistica 35 (2009), 77-101.
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 di tante cose quant’ i’ ho vedute,
dal tuo podere e da la tua bontate
riconosco la grazia e la virtute.
 Tu m’hai di servo tratto a libertate
per tutte quelle vie, per tutt’ i modi
che di ciò fare avei la potestate.
 La tua magnificenza in me custodi,
sì che l’anima mia, che fatt’ hai sana,
piacente a te dal corpo si disnodi”.
 Così orai; e quella, sì lontana
come parea, sorrise e riguardommi;
poi si tornò a l’etterna fontana.18
Now grace, as nothing other than the extrinsication or outpouring of the 
love-substance of the Godhead, everywhere abounds in the Commedia, and 
everywhere abounds as the prior and perpetual condition of man’s proper 
homecoming as man, as that whereby, in and through the love-solicitude 
of the Father, he lays hold of the deiformity or Godlikeness to which he 
is called from beforehand. But within the economy of the Commedia as an 
account of the ‘indiarsi’ or in-Godding of self as the final cause of every 
significant inflexion of the spirit, grace thus understood, as nothing but 
the overflowing of divine goodness in ever new channels of creative and 
recreative concern, is mediated as much by the encounter as by the forms 
and formularies of the Church, at which point ecclesiology gives way to 
something closer to a theology of culture as a way of seeing and setting up 
the soteriological issue. Emphatically, nothing is lost here ecclesiologically, 
for Dante’s, in the Commedia, is a rejoicing both in the unspeakable sweetness 
of the liturgical moment and in the refined substance of prayer under the 
aspect both of praise and of intercession.19 But for all that, the journey into 
18 Without answering I lifted up my eyes and saw her where she made for herself a crown 
as she reflected the eternal rays. From the region which thunders most high no mortal eye 
is so distant, were it plunged most deep within the sea, as there from Beatrice was my 
sight. But to me it made no difference, for her image came down to me unblurred by aught 
between. “O lady in whom my hope is strong, and who for my salvation did endure to leave 
in hell your footprints, all those things which I have seen I acknowledge the grace and 
the virtue to be from your power and your excellence. It is you who have drawn me from 
bondage into liberty by all those paths, by all those means by which you had the power so 
to do. Preserve in me your great munificence, so that my soul which you have made whole, 
may be loosed from the body, pleasing unto you.” So did I pray; and she, so distant as she 
seemed, smiled and looked on me, then turned again to the eternal fountain.
19 J. C. Barnes, ‘Vestiges of the Liturgy in Dante’s Verse’, in Dante and the Middle Ages, 
ed. J. C. Barnes and C. Ó Cuilleanáin (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995), pp. 231-
270; E. Alberione, ‘Liturgie della speranza nel Purgatorio dantesco’, in Purgatorio (Milan: 
San Fedele, 1996), pp. 54-67; R. L. Martinez, ‘L’“amoroso canto”. Liturgy and Vernacular 
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God is existentially rather than ecclesially conceived, effected by way, not of 
the strange semiosis of the sacrament, but of the sacredness of the event itself 
in all its power to persuade from out of its innermost recesses.
But with what amounts to a sense in Dante of the salvific status of 
the encounter generally we are still in the foothills where his version of 
the protest is concerned, for more impressive still is his fashioning from 
the idea of episcopacy something closer to self-episcopacy as the goal of 
moral and ontological aspiration. Now this too needs careful statement, 
for if on the one hand to be as man is to be in and through the power 
properly one’s own to moral self-determination, then there can, on the 
other, be no dispensing with the kind of episcopal oversight whereby self 
is encouraged and sustained from beyond self as a pilgrim spirit; so, for 
example, these lines from Paradiso V (73-78) with their commitment, not 
only to Scripture, but to pastoral care as the way of salvation:
 Siate, Cristiani, a muovervi più gravi:
non siate come penna ad ogne vento,
e non crediate ch’ogne acqua vi lavi.
 Avete il novo e ’l vecchio Testamento,
e ’l pastor de la Chiesa che vi guida;
questo vi basti a vostro salvamento.20
or these (lines 13-18) from the next canto on the place of the priest and 
above all of the Pope as pastor to the perplexed:
Lyric in Dante’s Purgatorio’, Dante Studies 127 (2009), 93-127; idem, ‘Place and Times of the 
Liturgy from Dante to Petrarch’, in Petrarch and Dante. Anti-dantism, Metaphysics, Tradition, 
ed. Z. G. Barański (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2009), pp. 320-370. On 
prayer and prayerfulness, E. Auerbach, ‘La preghiera di Dante alla Vergine (Par. XXXIII) 
ed antecedenti elogi’, in Studi su Dante (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1984), pp. 273-308; N. Costanzo, ‘I 
versi 1-21 della preghiera alla Vergine. Ipotesi di rilettura’, in L’Alighieri. Rassegna bibliografica 
dantesca 28 (1987), 2, 26-47 (and in Curiosità del ritmo poetico (Pasian di Prato: Campanotto, 
2003), pp. 31-65); A. Vallone, ‘Par. XXXIII: la preghiera, l’uso della scuola e l’insufficienza 
della parola’, in Cultura e mxemoria in Dante (Naples: Guida, 1988), pp. 59-119; F. Salsano, 
‘Nella preghiera alla Vergine un percorso melodico. Considerazioni sul Canto XXXIII del 
Paradiso’, in L’Osservatore Romano, 8 dicembre (1991), p. 3 (with a revised version entitled 
‘Canto XXXIII’, in Lecturae Dantis (Ravenna: Longo 2003), pp. 242-53); G. Barberi 
Squarotti, ‘La preghiera alla Vergine: Dante e Petrarca’, Filologia e Critica 20 (1995), 2-3, 
365-74 (subsequently in Il tragico cristiano da Dante ai moderni (Florence: Olschki, 2003), pp. 
87-95); P. A. Perotti, ‘La preghiera alla Vergine (Par. XXXIII.1-39)’, in L’Alighieri. Rassegna 
bibliografica dantesca 36 (1995), 6, 75-83; R. Migliorini Fissi, ‘La preghiera alla Vergine 
(Paradiso XXXIII, vv. 1-39)’, in Archivio Perugino-Pievese, 3 (2000), 1, 115-33; R. Scrivano, 
‘Superbia, umiltà e preghiera in Purgatorio XI’, in Esperienze Letterarie 31 (2006), 3, 3-19.
20 Be graver, you Christians, in moving. Be not like a feather to every wind, and think 
not that every water may cleanse you. You have the New Testament and the Old, and the 
shepherd of the Church, to guide you.
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 E prima ch’io a l’ovra fossi attento,
una natura in Cristo esser, non piùe,
credea, e di tal fede era contento;
 ma ’l benedetto Agapito, che fue
sommo pastore, a la fede sincera
mi dirizzò con le parole sue.21
or these from the Monarchia at III.xv.3 on feeding the sheep as the very 
stuff of the Church Militant:
Forma autem Ecclesie nichil aliud est quam vita Cristi, tam in dictis 
quam in factis comprehensa : vita enim ipsius ydea fuit et exemplar 
militantis Ecclesie, presertim pastorum, maxime summi, cuius est 
pascere agnos et oves.22
Everywhere, then, it is a question of priestly oversight, of a species 
of superintendency designed in response to the gospel imperative to 
ensure the well-being of Christ’s flock, to exercise, in short, a duty 
of care and compassion. But – and this now is what matters – for all 
the indispensability of shepherding thus understood to any kind of 
ultimate homecoming, there can be no question of Dante’s privileging 
the heteronomous over the autonomous component of human experience 
under the conditions of time and space, the regulative over the self-
regulative component, for herein – in the power of self to self-governance 
– lies the ground and guarantee of man’s likeness to God as a creature 
of self-understanding and of self-determination; hence the following 
passage from Canto XXVII of the Purgatorio designed precisely to 
confirm and celebrate the entry of the soul into its own company, there 
to rejoice in the completeness of its regal and episcopal sufficiency:
 “Quel dolce pome che per tanti rami
cercando va la cura de’ mortali,
oggi porrà in pace le tue fami”.
 Virgilio inverso me queste cotali
parole usò; e mai non furo strenne
che fosser di piacere a queste iguali.
 Tanto voler sopra voler mi venne
21 And before I had put my mind to this work, one nature and no more I held to be in 
Christ, and with that faith I was content; but the blessed Agapetus, who was the supreme 
pastor, directed me to the true faith by his words.
22 Now the form of the Church is simply the life of Christ, including both his words and 
his deeds; for his life was the model and exemplar for the Church Militant, especially for 
the pastors, and above all for the supreme pastor, whose task is to feed the lambs and the 
sheep. John 21:15-17.
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de l’esser sù, ch’ad ogne passo poi
al volo mi sentia crescer le penne.
 Come la scala tutta sotto noi
fu corsa e fummo in su ’l grado superno,
in me ficcò Virgilio li occhi suoi,
 e disse: “Il temporal foco e l’etterno
veduto hai, figlio; e se’ venuto in parte
dov’ io per me più oltre non discerno.
 Tratto t’ho qui con ingegno e con arte;
lo tuo piacere omai prendi per duce;
fuor se’ de l’erte vie, fuor se’ de l’arte.
 Vedi lo sol che ’n fronte ti riluce;
vedi l’erbette, i fiori e li arbuscelli
che qui la terra sol da sé produce.
 Mentre che vegnan lieti li occhi belli
che, lagrimando, a te venir mi fenno,
seder ti puoi e puoi andar tra elli.
 Non aspettar mio dir più né mio cenno;
libero, dritto e sano è tuo arbitrio,
e fallo fora non fare a suo senno:
 per ch’io te sovra te corono e mitrio”.
(Purg. XXVII.115-42)23
Predictable as this is as a point of arrival in respect of what amounts in 
the first two canticles of the Commedia to a song of descents and of ascents 
on the part of the ontically anxious subject, it comes as a shock to see it 
in black and white, Dante’s in this sense being a radical internalization of 
every authoritarian structure in the Church, a fashioning from observance 
and obedience something closer to an inner discipline of the Spirit. If, then, 
princes and prelates have their part to play in facilitating the process of 
23 “That sweet fruit which the care of mortals goes seeking on so many branches, this 
day shall give your hungering peace.” Such were Virgil’s words to me, and never were 
there gifts that could be equal in pleasure to these. Such wish upon wish came to me to 
be above, that at every step thereafter I felt my feathers growing for the flight. When all 
the stair was sped beneath us and we were on the topmost step, Virgil fixed his eyes on 
me and said, “The temporal fire and the eternal you have seen, my son, and are to come 
to a part where I of myself discern no farther onward. I have brought you here with 
understanding and with art. Take henceforth your own pleasure for your guide. Forth 
you are from the steep ways, forth from the narrow. See the sun that shines on your brow, 
see the tender grass, the flowers, the shrubs, which here the earth of itself alone produces; 
till the beautiful eyes come rejoicing which weeping made me come to you, you may sit 
or go among them. No longer expect a word or sign from me. Free, upright, and whole is 
your will, and it would be wrong not to act according to its pleasure; wherefore I crown 
and mitre you over yourself”.
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properly human being and becoming, dereliction by way either of vacancy 
or of violence making for catastrophe in the lives of those subject to them, 
there can, he thinks, be no delivering of self to anything other than its 
proper power to self-actualization, anything other than this, Dante must 
have thought, making less for the meat than for the milk of the moral and 
religious life, for something closer to the adolescent than to the adult as a 
disposition of the spirit. 
3. The first thing to say when it comes to Dante and the protestant 
principle is that there can be no question of fashioning from him a 
proto-protestant, a crypto-protestant or any other kind of protestant 
in any historically determinate sense of the word, Dante’s being an 
understanding of the religious situation generally and of the ecclesiological 
situation in particular predating both in the letter and in the spirit those 
of the great divide. On the contrary, both in its sacramentalism and in 
its sacerdotalism (neither, however, figuring prominently on his horizon 
of concern) his sense of the Church in respect of what it is and what it 
does remains a product of contemporary consciousness in all the, as far 
as he is concerned, unexceptionality of that consciousness. But for all 
that, and entirely without prejudice to the indispensibility of the rites and 
observances of the moral and religious life to its stable pursuit and orderly 
implementation, his is a thinking through of that life in terms, less of its 
ecclesiality, than of its existentiality, of its rootedness in, and transparency 
to a consummate act of specifically human being. Thus those same rights 
and observances, functional in the highest degree as that whereby the 
spirit knows itself in the rhythm of its journey into God, stand at last to be 
referred to something at once more profound and more primordial than 
themselves, at which point the protest – as indispensible to the life of the 
spirit as its forms and formularies – once again moves into view.
The Courage of the Commedia
 “Or va, ch’un sol volere è d’ambedue:
tu duca, tu segnore e tu maestro”.
Così li dissi; e poi che mosso fue,
 intrai per lo cammino alto e silvestro.
(Inf. II.139-42)1
1. Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be, and species of ontological anxiety: the anxiety of death 
and fate – the anxiety of guilt and condemnation – the anxiety of meaninglessness.  2. A 
further distinction: the courage to be as part and the courage to be as oneself.  3. Dante and the 
courage to be as part (civitas, imperium and ecclesia).  4. Dante and the courage to be as oneself: 
the moment of acknowledgement (Inferno), the moment of alignment (Purgatorio), and the 
moment of actualization (Paradiso).  5. Conclusion: the courage of the pilgrim and the 
courage of the poet.
In his book The Courage To Be, Paul Tillich identifies three forms of 
ontological anxiety, of the kind of anxiety which, transcending the merely 
circumstantial, rises up from the depths to constitute the dominant mood 
of existence. First comes the kind pertaining to being – by which we mean 
this or that instance of specifically human being – as it contemplates non-
being as its polar counterpart. This, Tillich calls the anxiety of fate and of 
death, an order of anxiety engendered by the rhythm of unpredictability in 
human experience and confirmed in its power to terrify by the prospect 
sooner rather than later of ceasing to be.2 Courage as the courage to be 
1 “Now on, for a single will is in us both; you are my leader, you my master and my 
teacher.” So I said to him, and when he moved on, I entered along the deep and savage 
way.  What follows is the revised version of a lecture by the same title delivered in 
University College London on 25 April, 2007 as the twelfth Alan Marre Maccabaeans 
Centenary Lecture in the Humanities. I am grateful to René Weiss, Professor of English 
in University College London and (at that time) Chair of the Maccabaeans Lectureship 
Committee for his kindness to me on that occasion.
2 Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (Glasgow: Collins, 1977; originally 1952), pp. 52-
53: ‘The threat of non-being to man’s ontic self-affirmation is absolute in the threat of 
death, relative in the threat of fate. But the relative threat is a threat only because in 
its background stands the absolute threat. Fate would not produce inescapable anxiety 
without death behind it. And death stands behind fate and its contingencies not only 
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enters into this situation as that whereby the individual seeks even so to 
affirm self in the fundamental intelligibility and thus in the fundamental 
security of self, thus offsetting as far as may be those forces operative both 
from within and from beyond making by way of fear for a tearing down, 
as distinct from a building up, of historical selfhood. This, Tillich notes, 
was what Plato had in mind when in attempting to identify the dynamic 
element in human experience, he settled upon its thymotic or spirited 
component (θυμος) as dwelling somewhere between reason and desire and 
quickening the whole in respect of its proper finality.3 It was what Aristotle 
had in mind when it came to the notion of bravery as a matter, not merely 
of military, but of moral concern, of a man’s readiness ‘to endure or fear 
the right things, for the right purpose, in the right manner, and at the right 
time’, all this making for a nobility of spirit.4 And it was what the Stoics 
in the last moment when one is thrown out of existence but in every moment within 
existence. Non-being is omnipresent and produces anxiety even where an immediate 
threat of death is absent. It stands behind the experience that we are driven, together with 
everything else, from the past toward the future without a moment of time which does 
not vanish immediately. It stands behind the insecurity and homelessness of our social 
and individual existence. It stands behind the attacks on our power of being in body and 
soul by weakness, disease and accidents. In all these fate actualizes itself, and through 
them the anxiety of non-being takes hold of us. We try to transform the anxiety into fear 
and to meet courageously the objects in which the threat is embodied. We succeed partly, 
but somehow we are aware of the fact that it is not these objects with which we struggle 
that produce the anxiety but the human situation as such. Out of this the question arises: 
Is there a courage to be, a courage to affirm oneself in spite of the threat against man’s 
ontic self-affirmation?’ Dante on the death as the far limit of significant activity, Purg. 
XXXIII.54: ‘del viver ch’è un correr a la morte’.
3 Plato, Republic IV.xv (440c-e): ‘Αληθῆ , ἔφη. Τί δὲ ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαί τις ἡγῆται; οὐκ 
ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ καί, διὰ τὸ πεινῆν 
καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν, ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει 
τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξηται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ 
τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ’ αὑτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραϋνθῇ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔοικε τούτῳ 
ᾧ λέγεις καίτοι γ’ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρὰ πόλει τοὺς ἐπικούρους ὥσπερ κύνας ἐθέμεθα 
ὑπηκόους τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ποιμένων πόλεως. Καλῶς γάρ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, νοείς 
ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἀλλ’ ἦ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμῇ; Τὸ ποῖον; ῞Οτι τοὐναντίον 
ἢ ἀρτίως ἡμῖν φαίνεται περὶ το θυμοειδοῦς. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ 
ᾠόμεθα εἶναι, νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμεν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς 
στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν.’
4 Aristotle, Nic. Eth. III.vii (1115b16-24): ‘ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ 
φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δε καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος κατ᾽ ἀξίαν γάρ, 
καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ 
τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, καὶ τῶ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος 
ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει 
τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.’ Thomas, ad loc. (III.xv, n. 6): ‘Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui 
sustinet quae oportet sustinere et fugit per timorem ea quae oportet vitare, et facit hoc 
eius gratia cuius oportet et eo modo quo oportet et quando oportet, vocatur fortis. Qui 
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had in mind when, sensitive to the challenge mounted by fate and death 
to the integrity and intelligibility of this or that act of specifically human 
being, they looked to the kind of self-sufficiency whereby the individual 
remains equal to the vicissitudes of the world as ranged over against him.5 
Courage thus understood, clearly, falls well short of the kind of courage 
whereby the guilt of estrangement is taken into self as the condition of its 
liquidation, Stoic courage in this sense being a matter, less of recognition 
than of resolve, of standing in the λόγος as a reply to the threat to existence 
everywhere mounted by existence. But for all that, it is ontological in 
kind, attuned to the problematics, not merely of right doing, but of right 
being as an object of concern.
But if the dominant species of anxiety in the ancient world is the 
anxiety of fate and of death, this, though never eclipsed as the deepest 
and most insistent form of ontological apprehension in human experience, 
is overlaid in successive periods of western sensibility by the anxiety of 
guilt and condemnation characteristic of the high Middle Ages and the 
early modern world, and by the anxiety of meaninglessness characteristic 
etiam similiter audet quae oportet, et cuius gratia et cetera. Et huius rationem assignat 
dicens quod quia fortis et virtuosus patitur per timorem et operatur per audaciam, 
secundum quod dignum est et secundum quod recta ratio dictat. Omnis enim virtus 
moralis est secundum rationem rectam, ut supra habitum est.’
5 The Courage To Be cit. (note 2 above), pp. 23-24: ‘The Stoic courage is, in the ontological 
as well as the moral sense, “courage to be”. It is based on the control of reason in man. But 
reason is not in either the old or the new Stoic what it is in contemporary terminology. 
Reason, in the Stoic sense, is not the power of “reasoning”, of arguing on the basis of 
experience and with the tools of ordinary or mathematical logic. Reason for the Stoics 
is the Logos, the meaningful structure of reality as a whole and of the human mind in 
particular. “If there is”, says Seneca, “no other attribute which belongs to man as man 
except reason, then reason will be his one good, worth all the rest put together”. This 
means that reason is man’s true or essential nature, in comparison with which everything 
else is accidental. The courage to be is the courage to affirm one’s own reasonable nature 
over against what is accidental in us. It is obvious that reason in this sense points to the 
person in his centre and includes all mental functions. Reasoning as a limited cognitive 
function, detached from the personal centre, never could create courage. One cannot 
remove anxiety by arguing it away. This is not a recent psychoanalytical discovery; the 
Stoics, when glorifying reason, knew it as well. They knew that anxiety can be overcome 
only through the power of universal reason which prevails in the wise man over desires 
and fears. Stoic courage presupposes the surrender of the personal centre to the Logos of 
being; it is participation in the divine power of reason, transcending the realm of passions 
and anxieties. The courage to be is the courage to affirm our own rational nature, in 
spite of everything in us that conflicts with its union with the rational nature of being-
itself.’ Cicero (in the course of his reconstruction of the moral systems of antiquity), De 
fin. III.ix.31: ‘Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis quas posui, et iis si quae similes earum 
sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum 
quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint 
reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere’, etc.
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of the modern world. The anxiety of guilt and condemnation is there 
whenever the individual sensitive to the part he himself has to play in 
the working out of his historical and eschatological destiny is at the same 
time possessed by a sense of his perversity, of his both willing and not 
willing at one and the same time. Impressed to the point of oppressed by 
his unrighteousness, he stands forever indicted in the forum of conscience 
and prey to despair.6 Courage as the courage to be enters into this situation 
as that whereby, embarking on the way of sorrowing and of repentance, 
the individual delivers himself to grace either as a principle of additional 
formality (Aquinas) or else as a principle of acceptability in the midst of 
unacceptibility (Luther), either way the burden of guilt and condemnation 
finding relief in a movement of faith as the beginning of new life. The 
anxiety of meaninglessness, by contrast, is there whenever the individual 
concerned on the plane of self-intelligibility feels unable to discern within 
6 The Courage To Be cit. (note 2 above), pp. 58-59: ‘Non-being threatens from a third 
side: it threatens man’s moral self-affirmation. Man’s being, ontic as well as spiritual, 
is not only given to him but also demanded of him. He is responsible for it; literally, 
he is required to answer, if he is asked, what he has made of himself. He who asks 
him is his judge, namely he himself, who, at the same time, stands against him. This 
situation produces the anxiety which in relative terms is the anxiety of guilt; in absolute 
terms, the anxiety of self-rejection or condemnation. Man is essentially “finite freedom”; 
freedom not in the sense of indeterminacy but in the sense of being able to determine 
himself through decisions in the centre of his being. Man, as finite freedom, is free 
within the contingencies of his finitude. But within these limits he is asked to make 
of himself what he is supposed to become, to fulfil his destiny. In every act of moral 
self-affirmation man contributes to the fulfilment of his destiny, to the actualization of 
what he potentially is. It is the task of ethics to describe the nature of this fulfilment, 
in philosophical or theological terms. But however the norm is formulated man has the 
power of acting against it, of contradicting his essential being, of losing his destiny. And 
under the conditions of man’s estrangement from himself this is an actuality. Even in 
what he considers his best deed non-being is present and prevents it from being perfect. 
A profound ambiguity between good and evil permeates everything he does, because it 
permeates his personal being as such ... The awareness of this ambiguity is the feeling 
of guilt. The judge who is oneself and who stands against oneself, he who “knows with” 
(conscience) everything we do and are, gives a negative judgment, experienced by us as 
guilt.’ Thomas on despair as sin, ST IIa IIae.20.1 resp.: ‘secundum philosophum, in VI 
Ethic., id quod est in intellectu affirmatio vel negatio est in appetitu prosecutio et fuga, 
et quod est in intellectu verum vel falsum est in appetitu bonum et malum. Et ideo omnis 
motus appetitivus conformiter se habens intellectui vero, est secundum se bonus, omnis 
autem motus appetitivus conformiter se habens intellectui falso, est secundum se malus 
et peccatum. Circa Deum autem vera existimatio intellectus est quod ex ipso provenit 
hominum salus, et venia peccatoribus datur; secundum illud Ezech. XVIII, nolo mortem 
peccatoris, sed ut convertatur et vivat. Falsa autem opinio est quod peccatori poenitenti 
veniam deneget, vel quod peccatores ad se non convertat per gratiam iustificantem. Et 
ideo sicut motus spei, qui conformiter se habet ad existimationem veram, est laudabilis 
et virtuosus; ita oppositus motus desperationis, qui se habet conformiter existimationi 
falsae de Deo, est vitiosus et peccatum.’
The Courage of the Commedia 175
him the still centre of that existence, this too serving both to sustain and 
to be sustained by a movement of despair.7 Courage as the courage to be 
enters now as that whereby the acknowledgement of meaninglessness 
comes in itself to constitute a meaningful act, at which point being, despite 
every inkling to the contrary, triumphs over non-being as a principle of 
self-understanding.8 Here too, therefore, in the context of anxiety as the 
anxiety of meaninglessness, courage as the courage to be breaks through 
to neutralize everything within the economy of personality making for 
resignation as a response to the agony of existence.
2. Now, however, the argument is subject to further inflexion, for the 
idea of courage thus understood – as a matter of the courage to be in 
respect of the anxiety of fate and death, of guilt and condemnation, 
and of meaninglessness – admits of a further distinction between the 
courage to be as part and the courage to be as oneself. By the expression 
‘courage to be as part’, Tillich has in mind the kind of courage 
whereby the individual alert to the problematics of his existence 
under the conditions of time and space seeks to assuage his anxiety 
by way of allegiance to the structures of collective and of institutional 
consciousness by which he is sustained and reassured in respect of the 
7 ibid., pp. 54-55: ‘The anxiety of meaninglessness is anxiety about the loss of an 
ultimate concern, of a meaning which gives meaning to all meanings. This anxiety is 
aroused by the loss of a spiritual centre, of an answer, however symbolic and indirect, to 
the question of the meaning of existence.’ Further on the place of systematic doubt in the 
spiritual life, and on the shading off of systematic doubt into existential despair, pp. 55-56: 
‘Emptiness and loss of meaning are expressions of the threat of non-being to the spiritual 
life. This threat is implied in man’s finitude and actualized by man’s estrangement. It can 
be described in terms of doubt, its creative and its destructive function in man’s spiritual 
life. Man is able to ask because he is separated from, while participating in, what he is 
asking about. In every question an element of doubt, the awareness of not having, is 
implied. In systematic questioning systematic doubt is effective, e.g. of the Cartesian 
type. This element of doubt is a condition of all spiritual life. The threat to spiritual life 
is not doubt as an element but total doubt. If awareness of not having has swallowed up 
the awareness of having, doubt has ceased to be methodological asking and has become 
existential despair.’
8 ibid., p. 171: ‘The faith which makes the courage of despair possible is the acceptance 
of the power of being, even in the grip of non-being. Even in the despair about meaning 
being affirms itself through us. The act of accepting meaninglessness is itself a meaningful 
act. It is an act of faith. We have seen that he who has the courage to affirm his being in 
spite of fate and guilt has not removed them. He remains threatened and hit by them. But 
he accepts his acceptance by the power of being-itself in which he participates and which 
gives him the courage to take the anxieties of fate and guilt upon himself. The same is 
true of doubt and meaninglessness. The faith which creates the courage to take them into 
itself has no special content. It is simply faith, undirected, absolute. It is undefinable, 
since everything defined is dissolved by doubt and meaninglessness.’
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otherwise impossible loneliness of his presence in the world.9 In fact, 
Tillich is careful in the course of his argument to distinguish between 
what he sees as primitive and as developed forms of the courage to be 
as part. Primitive versions – recrudescences of which, he thinks, are 
discernible in certain kinds of modern totalitarianism – are primitive 
in the degree to which the collective solution is espoused as a matter 
of course, there being as yet no developed sense of the problematics 
of selfhood.10 Advanced manifestations of this same phenomenon, 
however, are advanced in the degree to which, albeit within the 
context of collective consciousness as the means of self-actualization, 
there is even so some doubt as to the power of that consciousness fully 
to resolve the sensation of personal anxiety, an element of misgiving 
thus ruling out unqualified submergence of the private in the collective 
– a situation discernible, Tillich thinks, in the bourgeois conformism 
of the modern world. Even so, the fundamental pattern is the same, 
the courage to be as part commending itself as a way of overcoming the 
sensation of ontological anxiety and thus of drawing its sting. True, 
without the courage to be as oneself as its innermost principle, Tillich 
says,11 the courage to be as part can never be equal to the problem it seeks 
to address, for the problem it seeks to address can only ever be resolved 
by a coming home of self to the deep reasons of self; but in the degree 
to which the soul in its far-offness is strengthened by the institutions 
and ideologies which it embraces and by which it is in turn embraced 
9 ibid., p. 93: ‘The courage to be as part is the courage to affirm one’s own being by 
participation. One participates in the world to which one belongs and from which one 
is at the same time separated. But participating in the world becomes real through 
participation in those sections of it which constitute one’s own life. The world as a whole 
is potential, not actual. Those sections are actual with which one is partially identical. The 
more self-relatedness a being has the more it is able, according to the polar structure of 
reality, to participate. Man as the completely centred being or as a person can participate 
in everything, but he participates through that section of the world which makes him a 
person. Only in the continuous encounter with other persons does the person become and 
remain a person. The place of this encounter is the community.’
10 In the context of primitive collectivism, the individual ‘affirms himself through the 
group in which he participates. The potential anxiety of losing himself is not actualized, 
because the identification with the group is complete. Non-being in the form of the threat 
of loss of self in the group has not yet appeared’ (ibid., p. 95).
11 ibid., pp. 94-95: ‘There is no collective anxiety save an anxiety which has overtaken 
many or all members of a group and has been intensified or changed by becoming 
universal. The same is true of what is wrongly called collective courage. There is no 
entity “we-self” as the subject of courage. There are selves who participate in a group 
and whose character is partly determined by this participation. The assumed we-self is a 
common quality of ego-selves within a group. The courage to be as part is like all forms 
of courage, a quality of individual selves.’
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as a means of affirmation, it holds at bay  the structures of destruction 
by which it is threatened both from within and from beyond.
By the expression courage to be as oneself Tillich means the kind of 
courage whereby, anxious in respect of the problematics of historical 
selfhood, the individual seeks to address this anxiety by way, not now of 
social, institutional or ideological alignment, but of an encounter with self 
in the depths. Sensitive to the forces at work within him making by turns 
for being and for non-being, and yet unwilling either by formation or by 
conviction, or both, to deliver himself to the collective solution, he looks 
instead to the interrogation of his own existence as a point of departure, 
the courage to be as oneself, therefore, taking the form of a seeking out of 
the deep rationality of self as glimpsed across its surface irrationality, 
across the clutter of high-level consciousness making in the ordinary way 
of things for distraction, confusion, and self-inexplicability. Tillich, with 
special reference at this point to the courage of the Enlightenment as, in 
this respect, exemplary, puts it thus:
Courage to be as oneself, as this is understood in the Enlightenment, 
is a courage in which individual self-affirmation includes 
participation in universal, rational, self-affirmation. Thus it is not the 
individual self as such which affirms itself but the individual self as 
the bearer of reason. The courage to be as oneself is the courage 
to follow reason and to defy irrational authority. In this respect – 
but only in this respect – it is neo-Stoicism. For the courage to be 
of the Enlightenment is not a resigned courage to be. It dares not 
only to face the vicissitudes of fate and the inescapability of death 
but to affirm itself as transforming reality according to the demands 
of reason. It is a fighting, daring courage. It conquers the threat of 
meaninglessness by courageous action. It conquers the threat of guilt 
by accepting errors, shortcomings, misdeeds in the individual as well 
as in social life as unavoidable and at the same time to be overcome 
by education. The courage to be as oneself within the atmosphere 
of Enlightenment is the courage to affirm oneself as a bridge from a 
lower to a higher state of rationality.12
Courage as the courage to be as oneself, therefore, is the courage of being 
in the structured character of being, herein lying its power to overcome 
the threat of non-being as its demonic counterpart. Now neither of these 
forms of courage, Tillich thinks, excludes the other, the courage to be as 
part everywhere bearing deep within itself something of the courage to be 
as oneself and the courage to be as oneself everywhere shading off into the 
12 ibid, pp. 116-17.
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courage to be as part, into the courage of belonging. Nonetheless, as a way of 
setting up the issue here – namely the interaction of anxiety and courage 
as paradigms of consciousness – the distinction may be allowed to stand. 
Both ontologically, in respect of its basic taxonomy, and historically, in 
respect of its basic phenomenology, it takes us to the heart of the matter.
3. Typically, Tillich thinks,13 the courage of the Middle Ages was the 
courage to be as part, the courage to affirm self by way of the great power-
configurations presiding over human affairs in this period and having 
about them both a prior and a providential status, a situation which Dante, 
with his sense of the city, empire and Church – of civitas, imperium, and 
ecclesia – as part of the pre-ordained pattern of things, reflects perfectly. 
First, then, comes the city, which, in addition to its function as a means 
of survival (no one man being equal to the practicalities of his existence), 
constitutes both a context and a co-efficient of historical selfhood, both 
the whereabouts and the means of a properly fulfilled humanity; on the 
one hand, then, and in respect first of all of survival pure and simple, this 
passage from the Convivio at IV.iv.2: ‘E sì come un uomo a sua sufficienza 
richiede compagnia dimestica di famiglia, così una casa a sua sufficienza 
richiede una vicinanza: altrimenti molti difetti sosterrebbe che sarebbero 
impedimento di felicitade. E però che una vicinanza [a] sé non può in tutto 
satisfare, conviene a satisfacimento di quella essere la cittade’,14 while on the 
other, and as touching now on the idea of the city as the crucible of properly 
human being and becoming as determined in this or that individual by way 
of personality and/or vocation, these lines (115-48) from Paradiso VIII:
13 ibid., pp. 96-97: ‘The courage of the Middle Ages [...] is basically the courage to be as a 
part. The so-called realistic philosophy of the Middle Ages is a philosophy of participation. 
It presupposes that universals logically and collectives actually have more reality than 
the individual. The particular (literally: being a small part) has its power of being by 
participation in the universal. The self-affirmation expressed, for instance, in the self-respect 
of the individual is self-affirmation as follower of a feudal lord, or as the member of a guild, 
or as the student in an academic corporation, or as a bearer of a special function like that of a 
craft or a trade or a profession. But the Middle Ages, in spite of all primitive elements, is not 
primitive. Two things happened in the ancient world which separate medieval collectivism 
definitely from primitive collectivism. One of these was the discovery of personal guilt – 
called by the prophets guilt before God: the decisive step to the personalization of religion 
and culture. The other was the beginning of autonomous question-asking in Greek 
philosophy, the decisive step to the problematization of culture and religion. Both elements 
were transmitted to the medieval nations by the Church. With them went the anxiety of 
guilt and condemnation and the anxiety of doubt and meaninglessness.’
14 And just as the individual for his fulfilment requires the domestic society of a family, 
so the household requires for its fulfilment to be part of a neighbourhood; it would 
otherwise be lacking in many ways, and thus be precluded from attaining happiness. 
Again, a single neighbourhood cannot satisfy all its own needs; for this the city is required.
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 Ond’ elli ancora:  “Or dì: sarebbe il peggio
per l’omo in terra, se non fosse cive?”.
“Sì”, rispuos’ io; “e qui ragion non cheggio”.
 “E puot’ elli esser, se giù non si vive
diversamente per diversi offici?
Non, se ’l maestro vostro ben vi scrive”.
 Sì venne deducendo infino a quici;
poscia conchiuse: “Dunque esser diverse
convien di vostri effetti le radici:
 per ch’un nasce Solone e altro Serse,
altro Melchisedèch e altro quello
che, volando per l’aere, il figlio perse.
 La circular natura, ch’è suggello
a la cera mortal, fa ben sua arte,
ma non distingue l’un da l’altro ostello.
 Quinci addivien ch’Esaù si diparte
per seme da Iacòb; e vien Quirino
a sì vil padre, che si rende a Marte.
 Natura generata il suo cammino
simil farebbe sempre a’ generanti,
se non vincesse il proveder divino.
 Or quel che t’era dietro t’è davanti:
ma perché sappi che di te mi giova,
un corollario voglio che t’ammanti.
 Sempre natura, se fortuna trova
discorde a sé, com’ ogne altra semente
fuor di sua regïon, fa mala prova.
 E se ’l mondo là giù ponesse mente
al fondamento che natura pone,
seguendo lui, avria buona la gente.
 Ma voi torcete a la religïone
tal che fia nato a cignersi la spada,
e fate re di tal ch’è da sermone;
 onde la traccia vostra è fuor di strada”.15
15 “Now say, would it be worse for man on earth if he were not a citizen?” “Yes”, I replied, 
“and here I ask for no proof”. “And can that be, unless men below live in diverse ways for 
diverse duties? Not if your master writes well of this for you.” Thus he came deducing as 
far as here, then he concluded, “therefore the roots of your work must needs be diverse, so 
that one is born Solon and another Xerxes, one Melchizedeck and another he who flew 
through the air and lost his son. Circling nature, which is a seal on the mortal wax performs 
its art well, but does not distinguish one house from another. Whence it happens that Esau 
differs in seed from Jacob, and Quirinus comes from so base a father that he is ascribed to 
Mars. The begotten nature would always make its course like its begetters, did not divine 
provision overrule. Now that which was behind you is before you; but that you may know 
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It is then, by way of the special socio-political and cultural complexion 
of the city that the individual sees and lays hold of the moral and ontological 
possibilities properly his and his alone, of all that he has it in himself to 
be and to become, at which point courage as the courage to be as part – the 
courage, that is to say, of affirmation as a matter of allegiance – moves 
into view.
But that is not all, for no less indispensable to a consummate act of 
specifically human being is the empire as the ground and guarantee of 
universal peace.16 The idea is simple. Man as man, Dante maintains in 
the Monarchia, has a collective as well as a private end, the collective end 
that I delight in you, I will have a corollary cloak you round. Ever does nature, if she find 
fortune discordant with herself, like any kind of seed out of its proper region, come to ill 
result. And if the world below would give heed to the foundation which nature lays, and 
followed it, it would have its people good. But you wrest to religion one born to gird on the 
sword, and you make a king of one that is fit for sermons; so that your track is off the road”. 
Aristotle, Pol. I.2; 1252b27-29 (‘Quae autem ex pluribus vicis communitas perfects civitas, 
iam omnis, habens terminum per se sufficientiae’), etc., though see in relation to Dante and 
Aristotle, A. H. Gilbert, ‘Had Dante read the Politics of Aristotle’, Publications of the Modern 
Language Association 43 (1928), 3, 602-13; L. Minio Paluello, ‘Dante’s Reading of Aristotle’, 
in The World of Dante. Essays on Dante and his Times, ed. C. Grayson (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), pp. 61-80, subsequently in Luoghi cruciali in Dante, ed. F. Santi (Spoleto: Centro 
Italiano di Studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 1993), pp. 29-49, and in Dante. The Critical Complex, 
8 vols, ed. R. Lansing (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), vol. 3, pp. 35-54. On 
Dante and the city, E. Peters, ‘Pars, parte: Dante and an Urban Contribution to Political 
Thought’, in H. A. Miskimin et al. (eds), The Medieval City (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1977), pp. 113-40; C. Honess, ‘Feminine Virtues and Florentine Vices: Citizenship 
and Morality in Paradiso XV-XVII’, in J. R. Woodhouse (ed.), Dante and Governance 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 102-20; C. Keen, Dante and the City (Stroud: Tempus, 
2003). More generally, G. Holmes, ‘The Emergence of an Urban Ideology at Florence, c. 
1250-1450’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 22 (1973), 111-34; J. K. Hyde, Society 
and Politics in Medieval Italy. The Evolution of Civil Life, 1000-1350 (New York and London: St 
Martin’s Press, 1973); D. Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 3rd edn (London: Longman, 
1988); P. Jones, The Italian City State. From Comune to Signoria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997).
16 Preliminary in respect of an ample bibliography, F. Ercole, Il pensiero politico di Dante, 
2 vols (Milan: Alpes, 1927-28); F. Battaglia, Impero, Chiesa e Stati particolari nel pensiero di 
Dante (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1944); A. P. D’Entrèves, Dante as a Political Thinker (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952; repr. 1965); M. Barbi, ‘L’ideale politico-religioso di Dante’, ‘L’Italia 
nell’ideale politico di Dante’ and ‘Impero e Chiesa’, in Problemi fondamentali per un nuovo 
commento alla Divina Commedia (Florence: Sansoni, 1955), pp. 49-68, 69-89, 91-114; C. T. 
Davis, Dante and the Idea of Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); idem, Dante’s Italy and 
Other Essays (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984); B. Nardi, ‘Il concetto 
dell’Impero nello svolgimento del pensiero dantesco’ and ‘Tre pretese fasi del pensiero 
politico di Dante’, in Saggi di filosofia dantesca, 2nd edn (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1967), 
pp. 215-75 and 276-310; M. Maccarrone, ‘Papato e Impero nella Monarchia’, Nuove letture 
dantesche 8 (1976), 259-332; D. Mancusi-Ungaro, Dante and the Empire (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1987); J. R. Woodhouse (ed.), Dante and Governance (previous note).
The Courage of the Commedia 181
consisting in the actualization at any given moment of his total capacity 
for knowing and understanding. But actualization on any scale and with 
any degree of permanence requires a quiet mind and an untroubled spirit, 
which is where the emperor comes in, he and he alone being in a position 
to establish and maintain the peace and quiet necessary to the joint 
enterprise; on the notion, then, of collective intelligence and of universal 
peace as its prior and subsistent condition, these lines from not too far into 
the first book of the Monarchia:
Satis igitur declaratum est quod proprium opus humani generis 
totaliter accepti est actuare semper totam potentiam intellectus 
possibilis, per prius ad speculandum et secondario propter hoc 
ad operandum per suam extensionem. Et quia quemadmodum 
est in parte sic est in toto, et in homine particulari contingit 
quod sedendo et quiescendo prudentia et sapientia ipse perficitur, 
patet quod genus humanum in quiete sive tranquillitate pacis ad 
proprium suum opus ... liberrime atque facillime se habet. Unde 
manifestum est quod pax universalis est optimum eorum que ad 
nostram beatitudinem ordinantur.
(Mon. I.iv.1-2)17
while on the notion of peace and quiet thus understood as the responsibility 
17 Now it has been sufficiently explained that the activity proper to mankind considered 
as a whole is constantly to actualize the full intellectual potential of humanity, primarily 
through thought and secondarily through action (as a function and extension of thought). 
And since what holds true for the part is true for the whole, and an individual human 
being “grows perfect in judgment and wisdom when he sits at rest”, it is apparent that 
mankind most freely and readily attends to this activity ... in the calm or tranquillity of 
peace. Hence it is clear that universal peace is the best of those things which are ordained 
for our human happiness.  On the collective actualization of the possible intellect, Mon. 
I.iii 7-8: ‘Patet igitur quod ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive virtus 
intellectiva. Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per aliquam particularium 
comunitatum superius distinctarum tota simul in actum reduci non potest, necesse est 
multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur; sicut 
necesse est multitudinem rerum generabilium ut potentia tota materie prime semper sub 
actu sit; aliter esset dare potentiam separatam, quod est inpossibile.’ For the ‘sedendo et 
quiescendo prudentia et sapientia ipse perficitur’ motif, Aristotle, Physics VII, 3; 247b17-
18; Thomas, ScG III.xxxvii.7: ‘Ad hanc etiam omnes aliae humanae operationes ordinari 
videntur sicut ad finem. Ad perfectionem enim contemplationis requiritur incolumitas 
corporis, ad quam ordinantur artificialia omnia quae sunt necessaria ad vitam. Requiritur 
etiam quies a perturbationibus passionum, ad quam pervenitur per virtutes morales et 
per prudentiam; et quies ab exterioribus perturbationibus, ad quam ordinatur totum 
regimen vitae civilis’; In Eth. X.vii, lect. xi, n. 4 ult.: ‘Haec est enim felicitas speculativa, 
ad quam tota vita politica videtur ordinata; dum per pacem, quae per ordinationem vitae 
politicae statuitur et conservatur, datur hominibus facultas contemplandi veritatem.’
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of the emperor, this passage from the third book: 
Et cum ad hunc portum vel nulli vel pauci, et hii cum difficultate 
nimia, pervenire possint, nisi sedatis fluctibus blande cupiditatis 
genus humanum liberum in pacis tranquillitate quiescat, hoc est illud 
signum ad quod maxime debet intendere curator orbis, qui dicitur 
romanus Princeps, ut scilicet in areola ista mortalium libere cum 
pace vivatur.
(Mon. III.xvi.11)18
Now imperial jurisdiction, as Dante understands it, is not a 
moral jurisdiction. On the contrary, imperial writ runs fully and 
unequivocally only in matters of pure positive law, in all other cases – 
wherever human law preserves by virtue of its descent from the natural 
law a moral component – the subject retaining a right of dissent.19 In 
the degree, however, to which a man ‘grows wise by sitting at rest’, 
imperial power is present to him as a necessary condition of his proper 
18 And since none can reach this harbour (or few, and these few with great difficulty) 
unless the waves of seductive greed are calmed and the human race rests free in the 
tranquillity of peace, this is the goal which the protector of the world, who is called 
the Roman Prince, must strive with all his might to bring about: i.e. that life on this 
threshing-floor of mortals may be lived freely and in peace. On the further and more 
refined notion of the emperor as emancipator of the spirit, as guaranteeing by way of 
his universal jurisdiction a free passage in the subject from seeing and understanding to 
willing and doing, I.xii.3-4 and 9: ‘Et ideo dico quod iudicium medium est apprehensionis 
et appetitus: nam primo res apprehenditur, deinde apprehensa bona vel mala iudicatur, et 
ultimo iudicans prosequitur sive fugit. Si ergo iudicium moveat omnino appetitum et nullo 
modo preveniatur ab eo, liberum est; si vero ab appetitu quocunque modo proveniente 
iudicium moveatur, liberum esse non potest, quia non a se, sed ab alio captivum trahitur 
[...] Genus humanum solum imperante Monarcha sui et non alterius gratia est: tunc enim 
solum politie diriguntur oblique – democratie scilicet, oligarchie atque tyrampnides – que 
in servitutem cogunt genus humanum, ut patet discurrenti per omnes, et politizant reges, 
aristocratici quos optimates vocant, et populi libertatis zelatores; quia cum Monarcha 
maxime diligat homines, ut iam tactum est, vult omnes homines bonos fieri: quod esse 
non potest apud oblique politizantes.’
19 Conv. IV.ix.14-15: ‘Queste cose simigliantemente, che de l’altre arti sono ragionate, 
vedere si possono ne l’arte imperiale; ché regole sono in quella che sono pure arti, sì come 
sono le leggi de’ matrimonii, de li servi, de le milizie, de li successori in dignitade, e di 
queste in tutto siamo a lo Imperadore subietti, sanza dubbio e sospetto alcuno. Altre leggi 
sono che sono quasi seguitatrici di natura, sì come constituire l’uomo d’etade sofficiente 
a ministrare, e di queste non semo in tutto subietti. Altre molte sono, che paiono avere 
alcuna parentela con l’arte imperiale – e qui fu ingannato ed è chi crede che la sentenza 
imperiale sia in questa parte autentica –: sì come [diffinire] giovinezza e gentilezza, sovra 
le quali nullo imperiale giudicio è da consentire, in quanto elli è imperadore: però, quello 
che è di Dio sia renduto a Dio.’ J. Took, ‘“Diligite iustitiam qui iudicatis terram”: Justice 
and the Just Ruler in Dante’, in Dante and Governance, ed. J. R. Woodhouse (note15 
above), pp. 137-51.
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emergence, at which point courage as the courage to be as part once again 
moves centre stage.
Finally, there is the Church, the gathered community of souls naming 
the name here below on earth and in heaven.20 Now here there is a paradox, 
for not only was Dante among the staunchest critics of the Church in its 
lovelessnesss,21 but he spent a great deal of time and energy rescuing the 
human project from what amounts to the clerical world-view, to a finality 
impatient of qualitative and thus of political distinctions along the way. In 
the Convivio, this declericalization of the moral and intellectual life takes the 
form of an attempt to identify a species of human happiness appropriate 
to, and realizable by, those ‘many men and women in this language of 
ours ... bowed down by domestic and civic care’.22 In the Monarchia it 
20 P. Brezzi, ‘Dante e la Chiesa del suo tempo’, in Dante e Roma: atti del convegno di studi, 
Roma 8-9-10 aprile, 1965 (Florence: Le Monnier, 1965), pp. 97-113 (with, at pp. 115-35, 
R. Manselli, ‘Dante e l’ecclesia spiritualis’); idem, ‘L’Italia tra Chiesa e Impero nell’età 
di Dante’, in Letture classensi 16 (1987), pp. 99-118; P. Armour, The Door of Purgatory. 
A Study of Multiple Symbolism in Dante’s Purgatorio (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); S. 
Botterill, ‘Not of This World: Spiritual and Temporal Powers in Dante and Bernard of 
Clairvaux’, Lectura Dantis 10 (1992), 8-21; idem, ‘Ideals of the Institutional Church in 
Dante and Bernard of Clairvaux’, Italica 78 (2001), 3, 297-313 (subsequently in Dante: The 
Critical Complex, 8 vols, ed. R. Lansing (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), vol. 
4, pp. 405-21); A. K. Cassell, ‘“Luna est Ecclesia”: Dante and the “Two Great Lights”’, 
Dante Studies 119 (2001), 1-26; C. T. Davis, ‘Dante and Ecclesiastical Property’, in Dante: 
The Critical Complex (above), vol. 5, pp. 294-307 (originally in Law in Mediaeval Life and 
Thought, ed. E. B. King and S. J. Ridyard (Sewanee, Tenn.: The Press of University of 
the South, 1990), pp. 244-57); M. S. Kempshall, ‘Accidental Perfection:Ecclesiology and 
Political Thought in Monarchia’, in P. Acquaviva and J. Petrie (eds), Dante and the Church: 
Literary and Historical Essays (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), pp. 127-71 (also, in the 
same volume, pp. 93-125, P. Nasti, ‘The Amorous Bride and her Lovers: Images of the 
Church in the Heaven of the Sun’).
21 Recently on the forms of Dantean dissent, A. Consoli, ‘Dante anticlericale?’, in Dante 
ecumenico. Letture e postille (Naples: Conte, 1973), pp. 20-24; A. Comollo, Il dissenso religioso 
in Dante (Florence: Olschki, 1990; Biblioteca dell’‘Archivum Romanicum’, 1st series, vol. 
235); V. Esposito, La ‘Commedia’ dantesca tre fede e dissenso (Pescara: Tracce, 1999). The 
notion of Dantean dissent stands, however, to be developed in terms of what Tillich calls 
the protestant principle (as distinct from Protestantism as but the most dramatic of its 
historical manifestations) everywhere at work in Christian spirituality as the guardian 
and guarantor of its deep substance, as that whereby the religious undertaking is protected 
against ‘the aspiration of its own religious and secular appearances’ (Theology of Culture, 
ed. R. C. Kimball (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 
29). For an account of Dante’s restiveness as a specifically Christian thinker in terms 
(a) of his sense of the  cultural encounter in general as distinct from the ecclesiastical 
encounter in particular as salvifically significant, and (b) of his commitment to the notion 
of episcopacy as a matter ultimately of self-episcopacy or self-oversight (this being the 
final cause every proper striving of the spirit in man), see pp. 155-70 above (‘Dante and 
the Protestant Principle’).
22 Conv. I ix.5 and I.i.4.
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takes the form of a distinction between, as Dante sees it, the two kinds 
of happiness proper to man as man, namely the happiness of the next 
life overseen by the pope as bridge-builder-in-chief (pontifex maximus) 
on the basis of revelation, and the happiness of this life overseen by the 
emperor, as assisted by the philosopher, on the basis of reason,23 this, then, 
being his way of loosening the kind of theologism and ecclesiasticism 
whereby the Church is able to insist on its primacy in every area of the 
moral and political life. Here again, however, we must be careful, for not 
only does declericalization not mean detheologization, but the ferocity of 
his denunciation of the Church in its lovelessness is itself testimony to 
the strength of his commitment to the status of the Church as but the 
continuing presence of Christ to us, albeit of the Christ crucified afresh. 
To be beyond the pale of the Church, then, and of the faith she proclaims 
is to be cast adrift on the sea of directionlessness and of despair, at which 
point courage as the courage to be as part yet again commends itself as a 
principle of self-understanding and self-implementation.
4. For Dante too, then, the formal structures of being and becoming – 
civitas, imperium and ecclesia – matter, each having a part to play in the 
coming about of man as man; for it is by way of the city and of the unique 
dynamic of the city that the individual comes home to himself as a soldier 
or sermonizer, by way of the empire that he enjoys the peace and quiet 
necessary to both the collective and the individual undertaking, and 
by way of the Church that he knows himself even now as party to the 
elect. To this extent, therefore, Dante fits the bill, his too being a sense 
of courage as the courage to be as part.24 But to live with the Commedia as 
an account of the soul’s journey into God as verified at first hand by the 
one who says ‘I’ is straightaway to become aware of its character as an 
essay in courage, not, in fact, as the courage to be as part, but as the courage 
to be as oneself, in the kind of courage whereby the individual called from 
23 Mon. III.xvi.7-8: ‘Duos igitur fines providentia illa inenarrabilis homini proposuit 
intendendos: beatitudinem scilicet huius vite, que in operatione proprie virtutis consistit 
et per terrestrem paradisum figuratur; et beatitudinem vite ecterne, que consistit in 
fruitione divini aspectus ad quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi lumine 
divino adiuta, que per paradisum celestem intelligi datur. Ad has quidem beatitudines, 
velut ad diversas conclusiones, per diversa media venire oportet. Nam ad primam per 
phylosophica documenta venimus, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales 
et intellectuales operando; ad secundam vero per documenta spiritualia que humanam 
rationem transcendunt, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes theologicas 
operando, fidem spem scilicet et karitatem.’
24 W. Kölmel, ‘Chiesa, cristianità, genero umano: riflessioni sull’autocomprensione 
della società medievale’, Cristianesimo nella Storia. Ricerche storiche, esegetiche, teologiche 5 
(1984), 3, 507-22.
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beforehand to be in God as the first and final cause of his every aspiration 
of the spirit seeks to lay hold of his proper humanity from out of that 
humanity, from out of the power properly his to moral and ontological 
determination. Indispensable, then, as city, empire and Church are as 
principles both of self-recognition and of self-affirmation, there can be 
no escaping the anxiety of existence by taking refuge in the structures of 
collectivity as a response to the sensation of dividedness and catastrophe; 
for neither the structures of local or of world citizenship (civitas, imperium) 
nor the communion of the faithful as those called out for God’s service 
(ecclesia) can exempt the individual from the struggle to be by way of an 
act of self-knowledge, of self-reconfiguration and of self-transcendence as the 
condition of moral and ontological emergence, at which point we witness 
the triumph of the courage to be as oneself over the courage to be as part as 
a way of seeing and understanding the human predicament. Short, in 
other words, of courage as the courage to be as oneself, as the courage to 
engage with self from out of the power of self to self-determination, there 
can be no question of homecoming, for short of courage thus understood 
the individual is forever engaged in a process of evasion, of sidestepping 
what actually matters about his presence in the world as a creature of 
accountability.
The moral component in this situation is set out by Dante in the central 
cantos of the Purgatorio, cantos turning on a sense of the human project as 
a matter of affective organization. Man as man, then, knows himself in a 
twofold order of loving. He knows himself by way (a) of the kind of love 
given with the act itself of existence, of an ‘amore naturale’ predating the 
moral moment proper of human experience and thus governing it, and (b) 
of the kind of love generated by this or that passing object of perception, 
of an ‘amore d’animo’ or contingent loving post-dating the moral moment 
and thus governed by it. His proper task, therefore, when it comes to right 
loving, lies not so much in the denial of this or that set or sub-set of love-
impulses, as in their co-ordination, in the bringing home of elective to 
essential loving such that each alike serves the highest good, the call to 
be in, through and for God as the alpha and omega of all being. This is 
the meaning of the ‘Né creator né creatura’ passage beginning at Purg. 
XVII.91, a passage placed by Dante upon the lips of Virgil but, especially 
as it goes on, transparent to its theological content, to the possibility of 
love as, withal, a principle of apostasy (the ‘contra ’l fattore adovra sua 
fattura’ moment of the last line):
 “Né creator né creatura mai”,
cominciò el, “figliuol, fu sanza amore,
o naturale o d’animo; e tu ’l sai.
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 Lo naturale è sempre sanza errore,
ma l’altro puote errar per malo obietto
o per troppo o per poco di vigore.
 Mentre ch’elli è nel primo ben diretto,
e ne’ secondi sé stesso misura,
esser non può cagion di mal diletto;
 ma quando al mal si torce, o con più cura
o con men che non dee corre nel bene,
contra ’l fattore adovra sua fattura”.25
Now in the degree to which the individual seeks to measure secondary 
loving up against primary loving (the ‘ne’ secondi sé stesso misura’ of line 
98) he knows himself in the consummate character of his existence as a 
creature in potential to God. In the degree, by contrast, to which, waylaid 
by proximate possibility, he falls short in this, he knows himself only in 
the kinds of fear, disorientation and self-inexplicability characteristic of 
being in its remotion. This, then, is where Dante begins. He begins with 
the phenomenology of dividedness, with the psychological substance of 
being as ranged over against itself in the forum of conscience:
 Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita
mi ritrovai per una selva oscura,
ché la diritta via era smarrita.
 Ahi quanto a dir qual era è cosa dura
esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte
che nel pensier rinova la paura! ...
 Io non so ben ridir com’ i’ v’intrai,
tant’ era pien di sonno a quel punto
che la verace via abbandonai ...
 questa mi porse tanto di gravezza
con la paura ch’uscìa di sua vista,
ch’io perdei la speranza dell’altezza.
(Inf. I.1-6, 10-12, 52-54)26
25 He began: “Neither Creator nor creature, my son, was ever without love, either 
natural or of the mind, and this you know. The natural is always without error; but the 
other may err either through an evil object, or through too much or too little vigour. 
While it is directed on the primal good, and on secondary goods observes right measure, 
it cannot be the cause of sinful pleasure. But when it is turned awry to evil, or speeds to 
good with more zeal, or with less, than it ought, against the Creator works his creature.”
26 Midway in the journey of our life I found myself in a dark wood, for the straight 
way was lost. Ah, how hard it is to tell how that wood was, wild, rugged, harsh; the very 
thought of it renews my fear ... I cannot rightly say how I entered it, I was so full of sleep 
at the moment I left the true way ... she put such heaviness upon me with the fear that 
came from the sight of her that I lost hope of the height.
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And it is into this situation that courage as the courage to be as oneself 
enters as that whereby the individual embarks on the way of death and 
resurrection. First, then, and as sustained by a movement of grace tending 
from deep within it to confirm and strengthen it, comes the courage of 
acknowledgement, the courage whereby, sensitive to everything within the 
economy of personality making for the alternative solution, the individual 
commits himself to the way of descent and of disclosure, to a laying open of 
self in the demonic substance of self; hence, on the threshold of the text, the 
‘Quali fioretti dal notturno gelo’ passage of Inf. II.121-42, superlative in its 
account of courage as the courage of commitment, as that whereby, secure 
in its sense of the providentiality of it all, of the journey as authorized 
from on high, the pilgrim spirit sets about the business of recognition, of 
contemplating as the condition of all righteousness in human experience 
the spectacle of unrighteousness:
 “Dunque: che è? perché, perché restai,
perché tanta viltà nel core allette,
perché ardire e franchezza non hai,
 poscia che tai tre donne benedette
curan di te ne la corte del cielo,
e ’l mio parlar tanto ben ti promette?”.
 Quali fioretti dal notturno gelo
chinati e chiusi, poi che ’l sol li ’mbianca,
si drizzan tutti aperti in loro stelo,
 tal mi fec’ io di mia virtude stanca,
e tanto buono ardire al cor mi corse,
ch’i’ cominciai come persona franca:
 “Oh pietosa colei che mi soccorse!
e te cortese ch’ubidisti tosto
a le vere parole che ti porse!
 Tu m’hai con disiderio il cor disposto
sì al venir con le parole tue,
ch’i’ son tornato nel primo proposto.
 Or va, ch’un sol volere è d’ambedue:
tu duca, tu segnore e tu maestro”.
Così li dissi; e poi che mosso fue,
 intrai per lo cammino alto e silvestro.27
27 “What, then, is this? Why, why do you hold back? Why do you harbour such 
cowardice in your heart? Why are you not bold and free, when in Heaven’s court three 
such blessed ladies are mindful of you, and my words pledge you so great a good?” As 
little flowers, bent down and closed by chill of night, straighten and all unfold upon their 
stems when the sun brightens them, such in my faint strength did I become; and so much 
good courage rushed to my heart that I began, as one set free, “Oh, how compassionate 
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But that is not all, for following hard upon the heels of courage as 
the courage of acknowledgement comes the courage of alignment, the 
courage whereby, having seen and contemplated self in its destitution, but 
having by grace taken the guilt of this situation into itself, the soul begins 
now to contemplate the shape and substance of its loving, the pattern 
of its disorganized affectivity – the business of the purgatorial phase of 
its journey into God. First, then, comes the anti-purgatorial moment of 
the journey, the moment of spiritual readying giving way at last to the 
travail of the purgatorial moment proper, to the nothing if not painful 
fashioning from the disgregated substance of being so far something more 
intimately ordered, more properly transparent to the deep reasons of that 
being. With this, the spirit comes at last into the fullness of its proper 
humanity, to a now uncluttered opening out of the intentional upon the 
actual and a fresh equality of self to an act both of self-understanding and 
of world-historical understanding, each of these things, however, bereft 
of its power to despair and destruction. Here too, then, it is a question of 
courage, of the courage, not now of recognition, but of reconfiguration, of 
affirming self in the revised structure of self.
But even that is not all, for the courage of acknowledgement and 
the courage of alignment flow into the courage of actualization, into the 
courage required of the individual as, risking all for the sake of finding 
all, he maps his humanity onto the kind ‘transhumanity’ present to him 
as but the most immanent of his immanent possibilities; so, then, as a call 
to attention in respect of this, the final step along the way, these lines 
from Canto II of the Paradiso, an essay in the courage of anticipation, the 
courage required of the pilgrim spirit as it projects itself upon its ultimate 
possibility:
 O voi che siete in piccioletta barca,
desiderosi d’ascoltar, seguiti
dietro al mio legno che cantando varca,
 tornate a riveder li vostri liti:
non vi mettete in pelago, ché forse,
perdendo me, rimarreste smarriti ...
 Voialtri pochi che drizzaste il collo
was she who helped me, and how courteous were you, so quick to obey the true words 
she spoke to you! By your words you have made me so eager to come with you that I have 
returned to my first resolve. Now on, for a single will is in us both; you are my leader, 
you are my master and my teacher”. So I said to him, and when he moved on, I entered 
along the deep and savage way.  See too in respect of the Inferno as, whatever else it is, an 
essay in the rhythm of ontological courage the ‘Or sie forte e ardito. Omai si scende per 
sì fatte scale’ moment of Inf. XVII.81-82 and the ‘“Ecco Dite”, dicendo, “ed ecco il loco / 
ove convien che di fortezza t’armi’ moment of XXXIV. 20-21.
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per tempo al pan de li angeli, del quale
vivesi qui ma non sen vien satollo,
 metter potete ben per l’alto sale
vostro navigio, servando mio solco
dinanzi a l’acqua che ritorna equale.
(Par. II.1-6, 10-15)28
while as registering the triumph of the individual as he comes into the 
presence of the One who is as of the essence, these lines from Canto 
XXXIII of the Paradiso, an essay now in the courage of accomplishment, 
the courage of the pilgrim spirit as it rejoices at last in a consummate act 
of understanding: 
 E’ mi ricorda ch’io fui pió ardito
per questo a sostener, tanto ch’i’ giunsi
 l’aspetto mio col valore infinito.
 Oh abbondante grazia ond’ io presunsi
ficcar lo viso per la luce etterna,
tanto che la veduta vi consunsi!
 Nel suo profondo vidi che s’interna,
legato con amore in un volume,
ciï che per l’universo si squaderna:
 sustanze e accidenti e lor costume
quasi conflati insieme, per tal modo
che ciï ch’i’ dico ä un semplice lume.
 La forma universal di questo nodo
credo ch’i’ vidi, perchÇ pió di largo,
dicendo questo, mi sento ch’i’ godo.
 (Par. XXXIII.79-93)29
28 O you that are in your little bark, eager to hear, following behind my ship that 
singing makes her way, turn back to see again your shores. Do not commit yourselves to 
the open sea, for perchance, if you lost me, you would remain astray ... You other few who 
lifted up your necks betimes for bread of angels, on which men here subsist but never 
become sated of it, you may indeed commit your vessel to the deep brine, holding to my 
furrow ahead of the water that turns smooth again.
29 I remember that on this account I was the bolder to sustain it, until I united my 
gaze with the infinite goodness. Oh abounding grace whereby I presumed to fix my 
look through the eternal light so far that all my sight was spent therein. In its depth I 
saw ingathered, bound by love in one single volume, that which is dispersed in leaves 
throughout the universe: substances and accidents and their relations, as though fused 
together in such a way that what I tell is but a simple light. The universal form of this knot 
I believe that I saw, because, in telling this, I feel my joy increase. 
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To embark on the way of transhumanity, Dante suggests, is to embark 
on the way, not merely of recognition and of reconfiguration (each alike 
preliminary in respect of what comes next), but of a positive redefining 
of self on the planes both of knowing and of loving, of a re-dimensioning 
of cognitive and affective selfhood. With this, then, with what amounts 
to a hymn to courage as the virtue par excellence of being in its ‘out-
standingness’ (ex-sistere), we are in a position both to commend and to 
qualify Tillich’s account of courage at least as far as Dante is concerned; 
for if on the one hand Dante’s is indeed a commitment to the notion of 
courage as the courage to be as part, civitas, imperium and ecclesia entering 
properly into the soteriological scheme, courage thus understood stands 
even so to be taken up as far as the Commedia is concerned in the courage to 
be as oneself, in the kind of courage born not of allegiance, but of actuality, 
of knowing self in the thereness of self. 
5. Put thus, Dante’s, for all his commitment in the Commedia to the notion 
of grace as the ground and guarantee of every significant inflexion of the 
spirit in man, is nonetheless a heroic spirituality, heroic in its commitment 
to courage under both kinds – but above all as the courage to be as oneself – 
as the prius of everything that ultimately matters in human experience, of 
every reaching out of the creature towards the creator. But there is more, 
for the courage he commends as a disposition of the spirit in its seeking 
out of God as the beginning and end of all seeking in human experience 
is the courage he himself lived out as poet and prophet of the pilgrim way. 
Deriving, in other words, comfort and encouragement from all those of 
his auctores to whom he was most indebted and of whom he was most 
enamoured (from Thomas, Albert, Bonaventure, Bernard, Boethius and 
from the cloud of witnesses among whom he himself now numbers), he 
nonetheless fashioned a theology quite other than anything he discovered 
in his texts; for his, wedded as it was to the idea pure and simple in all the 
exquisite purity of the idea, was an exploration of the theological issue 
by way not, in fact, of the idea tout court, but of the drama of being and 
becoming as lived out at first hand by the one who says ‘I’. Responsive 
in the highest degree to the contents of dogmatic awareness, his was an 
account of the religious situation by way of its inner agony, of the pain of 
knowing self in the inexplicability of self and of this as the condition of 
new life. The courage to be, therefore, fully thematicized in the text and 
commended there as an object of contemplation, at every point transcends 
its merely textual elaboration to subsist as its encompassing – an instance, 
we might say, of metalettarietà at its most sublime.
Afterword
 ‘Al Padre, al Figlio, a lo Spirito Santo’,
cominciò, ‘gloria!’, tutto ’l paradiso,
sì che m’inebrïava il dolce canto.
 Ciò ch’io vedeva mi sembiava un riso
de l’universo; per che mia ebbrezza
intrava per l’udire e per lo viso.
 Oh gioia! oh ineffabile allegrezza!
oh vita intègra d’amore e di pace!
oh sanza brama sicura ricchezza!
(Par. XXVII.1-9)1
Conversation with Kenelm always was, and still is, a privilege, for his 
was a seasoned spirituality, full of – by the time, at any rate, that I knew 
him – years and wisdom. Yet it generated a strange paradox, for whereas, 
as heir to the rich humanity of Thomism, one might have expected him 
to delight in the rich humanity of Dante, of a Dante attuned to the part 
played by man in the working out of his own destiny, Kenelm’s instead 
was a sense ultimately of the defectiveness of it all, of Dante’s falling short 
as a theological spirit. This, at least, is where his lifelong meditation on 
the poet comes to rest. It comes to rest with a sense (a) of the mutual far-
offness, even in the Commedia, of grace and nature within the economy of 
human activity as a whole; (b) of Dante’s somehow managing to separate 
out in the Commedia virtue as a matter of right doing and charity as a 
matter of right loving; (c) of Dante’s less than deft management of his 
cultural  premises; and (d) of all this as cause for misgiving. The key 
passage once again:
From all the above, in any event, we may conclude, I think, that Dante 
shows a marked tendency, through the Convivio and the Monarchia 
1 “Glory be to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit!” all Paradise began, so that 
the sweet song held me rapt. What I saw seemed to me a smile of the universe, so that my 
rapture entered both by hearing and by sight. O joy! O ineffable gladness! O life entire 
of love and of peace! O wealth secure without longing!
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and even in the Comedy, to reduce to a minimum the conceivable 
contacts between human nature and divine grace; even if we are 
persuaded, by the evidence adduced in the last few pages, or on other 
grounds, that he did allow a bare possibility of such contact for all 
adult human beings. And that tendency, with its consequences, is 
what I have taken as characteristic of the ‘other’, the second Dante 
implied in the title of this essay. And perhaps it reveals an important 
defect, from the Christian point of view, in this great Christian’s 
thinking about man: an over-readiness to conceive of moral virtue in 
isolation from Charity, the ‘first and greatest commandment’. After 
all, a certain practice and cult of moral virtue is quite compatible 
with the radical perversity of indifference to God. But Christianity 
requires that the moral virtues themselves be offered to God as a 
way – as the way – of cooperating with his grace. In this perspective 
the natural virtues themselves, ordered under Charity (‘the mother 
of the virtues’), become as it were organs of grace, are no longer just 
humanly ‘acquired’ but divinely ‘infused’. Guided by this insight 
St Thomas could take over the whole achievement of Aristotle, as 
a philosophical moralist, while giving it an entirely new setting 
and direction. In Dantean terms this means the difference between 
Limbo and the Purgatorio; in which we see repentant man recovering, 
under grace, the lost or diminished natural virtues, but only in 
preparation for something that is utterly beyond their range, a love-
union with the Infinite. In the Purgatorio Aristotelianism is integrated 
into Christianity; in the Dantean Limbo it is not.2
But this sense of Dante’s falling short as a specifically Christian thinker 
is itself a cause for misgiving; for even taking on board the problems 
engendered by his particular kind of biculturalism (in truth no more acute 
than those of Christian Peripateticism in any of its manifestations), there 
is at work here something more exquisite, namely a sense of how it is that, 
in consequence of the original and abiding let it be of the Pentateuch, and 
irrespective of the catastrophe of Eden, man may even so be said to co-
operate with God at the point of ultimate concern, to enter by way of his 
proper power to moral and ontological determination into the presence of 
his maker. Now this requires careful statement, for as far as the Commedia 
is concerned there can be no sidestepping the indispensability of grace, and 
above all of the grace made known to man in Christ, as the ground and 
guarantee of every significant movement of the mind and of the will. On 
the contrary, it is by way of that grace that man as man is made equal to his 
2 Kenelm Foster, O.P., The Two Dantes (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1977), 
pp. 252-53.
Afterword 193
high calling as a creature capable of God (capax Dei). But that, precisely, 
is the point, God’s undertaking in man’s regard, and above all his work 
in and through the Christ, being for Dante but a recapacitation of human 
nature, a re-potentiation of man’s humanity in respect of the transhumanity 
to which it is called from beforehand. Aristotle and Aristotelianism are 
there – of course they are – as an element in all this, as apt to shape and 
substantiate Dante’s anthropology, psychology and ethic. But to suggest 
that the Dante of the Commedia was in any sense detained or waylaid by 
the Philosopher or at a loss as to what to do or say about him will not do. 
For Dante knew exactly what to do and say about Aristotle: to learn from 
him, to rejoice in him, and to incorporate every facet of that learning and 
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